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# Next step in the Middle Powers-ish agenda
- URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/eu-canada-digital-alliance-middle-powers/
- Published: 2026-11-02T12:00:00.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-04T17:10:56.000Z
- Description: Europe doesn't like being called a Middle Power. But its new deal with Canada suggests otherwise. Can Brussels and Ottawa build a Third Way?
- Author: Mark Scott
- Tags: #edition, #archive, #democracy-information, #digital-power-geopolitics, #platforms-online-safety, Brazil, canada, Brussels, Competition, data flows, digital competition, digital markets act, digital public infrastructure, digital services act, Donald Trump, economic policy, European Commission, European Union, tech sovereignty, trade, transatlantic, United States, US election, US states, Washington, middle powers, foreign interference, industrial policy, information environment, Instagram, serbia

**IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I've got something for you to try. I've turned the newsletter's archive into a searchable research tool called [**Ask Digital Politics**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/ask/). You can pose questions about digital policy, explore how themes have changed over time and get answers grounded in my published analysis — rather than whatever happens to be floating around the internet. You can try it [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/ask/).

**It's now available with access included** in all subscriptions (question allowances vary by tier).

**I'm still ironing out a few glitches,** so give it a go and [let me know what you think](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). I'm also working on adding primary documents from the [Digital Politics Regulatory Tracker](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/tracker/), so watch this space

**— The latest European Union-Canada pact demonstrates the** potential and risks associated with the rise of Middle Powers 

**— Three political movements across Brazil, India and Serbia** show why digital campaigning is becoming harder to define — and what that means for elections in 2027.

**— All you need to know about political ad spending** in this week's midterm elections in the United States, in one chart.

**Let's get started:**

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## **IS THIS WHAT THE NEW WORLD ORDER LOOKS LIKE?**

**WHEN IT COMES TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS**, it was a doozy. On Oct 30, Brussels and Ottawa announced a so-called [**Alliance for the Future**](https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2026/10/30/joint-statement-canada-and-european-union-building-together-alliance?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com)**.** 

**Among the digital commitments, Europe and** Canada concluded talks on a [digital trade agreement](https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-canada-conclude-negotiations-digital-trade-agreement-2026-10-30%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co), though formal approval is still required. They also agreed to greater cooperation on artificial intelligence and cloud computing, alongside closer ties between their respective competition authorities. Canada [similarly joined](https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/backgrounders/2026/10/30/canada-and-european-union-announce-new-alliance-future-create-greater?ref=digitalpolitics.co) the [European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking](https://www.eurohpc-ju.europa.eu/index%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co), the bloc's supercomputing push. Officials [also proposed](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2026/10/29-30/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) new internet subsea cables and satellite connectivity between Canada, Europe and Asia. 

**The two-day summit's communiqué included** language on improved ways to make instant payments between the two sides, as well as potential European investment in Canada's critical mineral industry.

**In case you had missed the point,** EU and Canadian officials made their reasoning explicit. "Geopolitical tensions, economic fragmentation, climate change, technological transformation and growing competition for energy, resources and strategic technologies are reshaping the international environment," [read the joint statement](https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2026/10/30/joint-statement-canada-and-european-union-building-together-alliance?utm%5Fsource=chatgpt.com). "Canada and the EU are building a deeper, more integrated and strategically aligned relationship."

**They might as well have added:** <<cough, cough>> Donald Trump <<cough, cough.>>

**There's a lot riding on this new cozy EU-Canada relationship.** And it's not just about Ottawa becoming a potential associate member of the 27-country bloc or, heaven forbid, Canada [participating in Eurovision](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada%5Fin%5Fthe%5FEurovision%5FSong%5FContest?ref=digitalpolitics.co). 

**Mark Carney has become the de facto spokesperson** for the Middle Powers movement. Ever since his [unabashed speech](https://www.weforum.org/stories/forum-in-focus/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada?gad%5Fsource=1&gad%5Fcampaignid=22234048793&gbraid=0AAAAAoVy5F7JbavUT2QxxS3TCUUgwDKSt&gclid=CjwKCAjwxpvXBhASEiwAue4B4Q9Q5a8y6Mw34rSAyQFenjMQguZD3FJ4AybOjAQpESfvgo%5FAbCbegxoCu3MQAvD%5FBwE&ref=digitalpolitics.co) at this year's Davos conference, the former central banker has laid out his stall for what a potential alternative path can be for the likes of Australia, Singapore and Brazil. That involves maintaining ties, where necessary, with the US and China. But it also means finding new partners, new business opportunities, and new alliances in a world where (at least in the West) a reliance on Washington's goodwill is pretty much over.

Thanks for reading Digital Politics. If you've been forwarded this newsletter (and like what you've read), please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter058/#/portal/). For those already subscribed, reach out on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com

**The EU does not like to think of itself as a Middle Power.** And, on paper, that's certainly true. Its population (450 million). Its economy (behind that of the US, but ahead of that of China, based on nominal GDP.) Its digital rulebook (arguably the most advanced in the Western World.) All top tier. European politicians view themselves on par with their counterparts in Beijing and Washington. They want to be treated as a Digital Great Power — even if the Continent's technology industry leaves a lot to be desired.

**But here are some tough words for Brussels.** You are a Middle Power, and that's OK. The Oct 30 agreements with Canada make that blatantly clear. By allowing Ottawa to participate in Europe's supercomputing infrastructure; by agreeing to an expanded digital trade deal, which goes along with the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement; and by signing the litany of smaller agreements with Carney & Co, Europe is making it clear (possibly tacitly?) that it's Team Middle Powers.

**Let's put it another way:** would Washington or Beijing sign up to what Brussels just did with Ottawa? On the digital trade agreement, yes — that's very much a hat-tip to how US foreign policy used to operate. But in the other areas, I would say probably not. It’s not that either country couldn’t build new subsea cables or cooperate more closely on competition enforcement. It's just that such politicking is relatively small fry when it comes to how the US and China operate on the global stage.

**And this is where it gets interesting —** especially for other Middle Power countries.

**Over the last few years, Europe has signed** similar digital partnership agreements with [Japan](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-partnership-japan?ref=digitalpolitics.co); [South Korea](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-partnership-south-korea?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [Brazil](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-partnership-brazil?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [Singapore](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-partnership-singapore?ref=digitalpolitics.co). All differ in complexity and theme. But they generally have included deals on cross-border data flows, reciprocal arrangements on research and development, regulatory cooperation and, in some cases, digital trade agreements. Not to be outdone, Canada has deals with the [United Kingdom](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-canada-renewed-ai-security-partnership?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [Mexico and the US](https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/digital-trade-graph-commerce-numerique.aspx?ref=digitalpolitics.co) (not exactly going well), and [countries across the Pacific](https://international.canada.ca/en/services/business/trade/policy/digital?ref=digitalpolitics.co).

**What can change is the purpose of these partnerships.** Cooperation on semiconductors, research or data flows can make individual markets work better. Connecting those arrangements may give participating countries more options when access to technology becomes a bargaining chip. 

**A Canadian company’s ability to use European** computing resources would not eliminate its dependence on American technology. But it could give that firm — and its government — another option when negotiating access, prices or conditions. The geopolitical test is whether these deals create alternatives that remain usable when relations with a major power deteriorate.

**That is the difference between jumpstarting business** and building collective resilience. The EU-Canada package puts digital trade, computing access and economic security within the same political framework. Whether governments can connect that framework to their other partnerships is still an open question. But that is where the potential shift lies: familiar agreements serving a more explicitly strategic multilateral purpose.

**Taken together, they start to piece together a** potential digital Third Way that gives Middle Powers countries a network of like-minded allies with which they can trade, talk AI governance and shift the dynamics away from the bipolar world led by China and the US. That's the vision that Carney outlined in his Davos speech. It's also the vibe shift taking place in Brussels as officials implement an [emerging digital sovereignty agenda](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/eu-tech-sovereignty-data-access-2026/).

**But one digital trade pact (or even several)** doth not make a shift in geopolitics. Much of what Brussels and Ottawa announced on Oct 30 was a commitment to future action, not evidence of delivery. If the EU and Canada truly want to shift the digital power dynamics, they will have to invest billions of (US) dollars in tech infrastructure; shift people's habits away from American tech products; and rewire a global technological worldview that sits somewhere between Silicon Valley and Shenzhen.

**That's not an easy task.** Nor is it automatically a good deal. Governments have to show that greater technological independence is worth the cost, especially where alternatives are more expensive or less capable than the status quo.

**As a geopolitical project, the EU-Canada agreement** — sorry, Alliance for the Future — falls into the ‘promising, but not yet a thing’ camp. It demonstrates Carney's view of what Middle Powers can do, even for a large bloc like the EU. It identifies the geopolitical shift, and then outlines what steps are required to rework that digital reality. If done well, the deal could bring Canada and the EU closer together, foster greater regulatory and economic ties between both sides and reduce dependencies on the US and China.

**But, currently, that's more a wish** than a conclusion. It highlights the risk for other Middle Powers in their own attempts to "pull a Carney" via similar bilateral deals. For these agreements to stick, a lot will come down to money invested, companies created and an ability to say no to Beijing and Washington when, eventually, they come a knockin'.

---

## Chart of the week

**AMERICAN VOTERS GO TO THE POLLS** on Nov 3\. Digital Politics [has tracked](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/midtermelections/) political ad spend on Facebook and Instagram during the US midterms, and the figures are in: a lot of money was spent this election cycle.

**Since the summer, almost half a billion** dollars has been spent on political, issue-based and social paid-for messages. Not all of those targeted the Nov 3 election. But it's fair to say that a lot of them did.

**For the country's 34 most-contested elections,** Democratic Party candidates outspent their Republican Party counterparts 4-to-1, though those figures do not include spending from non-campaign entities like Super PACs. 

**Not surprisingly with all this money being** **spent,** almost two-thirds of the Meta-based ads referenced fundraising in some way.

![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/11/U.S.-Campaigns----Digital-Ad-Surge-1.png)

Source: [Digital Politics](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/midtermelections/); Meta

---

## **WHEN IS A DIGITAL POLITICAL CAMPAIGN NOT A DIGITAL POLITICAL CAMPAIGN?**

**WHEN ANDRE JANONES** [**SENT OUT**](https://english.elpais.com/technology/2026-10-27/andre-janones-the-whatsapp-general-who-turned-the-brazil-election-around-for-lula.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co) **POLITICAL** campaign messages on WhatsApp to an estimated 11 million Brazilians ahead of the country's most recent election, were these independent posts about political activism or a coordinated effort to re-elect Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva? When [**Abhijeet Dipke**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abhijeet%5FDipke?ref=digitalpolitics.co) turned remarks about unemployed young people during an Indian Supreme Court hearing into the Cockroach Janta Party, and then used Instagram, memes and satirical online messages to attack the country's ruling political party, where does political activism stop and political campaigning begin?

**Two different countries, two very different political** situations. But as we gear up for another mega-round of global elections in 2027 (let alone the US midterms on Nov 3), I see a growing mismatch between how political influence is organized, digitally, and how analogue electoral systems oversee what is traditionally called a "political campaign."

**This may feel very esoteric. But when I look at how** a network of Serbian students steadily built up an offline and online movement to distribute campaign content and rally people to their cause, and then used that nationwide infrastructure to [win a historic victory](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbia-votes-students-seek-unseat-vucic-snap-election-2026-10-25/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in the Eastern European country, something feels new. 

**In Serbia, the student-led protest movement's main** Instagram account had more than 930,000 followers, while three-quarters of candidates on its eventual electoral list had almost no social media visibility. The movement's political reach wasn't dependent on the candidates themselves. Its network of student and supporter accounts already existed before it became a formal electoral campaign.

**To be clear, I am not an expert in any of these** countries' elections. But the three examples point to a blurring of the lines between grass-roots political activism and its ability to both galvanize supporters and nudge them to make political decisions. In late 2026, political organizations increasingly reside in these bottom-up, decentralized networks. They don't exclusively depend on how professional candidates or political parties use digital routes to reach would-be voters.

**None of this means that digital grass-roots** organizing is new. What's more interesting is how these networks can acquire significant political influence before they become electoral organizations — and what that means for the rules governing political campaigns.

**That may feel off, given that this week's Chart of the week** demonstrates how much American political candidates still fork out mega-money in their efforts to get elected. But, in many ways, the US feels like the exception that proves the rule.

**Most countries have strict campaign financing laws.** But campaigning can now be done through massive accounts on encrypted messaging accounts (see Brazil). In supporter-run accounts (see Serbia). And in online movements (see India.) Some of this activity is controlled. Some of it is not. Some of it is also paid for. Much is not. 

**Nor is all coordinated political activity** necessarily regulated campaigning. There's a legitimate difference between volunteers independently sharing political messages and people being paid, directed or otherwise organized to do so. The tricky part is establishing where that distinction lies.

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**That is certainly going to prove almost** impossible for countries' electoral oversight bodies to distinguish between these different forms of political influence. In a world where most electoral bodies still rely on analogue reporting systems to keep track on who's doing what, and where, this new-ish world of decentralized political movements/campaigns is like asking a dog to read War and Peace, in the original Russian. 

**Ahead of the 2027 election cycle,** the examples of Brazil, India and Serbia highlight two headaches for electoral officials. This is not to say people shouldn't be able to coordinate/campaign in new and novel ways. It's more to ensure that countries' existing electoral rules are upheld — and no one does anything dodgy (See [Romania in 2024](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter019/))

**First, how do you know who's behind a campaign?** Election rules typically focus on parties, candidates and political advertisers. But many of these new movements develop outside of those structures, and often are not transparent about how they go about their business (sometimes, for legitimate reasons.)

**Second, what's the difference between campaign** spending and coordinated political activity? Again, that may sound like semantics. But should a social media user who posts a campaign-related meme — under the direction of a political operative — be responsible for disclosing that connection, as what would happen with a traditional political ad? That is a question in need of an answer.

**That's where 2027 comes in.** Electoral authorities may find themselves overseeing political activity that began months or years before an election was called — conducted by networks whose organizers, finances and connections to formal campaigns aren't always visible. 

**It's not like these issues have not been around** for years. But with campaign-related technology becoming cheaper by the day, movements shifting their emphasis to bottom-up participation, and national electoral authorities mostly clueless about what's happening around them, it's a ripe space for potential hijinks — or, as we saw in Brazil and Serbia, significant electoral success.

---

## What I'm reading

**— Ofcom is investigating two adult services’** protections against nonconsensual intimate imagery, the UK regulator [announced](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/illegal-and-harmful-content/Enforcement-programme-into-measures-being-taken-by-services-to-prevent-users-from-encountering-or-sharing-non-consensual-intimate-imagery-NCII?ref=digitalpolitics.co).

**— Spamouflage-linked accounts are impersonating** Americans and spreading divisive midterm content, largely attracting engagement from their own networks, [found](https://www.graphika.com/blogs/the-americans-season-2?ref=digitalpolitics.co) Graphika.

**— Brussels has accepted Temu’s plan to address** illegal products, including assessing how its recommender systems amplify them, the European Commission [announced](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-accepts-temus-action-plan-remedy-breach-digital-services-act?ref=digitalpolitics.co).

**— Anthropic’s proposed stock-market debut** offers a window into its business, governance and risks, detailed in its [IPO filing](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2130357/000162828026067168/anthropicpbc-sx1.htm?ref=digitalpolitics.co).

**— Europe could combine Nordic computing** infrastructure with German industrial demand to strengthen its AI capabilities, [argues](https://www.cep.eu/eu-topics/details/europes-compute-gap-and-the-data-centre-backlash-1.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co) the Centre for European Policy’s Anselm Küsters.

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