# Digital Politics > Weekly analysis of how the political and digital worlds are colliding worldwide Public Ghost content for AI and LLM tooling. This file includes a bounded export of public pages first, then recent public posts. Append `.md` to any post or page URL to get the content in Markdown (for example, `/example-post.md`). ## Pages ### Welcome to Digital Politics URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/about/ Last updated: 2026-05-25T09:27:07.000Z Hi. I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)— a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Democracy + Technology Initiative and a research fellow at the Hertie School Center for Digital Governance in Berlin. I spent more than 15 years covering digital policy as a senior correspondent at the New York Times and POLITICO, where I built a newsletter audience of more than 85,000 readers. Digital Politics is my independent weekly newsletter on global digital policymaking. After 100 issues, it tells you what is actually happening in digital governance — not what the press release says. That means comparative analysis of AI governance, platform regulation, digital sovereignty, antitrust enforcement and the geopolitics of technology — across the European Union, United States, United Kingdom and beyond. It includes assessments of the emerging digital strategies of Middle Powers and the G2 dynamic between Washington and Beijing. Readers include senior government officials, policy researchers, technology company executives and civil society advocates across the EU, the US and elsewhere. There are two paid tiers — Expert at $100/year and Guru at $250/year — and a free monthly edition published on the first Wednesday of each month. You can subscribe [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/#/portal/signup). Couple of caveats. These are my opinions, based on years of digital policy work. They don't reflect those of my employers. I'm going to make mistakes. If you spot something you think is off, email me at digitalpolitics@protonmail.com. For what I've already written, a full list of Digital Politics' editions is [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter/). ### Newsletter URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter/ Last updated: 2026-07-14T22:05:00.000Z Every week's newsletter, all in one place. New editions will hit your mailbox each Monday at noon UK time/7am Eastern time/1pm Central European Time. If you're interested in getting these weekly updates, [you can subscribe for paid access here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/#/portal/signup) (free access means you'll receive the first newsletter of each month, delayed by two days compared to paying subscribers.) Let's get started: **July 13, 2026:** [Platform governance: It's the design, stupid](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/platform-design-enforcement-un-ai-governance-2026/) **June 30, 2026:** [Postcard from New Hampshire: The digital translation problem](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/digital-regulation-tech-sovereignty-2026/) **June 22, 2026:** [How social media bans can work](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/social-media-bans-platform-liability-2026/) **June 15, 2026:** [The G6 vs United States](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/g7-digital-divide-ai-competition-2026/) **June 8, 2026:** [Sovereign AI: the timing problem](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/sovereign-ai-social-media-bans-2026/) **June 1, 2026:** [Digital Politics at 100: What I got wrong](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/what-i-got-wrong-digital-politics-100/) **May 25, 2026:** [Postcard from Brussels: the digital sovereignty debate](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/eu-tech-sovereignty-data-access-2026/) **May 18, 2026:** [Warning from the UK: how not to create digital policy](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter098/) **May 11, 2026:** [How much would sovereign AI cost?](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter097/) **May 4, 2026:** [You say child safety, I say data protection](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter096/) **April 27, 2026:** [The two sides of digital sovereignty](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter095/) **April 20, 2026:** [The global AI race deconstructed](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter094/) **April 13, 2026:** [The EU-US tech relationship is still on life support](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter093/) **April 6, 2026:** [Hungary's election: the digital frontline](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter092/) **March 30, 2026:** [Platform governance goes to court](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter091/) **March 23, 2026:** [Digital sovereignty: Hope versus reality](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter090/) **March 16, 2026:** [The era of kids social media bans is upon us](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter089/) **March 10, 2026:** [The AI military industrial complex](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter088/) **March 2, 2026:** [Postcard from Brussels: the digital vibe shift](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter087/) **Feb 23, 2026:** [Postcard from Amsterdam: the online safety frontline](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter086/) **Feb 16, 2026:** [The global AI governance bonanza](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter085/) **Feb 9, 2026:** [Public security meets disinformation threats](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter084/) **Feb 2, 2026:** [Tech policy is now industrial policy](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter083/) **Jan 26, 2026:** [When Digital Sovereignty got real](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter082/) **Jan 19, 2026:** [Is the transatlantic (digital) relationship dead?](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter081/) **Jan 13, 2026:** [The People vs Digital Omnibus](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter080/) **Jan 5, 2026:** [What will happen in tech policy during 2026?](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter079/) **Dec 22, 2025:** [What I learned about tech policy in 2025](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter078/) **Dec 15, 2025:** [Australia: whatever you do, don't call it a ban](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter077/) **Dec 8, 2025:** [What Europeans really think about tech](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter076/) **Dec 1, 2025:** [The complicated world of kids' online safety](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter075/) **Nov 24, 2025:** [A plan for next year's G20](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter074/) **Nov 17, 2025:** [Brussels' digital power grab](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter073/) **Nov 10, 2025:** [Tech policy when the AI bubble bursts](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter072/) **Nov 3, 2025:** [Europe's 'Jekyll and Hyde' tech strategy](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter071/) **Oct 29, 2025:** [Looking beyond the AI hype](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter070/) **Oct 27, 2025:** [A digital age of majority](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter069/) **Oct 20, 2025:** [The end of social media](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter068/) **Oct 13, 2025:** [Europe brought a knife to an AI gun fight](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter067/) **Oct 6, 2025:** [Social media at a time of war](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter066/) **Sept 29, 2025:** [TikTok: The art of the (non) deal](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter065/) **Sept 22, 2025:** [The United Nations goes big on AI](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter064/) **Sept 15, 2025:** [The next digital fight in the transatlantic turf war](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter063/) **Sept 8, 2025:** [What most don't understand about Brussels' take on tech](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter062/) **Sept 1, 2025:** [Online safety's day in court](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter061/) **Aug 25, 2025:** [My AI stack is better than your AI stack](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter060/) **Aug 18, 2025:** [The never-ending battle between safety and privacy](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter059/) **Aug 11, 2025:** [The AI summit bandwagon heads to India](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter058/) **Aug 4, 2025:** [In defense of digital political ads](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter057/) **July 28, 2025:** [The tech-shaped hole in the transatlantic trade deal](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter056/) **July 21, 2025:** [The end of online anonymity](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter055/) **July 14, 2025:** [EU-US trade war: no sign of digital](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter054/) **June 30, 2025:** [The Fake News Factory](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter053free/) **June 23, 2025:** [What does the US want from tech?](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter052/) **June 16, 2025:** [Where is the G7 on digital?](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter051/) **June 9, 2025:** [The internal battle of digital antitrust](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter050/) **June 4, 2025:** [Platform governance: myths vs reality](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter049free/) **May 26, 2025:** [The unstoppable ascent of AI](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter048/) **May 19, 2025:** [The consequences of digital sovereignty](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter047/) **May 12, 2025:** [A shift away from AI rulemaking](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter046/) **May 9, 2025:** [EU-US tech: a changing of the guard](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter045/) **May 5, 2025:** [Can we fix the digital transatlantic relationship?](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter044/) **April 28, 2025:** [The limits of misinformation: Canada election edition](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter043/) **April 21, 2025:** [A digital conscious uncoupling](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter042/) **April 14, 2025:** [**The fallacy of social media monopolies**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter041/) **April 7, 2025:** [The digital side of the trade war](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter040/) **March 31, 2025:** [A game plan for middle powers](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter039/) **March 24, 2025:** [Rethinking tech sovereignty](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter038/) **March 20, 2025:** [Social media is a black box. Here's how to fix that](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter037/) **March 17, 2025:** [Postcard from Washington: MAGA on tech](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter036/) **March 10, 2025:** [The censorship battle goes global](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter035/) **March 3, 2025:** [How to navigate Washington and Brussels: a tech policy guide](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter034free/) **March 1, 2025:** [What Germany's election teaches us about foreign interference](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter033/) **Feb 24, 2025:** [We don't know what happens online: German election edition](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter032/) **Feb 17, 2025:** [The US just blew a hole in combatting 'hybrid warfare'](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter031/) **Feb 10, 2025:** [When tech meets realpolitik: the new reality](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter030/) **Feb 3, 2025:** [What you need to know about France's AI Action Summit](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter029free/) **Jan 27, 2025:** [We need to talk about AI infrastructure. Really.](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter028/) **Jan 23, 2025:** [Postcard from London: Will the UK's real digital policy please stand up?](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter027free/) **Jan 20, 2025:** [Who's who on tech policy in Trump 2.0 administration](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter026/) **Jan 13, 2025:** [Europe's response to the US on digital regulation](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/) **Jan 10, 2025:** [TikTok goes to court](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter024/) **Jan 6, 2025:** [The miseducation of Jan 6](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter023free/) **Dec 23, 2024:** [Digital Politics: 2025 predictions](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter022/) **Dec 16, 2024:** [The global election-palooza comes to an end](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter021/) **Dec 11, 2024:** [5 Things to know about the DSA risk assessments and audits](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter020free/) **Dec 9, 2024:** [What just happened in Romania?](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter019/) **Dec 2, 2024:** [Postcard from Paris: politics vs policy](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter018free/) **Nov 25, 2024:** [Postcard from Berlin: Germany's digital missteps](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter017/) **Nov 18, 2024:** [What next for AI Safety Institutes?](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter016/) **Nov 11, 2024:** [Europe's new digital leadership](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter015/) **Nov 4, 2024:** [The US election goes digital](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter014free/) **Oct 28, 2024:** [Don’t expect much on tech from US election](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter013/) **Oct 21, 2024:** [The AI battle no one is talking about](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter012/) **Oct 18, 2024:** [Why you should pay attention to Moldova](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter011/) **Oct 14, 2024:** [**The Fallacy of foreign interference**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter010/) **Oct 11, 2024:** [Q&A: Content moderation under Europe's Digital Services Act](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter009free/) **Oct 7, 2024:** [The digital legacy of October 7](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter008/) **Sept 30, 2024:** [Australia's digital rulemaking](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter007/) **Sept 24, 2024:** [We're the UN, and we're here to help](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter006/) **Sept 19, 2024:** [The lopsided (digital) US election](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter005/) **Sept 16, 2024:** [To regulate or to compete?](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter004/) **Sept 9, 2024:** [The AI election global boomerang](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter003/) **Sept 3, 2024:** [The year ahead: what I'm watching (part two)](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter002/) **Sept 2, 2024:** [The year ahead: what I'm watching (part one)](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter001/) --- ### Advertising ethical policy URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/advertising-ethical-policy/ Last updated: 2026-03-04T22:18:52.000Z I started Digital Politics as a way to understand how the worlds of tech and politics were colliding like never before. The newsletter is my attempt to unpack what is going on with digital policymaking in a way that is both nonpartisan and opinionated. Readers come to Digital Politics for impartial analysis free from bias. I value that relationship, and use it as my North Star in how I write the newsletter each week. You take time in your busy schedules to read what I write. Nothing will, or should, take away from that trust. That's why I wanted to lay down how Digital Politics approaches any form of advertising that appears in the newsletter. That refers to inserted "sponsored content" that may be displayed within the weekly dispatches. Here are my guiding rules that are non-negotiable: 1) No sponsor will be told what appears in the newsletter ahead of publication. 2) No sponsor will be able to dictate what appears (or doesn't appear) in the newsletter. 3) All "sponsored content" (in the form of inserts in the newsletter) will be vetted by Digital Politics before publication to meet my ethical standards. 4) Digital Politics makes no judgement on what appears in these "sponsor content" inserts beyond ensuring that whatever text complies with my ethical standards. (For more on my approach, read chapter 6 [here](https://www.nytimes.com/editorial-standards/ethical-journalism.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co).) 5) Final decisions of what "sponsored content" appears in the newsletter will be made by Digital Politics alone. I understand seeing advertising in the newsletter may not be what you want to see. I get it. If you have any questions, please reach out to me on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com and I'd be happy to talk about how I approach these relationships. Let's get started. ### European Commission's Digital Omnibus Files URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/digitalomnibusfiles/ Last updated: 2025-11-17T00:11:44.000Z _This page is for paying subscribers only._ ### Sovereign AI: the timing problem URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/sovereign-ai-social-media-bans-2026free-2/ Last updated: 2026-06-08T09:57:25.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I'll be speaking at this Harvard University/IAPP [digital conference](https://iapp.org/conference/iapp-navigate-leadership-summit/agenda?day=1&ref=digitalpolitics.co) in New England at the end of the month. If you're in Boston and want to meet, let me know [here](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **— The European Union, Canada and the United States** outlined dueling visions for sovereign AI. None of them is keeping up with industry. **— Australia laid out a game plan for social media** bans aimed at children. The country's early findings demonstrate the policy doesn't address the root cause of parents' anxieties. **— Two-thirds of future US data centers** will be built in rural areas. **Let's get started:** --- ## Let the Sovereign AI competition begin! **THREE SEPARATE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENTS** over three consecutive days. On June 2, the White House [issued an executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/promoting-advanced-artificial-intelligence-innovation-and-security/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), mostly focused around AI and national security. A day later, the European Commission announced its long-awaited [European Tech Sovereignty](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F26%5F1187?ref=digitalpolitics.co) package, including new legislative proposals to jumpstart the Continent's cloud computing industry. On June 4, Canada unveiled its [National AI Strategy](https://ised-isde.canada.ca/site/ised/en/artificial-intelligence-ecosystem/overview-canadas-national-artificial-intelligence-strategy?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — a document aimed specifically at boosting the country's sovereign ambitions around the emerging technology. **Taken together, it represents the most overt example** of what countries have been doing, mostly tacitly, for at least 12 months. Where once the focus was on AI security and governance, national leaders have pivoted hard toward greater sovereignty and economic growth. Gone are the days where government announcements — even those from the US — centered on creating greater legislative safeguards around the emerging technology. We now live in an inherently geopolitical world, and countries are playing for keeps. **Each AI announcement framed this pivot** in a different way. For Washington, the focus on national security played directly into what US policymakers believe is their competitive advantage. Almost all of the West's AI stack is currently based on American technology. Ensuring Silicon Valley stays the pre-eminent power in the era of AI is existential to the country's economic future. **"We will continue to lead an America First** cybersecurity effort that enhances both our national security and our global AI dominance," read the executive order. **Europe's** [**pitch**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/eu-tech-sovereignty-data-access-2026/) **was similarly geopolitical.** Brussels pulled back from inserting "Buy European" commitments in how EU member states built out domestic cloud computing/AI infrastructure. But the message was clear: "We cannot afford to depend on others for the technologies that keep our hospitals running, our energy grids stable and our services secure," European Commission president **Ursula von der Leyen**, said in a statement. **Canada — the OG of the "Middle Powers" movement —** similarly made explicit its need to go it alone on AI infrastructure. That would come via international partnerships, public investment in domestic AI compute power, and an AI literacy and jobs campaign aimed at generating $200 billion of economic growth by 2034\. "AI that builds Canada strong for all: that is our mission," said **Mark Carney,** the Canadian prime minister. **There's just one problem with these announcements.** They are policymaking efforts designed to tackle questions around AI — but built for an analogue world. _This page is for subscribers only._ ### Digital Politics Institutional Subscriptions URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/institutional-subscriptions/ Last updated: 2026-09-01T23:02:55.000Z More details coming soon. ## Posts ### Who wants to be a VLOP? URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/dsa-vlop-openai-data-center-midterms/ Last updated: 2026-09-07T11:00:48.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I'll be back in Brussels next week after the summer lull. If you're around and want to grab coffee, [you know where to find me](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **— The European Commission faces a renewed test** on how well it can enforce the 27-country bloc's online safety rules. **— A backlash against AI data centers is** the main digital policy driver ahead of the US midterm elections in November. **— Which countries produce the most cyber attacks**, and which states are targeted the most? **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Rethinking how AI should be governed URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/operational-ai-governance-meta-settlement-industry-rules-2026/ Last updated: 2026-09-02T11:03:26.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and here's a date for your diary. I'll be hosting a panel discussion in Brussels on **Oct 8** to dissect the current and future EU-US digital relationship, based on this recent [report](https://dfrlab.org/2026/08/17/sovereignty-without-borders-decoding-the-transatlantic-digital-relationship-at-a-time-of-change/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that I published for my day job. **If that sounds like your cup of tea,** please [fill in this form](https://forms.gle/YyHZnQ5L8EGd2XBY7?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to express your interest in joining me and leading European and US voices (including a drinks reception after the panel.) I'll be in touch later in September to confirm participation. **— Most artificial intelligence oversight** focuses on how these models are trained and created. Operational AI governance is how policymakers should police these systems in the wild. **— Meta's $18 billion dollar child safety settlement** gives the social media giant the tacit power to set an industry benchmark that rivals may be forced to follow. **— Three-quarters of Europeans now back an** Australian-style social media ban. **Let's get started:** --- ## AI GOVERNANCE CANNOT STOP AT THE LAB **WHEN MOST OF US THINK OF AI OVERSIGHT,** we picture internal corporate red teams (and some [recent high-profile failures](https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-incident-and-the-road-ahead/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)), discussions about biases and copyright in training data, and debates over proprietary and open-weight models. To fully grasp what that looks like, you need a PhD in computer science and be able to churn out analysis like Stanford University's annual [Foundation Model Transparency Index](https://crfm.stanford.edu/fmti/December-2025/index.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **All this is God's work, and must continue**. But the more I delve into this world, the more I believe it's only half of the discussion. **Much of current AI governance** — even the United States' recent [conversion](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/promoting-advanced-artificial-intelligence-innovation-and-security/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to the topic — is framed around one question: should a next-generation model be released? That's what happened with Anthropic's Mythos, including [analysis](https://www.aisi.gov.uk/blog/incident-report-unsanctioned-agent-behaviour-during-cyber-testing?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from the United Kingdom's AI Security Institute that flagged unexpected cybersecurity threats with the company's latest model. It was also preceded by the White House's [short-term export](https://www.anthropic.com/news/fable-mythos-access?ref=digitalpolitics.co) ban on the same model after US national security agencies similarly flagged ongoing vulnerabilities. Anthropic said it had instituted strong safeguards to mitigate such behavior. **But what that oversight is missing is** the reams of AI models that have already been released into the wild. Yes, they may not be the fanciest of systems. But from how Google serves up search results to how TikTok ranks online content to how Amazon splices e-commerce queries, all of these online services are now driven by underlying AI systems that equally need to be held to account. **Policymakers have built a governance ethos** and infrastructurearound frontiermodels. What they haven't done is do the same for the AI systems that determine what people see, buy and interact with. Those are still treated as separate problems of platform regulation, consumer protection and administrative law. **This is what I'm calling operational AI governance.** Thanks for reading Digital Politics. If you've been forwarded this newsletter (and like what you've read), please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter058/#/portal/). For those already subscribed, reach out on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com **That term can be used to describe how companies** implement in-house AI policies. But I'm using it more broadly to describe public-interest oversight of already deployed AI systems whose rankings, recommendations and automated decision-making already affect people. **It builds on existing work around algorithmic** accountability. But the concept reflects a change in both scale and character. AI systems now power different parts of digital services, and companies routinely tweak the models, data and objectives behind them. It's no longer about auditing "an algorithm." It's about unpicking interconnected AI systems that are the engine behind the online world. **Operational does a lot of heavy-lifting in this definition.** It refers to how the world is already flooded with all forms of artificial intelligence — and how most of these systems are opaque to outsiders and already have real-world consequences. **That includes how automated decision-making** systems in the Netherlands, more than a decade ago, [incorrectly profiled](https://europeanaifund.org/newspublications/how-ai-driven-welfare-systems-are-deepening-inequality-and-poverty-across-europe/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) individuals applying for childcare benefits that reinforced biases related to race, ethnicity and alleged benefits fraud. It relates to the [string of US lawsuits](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/a-new-mexico-judge-ordered-new-child-safeguards-for-meta-advocates-hope-other-courts-follow?ref=digitalpolitics.co) (more on the recent Meta settlement below) that raised concerns about how AI-powered content recommender systems displayed harmful and explicit content to children. It is baked into the European Commission's [recent $230 million fine](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip%5F26%5F1178/IP%5F26%5F1178%5FEN.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) against Temu over how European consumers were displayed illegal goods via the Chinese e-commerce giant's AI-enabled search results. **Traditionally, these examples would fit somewhere** between consumer protection and platform governance. But as AI systems have steadily taken over the back-end of almost all digital services, there is now a disconnect between how policymakers define what they see as consumer-facing goods and what is happening within companies as they optimize internal procedures to take advantage of increasingly powerful AI tools. **This isn't technically a new concept. AI researchers** [have been calling](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-02094-7.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) for years for a focus on short-term harms associated with large language models instead of the existential risk associated with [artificial general intelligence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial%5Fgeneral%5Fintelligence?ref=digitalpolitics.co) (aka: the SkyNet dilemma.) **But what is missing is a reframing among** the regulatory, policymaking and (non-AI) research communities — and I put myself in that bucket — toward the concept of operational AI governance. It's less about everyone becoming AI experts. It's more about acknowledging that all digital services are now AI-powered, and that has to become embedded in the types of required oversight. **Part of this is about infrastructure.** For those seeking to govern next generation AI models, there's a growing cottage industry of funders, institutions and research institutions dedicated to protecting against harm created by these latest releases. Yet within the operational AI governance world, there's still a lack of similar infrastructure (and, ahem, funding) to keep pace with how less-advanced AI systems are out in the wild, potentially causing harm. **That is because so-called platform governance**, or efforts to quell problems on social media, has fallen out of fashion. Funders, government bodies and researchers are pivoting away to protect themselves against attacks from the US government, which claims (incorrectly) that such oversight is an [illegitimate attack on free speech](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/restoring-freedom-of-speech-and-ending-federal-censorship/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Confronted with these claims, many have turned to less politically-sensitive topics like [online fraud](https://about.fb.com/news/2026/03/fighting-scammers-protecting-people-with-new-technology-and-partnerships/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **But for officials and lawmakers still eager** to dip their toes into social media oversight — especially when it comes to [kids' online safety](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/social-media-bans-platform-liability-2026/) — to approach such policymaking without framing it via operational AI governance would be like trying to referee a football match blindfold. You could probably do it. But it would not lead to good outcomes. **So, too, must regulators stop distinguishing** online safety rules from AI governance. That's a hard one as many of these agencies in countries across the European Union, as well as in the UK and Australia, have specific mandates that include the former, but not the latter. But as platform governance [shifts](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/platform-design-enforcement-un-ai-governance-2026/) toward how these social media companies are designed, regulators can no longer pretend they don't have skin in the AI game. **Similarly, non-AI researchers who focus on** online safety, consumer protection and other adjacent policymaking areas need a "Come to Jesus" moment. **Again, this isn't about cramming for a** PhD in artificial intelligence or jumping on the AI hype-train. Instead, it's rethinking how potential harms are created, at the source, and acknowledging that many of the digital services that we all monitor are not what they once were, even three years ago. Over that short period, AI systems — albeit not as powerful as the latest models — have taken over, and that requires a reappraisal of how we all go about our business. **Currently, operational AI governance** is happening, but in dribs and drabs via [specific regulatory decisions](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-preliminarily-finds-tiktoks-addictive-design-breach-digital-services-act?ref=digitalpolitics.co) or [researcher outputs](https://algorithmwatch.org/en/instagram-algorithm-nudity/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **What's needed isn't a fundamental reworking** of existing platform governance and consumer protection. Instead, we need to be honest with how much everyday AI systems have eaten the digital universe — and how that step change needs to become a core principle in how these platforms are policed worldwide. --- ## Chart of the week **Across the EU's five most populous** countries and the UK, just under three-quarters of those polled by YouGov would support an Australia-style social media ban for kids. **The one outlier in Poland where only** 53 percent of adults said they would back such a moratorium. **Across all age groups, however, the concept** of an Aussie-style ban was still highly popular. Though it's also true that YouGov did not survey teenagers about how they would feel about such proposals. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/08/Untitled-2-3.jpg) Source: YouGov's [European Political Monthly](https://yougov.com/articles/54429-most-europeans-in-six-countries-support-banning-social-media-for-under-16s?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## META JUST BECAME A DE FACTO RULEMAKER **FOR A COUNTRY WITH NO COMPREHENSIVE** federal law governing kidsonlinesafety rules, the US just scored a doozy against Meta. In a landmark settlement and consent judgment, Meta agreed to pay up to $18 billion to 48 US state attorneys general over allegations that its Facebook and Instagram services may have caused harm to children (see [here](https://www.wsj.com/tech/meta-reaches-18-billion-settlement-with-48-states-over-child-safety-claims-cf725a2b?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/26/technology/meta-settlement-social-media-addiction-lawsuit.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://www.techpolicy.press/whats-in-metas-teen-social-media-settlement-and-what-hinges-on-its-rivals/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://portal.ct.gov/ag/press-releases/2026-press-releases/settlement-with-meta?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://oag.dc.gov/release/attorney-general-schwalb-announces-meta-will-pay?ref=digitalpolitics.co).) **The Big Tech giant did not admit fault.** But the 10-year settlement — whose payout equated to just a little less than Meta's [quarterly net income](https://investor.atmeta.com/investor-news/press-release-details/2026/Meta-Reports-Second-Quarter-2026-Results/default.aspx?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — is a clear example of how platform governance is shifting toward how these services [are designed](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/platform-design-enforcement-un-ai-governance-2026/). **There's a lot to the settlement.** Under the agreement, Meta will pay roughly $12 billion in payments to the affected US states over the next decade. It will institute a daily two-hour limit across its apps (with pauses after 15 minutes of continuous use, and further pauses at 60 and 90 minutes) for children. It will block access to social media feeds for minors overnight. It will also silence notifications over roughly the same period, and stop weekday push notifications during the school day. **Other commitments include stronger age assurance** checks, mostly to determine which users are children; greater parental controls, including the ability to turn off algorithmic-powered feeds; and a limit on some beauty filters. **Yet as I reread the** [**settlement**](https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.401490/gov.uscourts.cand.401490.3447.1.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**, the more confused I became.** **What Meta has agreed to is significant.** But the negotiated deal also includes a second level of commitments — so long as Meta's corporate rivals also agree to the same kid-focused online protections. **This is the unusual part. Meta accepted** a baseline set of rules for Facebook and Instagram. But it also negotiated a second phase of design changes that apply if Snap, TikTok and YouTube also become bound by equivalent kid-focused safety obligations. If that happens, Meta will pay an additional $5 billion, tighten its own time-management rules on its apps, and gain what it wants more than anything else: a level playing field with its bitter rivals. **Importantly, the agreement also contains a so-called** "Most Favored Nation" provision. If a settling US state, for instance, later gives Snap, TikTok or YouTube more favorable terms over comparable kids safety claims, Meta can require that state to modify the company's comparable obligations to match them accordingly. **In essence, Meta, which agreed to** up to $18 billion in payments and a flurry of design changes in the name of children's online safety, has helped negotiate a potential de facto rulebook for kids-focused social media in the US. Its negotiated deal — and the incentives that come with it if YouTube, Snap and TikTok agree to equivalent design changes — may become the standard for how minors use these platforms for potentially the next 10 years across the US. **That means Meta's willingness to, say,** silence notifications for children between 10pm and 7am may also become what YouTube institutes in the future. Similarly, Meta's expanded age assurance provisions might be accepted by TikTok. And if Snap, at some point, reaches a more favorable settlement over similar kids' online safety claims, then Meta has the right to rewrite its own deal to match that of its rival. **None of these platforms may agree** to such changes. But the financial and design incentives built into the agreement if Meta's rivals agree to the same safeguards give US state attorneys general a significant stick to whack other social media companies to fall in line. **This isn't necessarily a bad thing.** ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **As the recent New Mexico ruling, also involving Meta,** [outlined](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/platform-governance-limits-transatlantic-data-privacy-framework-2026/), these platforms are in ongoing competition with each other. As much as platform governance is important, it must be weighed up against other issues, including the ability for all companies to be treated the same under the law. Much of the recent settlement's provisions are also good practice. If there's an industry-wide push to reduce children from seeing harmful content online, then I'm all in. **For me, the oddity is not that US states extracted** concessions from Meta. It's that they allowed the Big Tech giant, which was accused of creating harms for children online, to participate in defining the competitive conditions under which those concessions could spread across the industry. **In the absence of federal legislation,** this multi-state settlement with Meta has become a possible route to US-wide social media governance. And it's true that Meta did not write these rules alone. It did so with US states. But the settlement gave the tech company a seat at the table, a financial incentive to US states for competitors to adopt the framework and contractual protections for Zuck & Co against being left behind if rivals secured a better future deal. **That may keep kids safer online.** It may even be a pragmatic response to how teenagers split their time between rival platforms. But, let's be clear: it's an unusual way to make digital policy. **Typically, the alleged source of harm does not** get to negotiate a potential industry benchmark. Nor does it get to rewrite its landmark settlement if a competitor later receives a less harsh outcome. --- ## What I'm reading **— Ofcom, the UK online safety regulator, outlined** its approach for ensuring digital platforms comply with its supervision and compliance obligations. More [here](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/illegal-and-harmful-content/our-approach-to-online-safety-supervision-and-compliance?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Oliver Patel explains how China is gradually** building up one of the world's most advanced AI governance structures. More [here](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/oliver-patel%5Fchina-is-quietly-developing-one-of-the-world-share-7497995145691303937-%5FP2z/?utm%5Fsource=share&utm%5Fmedium=member%5Fios&rcm=ACoAAATsaZ8BQ5eV2dLTB4ajT1y1P-2vC9wlPbU). **— Meta published its now twice-yearly threat report**, including details on financial scams and coordinated inauthentic behavior on its platforms. More [here](https://transparency.meta.com/sr/H2-2026-adversarial-threat-report/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The Union of Concern Scientists** and the Association of Computing Machinerypublished separate open letters in support of the ability of academics to publish research without fear of intimidation. More [here](https://www.acm.org/about-acm/statement-on-academic-freedom-and-scientific-collaboration?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://blog.ucs.org/guest-commentary/protecting-science-from-government-intimidation/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— France's Mistral announced that it would host** third-party open-weight models on its platforms, including those from China. More [here](https://mistral.ai/news/regional-inference-open-models-new-compute/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- ### Online child safety's odd couple URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/social-media-bans-chinese-ai-tiktok-playbook-2026/ Last updated: 2026-08-24T11:00:35.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and hope many of you are heading back to work after a restful (if hot) summer break. There's a lot to dig into for the Fall — buckle up. **— French lawmakers and US tech companies** don't agree on much. But both believe efforts to protect children from harm on social media are undercooked. — **Washington is re-using its TikTok playbook** to go after Chinese open-weight AI models. That does a disservice to the artificial intelligence industry in the United States. — **Roughly one-third of the English-language** webpageshave been written or edited via AI since OpenAI released Chat-GPT in late 2022\. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The limits to platform governance 2.0 URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/platform-governance-limits-transatlantic-data-privacy-framework-2026/ Last updated: 2026-08-10T11:00:20.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**,** and like many of you, will be taking next week off. The next edition of Digital Politics will be published on Aug. 24\. Until then, I hope you all have a good break. **— A legal ruling against Meta in New Mexico** highlights the enforcement limits of demanding social media be redesigned to stop the spread of harm. **— A transatlantic data-sharing agreement is on a legal** knife edge, even though Brussels and Washington both want it to stick around. **— Artificial intelligence experts agree on one thing:** global AI governance isn't going to happen any time soon. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The global battle for AI, revisited URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/global-ai-governance-rules-regulation-national-security-2026free/ Last updated: 2026-08-05T11:00:09.000Z **WELCOME TO THE FREE MONTHLY EDITION** of Digital Politics.I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and many of you (I hope) are on vacation. A lot has happened so far in 2026\. With the summer lull upon us, this week's edition is updating a [piece](https://www.politico.eu/article/ai-control-kamala-harris-nick-clegg-meta-big-tech-social-media/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that I wrote for POLITICO in 2024 about the global race to control artificial intelligence. **It's not a like-for-like comparison.** Back then, I was a tech reporter. Now, I'm a think tanker (and newsletter writer.) But the underlying question — about who will control the emerging technology for years to come — has not changed. **If anything, it's become even more complex.** **Let's get started:** --- ## TWO SUMMITS, DIFFERENT AGENDAS **ON A WET AFTERNOON IN LATE 2023,** the likes of former US vice president **Kamala Harris** and then-senior Meta executive **Nick Clegg** trudged into a wind-swept tent an hour north of London. They had gathered to show a united front against what many feared would be a threat to the world: uncontrolled artificial intelligence. After late-night negotiations, the outcome was the [Bletchley Declaration](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-2023-the-bletchley-declaration/the-bletchley-declaration-by-countries-attending-the-ai-safety-summit-1-2-november-2023?ref=digitalpolitics.co), a voluntary commitment by 28 countries, including the United States and China, to identify and respond to existential risks tied to the emerging technology. **Fast forward two years, and Narendra Modi,** India's prime minister, stood in front of a podium in February to address thousands of conference attendees at a purpose-built convention center in New Delhi. His speech — translated simultaneously into 11 languages via AI — had followed announcements from Google, Tata and Anthropic about multi-billion dollar investments in India's fast-growing economy. The event's communiqué, signed by 92 countries and international bodies, only paid lip service to the safety concerns that had been central to the United Kingdom's inaugural AI summit. **Instead, the so-called** [**AI Impact Summit**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter058/)in New Delhi was, above all, about the economic gain to be derived from the technology. "This is the fourth AI summit since Bletchley Park," Anthropic chief executive, **Dario Amodei**, told conference-goers. "We are increasingly close to a country of geniuses in a data center, systems more capable than most humans at most tasks." **What follows is an assessment of the global race for AI** in 2026\. It focuses on four themes that remain central to this geopolitical battle: 1) Who sets the rules?; 2) What do those rules look like?; 3) How corporate lobbying merged with countries' priorities; 4) How AI merged with national security. **These themes are obviously intertwined.** But, above all, this update on the global race around AI tracks the rise of geopolitics, the disintegration of a Western consensus around AI safety/governance and a fundamental change in the global debate since officials first gathered at Bletchley Park in November 2023. --- ## **The splintering of AI-rulemaking** **THERE WAS NEVER A WESTERN CONSENSUS** for AI rule-making. Back in 2023-2024, the European Commission and former White House administration criss-crossed the globe to champion their respective visions of what AI oversight looked like. Washington preferred voluntary commitments. Brussels went all-in on its AI Act. **That basic tension is still there. Arguably,** it's more pronounced in 2026\. Where we are now (at least in terms of the European Union, US and China) is three competing sets of rules with no realistic "translation layer" to connect them. If the Bletchley Park Declaration, albeit voluntary, was about setting aside national interests to promote AI safety at a global level, then the current landscape is defined by fragmented national/regional rule-setting designed to favor individual strategic interests. Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter087free/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in July:** — An inside look at how regulators and companies view digital rules differently; Why Europe's digital sovereignty ambitions are missing a critical element; Almost half of Americans use AI chatbots at work. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/digital-regulation-tech-sovereignty-2026/). — Platform governance has entered a new phase: redesigning social media; The United Nations' push into AI misses where the real decisions are made; People aren't relying on chatbots to access news. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/platform-design-enforcement-un-ai-governance-2026/). — An ongoing focus on digital foreign interference misses where the next online threats are coming from; How the US and China laid out AI governance plans that left everyone else in their wake; More than half of Americans now favor a social media ban for kids. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/foreign-interference-us-china-ai-governance-2026/). — Brussels and Washington are a lot closer on digital competition than you may think; The United Kingdom again shows why it's a second-tier digital nation; Data to show why China and the US are so far ahead on AI. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/google-antitrust-eu-us-alignment-uk-digital-governance-2026/). **The US' subtle pivot is demonstrable of how things** have changed. During Joe Biden's administration, Washington laid out plans (via [White House Executive Order](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive%5FOrder%5F14110?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) that made clear US efforts to remain the global leader on AI. But it also included some safety provisions, including watermarking for AI content and protecting consumers from AI harm, that positioned Biden in a co-regulatory relationship with AI firms. **That Biden-era Executive Order was quickly scrapped.** In its place, Donald Trump's administration [initially doubled down](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive%5FOrder%5F14179?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on removing all forms of AI oversight in the name of promoting US dominance. That framing, however, [has](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/06/promoting-advanced-artificial-intelligence-innovation-and-security/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) [shifted](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/12/eliminating-state-law-obstruction-of-national-artificial-intelligence-policy/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in 2026 as US officials respond to growing national security concerns around both how powerful the latest AI models have become and how quickly China's open-source rivals have matched US tech firms' proprietary systems. Ironically, in [imposing export controls](https://www.politico.com/news/2026/06/13/inside-the-whirlwind-24-hours-that-led-the-white-house-to-slap-export-controls-on-anthropic-00961519?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on Anthropic's most-advanced model, the *laissez-faire* Trump Administration had more direct intervention than the Biden Administration — and its favoring of some regulation — ever did. **For Europe, there also has been an about-turn on what** had been Brussels' clear policymaking objective: comprehensive AI rules. **It's not that the EU isn't still committed to its AI Act.** Those rules — like everything in Brussels — will stick around no matter what. But the recent [AI Omnibus](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/ai-omnibus-enters-force?ref=digitalpolitics.co) delayed some of the regulatory deadlines associated with high-risk AI use cases. It also introduced a ban on AI tools that created non-consensual explicit images/deepfake content, in part to placate anger within the European Parliament for the wider delay in the comprehensive AI rulebook. **More importantly, Europe shifted gears from** using regulation to police AI to passing rules to jumpstart AI-enabled economic growth. The bloc's recent [European Technology Sovereignty Package](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-tech-sovereignty?ref=digitalpolitics.co) is less about AI enforcement, and more about using public funds to build EU digital infrastructure and compute power to ward off the "kill switch" fear associated with the bloc's current reliance on US tech providers. **This change put Brussels directly at odds with** Washington's "AI dominance" strategy in a way that escalates the previous tensions between the US and EU on who should set global AI standards. **I won't pretend to be an expert in China's domestic** AI rulebook (more on that [here](https://regulations.ai/regulations/china-summary?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/navigating-chinas-regulatory-approach-to-generative-artificial-intelligence-and-large-language-models/969B2055997BF42DE693B7A1A1B4E8BA?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://iapp.org/news/a/china-s-new-ai-rules-ethics-ai-agents-and-anthropomorphic-ai?ref=digitalpolitics.co)). But its international priorities now match those of Beijing's similar approach to digital diplomacy: use its convening, financial and standards-setting muscle to nudge other (Global Majority) countries to back its more authoritarian take on the emerging technology. **Its recent creation of the so-called** [World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World%5FArtificial%5FIntelligence%5FCooperation%5FOrganization?ref=digitalpolitics.co), based in Shanghai, is this "Belt and Road" philosophy [tilted toward the AI age](https://dfrlab.org/2026/02/25/china-digital-silk-road-report/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). It's nominally multilateral, with 28 countries joining the organization, and includes language around openness, equity and inclusiveness. But the geopolitical aim is clear: to export a China-focused regulatory and governance model for AI to position Beijing (and its world view) at the center of the global AI rule-making discussion. --- ## Chart of the Week: Total combined investment between 2021-2024 for countries worldwide (with a minimum investment of $1 billion). The scale of accumulated US and Chinese investment over the time period explains why AI rulemaking for those countries is now inseparable from states’ attempts to protect existing industrial advantages for strategic national gain. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/08/Untitled-2.jpg) Source: [The 2025 AI Index Report; Visual Capitalist](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/visualizing-global-ai-investment-by-country/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## Yes to regulation. Just make it my regulation. **THIS IS WHERE THINGS REALLY HAVE BECOME** complex compared to where we stood in 2023/24\. Back then, the battle centered on disputes about what regulation should do and who should be policed. Many of the largest US tech firms — the ones with the most advanced large language models — called for regulatory limits so only their systems could be used. That would be based on voluntary commitments to comply with oversight from a number of national AI safety institutes that had begun to sprout up. **The fear was that the alternative — framed** via the expansion of open-source alternatives — would lead to short-term (AI's creation of bioweapons) and existential (read: Skynet) risks that were just too big to not be enforced by strict rules. **That dynamic continues in 2026, but with an even** greater corporate bent. The likes of Google's DeepMind [now actively call](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/foreign-interference-us-china-ai-governance-2026/) for greater regulation — albeit via an industry-funded self-regulatory agency akin to the US Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. OpenAI's **Sam Altman** [has similarly suggested](https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/openais-sam-altman-discuss-voluntary-ai-safety-tests-with-trump-officials-after-2026-07-30/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) Washington lead efforts to create international certificates/standards for the latest large language models, again in a model that would massively favor that tech giant over smaller rivals. **Now, the regulatory discussion has become** a geopolitical contest where each country's/region's approach and strategy is framed around promoting separate strategic interests. Regulation has become industrial policy by another name. **In the US, AI rules have now become OK**, especially in light of the recent [hacking efforts](https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-model-evaluation-security-incident/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) by OpenAI's systems and [rumors](https://www.aisi.gov.uk/blog/our-evaluation-of-claude-mythos-previews-cyber-capabilities?ref=digitalpolitics.co) about what Anthropic's latest models can do. Yet these proposals are inevitably self-serving. Companies propose oversight that will likely entrench their dominance by raising barriers around who can build such advanced AI systems. Call it regulatory capture framed as public safety. **The Chinese have thrown their full weight behind** open source. In part, that is a pragmatic response to increasing US efforts to stop the world's second largest economy from accessing AI infrastructure like high-end semiconductors. But it's also a strategic play to reduce Beijing's (and other capitals') reliance on US proprietary models when much of the world's willingness to trust Washington has been diminished. **It helps that Chinese open source models** [are now mostly on par](https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/deepseeks-new-ai-model-is-by-far-cheapest-well-known-models-run-research-firm-2026-08-03/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) with those from Anthropic, Google and OpenAI. It also helps to position Beijing as a willing partner, see above section, with national capitals across the Global Majority which feel shut out from the conversations going on in Brussels and Washington, respectively. The fact that Western companies [are now embracing](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/the-quiet-rise-of-chinese-ai-inside-western-companies?ref=digitalpolitics.co) such Chinese open source models is a sign that Beijing's tactics are bearing fruit, even across the US and Europe. **Europe, the OG of digital regulation, has been caught** flat-footed by the "open versus closed" battle between the US and China. Part of that can be explained by the 27-country bloc's fixation on its digital sovereignty agenda that now includes pumping public money into "Made In Europe" digital infrastructure. That goal has been championed by the Continent's legacy industries. **The recently-published European Tech Sovereignty Package** didn't go as far as many of these firms would have liked in terms of kicking US tech giants out of the bloc's digital infrastructure. It also embraced open source as a means to both reduce the EU's reliance on US tech providers and jumpstart AI-enabled economic growth, which — at least on paper — sounded awfully similar to what China is now promoting. **But Europe's rule-making, like that of** the US and China, is now overwhelmingly positioned to support the Continent's industrial interests. Two years ago, that conversation was squarely focused on policing the emerging technology for public good. --- ## The combination of lobbying and geopolitics **COMPANIES PUSHING THEIR CORPORATE INTERESTS** is not new. And even in 2023/24, many of the arguments about whether regulation should favor either open or closed AI models were more akin to a lobbying fight between rival industrial camps. **Yet in 2026, the line between corporate lobbying** and countries' geopolitical strategies has blurred into insignificance. With so much on the line when it comes to AI (in terms of economic growth and national security, see below), officials are now more willing to actively promote specific companies — both at home and abroad — to ensure their vision of the AI future comes to pass. **I've already outlined some of this in the section above.** But when Anthropic's chief executive [outlines his concerns](https://www.anthropic.com/news/position-open-weights-models?ref=digitalpolitics.co) about the Chinese Communist Party developing AI models that are "more powerful than those built by the US, and use them to achieve permanent military superiority," the distinction between what are corporate and national priorities becomes hard to disentangle. **There is a reason why some within US tech circles** now refer to Chinese rival AI models as "[Communist AI](https://x.com/deanwball/status/2078133895766114412?s=20&ref=digitalpolitics.co)," and it's not because of legitimate concerns about how the authoritarian regime could potentially use such advanced technologies. It plays directly into Washington's mounting fears of Beijing's technological prowess, and turns corporate concerns about being supplanted by cheaper, Chinese open source competitors into national security concerns that, potentially, may lead to action by the US Congress or White House. **It's not like the Chinese are not doing something similar** with their embrace of open source. They decided that competing head-on with the likes of OpenAI and Google was a mug's game. A lack of access to high-end Nvidia chips and semiconductor technology from the likes of the Netherlands' ASML also forced their hand. But Beijing's interests now align with Chinese companies' interests: build globally-competitive open-source models that reduce the ability of US rivals to sell their wares to would-be clients worldwide. **The European lobbying is equally grounded in** policymaking priorities, albeit Brussels is somewhat more navel-gazing than either Washington and Beijing. EU companies have successfully (and possibly legitimately) framed the bloc's ongoing use of US technology as a strategic dependency that now must end. Europe's willingness to use public funds to build up its own digital infrastructure — often via contracts to these very same European companies — brings those corporate interests and policymaking goals full circle. **What no one (or, almost no one) is willing to admit** in the EU is that, currently and likely for the foreseeable future, European alternatives are not yet ready to compete, at scale, with incumbent US tech providers. Many in Brussels know that reality. Few are willing to say it out loud. --- ## New dynamic: AI = national security **WHEN I REPORTED THE POLITICO ARTICLE** in 2023/24, national security was an also-ran in the AI governance conversation. There were concerns around how the technology would be used in autonomous weapons. But questions around AI safety and "trustworthiness" were central to global AI policymaking discussions. **How much can change in two years.** **Alongside a focus on AI-enabled economic growth,** the merging of artificial intelligence with national security priorities has become the only digital policymaking game in town. Well, that and [kids' social media bans](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/social-media-bans-platform-liability-2026/). Many of the AI safety institutes created in the wake of the Bletchley Park Declaration even renamed themselves "security" institutes (looking at you, [United Kingdom](https://www.aisi.gov.uk/?ref=digitalpolitics.co).) **There are good reasons for this shift.** The latest AI models [are breaking things](https://www.anthropic.com/news/investigating-incidents-cybersecurity-evals?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that many thought unthinkable, even a year ago. The [use of AI in warfare](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/charting-middle-east/2026/04/the-proliferation-of-ai-enabled-military-technology-in-the-middle-east/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) is now worryingly routine. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **The ability of governments (aka Washington)** to impose export bans on advanced large language models, as well as stop other countries from accessing high-end chips, is now accepted, even if opposed by the likes of China that face such restrictions. There are some in the US who now [even want to ban](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/aug/01/china-silicon-valley-white-house?ref=digitalpolitics.co) Chinese open-source models from entering the country. **Where once AI governance was framed through** the prismof traditional digital regulation, it is now conducted via such export controls, model restrictions and investment screenings directly in the wheelhouse of national security. **In truth, national security has now consumed** the other areas of the global AI race that were so prominent in 2023/24\. Rules are set to meet national security objectives. Regulation is constructed to promote national strategic advantages. Corporate lobbying is positioned through a geopolitical lens, and not as one that pits companies and governments on separate sides of the table. **That is the biggest fundamental shift — and speaks** to the geopolitical nature of the global AI race that, while present in 2023/24, has been turned up to 11 over two years later. **In 2024, I asked who would control AI.** The answer in 2026 is that control itself has become the objective. Each jurisdiction is building the AI infrastructure, the regulatory framework and the corporate alliances to try to control the emerging technology, and not be controlled by it. --- ### The global battle for AI, revisited URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/global-ai-governance-rules-regulation-national-security-2026/ Last updated: 2026-08-04T02:30:55.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and many of you (I hope) are on vacation. A lot has happened so far in 2026\. With the summer lull upon us, this week's edition is updating a [piece](https://www.politico.eu/article/ai-control-kamala-harris-nick-clegg-meta-big-tech-social-media/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that I wrote for POLITICO in 2024 about the global race to control artificial intelligence. **It's not a like-for-like comparison.** Back then, I was a tech reporter. Now, I'm a think tanker (and newsletter writer.) But the underlying question — about who will control the emerging technology for years to come — has not changed. **If anything, it's become even more complex.** **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Finally, a transatlantic win on tech URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/google-antitrust-eu-us-alignment-uk-digital-governance-2026/ Last updated: 2026-07-27T11:00:43.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS**. I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I was expecting a slow July-August amid the ongoing heatwave. Alas, digital policymaking doesn't appear to be taking the summer off. Pace yourself, people. **— The European Union and United States are more** aligned on digital competition enforcement than ever. It's just that politics keeps getting in the way. **— The United Kingdom is again playing musical chairs** when it comes to digital policymaking. **— Everyone knows the US and China dominate AI.** But I have the startling data that makes that clear. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Foreign interference: fighting the last war URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/foreign-interference-us-china-ai-governance-2026/ Last updated: 2026-07-20T11:00:56.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and find myself in a deep depression now that the World Cup has ended. Still, mark your calendars for Euro 2028 — only 1054 days to go! **— Donald Trump's statements around alleged foreign** interference in the 2020 US election don't match the threat currently posed by adversarial countries in Western elections. **— China and the United States laid out competing** versions of AI governance that played to each country's strengths — and left everyone else in their wake. **— Roughly six out of 10 Americans now support** a social media ban for kids. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Platform governance: It's the design, stupid URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/platform-design-enforcement-un-ai-governance-2026/ Last updated: 2026-07-14T22:05:22.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and for those who want to reach me on July 15 for evening meetings, I apologize but my calendar [is already full](https://www.bbc.com/mediacentre/articles/2026/england-argentina-world-cup-2026-semi-finals?ref=digitalpolitics.co). #ThreeLions. **— Enforcers worldwide have shifted focus** toward forcing social media giants to revamp how they operate. That design change is going to be difficult. **— The United Nations has gone all-in on artificial intelligence.** Yet the real geopolitics around the emerging technology is happening elsewhere. **— People aren't using AI chatbots to** access news (yet). **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Postcard from New Hampshire: The digital translation problem URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/digital-regulation-tech-sovereignty-2026free/ Last updated: 2026-07-01T11:00:54.000Z **WELCOME TO THE FREE MONTHLY EDITION** of Digital Politics.I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I have a confession: I have World Cup fever. And despite England's poor performances against Ghana and Panama, I can't help but whisper: [It's coming home](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJqimlFcJsM&themeRefresh=1&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **Happy early July 4th to all US readers.** **— Regulators and companies are speaking past each other** when it comes to the litany of new digital regulatory challenges that lie ahead. **— Europe has drunk the kool-aid on tech sovereignty.** It risks putting its ambitions over the practicalities of implementing those proposals. **— Four out of every 10 Americans** now use AI chatbots at work. **Let's get started:** --- ## YOU SAY ENFORCEMENT, I SAY COMPLIANCE **REGULATORS ARE FROM MARS, COMPANIES** are from Venus. That's definitely how it felt after spending time with both groups in Portsmouth, New Hampshire last week at the annual [Navigate](https://iapp.org/conference/iapp-navigate-leadership-summit?ref=digitalpolitics.co) digital policy conference. The three-day gathering — co-hosted by Harvard University's Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society and the IAPP, an industry-focused non-profit — brought together policymakers, lawmakers and industry types from mostly Western countries to speak plainly about the current state-of-play on everything from cross-border data flows to platform governance enforcement. **That, and a fair share of lobster rolls.** **While the event was held under the Chatham House Rule,** it quickly became clear that those regulators and company executives present had radically different perspectives on what "good" looked like when complying with the growing list of national and regional rules related to artificial intelligence, data protection, digital competition and online safety. This divide — in which both sides fail to understand where the other is coming from — is a stark reminder that for digital legislation to truly take hold, more time needs to be spent on implementing the rules, and not just passing them. **In one conversation with a Western regulator,** the official raised frustration that companies under his remit didn't take the time to make themselves known to his agency. From his perspective, the door was always open to company executives looking to build up a good rapport with a newly-empowered agency eager and willing to understand the problems that firms were facing. Better to make that investment from the get-go, he added, than come asking for advice/help when things inevitably went wrong. The regulator said his goal wasn't doling out the largest fines. Instead, it was about ensuring firms were compliant with what, he admitted, were complex rules. **So far, so good.** **And yet, over lunch just a few hours later,** I sat next to someone from a large tech company whose services fall directly under the remit of the regulator mentioned above. Great, I thought. Time to confirm what the official said: that regulatory compliance was proceeding, as envisioned, built on mutual trust and communication. Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter087free/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in June:** — In Digital Politics' first 100 editions, I made a lot of claims. Some were right, some less so. Here's how I did over the last two years. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/what-i-got-wrong-digital-politics-100/). — How Western countries' AI plans are not keeping up with industry; Lessons from Australia's social media ban for kids; Where future data centers are likely to be built. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/sovereign-ai-social-media-bans-2026/). — How the G7 summit shows the digital divide between the US and everyone else; Why digital competition rules are already overseeing AI; SpaceX's IPO versus X's DSA fine. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/g7-digital-divide-ai-competition-2026/). — If social media bans for kids are coming, this is how they should work; How one of Europe's top courts just blew up platform liability protections; How digital industries are driving economic growth for the next decade. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/social-media-bans-platform-liability-2026/). **Not so fast. The company executive made clear that** his local colleagues had received a much different perspective when they had tried to engage with the regulator's case team. Those officials' failure to return emails, provide clear guidance and demonstrate a willingness to cooperate to determine what "good" looked like had become a daily frustration. "I don't think that regulator understands what's going on within his agency," the individual commented after I explained how the official had explained his regulatory ethos to me. **This pattern repeated during the conference.** Regulators — and, to a lesser extent, legislators who were present — outlined the complex structural implementation plans designed to support each country's newly-minted digital rulebooks. There were cross-agency task forces. There were lengthy public consultations to co-develop codes of practice. There were open-door policies to help companies navigate the intricacies of data protection, AI and competition rulebooks that often overlapped in unclear ways. **"We want companies to come to us before there's** a problem," said another regulator. "We're not going to bite." **That contrasted with high levels of frustration from** company executives attending the New Hampshire conference. Many of these individuals skewed toward larger, multinational firms. Their presence at what was essentially an informal digital policymaking gathering for regulators, industry types and civil society also indicated they were more likely to be engaged in these conversations than the average corporate type. **Yet, conversation after conversation revealed** the structural asymmetry currently at play in how companies comply with the growing list of national and regional digital rules. One compliance-focused executive told me her global team kept an ever-growing excel spreadsheet of the legislative proposals that may eventually become law. In 2023, the list was around 30 (excluding US state legislation.) This year, the number had grown to more than 200 — and covered traditional staples like the European Union and United States, as well as more far-flung locations like Brazil and Indonesia. **"I don't need sympathy for having to deal with this** complexity," the individual conceded. "It's just that for most regulators, they have to deal with one, maybe two, sets of rules. I'm dealing with at least 15." **In truth, the first half of that quote is doing** a lot of heavy-lifting. At a time of sky-rocketing profits (at least for the world's largest tech companies), it's hard to have sympathy for companies' needs to comply with the global cavalcade of digital regulation. That is just the state of play in 2026. **But what I do have time for is the questioning** of the effectiveness of so many different pieces of legislation — and across multiple digital policymaking topics — that are coming into force at a speed that even regulators and lawmakers admitted in New Hampshire was a lot to handle. That's especially true when many national efforts across different agencies and legislative agendas were not joined up, leaving companies to often comply with potential contradictory regulatory guidance. **This digital translation problem — in which regulators** and companies speak past each other — is a worry. Effective oversight should not be viewed solely via the prism of blockbuster fines. Instead, it's the day-to-day wonkery of mundane compliance meetings, requests for information and annual submissions that is the bread and butter of good digital regulation. **Both regulators and (most) companies want that.** But what the New Hampshire conference demonstrated was a fundamental gap between regulatory intent and corporate experience in complying with digital rules. **Yes, there is a communication failure** in terms of how both sides approach these issues. But, more importantly, there is a structural mismatch — one that shows no signs of resolving — that will determine whether the current generation of digital legislation actually changes corporate behavior or simply generates compliance paperwork without fundamentally improving people's online experiences. --- ## Chart of the week **IF YOU HAVE BECOME ADDICTED TO EITHER** Chat-GPT or Claude to give yourself quick answers to complex problems, don't worry. You're not alone. **More than 40 percent of Americans** [**polled**](https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2026/06/17/americans-and-ai-2026-chatbots-smart-devices-and-views-on-impact/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)by the Pew Research Center now use these AI chatbots to search for information on a regular basis. That's a worrying sign for Google whose own service, Gemini, is now outdone by Chat-GPT when it comes to such AI-powered search. **There's a growing number of US states** passing AI chatbot legislation, in part to ward off harm to kids. But among adults, only four percent of those surveyed used these tools for "companionship." ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/06/Untitled-2-4.jpg) Source: [Pew Research Center](https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2026/06/17/americans-and-ai-2026-chatbots-smart-devices-and-views-on-impact/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## THE FINE LINE BETWEEN TECH SOVEREIGNTY AND PROTECTIONISM **IN BRUSSELS AND OTHER EU CAPITALS,** an awkward balancing act is underway. In the era of AI hype in which we currently live, policymakers are desperate to Make Europe Great Again via industrial policies that jumpstart AI-enabled growth. That often includes earmarking billions of euros in public funds for digital public infrastructure like [data centers](https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/competitiveness-coordination-tool-projects/ai-gigafactories%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and even [semiconductor facilities](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/chips-act-2?ref=digitalpolitics.co). The goal: to onshore technologies expected to dominate the economic agenda for the next decade. **Such policies are not much different to those** promoted by the likes of Canada and Singapore. Sure, the 27-country bloc's economy is exponentially bigger than those so-called Middle Powers. But the combination of public investment, onshoring of critical technologies and the promotion of "tech sovereignty" has now become one of the critical digital policymaking trends for 2026. **But where the EU stands apart from others** is the internal divide on what to do with its most important economic and diplomatic partner: the US. **To say that the winds have shifted against Washington** would be an understatement. Donald Trump's administration has made its position toward Europe blatantly clear. Europe, too, has hardened its stance toward the US in the wake of the [Greenland crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland%5Fcrisis?ref=digitalpolitics.co), which — if you had forgotten — happened less than six months ago. **That stand-off, in which a NATO ally threatened** to take over part of another NATO country's territory, led to a significant mind-shift for the US' staunchest allies in the bloc. It also reinvigorated a primarily French-led agenda to cut US tech firms off from parts of the European economy. That also included a renewed attempt to use the EU countries' national procurement rules and other industrial policy levers to back the creation of European champions amid the rush for technological sovereignty. **Yet with so much of European digital policymaking,** things are never that easy. While there has been a growing call to pull the plug on American Big Tech giants — with the misguided specter of a "[kill switch](https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-eu-internet-europe-us-trade-war-data-cyber/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)" repeatedly doing the rounds — many in Brussels are also aware of how unrealistic those ambitions currently are. **Let's leave aside the politics of the transatlantic relationship.** Almost everyone understands they are in bad shape. But EU officials (especially those within the European Commission) have crunched the numbers and come to the conclusion that the bloc can't simply pull the plug on US tech overnight. There are too many dependencies, too much investment required and too little technical know-how across Europe to conduct a 'rip-and-replace' strategy promoted by Paris and its allies. **This realism was baked into the** [**European Tech Sovereignty**](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-tech-sovereignty?ref=digitalpolitics.co)package announced earlier this month. Yes, there was the now must-have language about boosting EU economic output, onshoring critical technologies and urging member countries to determine which parts of their infrastructure needed to be "fully sovereign." But the proposals also didn't mention the need to pull back completely from long-standing allies — even if [some of the plans](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/proposal-cloud-and-ai-development-act-cada?ref=digitalpolitics.co) certainly nudged the EU away from US tech. **Such pragmatism, in which EU officials acknowledge** the inability to pull away from America, even while popular demand for such an approach grows, has left the bloc in a weakened position. **It would be one thing if Europe had gone "full protectionist"** by blocking non-EU firms from bidding for lucrative government contracts and imposing export controls on critical technologies. Yes, before you ask, the EU [does have some of those](https://www.asml.com/en?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **But policymakers have been insistent that Europe** doesn't want to go down the protectionist route. This is about "right-sizing" the current relationship with the US, they tell me. Europe is open for business. But it also wants to build things more at home (via domestic companies) than rely on technologies from partners no longer seen as 100 percent trustworthy. **That nuance may play well in the corridors of the** Berlaymont Building. But as an industrial policy, it leaves much to be desired. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **By attempting a "cake and eat it, too" policy** of both promoting European tech solutions while also telling the world you're open for business, the EU may fail to keep pace with the US and China. Both are pursuing more binary digital policy options. I'm not saying that's a certainty. But the complexities of Europe's tech sovereignty pitch — borne from the different political objectives of its 27 member countries — appears to be too slow, too nuanced and too unwieldy to compete on the global stage. **I don't think this approach was done on purpose.** Instead, EU policymakers are attempting to balance the demands from the 'rip-and-replace" brigade (led by France) and the market liberals (led by the so-called [D9+ countries](https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9881-2026-INIT/en/pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co)). It's also trying to navigate a transatlantic relationship with a White House administration whose own policy objectives can blow hot and cold, often within weeks. **It's not an easy balance. Many within the Brussels bubble** would prefer a scorched-earth policy of an immediate pull-back from relations with Washington and US tech firms, many of which have sided with the White House on tech-related foreign policy topics. The EU should be given credit for not giving into such rhetoric — and recognizing that such policies would not be practical over the short-term. **But in trying to straddle the divide between the bloc's** tech sovereignty ambitions, Brussels has fallen into a long-standing trap. It laid out sophisticated [policy objectives](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/eu-tech-sovereignty-data-access-2026/), only for those proposals to potentially fail to meet the geopolitical reality — and binary tech sovereignty alternatives — promoted by China and the US. --- ## What I'm reading **— The European Commission informed** Microsoft and Amazon that their cloud computing services were likely to be so-called "gatekeepers" under the EU's antitrust rules. More [here](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F26%5F1444?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The German government's independent commission** on online child safety published 56 recommendations on how to keep kids better protected online. More [here](https://www.bmbfsfj.bund.de/bmbfsfj/expertenkommission-veroeffentlicht-handlungsempfehlungen-290226?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The British government outlined five different scenarios** for how artificial intelligence could develop between now and 2030\. More [here](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-scenarios-2030-helping-policymakers-plan-for-the-future-of-ai?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Columbia University's Institute of Global Politics** explains how so-called "AI slop" is infiltrating the online information ecosystem. More [here](https://igp.sipa.columbia.edu/sites/igp/files/2026-06/AI%20Slop%20and%20the%20Information%20Ecosystem%5FIGP%20Report.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The Royal United Services Institute makes the case** for why access to the latest AI models is increasingly viewed via the lens of national security. More [here](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/gatekeeping-frontier-when-ai-access-becomes-national-security-concern?ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- ### Postcard from New Hampshire: The digital translation problem URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/digital-regulation-tech-sovereignty-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-30T11:00:23.000Z **IT'S TUESDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I have a confession: I have World Cup fever. And despite England's poor performances against Ghana and Panama, I can't help but whisper: [It's coming home](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJqimlFcJsM&themeRefresh=1&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **A couple of housekeeping points:** Apologies for the newsletter coming to you a day early. That's down to travel, but no excuses. I'll also be on vacation next week, so there won't be a Digital Politics edition on July 6\. Finally, happy early July 4th to all US readers. **— Regulators and companies are speaking past each other** when it comes to the litany of new digital regulatory challenges that lie ahead. **— Europe has drunk the kool-aid on tech sovereignty.** It risks putting its ambitions over the practicalities of implementing those proposals. **— Four out of every 10 Americans** now use AI chatbots at work. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### How social media bans can work URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/social-media-bans-platform-liability-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-22T11:00:10.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be speaking on this [panel](https://iapp.org/conference/iapp-navigate-leadership-summit/agenda/whos-liable-trust-in-digital-services?ref=digitalpolitics.co) about trust in digital services at the [IAPP/Harvard Navigate conference](https://iapp.org/conference/iapp-navigate-leadership-summit?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in Portsmouth, New Hampshire this week. If anyone is around in Boston on June 25, drop me a line [here](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonmail.com) to grab coffee. **— The United Kingdom became the latest country** to propose a social media ban for children. If others follow suit, this is how such bans should actually work. **— One of Europe's top courts just blew a hole in liability** protections for online platforms. It's the second time judges have upended this decades-old precedent in recent months. **— Digital industries added $18 trillion in market value** over the last three years. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The G6 vs United States URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/g7-digital-divide-ai-competition-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-15T11:00:19.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I just co-authored [recommendations](https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstreams/c7c64ddf-d897-45f2-a787-942d58a05cd3/download?ref=digitalpolitics.co) via a [researcher taskforce](https://www.sdruk.ukri.org/our-work/social-platforms-data-access-taskforce/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) for how the United Kingdom can approach social media data access. I'll also be speaking about platform transparency and independent research on a webinar on June 17 at 10am ET / 4pm CET. You can sign up [here](https://columbiauniversity.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN%5F0N0DJru5SV2dmT3lFNllYw?ref=digitalpolitics.co#/registration). **— Leaders of the G7 industrialized nations meet** in France this week. There's a growing digital divide between the United States and everyone else. **— A spate of recent digital competition rulings** demonstrates that you don't need snazzy new rules to oversee artificial intelligence. **— Let's compare Elon Musk's SpaceX IPO** with Brussels' online safety fine against X. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Sovereign AI: the timing problem URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/sovereign-ai-social-media-bans-2026/ Last updated: 2026-06-08T11:00:40.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I'll be speaking at this Harvard University/IAPP [digital conference](https://iapp.org/conference/iapp-navigate-leadership-summit/agenda?day=1&ref=digitalpolitics.co) in New England at the end of the month. If you're in Boston and want to meet, let me know [here](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **— The European Union, Canada and the United States** outlined dueling visions for sovereign AI. None of them is keeping up with industry. **— Australia laid out a game plan for social media** bans aimed at children. The country's early findings demonstrate the policy doesn't address the root cause of parents' anxieties. **— Two-thirds of future US data centers** will be built in rural areas. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Digital Politics at 100: What I got wrong URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/what-i-got-wrong-digital-politics-100-free/ Last updated: 2026-06-03T11:00:24.000Z **WELCOME BACK. THIS IS THE FREE MONTHLY EDITION** of Digital Politics. I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be speaking at an [online event](https://columbiauniversity.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN%5F0N0DJru5SV2dmT3lFNllYw?ref=digitalpolitics.co#/registration) about social media data access and attacks on independent research, organized by Columbia World Projects, the Centre for Digital Governance at the Hertie School and Tech Policy Press. It's at 16:00 CET / 10:00 ET on June 18\. You can register [here](https://columbiauniversity.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN%5F0N0DJru5SV2dmT3lFNllYw?ref=digitalpolitics.co#/registration). **This week's edition marks Digital Politics' 100th newsletter.** That's just under 260,000 words over 22 months on everything from Europe's stuttering digital rulebook to the United States' quixotic take on tech to the rise of the Middle Powers movement. **Not everything I've written stood the test of time.** So I went back over the last two years to figure out what I got wrong, and why. Call it a *mea culpa.* Digital policymaking moves fast and the geopolitics have only grown more complex since 2024. **Thank you for reading along the way.** I started this newsletter to understand what was going on around me. I find these dispatches a useful way of framing my thinking. I hope you also find it useful. To mark Digital Politics' ****100th edition**, I'm offering a centenary rate of $80 a year — locked in permanently — for anyone who subscribes between ****now and June 10**. That's the only time this rate will be available. If you've been reading for free and have been considering whether to support the newsletter, you can subscribe [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/centenary-offer). **Let's get started:** --- ## Move over digital cold war. Say hello to G2 frenemies **DONALD TRUMP HAD YET TO WIN THE** White House when I started writing Digital Politics. But shortly after his victory in November, 2024, I [laid out](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter022/) what I thought would be a digital policymaking slam dunk. Just like his first term, the newly-elected president would take an aggressively hawkish view on China. That would include the extension of tech-related export controls and other trade barriers to stop the world's second largest economy from dominating the era of artificial intelligence, electric vehicles and quantum computing. **All other countries — most notably the so-called Middle Powers** like Brazil, South Korea and the United Kingdom — would have to figure out how to balance the United States' expected harsh treatment of its geopolitical foe with their own needs to engage directly with China. **Fast forward to the middle of 2026,** and the picture is more nuanced than I had expected. **The aggressive stance of the Trump 1.0 administration** has softened into a more transactional approach to Beijing. Under direct pleas from Nvidia, Washington allowed the American chip giant to ship some of its most advanced semiconductors to China — although that has stalled due to American bureaucracy and a growing aversion in the Middle Kingdom toward relying on US-made chips. The US and China also mulled greater cooperation on AI governance during Trump's visit to Beijing last month, though details of what that would actually look like remain unclear. **"Relations between the United States and** China are better than they’ve been in many years," Pete Hegseth, the US Secretary of Defense, [told an audience](https://www.ft.com/content/0a601b2b-aeba-439d-8915-359f44cecf09?syn-25a6b1a6=1&ref=digitalpolitics.co) in Singapore on May 30. **Well, possibly.** A day after Hegseth's comments, a unit within the US Commerce Department [issued guidance](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/bis-guidance-may-31-2026.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that closed a potential loophole that could have allowed high-end tech, including Nvidia's semiconductors, from being sold to subsidiaries of Chinese firms located outside the country. It's hard not to see that as hawkish parts of the US government holding the line — just like in the Trump 1.0 administration — against any rapprochement between Washington and Beijing. **Confused? Yeah, me too.** What I thought would be a binary 'digital Cold War' between the world's two largest economies has morphed into something more complex. It's a whipsawing relationship that mixes genteel diplomacy, economic realpolitik and more mutually-reinforcing ties on tech than could have been expected 18 months ago. **That has knock-on consequences for Middle Powers.** If we were living in a binary world in which the US took an overtly hostile position to China (and ongoing friendly relations with long-standing allies), then there could be a consensus between democratic countries about the need to push back against Beijing. **We do not live in that world.** So far this year, more than 20 national leaders or countries' heads of state [have visited China](https://www.ft.com/content/177fa481-2c79-4815-97fd-f702d94aee82?syn-25a6b1a6=1&ref=digitalpolitics.co) as states from Canada to Serbia figure out the new G2 dynamic. Sure, many of these same domestic politicians have also visited the US. But just as relations between Beijing and Washington have become messy, so too have diplomatic ties between other countries and the world's remaining superpowers. **My initial digital Cold War framing was wrong** not because Washington and Beijing are now besties. It was wrong because I had assumed a level of joined-up thinking from American policymakers toward China that didn't pan out. Call it a managed incoherence — something that is significantly harder for Middle Powers to navigate. Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up for the Centenary offer [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/centenary-offer). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in May:** — The protection for children online runs counter to long-standing fundamental privacy rights; the use of AI to profile voters, not to create deepfakes, is the greatest challenge to the US mid-terms; Half of Americans polled are worried about AI. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter096/). — I crunched the numbers on how much sovereign AI would actually cost; Why digital antitrust efforts have not hobbled online advertising dominance; Spending on government AI systems will hit $80 billion in 2026\. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter097/). — The UK's political implosion is an apt metaphor for its flagging digital policymaking; Middle Power countries are finding their feet in the new "G2 era;" AI giants are massively subsidizing their consumer-focused products. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter098/). — Everything you need to know about the European Tech Sovereignty proposals; The pros and cons of Europe's social media accountability efforts; Internet shut-downs have risen four-fold in a decade. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/eu-tech-sovereignty-data-access-2026/). --- ## Countries just can't stop with social media bans **I DO NOT LIKE SOCIAL MEDIA BANS.** To be honest, I'm not a big fan of banning outright. There's almost no evidence that such moratoriums lead to the results that politicians and policymakers are looking for. The proposals are often caught up in parents' legitimate concerns about protecting their child from online harm. The fact that we are even contemplating these moves is a black mark against global platforms which have repeatedly refused to open themselves up to independent scrutiny. **Where I went wrong (**[**again**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter069/) **and** [**again**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter089/)**) was** assuming that national officials and lawmakers would either review the existing literature on banning social media for minors, or wait for the ongoing trial in Australia to show results (or not) before making their own judgements about cutting off teenagers from the likes of TikTok and Instagram. **More fool on me.** **By the end of the year, expect a number of countries**, including the UK and those within the European Union, to either have implemented nationwide bans or outlined proposals about how such initiatives will be phased in over the next 18 months. In an era of FOMO, kids' social media bans have become the digital policy that no country's leader wants to miss out on. **Some of this is down to pure politics.** No politician is ever going to lose an election by telling would-be voters that her aim is to protect children. It also highlights how the political mood music has turned against social media giants — even when these platforms are still readily used by the same lawmakers to reach the electorate ahead of domestic votes. **Some of this is down to policymakers** having few meaningful levers to quell the growing amount of online harm that bombards us all online. Countries' ongoing attempts at policing social media are more philosophical than practical (despite the growing list of enforcement actions.) Some platforms — at least those from the US — have embraced a 'free speech' ethos that has made their interactions with regulators increasingly adversarial. **Either way, I underestimated the political stickiness** of a digital policy that is not grounded in quantifiable evidence. The honest truth is that when parents are scared and platforms no longer have credibility, such evidence no longer matters — and the social media bans start appearing. --- ## The era of AI regulation is not over **I HAVE A BIAS TOWARD WESTERN DIGITAL POLICYMAKING.** I spend much of my time trying to understand the inner workings of what's happening in Brussels, London, Washington, etc. In those capitals, the shift away from hard-nosed rules toward artificial intelligence is pronounced. We are in an era of AI-driven economic growth and competitiveness. Within that landscape, AI rulemaking has taken a back seat. **But what I missed over the last two years** was a growing stable of AI legislation from countries outside of this Western-centric world view. That was a significant own goal at a time when everyone and their grandmother wanted to know what was happening with AI. **This AI policymaking has taken on various shades** depending on where you look. **Brazil offers the most like-for-like comparison** to what the EU has just rolled back on via its Digital Omnibus package. In Latin America's most populous country, the [proposals](https://oecd.ai/en/dashboards/policy-initiatives/bill-no-2338-of-2023?ref=digitalpolitics.co) include a risk-based approach akin to what Brussels has envisioned. That includes corporate risk assessments and a combination of regulators to oversee different AI use cases. Still, it has yet to be enacted. **Japan has gone a different route. Tokyo** preferred a more innovation-friendly [approach](https://fpf.org/blog/understanding-japans-ai-promotion-act-an-innovation-first-blueprint-for-ai-regulation/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that involved public funds for AI research, co-regulation with companies and voluntary guidelines over mandatory restrictions. There are no potential fines for wrongdoing. Instead, regulators can issue guidance, request information from companies and shame firms that do not comply. **Singapore, again, has charted its own path.** The small Asian country views its [domestic AI rules](https://cms.law/en/int/expert-guides/ai-regulation-scanner/singapore?ref=digitalpolitics.co) through the prism of export and trade. It announced a world-first governance framework for agentic AI and is now working on interoperability standards which would position the country as the go-to standards setter. **Many may argue these proposals are less** rule-making and more voluntary guidelines. Fair point. But the geographical scope of AI governance — and in this analysis, I didn't include what's going on in India and parts of Africa — is a trend that I underestimated. Just because Western countries are pressing pause on the AI legislation button does not mean other parts of the world are willing to wait around. **For sure, AI rulemaking is not thriving globally.** But a purely Western frame is no longer sufficient to understand where AI governance is actually heading. --- ## Chart of the week **MY BRAIN WORKS IN IMAGES, NOT WORDS.** So I used Anthropic's Claude to produce a chart of the most commonly-used phrases over the first 100 editions of Digital Politics to figure out what were the main themes over the last 22 months. **Not surprisingly, topics like social media** and artificial intelligence get a lot of play. So too did politically-sensitive themes and people like the Digital Services Act and Donald Trump. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/06/Untitled-2.jpg) Source: Digital Politics --- ## What did actually happen in Romania? **I WOULD NEVER PRETEND TO BE AN EXPERT** on Romanian politics. But when far-right politician **Călin Georgescu** won the first round of the country's presidential election in late 2024 — and Romania's constitutional court annulled his victory after irregular social media activity on TikTok — I [took a stab](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter019/) at what was going on. **My main point: national policymakers** and the European Commission were getting over their skis by accusing social media of swaying the election in favor of Georgescu, and that accusations Russia played a direct role in that online activity had yet to be proved. **I was wrong, to a degree.** **The role that TikTok played in the presidential election's** first round has yet to be proved. Despite a lot of fanfare from Brussels that it had started an investigation into TikTok's potential role, no public assessment — roughly 18 months after the fact — has yet to be published. EU officials rushed headlong into a national political mess, and incorrectly used the bloc's Digital Services Act as a tool to "fix" whatever had just happened in the European country. **But where I misjudged was the level of both social media** activity and Russian involvement in what turned out to be a litmus test for Romania's commitment to its EU membership. FWIW, pro-Western politician **Nicusor Dan** [eventually won](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/05/18/europe/romania-presidential-election-result-intl-latam?ref=digitalpolitics.co) the Romanian presidency in May, 2025. **Yet last year, TikTok** [**admitted**](https://newsroom.tiktok.com/continuing-to-protect-the-integrity-of-tiktok-during-romanian-elections?lang=en-150&ref=digitalpolitics.co)a network of 27,200 accounts, which operated through a fake engagement middle-man, attempted to promote a far-right political party and independent candidate Georgescu by posting comments on the platform at a mass scale. It's hard not to see that anything other than a wholesale attempt to use social media to sway the election — albeit how successful this covert network was is still debatable. **The links to Russia are also more likely than** I had initially thought. Romania's national security agencies [declassified](https://www.romaniajournal.ro/politics/iohannis-declassifies-documents-in-csat-meeting-revealing-operation-of-a-state-actor-to-promote-calin-georgescu/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) documents that revealed a sophisticated TikTok operation that involved reams of accounts — which had been dormant for years — suddenly posting like crazy weeks before the 2024 first round election. These tactics, according to the country's spooks, were prime evidence of a coordinated effort by a foreign adversarial country (though they did not name Russia.) **Elections are always messy. So, too, is analysis** trying to figure out what happened, in almost real time. What I missed was the level of sophistication of the covert operation to support Georgescu's campaign via TikTok — and its likely ties to the Kremlin. --- ## The Brits don't know what they are doing on digital policy **THIS ONE SITS CLOSE TO HOME.** As someone who has watched consecutive British governments try to articulate a vision toward technology over the last decade, the subsequent inertia — on everything from online harms to artificial intelligence to data protection reform — has been hard to swallow. I may not always agree with what Brussels and Washington do on digital policy. But at least I can see a somewhat coherent argument about how they go about their business. **Not so for London.** **In early 2025, I** [**laid out**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter027free/) **what could be the UK's** post-Brexit dividend toward tech. It included a doubling down on the country's existing digital rulebook as a means of making it the global centerpoint for so-called "RegTech" (that position has now been taken by Singapore.) It included a revamping of the UK's financial services sector and public funding options to support the country's leading tech industry. It included a plea for London not to blow hot-and-cold on digital rule-making amid a generational shift in geopolitics. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **Looking back, none of these proposals landed.** That's not surprising. The UK's ruling Labour Party finds itself amid a likely leadership challenge. The country's tech sector remains Europe's largest — although most of its firms eventually go public in the US or are bought by American rivals. Any form of Brexit dividend, in terms of using the country's digital rules as a differentiator in the global tech race, has been in short supply. **These recommendations still hold true.** What I misjudged was the political inertia that has made the UK an also-ran in the global digital policymaking discussion. It's hard to articulate what London stands for on tech — other than wanting to both entice foreign firms to set up shop locally and create populist digital rules like a potential social media ban for kids. **This is not a party political criticism.** The same woes confronted previously Conservative Party administrations. The UK is still stuck in the middle ground and lacks a vision for digital policymaking. I offered suggestions on how to fix that. Politicians had other ideas. --- ## What I'm reading **— The Knight Georgetown Institute assessed how** individual governments were implementing age assurance and how each proposal stacked up against the others. More [here](https://kgi.georgetown.edu/research-and-commentary/age-assurance-online/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The G7 countries agreed to voluntary commitments** on how to protect children online. More [here](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-welcomes-g7-agreement-common-principles-protecting-minors-online?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The European Commission published draft** guidelines for so-called "trusted flaggers," or independent groups that can raise issues with online content to regulators. More [here](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-seeks-feedback-draft-trusted-flaggers-guidelines-under-digital-services-act?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Softbank announced it would invest up to $87 billion** in data center infrastructure in France. More [here](https://group.softbank/en/news/press/20260531?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The Pope laid out his concerns about artificial intelligence.** More [here](https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/encyclicals/documents/20260515-magnifica-humanitas.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- ### Digital Politics at 100: What I got wrong URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/what-i-got-wrong-digital-politics-100/ Last updated: 2026-06-01T11:00:46.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be speaking at an [online event](https://columbiauniversity.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN%5F0N0DJru5SV2dmT3lFNllYw?ref=digitalpolitics.co#/registration) about social media data access and attacks on independent research, organized by Columbia World Projects, the Centre for Digital Governance at the Hertie School and Tech Policy Press. It's at 16:00 CET / 10:00 ET on June 18\. You can register [here](https://columbiauniversity.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN%5F0N0DJru5SV2dmT3lFNllYw?ref=digitalpolitics.co#/registration). **This week's edition marks Digital Politics' 100th newsletter.** That's just under 260,000 words over 22 months on everything from Europe's stuttering digital rulebook to the United States' quixotic take on tech to the rise of the Middle Powers movement. **Not everything I've written stood the test of time.** So I went back over the last two years to figure out what I got wrong, and why. Call it a *mea culpa.* Digital policymaking moves fast and the geopolitics have only grown more complex since 2024. **Thank you for reading along the way.** I started this newsletter to understand what was going on around me. I find the weekly dispatches a useful way of framing my thinking. I hope you also find it useful. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Postcard from Brussels: the digital sovereignty debate URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/eu-tech-sovereignty-data-access-2026/ Last updated: 2026-05-25T11:00:24.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and just like city buses, those of you in Brussels will get me showing up again next week as I brief members of the European Parliament on this EU budget [report](https://dfrlab.org/2026/04/29/the-case-for-supporting-democratic-resilience/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). If you want to grab coffee, ping me [here](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **— The digital sovereignty conversation in Brussels** is becoming more nuanced. But the political will to cut ties with the United States is still paramount. **— Countries looking to implement their own** social media transparency rules should learn from the European Union about what has worked, and what hasn't. **— Internet shutdowns worldwide have grown** four-fold over the last 10 years. **Let's get started:** _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Warning from the UK: how not to create digital policy URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter098/ Last updated: 2026-05-18T11:00:13.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and you find me filing this dispatch via dodgy wifi on the way to Brussels. If you're in town, I'll be at the CPDP conference most of the week. Let's grab coffee. **— The United Kingdom is again engulfed in political infighting.** The country's tech ambitions are equally on life support. **— In the wake of the recent China-United States summit,** Middle Power countries are using their unique digital industrial policy skills to navigate the new geopolitical reality. **— The world's leading artificial intelligence firms** are massively subsiziding their models to win market share. That is unsustainable. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### How much would sovereign AI cost? URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter097/ Last updated: 2026-05-11T11:00:44.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be in Brussels all next week for [this conference](https://www.cpdpconferences.org/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) (where I'll be moderating a panel on May 20 at 11:50 CET.) If you're around and want to grab coffee, ping me [here](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **— Countries want to build sovereign AI infrastructure.** I crunched the numbers to see how much that would actually cost. **— Digital antitrust cases were supposed to** rein in the power of dominant players. But when it comes to online advertising, market power is on the rise. **— Spending on government-focused AI systems** will rise 35 percent this year to over $80 billion. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### You say child safety, I say data protection URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter096free/ Last updated: 2026-05-06T11:00:26.000Z **WELCOME TO THE FREE MONTHLY EDITION** of Digital Politics. I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?skipRedirect=true&ref=digitalpolitics.co), and many of you were likely traveling to [RightsCon](https://www.rightscon.org/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) this week in Zambia. It looks like that global digital rights conference was canceled [due to pressure from China](https://www.rightscon.org/rc26-statement/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **I don't typically promote my day job**. But [this report](https://dfrlab.org/2026/04/29/the-case-for-supporting-democratic-resilience/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) outlining how the European Union's next seven-year budget can support digital democratic resilience has taken up a lot of my last six months. Enjoy. **— Protection for children online runs counter** to long-standing fundamental privacy rights. It's time to acknowledge those opposing forces in digital policymaking. **— AI-enabled deepfakes are flooding the US mid-term elections.** But it's the use of large language models to track voter behavior that is the real concern. **— Half of Americans polled remain wary** of how artificial intelligence is going to affect daily life. **Let's get started:** --- ## WHEN TWO DIGITAL POLICYMAKING TOPICS COLLIDE **IF TECH POLICY WAS THE MOVIE ZOOLANDER,** then online child safety would be "[so hot right now](https://www.youtube.com/shorts/eEUf7FtEVI0?ref=digitalpolitics.co)." Age verification required for app stores and digital services abound. Everyone under the sun wants an Australia-style child social media ban. Regulators from the EU, United Kingdom and United States are falling over themselves to announce child-focused investigations or inquiries. **Yet these efforts — often based on legitimate concerns** about how minors can be protected in the digital world — run counter to long-term data protection rules aimed at giving us all greater control over our online data. In many cases, privacy and child safety policymaking are pulling in the opposite directions. Often, officials who drafted a country's data protection oversights are not in contact with those pursuing child online safety goals. **It's creating a digital policymaking mess that** 1) does not end up protecting kids online; 2) fundamentally erodes digital privacy rights at a time of mass data collection and surveillance; and 3) leads to regulatory confusion that puts individuals at risk (at the same time) of both being surveilled more and made less safe online. **In short, the current status-quo is not working.** Let's break down the three tensions that remain unanswered. Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter087free/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in April:** ****—** Hungary's election shows the limits of misinformation/disinformation; Washington's digital trade policy is more joined up than you may think; How many Australian teenagers have been kick off social media? More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter092/). — The EU-US digital relationship is still on life support; What Ireland got wrong with its upcoming AI summit; Europe issued more than $1.3 billion in data protection fines in 2025\. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter093/). — How China, the EU and US are approaching the global AI race; Why Brussels is prioritizing kids and marketplaces under the Digital Services Act; Which US states are leading the way on digital legislation? More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter094/). — Europe and the US have two opposing takes on digital sovereignty; How the US FISA renewal fails to understand its global impact; AI models are getting "smarter" faster than ever before. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter095/). **A central component of many child safety regimes** is age verification and assurance. These efforts often rely on third-party companies collecting people's sensitive data (ie: passport details, credit card information and other data points to confirm they are older than 18-years old) before they can access specific digital services. As countries enact age verification/assurance provisions, a cottage industry of these providers have sprouted up to give the likes of Meta, TikTok and Netflix the ability to meet these legal requirements to check people's ages. **Much of this data is inherently sensitive,** under the definition of most countries' data protection rules. That distinction matters. It means that companies must collect the minimal amount of data required; that such information must be gathered for specific purposes (and not re-used for other efforts); and that, once that task is complete, the data should be deleted. That trifecta is the mainstay of Western privacy standards. **But the age verification/assurance requirements** run directly counter to those principles. In many cases, companies hold onto this sensitive data — and even collect more of it than technically necessary — to cover their backs in case regulators come knocking to check for compliance. That is a totally defensible corporate move. But it represents a potential data protection violation, under most countries' rules, because it fails the "trifecta" principle, outlined above. **Case in point: Spain's data protection authority** [fined](https://www.aepd.es/documento/ps-00164-2025.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) Yoti, a British age verification service, $1.1 million in March. That levy related to unlawfully processing people's biometric data; processing that data without the right consent; and holding onto that data for too long. Yoti [rejected](https://www.yoti.com/blog/thoughts-from-our-ceo-march-2026/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) those findings. But it's ironic that this fine occurred in a country that is [aggressively seeking](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y2nddvmryo?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to ban teenagers from social media — a pledge that will require hefty age verification to ensure compliance. **This contradiction plays into the second stumbling block** that few policymakers want to acknowledge. The ability to continually check that minors are not using barred digital services inevitably requires the creation of extensive digital infrastructure. That involves the likes of third-party age verification services like Yoti (and others), as well as internal corporate systems within app stores and social media giants to demonstrate that they are complying with these rules. **But what this growing digital infrastructure** demonstrates is that what may begin as child safety-focused efforts can quickly snowball into a more expansive data collection effort that may fall afoul of countries' existing privacy regimes. Those rules specifically require companies to only use people's data for the purposes initially outlined to those individuals. Say, to check their age before using a digital service. What those firms can not then do is use the same personal information for other purposes — without going back to people to get their separate consent. **Security experts, for instance, discovered that** a verification provider for the likes of LinkedIn, Roblox and Chat-GPT [also provided](https://cybernews.com/privacy/persona-leak-exposes-global-surveillance-capabilities/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) separate surveillance services for US and Canadian authorities. That included the ability to run almost 270 separate verification checks, including comparing facial recognition results against specific government watchlists. Persona, the company, denied it had used the verification data for government-related work. Though the cybersecurity researchers said there were few, if any, specific limitations if the firm decided to do so in the future. **The third friction is both philosophical and practical**. **Under Western privacy standards,** individuals have the right to access their data, delete it (where necessary), object to it being collected in the first place and correct it if the information is wrong. It's a basic democratic safeguard to empower people to control how their data is collected, stored and used. **Yet the child-focused age verification infrastructure**, as described above, fundamentally breaks the direct connection between individuals and companies that collect this information. If I'm using, say, TikTok, that platform may then outsource its age verification/assurance work to a third-party contractor that remains anonymous to the end user (aka: me). It's hard to object about your data being collected if you don't know who to complain to in the first place. **This may sound too academic.** But it has real-world implications. **IDMerit, a global identity verification company,** with operations in more than a hundred countries [was found](https://www.pandasecurity.com/en/mediacenter/customer-records-idmerit-unprotected/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to have left one billion records from 26 countries — including people's date of births, home addresses and personal ID numbers — unprotected in an online database. Because IDMerit (which focuses on the financial services industry) provided its verification services to other companies, few, if any, of the people involved were aware of the firm's existence — and therefore could not directly engage with the company over how it mishandled their data. **Extrapolate that data breach onto the emerging** digital infrastructure around child online safety, and the gap between individuals' rights and unaccountable (leaking?) databases becomes even more pronounced. **What is described above is not theoretical.** It is already underway — and pits legitimate privacy concerns against equally valid online child safety discussions. This is not a question of one policy topic taking precedent over another. We're living in gray zone somewhere in between. **But in the rush to protect children from digital threats,** the impact on other valid policy areas is woefully missing. Privacy rights — including those involving children — are overridden by the policy incentive to "do something" around child online safety. **That is a political decision by elected officials.** But we should acknowledge that it comes with significant downsides. --- ## Chart of the week **THE US IS THE KNOCK-OUT** global leader when it comes to AI. But wariness among its citizens about how the emerging technology will affect daily life has been creeping upward over the last five years. Currently, 50 percent of those polled by the Pew Research Center said they were more concerned than excited about the increased use of AI in daily life. That compares to just 10 percent who were more excited and concerned. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/05/Untitled-2.jpg) Source: [Pew Research Center](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/03/12/key-findings-about-how-americans-view-artificial-intelligence/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## THE AI THREAT TO THE MID-TERMS NO ONE IS TALKING ABOUT **WHEN AN AI DEEPFAKE VIDEO OF JAMES TALARICO**, the Democratic Senate nominee for Texas, [started doing the rounds](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/13/politics/james-talarico-ai-deepfake-republicans-midterms?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on social media in March, alarm bells started to ring. In the one-minute video, the faked video pictured a life-like Talarico speaking directly to camera — repeating old social media posts that he had written, often years before. The post ran with a "AI generated" disclaimer. But it was small enough for most would-be voters to easily miss it. **The word "AI slop" has entered public conversation** for a reason. Ahead of the US mid-term elections in November, concerns are high that the vote will be consumed with AI-generated attack ads and other social media posts that will make it almost impossible to discern fact from fiction. It does not help that Donald Trump continues to use AI to [depict himself](https://theconversation.com/what-trumps-post-as-a-jesus-like-figure-tells-us-about-political-messianism-281415?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and his enemies. **But we are missing the true use case of** artificial intelligence in the upcoming November election. And it should be engendering a lot more worry compared to the legitimate concern of the "AI-slopification" of the mid-terms. **The real election-related use case for AI** is discerning how best to convince people to vote one way or another. It comes on the back of ongoing mass data collection of US citizens' personal data (often via commercial data brokers) and the increasing use of sophisticated AI systems in all aspects of daily life. Combined, these trends are likely to provide political consultants and politicians powerful levers to pull in what is already turning out to be one of the most divisive American elections in recent memory. **There are party political divides on how** willing people are to use these AI-powered tools. A survey from the American Association of Political Consultants [found](https://www.axios.com/2026/04/14/republicans-ai-campaigns-democrats-2026?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that 64 percent of Republican consultants used AI in their daily work versus 49 percent of their Democratic counterparts. That's not a meaningful difference. But it does demonstrate Republicans' slight advantage in using the latest technology to reach would-be voters. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **So what does this AI-fueled political advocacy** actually look like? **One service called** [Resonate](https://www.resonate.com/solutions/politics-advocacy/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) **includes a dataset** of thousands of data points pulled from millions of American citizens. It uses machine learning techniques to understand voter behavior, craft targeted social media messaging and predict how individuals may vote. Another, [**EyesOver**](https://www.eyesover.com/political?ref=digitalpolitics.co), pulls in data from multiple social media sites and then uses AI to predict how that sentiment may affect specific political campaigns or activities. **Much of this is traditional political consultancy** dressed up to look like shiny AI-powered wizardry. But it's undeniable that with large language models becoming exponentially more powerful, the ability for these services to gleam greater insight into voter behavior — fueled by vast amount of data on individual voters — is expanding rapidly. **The most novel use of AI in this year's US mid-term** elections is something called "[silicon sampling](https://www.semafor.com/article/09/20/2024/ai-startup-aaru-uses-chatbots-instead-of-humans-for-political-polls?ref=digitalpolitics.co)." Companies are rapidly using AI systems to simulate voter populations instead of using polling to identify people's electoral intentions. In one case, [Aaru](https://aaru.com/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) used census data to replicate voter districts and then created AI agents to act like voters. Another firm, [MiroFish](https://mirofish.homes/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), relied on open-source AI models to forecast public opinion by equally simulating actual voters through the combination of multiple datasets. **On paper, this use case is more economic than** traditional analogue polling. But the reliance on large language models to simulate voters' intentions has some serious downsides. At the top of that list is the inherent bias that AI simulations create due to the inequalities baked into the models upon which they rely. These AI systems are only as good as the data that builds them. All current next-generation models are still biased in ways that almost certainly under-represent minority groups. That makes it likely that such AI simulations will also undercount minority voters in whatever AI-powered polling is run via these firms' glitzy dashboards. **Much of this is the realm of political consultants,** not would-be voters. And compared to the inner workings of AI-powered surveys and metrics, the visual nature of the threat posed by AI deepfakes can feel more urgent and tangible. But that does not mean this AI political wonkery is less of a threat. **Most AI-enabled divisive political content** is flagged almost as soon as it is published. Such material is inevitably high-profile. The response to it is equally highly-public. That is not the case for most back-office political consultancy work that relies more and more on opaque, data-hungry AI systems which now drive how political campaigns interact with voters. **It is just not public enough to garner most people's** attention. But the fact that such AI systems now form part of much of mid-term political campaigns should be a reminder that this emerging technology — like in much of our lives — is increasingly central to how political operations work. --- ## What I'm reading **— The European Commission** claimed that Meta's Instagram and Facebook failed to identify, assess and mitigate risks to minors under the EU's Digital Services Act. More [here](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F26%5F920?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— New Mexico's Attorney General proposed** a series of significant changes to Meta's business model and platform design as part of remedies proposed in a second trial against the social media giant that started on May 4\. More [here](https://nmdoj.gov/press-release/statement-from-new-mexico-attorney-general-raul-torrez-on-metas-refusal-to-protect-children/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— A group of academics tested how social media** and online streaming may be associated with varying levels of addictiveness. Across two survey groups, they did not find meaningful increases in addiction compared to the general population. More [here](https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/2eqs8%5Fv1?ref=digitalpolitics.co). — **Researchers polled Australian teenagers about** how the country's social media ban had affected them. They found that most were still on the platforms, but they would leave if their friends did too. More [here](https://bfi.uchicago.edu/working-papers/why-bans-fail-tipping-points-and-australias-social-media-ban/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The European Parliament published** an analysis on how Google's AI-powered snippets at the top of search queries affected publishers' revenue and overall media freedom. More [here](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2026/787211/IUST%5FBRI%282026%29787211%5FEN.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- ### You say child safety, I say data protection URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter096/ Last updated: 2026-05-04T11:00:42.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?skipRedirect=true&ref=digitalpolitics.co), and many of you were likely traveling to [RightsCon](https://www.rightscon.org/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) this week in Zambia. It looks like that global digital rights conference was canceled [due to pressure from China](https://www.rightscon.org/rc26-statement/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Protection for children online runs counter** to long-standing fundamental privacy rights. It's time to acknowledge those opposing forces in digital policymaking. **— AI-enabled deepfakes are flooding the US mid-term elections.** But it's the use of large language models to track voter behavior that is the real concern. **— Half of Americans polled remain wary** of how artificial intelligence is going to affect daily life. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The two sides of digital sovereignty URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter095/ Last updated: 2026-04-27T22:45:13.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I have a confession: I'm a big Star Wars fan. So if anyone is looking to buy me a birthday present, I'm just going to leave this [here](https://www.youtube.com/shorts/YPkxET%5FWWzU?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The European Union and United States have** contrasting philosophies on digital sovereignty. Basic differences mean each side routinely talks past the other. **— Washington is on the verge of extending** mass surveillance rules aimed at non-Americans. US lawmakers are fighting for greater safeguards for citizens — without addressing the legislation's impact overseas. **— The most advanced artificial intelligence models** have progressed faster at completing complex tasks than anyone once believed. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The global AI race deconstructed URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter094/ Last updated: 2026-04-20T11:00:07.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and with all that's going on with the United States government and Anthropic, [this interview](https://giftarticle.ft.com/giftarticle/actions/redeem/1815c720-82d3-40fd-acbd-aba142ca1cd6?ref=digitalpolitics.co) of **Dario Amodei** in the Financial Times' 'Lunch with the FT' series is worth a read. **— Here are the four policy trends from** Stanford's latest annual analysis of the global artificial intelligence industry. **— The European Union has a new** online safety strategy: kids and online marketplaces. **— New York, California and Texas are leading** the charge among US states to pass digital rules. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The EU-US tech relationship is still on life support URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter093/ Last updated: 2026-04-13T11:00:45.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**,** and Hungary's opposition leader, **Péter Magyar**, secured a landmark two-thirds majority victory in the country's parliamentary elections on April 12\. More on that [here](https://www.reuters.com/world/hungary-election-2026-live-viktor-orbans-fidesz-faces-challenge-opposition-peter-2026-04-12/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://www.dw.com/en/hungary-elections/t-19110577?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Brussels and Washington are still at loggerheads** over digital regulation, even as both sides seek a path forward. **— Ireland is giving the world what it doesn't need:** another global AI summit. **— The European Union issued, collectively, $1.3 billion in** data protection fines during 2025. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Hungary's election: the digital frontline URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter092/ Last updated: 2026-04-06T11:00:45.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and as someone who has a mostly hate-filled relationship with Microsoft products, this [post](https://www.threads.com/@atwoshirts/post/DWpvDZEDBlq?xmt=AQF06zoIThk%5Fhs2yitDl1SQfK%5FpLjbTUxwT9C1dUsWMSNIQnjY6ATW1DgnmN8jM5VPXAPi4&source%5Fsurface=35&slof=1&utm%5Fcampaign=wa%5Fth%5Fweb%5Flink%5Fct&utm%5Fsource=waios) reminded me that I am not the only one. **— Hungarians go to the polls on April 12** in arguably Europe's most important election in a decade. The digital side of the campaign has been a dumpster fire. **— We're a year on from the United States'** so-called 'Liberation Day.' Washington's approach to digital trade is more coherent than you may think. **— Roughly two-thirds of Aussie kids still have** social media accounts. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Platform governance goes to court URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter091free/ Last updated: 2026-03-30T12:00:39.000Z PRESENTED BY ![Sponsor Logo](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/03/Meta_lockup_positive-primary_RGB-3.svg) **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and as the war in the Middle East enters its second month, here's a [map](https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-map-shows-a-crude-ticking-time-bomb-that-hits-much-of-the-worlds-oil-supply-in-april-2c058db6?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that explains we are all in for major energy price hikes (or shortages) in April. **— American and European courts are doing more** for social media oversight than the growing list of online safety regimes worldwide. **— Middle Powers are now testbeds for different forms** of AI, competition and platform governance regulation. Some will work, others will not. **— Two-thirds of people polled worldwide say** they have used AI, in some form, over the last 12 months. **Let's get started:** --- ## **LITIGATION** VERSUS LEGISLATION? **ONE OF THE HALLMARKS OF DIGITAL** policymaking over the last five years is the drive toward national or regional online safety rules. The likes of Australia's Online Safety Act; the European Union's Digital Services Act; and the United Kingdom's Online Safety Act epitomize lawmakers' efforts to create greater accountability and transparency for social media giants. That, in turn, has led to a pushback from some of these companies and the United States (at least within the federal government), which criticized these rules as either being overly cumbersome or an illegitimate attack on people's free speech rights. **My** [**day job**](https://dfrlab.org/staff/mark-scott/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) **means I'm pretty clued up on** most of these (Western) online safety regimes. If you want a wonky policy discussion about [mandatory data access requirements](https://www.techpolicy.press/in-critical-condition-how-to-stabilize-researcher-data-access/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) or the inner workings of companies' [annual risk assessments and external audits](https://www.techpolicy.press/5-things-to-know-about-the-digital-services-acts-first-risk-assessments-and-audits/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), then I'm your man. Yet we [need to be honest](https://www.techpolicy.press/the-eus-online-safety-moonshot-is-losing-altitude/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) about the current state of play of these online safety regimes. They are often too cumbersome, under-resourced and overly-politicized to meaningfully improve people's experiences online — at least in the short term. **In contrast, four recent court decisions** — two in the US, two in the EU — demonstrate how judges and juries now have had a more significant impact on platform governance compared to the growing number of national/regional online safety rulebooks. For countries similarly seeking to create greater transparency and oversight for the likes of TikTok and YouTube, this "litigation over legislation" strategy may be worth pursuing. That's especially true given how the current White House is [embedding provisions](https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-containment-doctrine-how-united-states-using-trade-stop-digital-regulation?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to ward off future digital regulation in its trade negotiations with third-party countries. --- ***\*\*A message from Meta\*\**** Following [the Brussels AI Symposium](https://brusselsaisymposium.splashthat.com/?full%5Furl=https%3A%2F%2Fbrusselsaisymposium.splashthat.com%2F&ref=digitalpolitics.co), hosted by Meta with eco and EssilorLuxottica as supporting partners, the message from leaders was clear: the world needs a strong Europe at the table in this ongoing technological revolution. Read eco’s white paper [here](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/eco-association%5Fseizing-the-ai-opportunity-activity-7442510697462243328-KjOR?rcm=ACoAABch9asBMQmJLMx6bbQyCfG5mxAW5Syf9fc&ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- **Before we get to the court cases and their implications**, let's lay out two caveats. **First, it's not a question of litigation or legislation.** These policy levers do different things. For officials, it's more about potentially front-running lawsuits, based on existing statutory oversight, before more long-term online safety regulation can navigate countries' often labyrinthine democratic processes. Second, litigation often builds on existing regulatory playbooks, providing individual citizens the ability to fill in gaps where slow-moving — and often untested — legislation has yet to take hold. **OK, caveats covered**. Now, to the cases. I'll keep these brief, given how much coverage there has been, especially related to the American lawsuits. **In a one-two punch, two US courts** — one in California, another in New Mexico, respectively — took swings at Meta and Google and, separately, Meta. On March 25, a jury in Los Angeles [awarded](https://www.npr.org/2026/03/25/nx-s1-5746125/meta-youtube-social-media-trial-verdict?ref=digitalpolitics.co) $6 million in damages to a plaintiff who had accused YouTube and Instagram of deliberate design choices that had made her become addicted to both platforms. In response, both Meta and Google rejected those assertions and said they would appeal. Thanks for reading the free monthly edition Digital Politics. Subscribers receive at least four newsletters a month. If you've been forwarded this newsletter (and like what you've read), please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter058/#/portal/). For those already subscribed, reach out on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com **In New Mexico, a separate jury on March 24 found that Meta** had violated state consumer protection laws and ordered the tech giant to pay $375 million in damages. The case revolved around [accusations](https://nmdoj.gov/press-release/new-mexico-department-of-justice-wins-landmark-verdict-against-meta/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from the state's attorney general that the social media company's services were designed to maximize engagement for children without embedding the appropriate safety measures to protect minors. In response, Meta said it kept people safe on its platforms and would similarly appeal. **In Europe, a regional court in southern Germany** [upheld](https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ecf28b95-029e-4967-940c-1ba4bda3627d&ref=digitalpolitics.co) a complaint on March 11, initially filed by a local consumer protection agency. It required YouTube to stop online influencers from posting sponsored content if the underlying advertiser was not disclosed and clearly stated. The court decision is not yet final. But the preliminary ruling may force YouTube to place a "sponsored post" label across all such videos, as well as require content creators to make public who is paying for such ads. It's a clarification to the EU's Digital Services Act ([Article 26](https://www.eu-digital-services-act.com/Digital%5FServices%5FAct%5FArticle%5F26.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) related to how online platforms handle transparency issues related to online advertising. **Finally, a Dutch court on March 26** [**forced**](https://offlimits.nl/assets/politiek-en-recht/uitspraak-kort-geding-offlimits-grok.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co)Elon Musk's xAI to stop generating and distributing sexually-explicit images of people without their consent in the Netherlands — or face daily fines of around $115,000\. The case had been brought by [Offlimits](https://offlimits.nl/nieuws/offlimits-wint-kort-geding-tegen-grok?ref=digitalpolitics.co), a local advocacy group. It followed global outrage — and regulatory investigations — into how xAI's Grok artificial intelligence tool and X, which hosted it, had been used to create realistic deepfake explicit images of women and children. xAI's lawyers had said it was impossible to remove all such abuse from the social media platform. The company also stopped Grok from creating such images in early 2026, though the Dutch judge believed there was still reasonable doubt that xAI's attempts would be effective. **Four legal cases, four slightly different legal issues.** More lawsuits are pending, and the current cases may still be overturned on appeal. **Yet what is striking are the similarities between** these lawsuits — and what they do compared to slow-moving online safety regulation. **Two central criticisms aimed at legislation** whichtarget social media are that 1) These platforms have significant liability carve-outs for what people post online and 2) The likes of Australia and the UK's Online Safety Acts represent illegal attacks on free speech rights. The four separate cases, outlined above, mostly circumvent these issues by focusing on the design of these platforms, not on how they moderate individual social media posts. **This is a significant distinction and one, to be fair,** also baked into national/regional online safety rules. The point of these lawsuits was not to dictate what could be posted online. Instead, they took aim at the intrinsic design choices that the likes of xAI, YouTube and Instagram had made that, at least in the views of the American juries and European judges, failed to live up to these companies' obligations under existing legislation. It's hard to accuse these decisions of undermining free speech rights when they focus exclusively on the wonkiness of how content recommender systems operate or the transparency requirements related to influencers' sponsored posts. **The** [**Censorship Industrial Complex**](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digital-bridge/the-horsemen-of-the-censorship-industrial-complex/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**,** it is not. **The second meaningful difference between** these lawsuits and the ongoing conveyor belt of online safety regulation is how much more personal such litigation makes the potential harms associated with social media. **I can count, on one hand, the number of experts** who have read the EU's most recent [risk assessments and external audits](https://tremau.com/resources/dsa-database/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) related to how so-called Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines combat alleged systemic risks under the bloc's Digital Services Act. I joke. But only just. These documents run into the hundreds of pages; are inherently legalistic in both tone and nature; and — after two years of these reports being published — have not provided meaningful transparency for the average EU citizen. **In contrast, the often personal (and routinely tragic)** stories at the heart of such lawsuits, as well as the spectacle of high-profile tech executives taking the stand to defend their platforms, cuts through to the average social media user more effectively than decades worth of dense policy documents. They demonstrate the potential real world harms resulting from poor design choices that is just not possible via online safety regulation which, inherently, takes a systemic view of such problems. **Inherently, platform governance litigation** does something different than online safety legislation. It is not one over the other. But at a time when regulatory headwinds are gathering against countries' attempts to pass such regulation, a shift toward national courts — as a means to boost transparency and accountability for some of the world's largest companies by centering these debates in the lived experiences of individuals — is a much-needed step. --- ## Chart of the day **THE US LIKES TO THINK IT'S THE CENTER** of the AI revolution. And at least when it comes to where these systems are built, that certainly is true. **But Americans remain behind the curve** in the use of artificial intelligence tools and applications compared to their peers across both the West and the Global Majority, based on a worldwide survey conducted between Sept - Oct, 2025. **On average, 66 percent of those polled** said they had used such services over the last 12 months. At 88 percent, Nigeria was the most AI-savvy country compared with Japan where only 45 percent of people said they had used AI over the last year. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/03/ipsos_google_ai_use_2025.jpg) Source: [Google / Ipsos](https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/google-ipsos-multi-country-ai-survey-2026?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## MIDDLE POWERS: LABORATORIES OF DIGITAL POLICYMAKING **IN THE EARLY 1930s,** **THE US SUPREME COURT** justice Louis Brandeis referred to US states as so-called "[laboratories of democracy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laboratories%5Fof%5Fdemocracy?ref=digitalpolitics.co)." By this, he meant smaller jurisdictions, with the Union, could try different social and economic models without these experiments unduly harming all 50 states. I can't help but think of that expression as I look over the similar digital policymaking crucible underway in so-called Middle Powers countries, or states like Brazil, Japan and the UK that sit slightly outside the trifecta of global digital policymaking powers of the US, EU and China, respectively. **Taken together, three ongoing experiments** in each of these jurisdictions demonstrate how national lawmakers and officials are meeting local needs in an increasingly globalized digital world. They offer potential alternatives for other Middle Power countries that do not necessarily want to be rule-takers from global powers when it comes to digital competition, artificial intelligence and data protection. **First, to London. I** [**remain skeptical**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter027free/) **the UK** government (of all political flavors) has the will to implement a serious digital policymaking agenda. Other, that is, than one that prioritizes foreign direct investment over all other demands. Yet the country's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is slowly implementing the so-called the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers, or updated digital antitrust rulebook, that offers an alternative to the more bureaucratic approach under the EU's Digital Markets Act. **A quick snapshot about how these competition rules** operate. Under the [UK's regime](https://www.gov.uk/guidance/how-the-uks-digital-markets-competition-regime-works?ref=digitalpolitics.co), regulators first determine if a company has so-called "Strategic Market Status," and then create specific rules to ensure its dominance doesn't skew the market. Under the [EU's rulebook](https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/about-dma%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co), companies are designated as "gatekeepers," and then — collectively — European regulators determine if these firms' activities infringe on smaller players. **Before I get angry emails, yes, Doug Gurr** — a former senior Amazon executive – [was appointed](https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/ex-amazon-executive-doug-gurr-named-permanent-chair-uks-antitrust-regulator-2026-02-23/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) as chairman of the British competition agency in February. That has raised concerns the CMA will pull back on its digital enforcement work. But since early 2026, the regulator has issued two statements — one [linked](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-proposes-package-of-measures-to-improve-google-search-services-in-uk?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to how people/business interact with Google's search product; [another](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-secures-commitments-from-apple-and-google-to-improve-fairness-in-app-store-processes-and-enhance-ios-interoperability?ref=digitalpolitics.co) aimed at leveling the playing field in both Google and Apple's App Stores — that are worth tracking. **Both are designed to loosen these services'** control of what are now viewed as dominant parts of the online economy. Critics will say they don't go far enough to hobble these services. But the UK's revamped digital antitrust regime is designed to create bespoke interventions, based on individual companies' services, that may prove more nimble than the one-size-fit-all approach outlined within the EU's Digital Markets Act. **What's worth paying attention to**, for other Middle Powers, is whether the proposed changes in both Google search and the app stores gives greater breathing space for competitors, as well as allowing users to more easily swap to rival search products. If that does start to happen in the UK (and it's still an 'if,') then London's digital antitrust approach may be worth adopting. **Shifting gears — both geographically and thematically —** takes us to Japan where the country's [AI regulation](https://www.gov-online.go.jp/en/assets/hj%5Fnovember%5F2025%5Fp24-25.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) is now more than six months old. Unlike the top-down legislation outlined by the likes of South Korea and Europe, Japan has instead implemented mostly voluntary guidelines, backed up with expanded enforcement powers for existing regulatory agencies, to create a flexible approach to AI oversight. At least, that is what Tokyo would like you to believe. --- ***\*\*A message from Meta\*\**** On 24 March, The Brussels AI Symposium hosted by Meta with eco, and EssilorLuxottica as supporting partners, convened political leaders including European Parliament President Roberta Metsola and US Ambassador Andrew Puzder, Italian Vice Minister Valentino Valentini, and leaders across industry. The speakers struck the same chord: the world needs a strong Europe at the table in this ongoing technological revolution. Regulatory simplification to enable innovation and competitiveness is a necessity. Implementation must match the ambition. To learn more, read eco’s white paper [here](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/eco-association%5Fseizing-the-ai-opportunity-activity-7442510697462243328-KjOR?rcm=ACoAABch9asBMQmJLMx6bbQyCfG5mxAW5Syf9fc&ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- **The legislation also includes a public commitment** to [invest $6.3 billion](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2026/03/10/japan-investment-targets-ai-quantum-drones/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), over five years, in AI-linked emerging technology, as well as other high-tech industries like drones and quantum computing. The idea is to combine a co-regulatory approach to AI governance — again, supported by [stricter enforcement](https://arakiplaw.com/en/insight/2665/?ref=digitalpolitics.co#:~:text=In%20particular%2C%20companies%20are%20expected,process%20should%20be%20closely%20monitored.) from the likes of the country's privacy regulator — with direct investment in local firms competing on the globe stage. **Japan's approach stands somewhere between** that of the 'regulate-first' EU and the 'don't-regulate' US, albeit via an AI governance framework that relies heavily on voluntary corporate compliance. Still, it may represent a potential third way for other countries both concerned about how AI is rolled out nationally and wanting to support local industries in this global technology race. **Finally, to Brazil. Latin America's most populous country** [enacted](https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2026/03/brazil-establishes-regulatory-framework-to-protect-children-and-adolescents-online?ref=digitalpolitics.co) its so-called ECA Digital law earlier this month, specifically aimed at protecting children online. The regulation gained widespread traction after local YouTube channels [were found](https://www.techpolicy.press/brazil-wants-to-reshape-the-internet-for-kids-the-hard-part-just-began/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to be profiting off sexualized videos of children. **Key provisions** [**include**](https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2026/03/brazil-regulates-the-children-and-adolescents-online-safety-act?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**:** age verification requirements for platforms that host potentially inappropriate content for minors; such age-gating must take place when an account is created; providers of digital services must prevent addictive design practices like infinite social media scrolling; companies must remove child-related criminal content and notify authorities; a new law enforcement center was created to coordinate potential violations. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **What's different from other online safety regimes** is that it puts a significant onus on companies, not the government, to enforce individual provisions. That will inevitably create higher regulatory burdens for companies operating in Brazil — and some firms will likely pull out because of that. **But for other countries, which don't have the financial** resources to implement a UK-style Online Safety Act, the outsourcing of such requirements to digital services where much of the potential harm is housed may offer a way forward in adopting online safety regulation without similarly incurring hefty increases in public money to support such oversight. --- ## What I'm reading **— The Reuters Institute at the University** of Oxford delve into the online media/news habits of Generation Alpha. It's more social media, less websites. More [here](https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/understanding-young-news-audiences-time-rapid-change?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The DSA Observatory explains what lessons** it learned when its application for data access to privately-held social media data was rejected under the EU's Digital Services Act. More [here](https://dsa-observatory.eu/2026/03/12/if-at-first-you-dont-succeed-reflections-on-a-rejected-art-40-dsa-data-access-request/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The Oversight Board published recommendations** for how Meta should implement its community notes instrument across its global platforms. More [here](https://www.oversightboard.com/news/board-provides-country-level-factors-to-guide-community-notes-rollout/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— New York University's Center on Tech Policy** produced a comparison of the 60 bills, across nearly 30 US states, aimed at regulating companion AI chatbots. More [here](https://techpolicynyu.org/research-commentary/60-bills-in-60-days-state-ai-companion-proposals/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Almost 70 countries within the World Trade Organization** agreed to an interim pathway toward global rules for digital trade, even though a final deal is unlikely in the short term. More [here](https://www.wto.org/english/news%5Fe/news26%5Fe/mc14%5F28mar26%5F341%5Fe.htm?ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- ### Platform governance goes to court URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter091/ Last updated: 2026-03-30T11:00:57.000Z SUPPORTED BY ![Sponsor Logo](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/03/Meta_lockup_positive-primary_RGB.svg) **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and as the war in the Middle East enters its second month, here's a [map](https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-map-shows-a-crude-ticking-time-bomb-that-hits-much-of-the-worlds-oil-supply-in-april-2c058db6?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that explains we are all in for major energy price hikes (or shortages) in April. **— American and European courts are doing more** for social media oversight than the growing list of online safety regimes worldwide. **— Middle Powers are now testbeds for different forms** of AI, competition and platform governance regulation. Some will work, others will not. **— Two-thirds of people polled worldwide say** they have used AI, in some form, over the last 12 months. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Digital sovereignty: Hope versus reality URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter090free/ Last updated: 2026-03-29T21:32:41.000Z SUPPORTED BY ![Sponsor Logo](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/03/Meta_lockup_positive-primary_RGB-1.svg) **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I'm not sure about you, but the concept of putting data centers in space — [outlined](https://x.com/i/broadcasts/1yKAPMzlvgWxb?ref=digitalpolitics.co) by Elon Musk [over the weekend](https://sg.news.yahoo.com/elon-musk-announces-terafab-project-171718240.html?guccounter=1&guce%5Freferrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce%5Freferrer%5Fsig=AQAAAIbejugfP7Kdz%5FiSxrP6ZbNTHfjIZm4RsXrC0-QAR9Mb3LqDHCrmo15zBFYUEohaxFKf0e5nhS6t%5Fjahk8cYGmjzSl-Ijtx%5FwVFWMhgEw3LCL%5FTnvsVCw%5FC3abG9UH7D5cHyBRzzZwaCSJJ29yiZ1F4oKNQK9ytIK5WhGivtO7Ob&ref=digitalpolitics.co) via his so-called 'Terafab' project — doesn't feel like a top priority with all that's going on in the world. **— Europeans want to wean themselves off US tech**. Many just don't think it's a realistic option, according to polling from YouGov. **— Social media is awash with AI-generated** content about the US/Israeli-Iran conflict. Companies need to do better at flagging and removing these posts. **— About 20 percent of Americans have yet** to make up their mind about how data centers will affect their daily lives. **Let's get started:** --- ## THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH FOR EUROPE'S DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY AMBITIONS **THERE'S A NEW VIBE TAKING SHAPE IN MANY** European capitals when it comes to digital sovereignty. Once it was mostly French officials that spoke of decoupling from the likes of Amazon and Google. Now, policymakers and politicians in other European Union countries openly talk about paring back dependencies on companies that are perceived (rightly or wrongly) to be leaning too much into current United States foreign policy. **That comes in the form of national governments,** like the Netherland's [newly-formed coalition](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/dutch-parliament-calls-end-reliance-us-software-2025-03-18/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), seeking to replace services from Silicon Valley with those from European/national competitors. It comes in the form of billions of dollars of EU taxpayers' money [earmarked](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-factories?ref=digitalpolitics.co) for Continent-wide AI infrastructure to boost economic growth — albeit almost all of this hardware is powered by US-designed chips. It comes in the form of nascent projects like the [Eurosky](https://www.eurosky.tech/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) social media network, whose tagline is "Hosted in Europe, governed in Europe." **Taken together, it represents a hardening of political resolve** (though mostly in Western European countries) at a time of deteriorating transatlantic relations, an increase in geopolitical competition around artificial intelligence, and unanswered questions about who should ultimately control the digital services upon which we all now rely. **Yet is such policymaking chatter** matched by what the average European believes? That's a fundamental question that often goes unanswered. So I teamed up again with YouGov, the polling company, to find out. --- ***\*\*A message from Meta\*\**** On 24 March, Meta, with eco and EssilorLuxottica as supporting partners, will host The Brussels AI Symposium featuring European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, US Ambassador to the European Union Andrew Puzder and some of Europe’s foremost innovators. Does Europe have what it takes to seize the AI opportunity? Learn more [here.](https://brusselsaisymposium.splashthat.com/?full%5Furl=https%3A%2F%2Fbrusselsaisymposium.splashthat.com%2F&ref=digitalpolitics.co) \*\* --- **In early March, the firm ran a series of digital sovereignty** questions across the EU's largest countries, by population. That includes Spain, Germany, France, Italy, and Poland, respectively. The survey covered just over 1,000 respondents per jurisdiction. The questions focused on 1) Which digital services these individuals currently used, and where these companies were headquartered; 2) Whether people had considered switching from US to European options; 3) If respondents thought it would be a good idea to shift toward EU alternatives; and 4) Was such a "rip-and-replace" strategy realistic? **I come bearing both good news and bad news** — for either side of the digital sovereignty debate. **Let's start off with the current vibe among** Europe's largest countries. **Overall, roughly 62 percent of those surveyed** said it was a good idea for both European governments and businesses to replace US data storage, video conferencing and digital payment systems with those headquartered in the 27-country bloc. (See chart below). Italy had the highest level of support (67 percent), followed by Germany (65 percent); Spain (64 percent); and France (58 percent). **One point of caution. There was a significant difference** between the four Western European countries and Poland. In the Eastern European country, only 49 percent of respondents said it was a good idea — highlighting a reticence to give up American tech services in a country whose population remains more aligned with the US compared to other EU countries. Interestingly, though, 38 percent of Poles responded "don't know" to YouGov's question. That means a sizable minority had yet to make up their mind (or weren't clued up on the issue to pass judgement.) --- ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/03/eu5_sovereignty_support.jpg) Source: YouGov European Political Monthly Survey --- **So that's the case for the prosecution.** A significant percent of citizens in Europe's largest countries, by population, support digital policymaking to replace American tech with European alternatives. Job done. Case closed. **And yet.** Thanks for reading Digital Politics. If you've been forwarded this newsletter (and like what you've read), please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter058/#/portal/). For those already subscribed, reach out on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com **YouGov then asked a follow-up question:** how realistic was it for European governments and businesses to replace US digital services with those from Europe? This goes directly to the vibe question. People may want greater digital sovereignty. But do they think it's achievable? **That's where the pendulum shifted away from** Europe's more muscular policymaking. Overall, 41 percent of respondents across all 5 countries said it would not be realistic to go "full European" when it came to digital services. That compared with 40 percent of people who said it was realistic, and a further 19 percent of poll respondents who didn't know. **Again, the country-by-country differences** (see chart below) were illustrative. In Germany, Europe's largest economy, skepticism about replacing US tech ran at 51 percent. In France and Poland, that figure fell to 32 percent, respectively, while over 40 percent of respondents in each country said it would be realistic to shift from American providers to those from the bloc. --- ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/03/eu5_realism_by_country.jpg) Source: YouGov European Political Monthly Survey --- **This skepticism — in which 41 percent of those surveyed** said they didn't believe a digital replacement strategy for US tech was realistic — should raise red flags for EU leaders now openly calling for such a move. Yes, 40 percent of respondents said this US-to-Europe tech shift was possible. But when the majority (albeit only just) don't think it's achievable, you run into a perception gap that needs to be filled before pushing ahead with a potentially generational change in the types of digital services across the Continent. **Another point was important** via YouGov's polling. Roughly a quarter of people in all five countries didn't know whether it was a good idea or realistic to change from US to European services. That represented a significant education gap between policymakers and citizens, about 25 percent of which were not sufficiently aware of the issues to make a judgement via the Continent-wide survey. **Let's give an example of why this is a problem**. **France currently** [**wants to replace**](https://www.euronews.com/next/2026/01/27/france-to-ditch-us-platforms-microsoft-teams-zoom-for-sovereign-platform-amid-security-con?ref=digitalpolitics.co)US videoconferencing services like Zoom and Microsoft's Teams with local alternatives by 2027, in part for digital sovereignty reasons. Yet when asked about this policy via YouGov's survey, 89 percent of French respondents had heard little or nothing about the proposals. That's a failure on the part of Paris to communicate about why it was pursuing a "Made in France" strategy with a population, at least on paper, open to shifting toward more European tech services. **This "I don't know" minority is where the real battle** around digital sovereignty resides. Yes, the most digital-literate citizens (some of whom, I'm presuming, are reading this newsletter) already know which side of the debate they are on. Those positions are entrenched. Yet the one-in-four Europeans who have yet to make up their mind are likely open to persuasion — either for/against a shift away from US tech. **That represents a policy communication challenge** for European lawmakers, as well as US/EU tech firms seeking to peddle their wares across the Continent. Whoever can convince the 25 percent of the 27-country bloc's citizens that it's a good or bad idea to reduce the Continent's current dependence on US tech will likely carry the day in the battle around digital sovereignty. --- ## Chart of the Week **IN CASE YOU HAD MISSED IT**, there's a data center boom underway across the US. As tech giants vie for AI dominance, they are building out this energy-hungry infrastructure faster than you can say 'large language model.' **But a significant percentage of Americans** have yet to make up their mind if these data centers are good for them, the economy, and the environment, respectively. **Across five areas that the Pew Research Center** polled earlier this year, around one-in-five Americans were not sure on the impact of this fast-growing AI-enabling infrastructure. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/03/how_americans_view_data_centers-_impact_in_various_areas.png) Source: [Pew Research Center](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/03/12/how-americans-view-data-centers-impact-in-key-areas-from-the-environment-to-jobs/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## AI SLOP AND THE FOG OF WAR **ON THE EVE OF THE TWO-YEAR ANNIVERSARY** of Hamas militants attacking Israel in 2023, I wrote [this](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter066/) about how social media companies were not doing enough to protect users from war-related content, propaganda and illegal content. That was as true for the Israeli-Hamas conflict as it was for the more than 60 other active state-based war zones worldwide. **Fast forward five months, and this problem** has been turned up to 11 in the ongoing Middle East conflict. AI-generated videos and images — either depicting attacks against Iran, Israel or other parts of the Middle East — [are rife](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg8wvz427vo?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on the likes of [X](https://x.com/alshayakhliu1/status/2028781809526272026?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [Facebook](https://perma.cc/4LJ8-UG4S?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and [Instagram](https://perma.cc/D3PM-NSTH?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Some of this AI-powered content comes from official government sources (including from the White House's [social media accounts](https://www.instagram.com/reels/DV%5FR-VFDh%5Fc/?ref=digitalpolitics.co).) Other material is created by click-bait merchants seeking to monetize people's views via online advertising. **But beyond why people are posting such AI-generated** material, the key question is how social media giants — all of which are using their own large language models to oversee what is posted on these global networks — are failing to catch what is now an avalanche of AI slop directed at the ongoing war in the Middle East. **This was not how it was supposed to be.** --- ***\*\*A message from Meta\*\**** On 24 March, Meta with eco — the Association of the Internet Industry — and EssilorLuxottica as supporting partners, will host The Brussels AI Symposium. The event will feature European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, Andrew Puzder,US Ambassador to the European Union and leading European innovators to discuss what it takes for Europe to seize the AI opportunity. The Symposium serves as a critical conversation about how Europe can foster innovation and build on its strengths. Learn more about the event [here.](https://brusselsaisymposium.splashthat.com/?full%5Furl=https%3A%2F%2Fbrusselsaisymposium.splashthat.com%2F&ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- **Two years ago, many of these tech firms** committed themselves to (albeit voluntary) standards known as the [**AI Election Accords**](https://securityconference.org/en/aielectionsaccord/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Yes, these pledges were linked to that year's election-palooza worldwide. But companies from X and OpenAI to Anthropic to Google said they would develop/implement tech to "mitigate risks" related to deceptive AI election content; find and address such content on their platforms; and provide greater transparency to the public about how they went about those efforts. **A lot has changed between** 2024 and 2026\. These (again, voluntary) commitments were also specifically drafted around elections, not conflicts. But the pledges should be taken as a benchmark for company commitments to combat AI-generated harmful content — be that related to how people vote or how state-based conflicts play out worldwide. **On those markers, the companies are failing.** **There are multiple reasons why, and it's not all down** to a failure of social media giants to effectively police their networks. **The ability to produce lifelike AI slop is a** lot better, in March 2026, than it was in February, 2024 when the AI Election Accords were signed. The use of such techniques by state-based actors also complicates responses for companies seeking to navigate the increasingly complex geopolitical world of digital policymaking. The sheer volume of AI-powered posts — which, collectively, have garnered hundreds of millions of views across all platforms related to the most-recent Middle East conflict — makes any comprehensive response a mere whack-a-mole operation. **But it's also true that tech firms are not doing enough.** ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **After AI-generated fake conflict videos** went viral on X, for instance, the company [said](https://x.com/nikitabier/status/2028873177028555201?s=20&ref=digitalpolitics.co) it would suspend any account involved in such dissemination from its creator revenue sharing program for 90 days. "This will be flagged to us by any post with a Community Note or if the content contains meta data (or other signals) from generative AI tools," Nikita Bier, the company's head of product, wrote on X. That's a slap on the wrist for content that, at its worst, can foment sectarianism and offline attacks in what is already an incredibly hostile environment. **Then there's Meta. On March 10,** the Oversight Board, or group of outside experts (which, to be clear, is funded by the tech giant) [posted](https://www.oversightboard.com/news/board-calls-for-new-rules-on-deceptive-ai-during-conflicts/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) recommendations on how the company should handle "deceptive AI during conflicts." The suggestions — which, under the Oversight Board structure, are only voluntary — were linked to a [binding ruling](https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/fb-46usuh23/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on Meta related to an AI-generated post during last summer's [12-day conflict](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twelve-Day%5FWar?ref=digitalpolitics.co) between Israel and Iran. **Back story on that ruling: a video posted on Facebook depicted significant** damage to an Israeli city. It garnered more than 700,000 views despite a fact-checking organization debunking the content (via an identical post on TikTok) as AI-generated. Several Facebook users appealed to Meta for the post to be removed. The company, however, said the content didn't violate its policies, and it didn't require a label saying the video was AI generated. **The Oversight Board said this month** that the decision was wrong.Meta [said](https://transparency.meta.com/oversight/oversight-board-cases/ai-generated-video-in-iran-israel-conflict/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) it would comply with that ruling (but only on that individual post, per the outside group's mandate) within 7 days. **"Social media platforms need to provide automated,** technical and human-led solutions to limit harmful impacts of AI content intended to deceive, while upholding people’s freedom of expression," said the Oversight Board. Its recommendations included: 1) improved standards for determining how all online content was created; 2) new tools to detect AI-generated material; 3) greater human content moderation, including the use of outside fact-checkers and internal trust and safety teams. **At a time of corporate retrenchment** from such activities (and not just from Meta), such recommendations will likely fall on deaf ears. Conflict-driven AI slop will continue to go viral — even as social media giants try, often with reduced resources, to combat it. **As the Middle East conflict rages on,** social media increasingly is not a trusted place to understand what is going on in the world (editor's note: for that, read newspapers.) People are confused about what they see online. They often can not legitimately tell the difference between what is real and what is imagined. Without a significant rethink of how that trust can be rebuilt, the utility of social media as a source for news ([more than 50 percent](https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/social-media-and-news-fact-sheet/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) of Americans still use it for that purpose) is now in question. --- ## What I'm reading: **— If you're wondering about my sponsorship policy**, please check out my advertising ethics statement [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/advertising-ethical-policy/). Get in touch on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com if you have questions. **— Courtney Radsch explains the political pressures** coming from the White House on Europe's attempts to implement its online safety regime. More [here](https://courtneyradsch.substack.com/p/dispatch-from-europe-the-censorship?r=2nzssq&utm%5Fcampaign=post&utm%5Fmedium=web&triedRedirect=true). **— The European Democracy Shield centralizes** control, maintains officials' gatekeeping powers and institutionalizes a top-down approach to media literacy, [according](https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/european-democracy-shield-threat-free-speech-and-democratic-accountability?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to Paul McCarthy for the Heritage Foundation. **— The level of democracy across Western Europe** and North America is at its lowest level in over 50 years, primarily due to autocratic tendencies in the US, based on an [annual survey](https://www.v-dem.net/documents/75/V-Dem%5FInstitute%5FDemocracy%5FReport%5F2026%5Flowres.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from Varieties of Democracy. **— The Christchurch Call Foundation published results** of a survey into how best to study social media algorithms and the dissemination of terrorist and violent extremist content. More [here](https://storage.ghost.io/c/f2/8e/f28e0f52-893f-4369-bd17-6ef79707f882/content/files/2026/03/Christchurch-Call-Initiative-on-Algorithmic-Outcomes-Phase-2-Delphi-Report-1.pdf?ref=christchurchcall.org). **— As the United Kingdom mulls a potential kids social media ban,** the country's online safety regulator reminded tech firms of their obligations to keep children under 13-years-old off their platforms. More [here](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/protecting-children/keep-underage-children-off-your-platforms-ofcom-tells-tech-firms?ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- ### Digital sovereignty: Hope versus reality URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter090/ Last updated: 2026-03-29T21:33:18.000Z SUPPORTED BY ![Sponsor Logo](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/03/Meta_lockup_positive-primary_RGB-2.svg) **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I'm not sure about you, but the concept of putting data centers in space — [outlined](https://x.com/i/broadcasts/1yKAPMzlvgWxb?ref=digitalpolitics.co) by Elon Musk [over the weekend](https://sg.news.yahoo.com/elon-musk-announces-terafab-project-171718240.html?guccounter=1&guce%5Freferrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce%5Freferrer%5Fsig=AQAAAIbejugfP7Kdz%5FiSxrP6ZbNTHfjIZm4RsXrC0-QAR9Mb3LqDHCrmo15zBFYUEohaxFKf0e5nhS6t%5Fjahk8cYGmjzSl-Ijtx%5FwVFWMhgEw3LCL%5FTnvsVCw%5FC3abG9UH7D5cHyBRzzZwaCSJJ29yiZ1F4oKNQK9ytIK5WhGivtO7Ob&ref=digitalpolitics.co) via his so-called 'Terafab' project —doesn't feel like a top priority with all that's going on in the world. **— Europeans want to wean themselves off US tech**. Many just don't think it's a realistic option, according to polling from YouGov. **— Social media is awash with AI-generated** content about the US/Israeli-Iran conflict. Companies need to do better at flagging and removing these posts. **— About 20 percent of Americans have yet** to make up their mind about how data centers will affect their daily lives. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The era of kids social media bans is upon us URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter089/ Last updated: 2026-03-16T12:00:54.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I'll be speaking at the annual CPDP conference in Brussels in May about how to boost researchers' access to social media data in the name of platform governance. If that's your bag, come say hello [here](https://www.cpdpconferences.org/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Countries are barreling ahead with kids' social media** bans without assessing the evidence and failing to understand the likely collateral damage. **– Canada offers an example of how a so-called Middle Power** can both increase its digital sovereignty without cutting itself off from the global tech community. **— Europe's national agencies in charge** of the Digital Services Act come from markedly different regulatory traditions. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The AI military industrial complex URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter088/ Last updated: 2026-03-15T22:18:59.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and given what's going on in the world, we all need a little pick-me-up. For that, I give you [this story](https://news.sky.com/story/britains-loneliest-sheep-fiona-gives-birth-for-first-time-13506186?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from the United Kingdom. Enjoy. **— How governments deploy artificial intelligence** within their militaries is starting to divide between those seeking guardrails, and those who are not. **— The European Parliament is expected to outline** its approach next week to proposed changes to the bloc's AI Act. That will set off five-months of intense negotiations. **— Young Europeans are using AI tools** at twice the rate compared to the total population. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Postcard from Brussels: the digital vibe shift URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter087free/ Last updated: 2026-03-04T12:03:01.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO THE FREE MONTHLY EDITION** of Digital Politics.I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and the world appears to be veering out of control (again). You're here for digital policy. But for the latest on the evolving crisis in the Middle East, see [here](https://www.aljazeera.com/where/iran/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east?mod=nav%5Ftop%5Fsubsection&ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://www.lemonde.fr/iran/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://www.theiranist.com/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://mei.edu/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The mood within European Union policymaking** circleshas markedly changed when it comes to digital sovereignty, online competition and platform governance. **— The likelihood of a digital-focused transatlantic** trade war has risen significantly in the wake of the US Supreme Court's overturning of Donald Trump's tariff regime. **— Who's actually funding Europe's AI industry?** The answer isn't who you would think. **Let's get started:** --- ## THE NEW REALITY OF THE BRUSSELS BUBBLE **THE EU QUARTER CAN BE A STRANGE PLACE.** Among the glass-fronted European Commission buildings, the hustle and bustle of multilingual lobbyists and the cavalcade of European Parliament lawmakers that most people have never heard of, it's difficult to decipher fact from fiction. I've spent most of the last two weeks entrenched in the so-called Brussels bubble. I come bearing news: the EU's collective digital policymaking priorities are in flux — and a new reality is starting to emerge. **First, a caveat. This analysis is based on conversations** before the US and Israeli attacks on Iran over the weekend. Such an open-ended conflict will inevitably change political priorities, including those associated with tech. I don't know how that will shake out. Reader discretion is advised. **What is unmistakable, however, is that** three fundamental shifts are underway in how the 27-country bloc approaches digital policymaking. This shift is couched in 1) the deregulatory environment created by Mario Draghi's [2024 competitiveness report](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter004/); 2) the dominance of the center-right European People's Party across all EU institutions; and 3) a relegation of tech-related issues behind those linked to Ukraine and trade. **First, the EU is implementing a version of** digital sovereignty that will try to onshore infrastructure and seek to reduce the Continent's independence on US tech giants. This move began before Donald Trump's second term in the White House. But over the last 12 months, even staunch US allies in Eastern Europe and the Baltics have come to recognize that Washington can no longer be seen as a short-term trusted partner. That has jumpstarted a policy agenda aimed at investing public European money into local alternatives to gradually wean the bloc off US tech. **This is still an early-stage movement.** Many within more defense-focused policy circles fret that a so-called "rip-and-replace" strategy, which would see the likes of AWS infrastructure give way to a European alternative, would create systemic vulnerabilities which would not be in EU member countries' short-term national interests. More fiscally hawkish officials also worry that throwing EU public funds at often legacy industrial players — many of which are the only ones currently positioned to offer alternatives to Silicon Valley — would not represent good value for money. Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in February:** — Digital policymaking needs a fundamental rethink; US attacks against Europe's online safety regime are not really about the bloc's online safety regime; Southeast Asia still dominates the world's semiconductor industry. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter083/). — Public security and combating disinformation are increasingly intertwined, often in ways that should leave us feeling queasy; How Brussels' latest regulatory enforcement about TikTok plays into the EU's wider legislative agenda; Polarized social media has led to a public exodus from these platforms. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter084/). — Be wary of anyone at India's AI Impact Summit peddling easy solutions for AI governance; The rise of kids' social media bans is example of the lack of quantifiable evidence in digital policymaking; The Global Majority is missing from the global data center boom. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter085/). — What is, and what is not, working within the EU's Digital Services Act; Debrief from the AI Impact Summit: more trade show than policymaking; One-third of US teenagers use AI chatbots every day. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter086/). **And yet, my conversations with EU officials** over the last two weeks made it clear that such a "Make Europe Great Again" digital sovereignty strategy — including now open discussions of funding European alternatives to American social media companies — has been baked into the bloc's policy priorities. **Second (and this is related to the first point)** is a growing awareness and willingness to use the EU's digital competition rulebook to fast-track the newly-empowered digital sovereignty strategy. **While some officials and advocates would like** to pour money into European alternatives (and that inevitably will happen), others are taking a more nuanced approach. That includes galvanizing the EU's Digital Markets Act to reduce market concentration which, in turn, would open up space for European alternatives to flourish. **This strategy is based on the somewhat naive belief** that if only Big Tech didn't control the market, then a steady flow of European and non-European firms would be able to compete in everything from social media to online marketplaces to cloud computing infrastructure. Such a theory misunderstands the network effects from which consumers benefit when such services are bundled together — often at a cheaper price compared to buying such digital wares individually. **But as the DMA undergoes a current review,** policymaking hope to extend the competition levers within this legislation to more aggressively hobble US tech firms, as well as expand areas of interoperability so that smaller firms can build on top of these platforms by offering people the ability to connect often rival services to each other. This is already available for messaging services within the bloc, and some EU startups [now offer that ability](https://www.birdy.chat/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **Policymakers are also looking to extend** that functionality — and, goes the theory, reduce Big Tech's market dominance and boost the bloc's digital sovereignty — to the likes of social media. **Third: the era of vigorous enforcement** of the bloc's online safety and platform governance rules will be replaced by more nuanced policymaking aimed at balancing internal political priorities with those coming from outside the bloc. **That may sound odd, given** [**my take**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter086/) **on the EU's** online safety landscape from last week. But the political winds have shifted away from comprehensive enforcement on topics like platform design and disinformation (editor's note: this does not constitute illegal content under the bloc's Digital Services Act). In its place, there will be more kneejerk policymaking attempts around populist topics like social media bans for teenagers, which meet short-term priorities for national leaders without addressing the long-term harm derived from how these platforms are designed. **It would be wrong to think that attacks from the US** on the DSA had not played a role in this shift. The European Commission is a political beast. The repeated (and unfounded) claims that these rules equate to censorship of Americans' First Amendment rights have been heard at the very top of the Berlaymont building. **But, in truth, the shift away from aggressive, fast** and comprehensive enforcement of the bloc's online safety rules has been driven by a change in the EU's internal dynamics. **Many center-right politicians — and such lawmakers** now hold a majority in the European Commission, European Parliament and Council of the EU — are openly skeptical of the need for these rules. The complexities of implementing the DSA, in which Brussels enforcers are struggling to have a meaningful impact, have run up against shifting political priorities that promote deregulation and a more populist digital agenda. **That doesn't mean Brussels won't continue** enforcing the DSA. But it is no longer first among legislative equals as EU officials turn their attention to digital sovereignty and the use of the bloc's competition rules to lift up European alternatives to their US and Chinese competitors. --- ## Chart of the week **EUROPE WANTS TO GO IT ALONE ON AI.** But which investors lie at the heart of the Continent's strategic ambitions for the emerging technology? **The University of Amsterdam's Leevi Saari** crunched investment funds for all AI-linked European startups (including those from non-EU countries.) He then ranked which investors were central to these deals, ranking them on so-called "[betweenness centrality](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Betweenness%5Fcentrality?ref=digitalpolitics.co)," or a figure that measures the importance of certain actors in how the Continent's AI startups grow. **At the top of the list is French public investor** BPI France, which plays a central role in the country's AI scene. Only one American Big Tech firm — Nvidia — makes the list (at number six.) Top-tier US venture capitalists and Europe's billionaire class, like Xavier Niel, also underpin how AI investment works across Europe, based on Saari's analysis. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/03/Untitled-2.jpg) Source: [Leevi Saari](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.1177/10245294261429545?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## ARE WE HEADING TOWARD A TRANSATLANTIC (DIGITAL) TRADE WAR? **THE RECENT US SUPREME COURT 6-3** [**DECISION**](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1287%5F4gcj.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co)to invalidate 60 percent of US tariffs against third-party countries feels like a lifetime ago. In truth, it only happened on Feb 20\. The world is rightly preoccupied with other matters. But the ongoing global [omnishambles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnishambles?ref=digitalpolitics.co) should take away from the fact that the EU-US trade deal — known as the [Turnberry Framework ](https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreement-reciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co)— is on life support after the European Parliament [refused](https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-parliament-puts-us-trade-deal-ice-after-latest-donald-trump-tariff-hit/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to ratify it; and US President Trump threatened a new round of potential tariffs, including those that targeted the 27-country bloc (more on that below). **Trade negotiators, on both sides, are seeking a compromise.** Maroš Šefčovič, the EU's trade czar, held meetings with his US counterpart, and [said](https://x.com/MarosSefcovic/status/2025929030545874948?s=20&ref=digitalpolitics.co) that "full respect for the EU-US deal is paramount." **If only things were that simple.** **I still believe that any future transatlantic trade** beef would likely be limited to the offline, not online, world. The US runs a significant trade surplus with the EU on digital services, whereas it runs an almost identical trade deficit on non-digital goods. If Washington really wants to hurt Brussels (and other European capitals), then it makes a lot more sense to slap tariffs on French wine and German cars than it does to tax incoming digital services from the likes of <> almost no EU-based firm (I joke, but only just.) **This, however, is where things get sticky.** As part of the White House's new arsenal of potential tariff measures are so-called [Section 301 investigations](https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations?ref=digitalpolitics.co). These probes allow the US Trade Representative to look into any country's trading practices to determine if they are discriminatory or unfair against US firms. When it comes to Europe, the Trump administration has already made clear its anger toward the bloc's digital rulebook. **"The European Union and certain EU Member States** have persisted in a continuing course of discriminatory and harassing lawsuits, taxes, fines, and directives against U.S. service providers," the USTR [said](https://x.com/USTradeRep/status/2000990028835508258?s=20&ref=digitalpolitics.co) in late 2025\. "If the EU and EU Member States insist on continuing to restrict, limit, and deter the competitiveness of U.S. service providers through discriminatory means, the United States will have no choice but to begin using every tool at its disposal to counter these unreasonable measures." **Shots fired, if you will.** ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **There is still a long way to go before Washington starts** specific 301 investigations into Europe — let alone before it leads to a tit-for-tat trade war with Washington. US President Trump, however, is looking for any opportunity to impose new tariffs. And for the EU, that's most likely connected to the bloc's competition laws, known as the Digital Markets Act, and national digital services taxes, which almost exclusively are paid by American tech firms. **That contrasts with the public attention focused** by some in the White House against the bloc's online safety rules. Such ire may represent red meat in the ongoing culture war issue of platform governance. But for almost all US tech giants, the bigger issue remains EU digital competition rules and these unilateral digital services taxes. **If I was to be a betting man, I would put all my money** on upcoming 301 investigations to focus on these two digital issues in how Washington responds to last month's US Supreme Court decision. Former administrations, on both sides of the aisle, have raised objections to these laws. Competition rules and digital services taxes would neatly fix into the definition required to start such investigations. And the focus on tech — compared to more analogue products — provides the White House with a strong corporate lobbying constituency willing to back a more aggressive stance with Europe. **For now, such speculation remains what it is:** speculation. Officials' attention is also drawn elsewhere. **But in the coming months, I would** wager the US will attempt to use such digital-focused 301 investigations to force the issue. In response, Europe already has a suite of tech-focused tariff responses that would be aimed at Silicon Valley — including potential hefty EU tariffs and, if things really go badly, potential Continent-wide bans on certain digital services. **Hopefully, we do not get to such a stage**, for the sake of officials on both sides of the Atlantic. In the wake of the Turnberry deal (almost of which did not affect the digital world), most people breathed a sigh of relief that we had avoided a transatlantic trade war. That threat is now back — and all bets may soon be off. --- ## What I'm reading **— Chatham House published an analysis into** how so-called Middle Powers countries could navigate the dual hegemony of the US and China on AI. More [here](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/2026-02-13-sovereign-ai-strategies-sandoval-et-al.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— A report from Citrini, a research group,** into the potential labor force and market impact of mass adoption of AI led to a significant fall in US financial markets. Read the analysis [here](https://substack.com/home/post/p-188821754?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— We are living in a 'sovereignty paradox'** in which the more governments and companies try to build their own AI systems, the more they rely on a small number of foreign providers, [argues](https://www.thedigitalnewdeal.org/en/the-dependency-economy-of-ai/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) Damien Kopp for the Digital New Deal **— More than 60 data protection authorities** from around the world signed a joint voluntary statement on the privacy impact on AI-generated imagery. More [here](https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/speeches-and-statements/2026/s-d%5F20260223%5Fai/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The US federal government ordered all agencies** to stop using Anthropic's AI systems after it refused to meet certain commitments, including the use of its technology to surveil American citizens within the country and to power unmanned military equipment. Here is Anthropic's [statement](https://www.anthropic.com/news/statement-department-of-war?ref=digitalpolitics.co). And here is the [statement](https://x.com/sama/status/2027578652477821175?s=20&ref=digitalpolitics.co) from OpenAI's Sam Altman after the company agreed to work with the US Department of War. --- ### Postcard from Brussels: the digital vibe shift URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter087/ Last updated: 2026-03-02T12:00:42.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and the world appears to be veering out of control (again). You're here for digital policy. But for the latest on the evolving crisis in the Middle East, see [here](https://www.aljazeera.com/where/iran/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east?mod=nav%5Ftop%5Fsubsection&ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://www.lemonde.fr/iran/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://www.theiranist.com/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://mei.edu/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The mood within European Union policymaking** circleshas markedly changed when it comes to digital sovereignty, online competition and platform governance. **— The likelihood of a digital-focused transatlantic** trade war has risen significantly in the wake of the US Supreme Court's overturning of Donald Trump's tariff regime. **— Who's actually funding Europe's AI industry?** The answer isn't who you would think. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Postcard from Amsterdam: the online safety frontline URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter086/ Last updated: 2026-02-23T12:00:57.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and you find me in the Geneva airport after a weekend spent in the extremely snowy French alps. For those of you in Brussels, I'm in town until Thursday. [Let's grab coffee](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **— Europe's online safety community gathered** in the Dutch city last week. The two-day meeting showed what was, and what was not, working with Europe's digital rulebook. **— India's AI Impact summit is now over.** The international meeting was more trade show and lobbying fest than anything meaningful on AI governance. **— One-third of American teenagers use** some form of AI chatbot at least once a day. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The global AI governance bonanza URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter085/ Last updated: 2026-02-16T12:00:16.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I won't be in New Delhi for India's AI Impact Summit this week. For those of you who are, here's the [official agenda](https://impact.indiaai.gov.in/agenda?ref=digitalpolitics.co). God speed navigating the endless side events. **— This week's AI conference in India pits** different visions of the emerging technology against each other. You should be wary of all of them. **— The global rush to ban kids from using social media** is a prime example of the lack of quantifiable evidence used to make digital rules. **— The Global Majority is missing from the** worldwide data center boom. **Let's get started.** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Public security meets disinformation threats URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter084/ Last updated: 2026-03-01T17:41:52.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be in Amsterdam next week to present this [work](https://worldprojects.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/2025-10/building-capacity-report.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) at this year's [DSA and Platform Regulation Conference](https://dsa-observatory.eu/conference-2026/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). If you're also in town, drop me a line to say hi. **— As defense types meet at the Munich Security Conference** this week**,** the importance of protecting the online information environment from abuse has never been more important. But it comes with significant perils. **— The European Commission's latest regulatory move** against TikTok is less to do with potential harm on the platform, and more about sending a policymaking message, at home and abroad. **— The rise of a polarized social media** has led to many users disengaging with these online platforms. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Tech policy is now industrial policy URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter083free/ Last updated: 2026-03-03T21:56:42.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO THE FREE MONTHLY EDITION** of Digital Politics.I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be in Amsterdam and Brussels during the week of Feb 16, and then back in Brussels the week of Feb 23\. If you're around for coffee, drop me a line [here](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **Also, apologies to those of you** who are struggling to access the web version of this newsletter. There are ongoing technical difficulties linked with Ghost's back-end infrastructure. I'm working to resolve this asap. **— What defines digital policymaking is fundamentally** shifting from a focus on online issues to those that directly affect the offline world. **—** **American lawmakers are again debating** if Europe's online safety rules threaten the First Amendment. What is actually going on here? **— The world's semiconductor market** remains highly concentrated within East Asia. **Let's get started:** --- ## THE END OF TECH POLICY AS WE KNOW IT **FOR YEARS, YOU COULD DIVIDE DIGITAL POLICYMAKING** into three main camps. There was antitrust, privacy and platform governance. Some would argue that artificial intelligence deserves its own bucket. But, for me, AI fitted neatly into one of the three existing dogmas that underpinned decades of governance efforts linked to the online world. **That era is now over.** **It's not that antitrust, privacy and platform governance,** as topics, are either "solved" or relegated to the trash heap of history. If anything, these policymaking topics are now more pressing, in 2026, than at any other time in history. Yet it is time for those of us enmeshed in this world to acknowledge what has been on a slow burn for at least the last decade. Now, tech policy is as much an industrial policy issue — with all the political ramifications that come with that — as it is something that merely affects (and I say this with a pinch of salt) people and their interactions with some of the largest companies on earth. **By industrial policy issue, I mean the offline-online nexus** of topics that encompass everything from the climate change problems and employment issues connected to data centres to the high politics of semiconductor subsidies and global tariffs imposed on electric vehicles. These topics significantly expand from the "antitrust, privacy and platform governance" cocoon that many of us, including myself, have lived in as the world has woken up to the fact that what happens online inevitably has consequences for the offline world. **There are many reasons for this shift.** **In part, policymakers are fickle beasts,** and the rise of semiconductors, large language models and "digital sovereignty" has allowed many to expand their interests from often wonky digital policy topics to those that have a more direct effect on the world around them. Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in January:** — Why the decline of US tech leadership, the rise of China as an internet governor, the growth of AI slop around elections, and the implications of child online safety rules will define 2026\. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter079/). — Europe wants to revamp its digital rules. Its citizens aren't so sure; Washington's departure from more than 60 international organizations shows how US officials are tactically engaging with global digital issues; Who dominates the world of data centers. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter080/). — The transatlantic digital relationship has gone from bad to worse; Everything you need to know about India's AI Impact Summit; How many teenagers' social media accounts have been removed in Australia. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter081/). — After Greenland-Gate, Europe is taking the gloves off when it comes to digital sovereignty; ByteDance's sale of its US TikTok unit doesn't solve any of the underlying problems; Teenagers are more open to smartphone bans than you might think. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter082/). **It's also true that many of the global efforts** to update antitrust, privacy and platform governance rules — from the United States and European Union to Brazil and South Africa — have only had middling success. Some of that is down to policymaking being, well, hard. But the increasing geopolitical consequences (see the next section on the EU-US platform spat) of these decisions have often made actual legislating hard. Even those who have passed laws (looking at you, Brussels) must live with the reality that not all of their revamped digital rulebook has been the success that many had first hoped for. **National leaders have similarly embraced this** "industrialization" of tech policy with open arms. **Being seen to open a new semiconductor foundry** or data center is just better retail politics, in the short term, compared to the hard yakka required to pass child safety rules or unpick the oligopoly of a small number of Silicon Valley giants. It's not that some (but not all) lawmakers want to do those things. But it's an easier lift to return to political form via tax incentives and other subsidies to entice foreign firms to set up locally than to build complex coalitions to update national data protection regulation that few people actually understand. **I don't mean to denigrate this shift.** The world is seeking economic growth — often powered by artificial intelligence. Politicians and policymakers face hard trade-offs between updating national economies to meet these new demands and supporting the more traditional digital wonkery which has defined the last 12 years of my career. **It's also true you can have both** tech-driven industrial policy and digital policy that focuses on antitrust, privacy and platform governance. But what is becoming clear in 2026 is that many policymakers are shifting toward the former and away from the latter. That will require a recalibration for many (again, including myself) who feel more comfortable discussing the inner workings of *ex ante* digital competition reforms than how best to construct a federated system of data centres with the least energy footprint possible. **It's a mind-shift from almost exclusively focusing** on the online world — often with offline consequences — to acknowledging that tech-focused industrial policy includes a greater number of traditional "analogue" policy areas than many of us have been used to dealing with. **That includes a heavy dose of trade policy** as the world hurtles toward a zero-sum, mercantilist viewpoint where re-shoring, export controls and subsidies tied to foreign direct investment are as important as whether social media companies are held accountable for what is posted within their global networks. **It also includes a mishmash of policymaking** specialisms that combines digital policy with labor policy with climate change policy with public health policy with a myriad of other policy areas which all intersect in this expanded form of tech-related industrial policy. Such coalitions are hard to create. Everyone believes their subject area is the most important and, routinely, experts speak past each other in jargon that no one outside of these communities understands. **None of this should take focus away from** the ongoing problems associated with antitrust, privacy and platform governance. If Digital Politics can be read as anything, it's an indictment that within those three areas, there is still a lot of work to do. **But we should not remain siloed into what is comfortable** and overlook what is happening around us. National leaders — mostly spurred on by the AI hype — are wedded to this blending of tech and industrial policy in the name of economic growth. That will have knock-on consequences beyond the digital realm, especially as the global labor force tries to navigate the complexities of the current techno-enabled geopolitical uncertainty. **Just like in last week's** [**newsletter**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter082/)on the more muscular approach to digital sovereignty, within Europe, after the Greenland crisis, I do not yet have solutions to much of the complexity outlined above. It's going to be hard. But pretending that tech policy has not morphed into something more offline, more industrial and more multi-disciplinary would be a mistake. **It's time for many of us to evolve** to meet this new challenge. --- ## Chart of the Week **NOT ALL SEMICONDUCTORS ARE CREATED** equally. But in terms of total production, three regions — East Asia, the US and the EU — represented more than 90 percent of the collective global annual production, based on figures from 2024, the last full-year available. **Even that geographical breakdown** doesn't tell the full story. **East Asia, as a region, produces roughly** three-fourths of the world's microchips. Within that, Taiwan manufactures 60 percent of total global semiconductor production — a figure that rises to 90 percent for the most advanced chips. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2026/02/Untitled-2.jpg) Source: [Technology in Global Affairs](https://technologyglobal.substack.com/p/semiconductor-manufacturing-facilities) --- ## THE US TO EUROPE'S ONLINE SAFETY RULES: I JUST CAN'T QUIT YOU **YOU HAVE TO HAND IT TO CONGRESS.** They may not be able to pass any digital rules (with maybe the exception of ByteDance's [TikTok US offloading](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter082/)), but they sure like a hearing about how Europe is censoring Americans online. On Feb 4, the House of Representatives' Judiciary Committee will hold its second hearing entitled "Europe's Threat to American Speech and Innovation: Part II." Watch along [here](https://judiciary.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/europes-threat-american-speech-and-innovation-part-ii?ref=digitalpolitics.co) at 10am ET / 4pm CET / 3pm UK. You can read a report Republican lawmakers published to outline their arguments [here](https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/2026-02/THE-FOREIGN-CENSORSHIP-THREAT-PART-II-2-3-26.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **The hearing follows a** [**similar meeting**](https://judiciary.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/europes-threat-american-speech-and-innovation?ref=digitalpolitics.co), in September, which included British politician Nigel Farage comparing the United Kingdom to North Korea — because of the country's online safety regime, known as the Online Safety Act (editor's note: the UK is not like North Korea.) David Kaye, a University of California professor who gave evidence at the invitation of the Democrats, [suggested](https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/kaye-testimony-1.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) it was the US, not Europe, that was undermining free speech. **Some US politicians and influencers' aversion** to European online safety rules are well known. Accusations include subverting Americans' free speech rights; forcing platforms to crack down on legal speech online; and working with outside researchers to demote most right-wing social media users due to an alleged woke agenda. For more on what this looks like on the ground, check out my [dispatch](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digital-bridge/the-horsemen-of-the-censorship-industrial-complex/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from 2023. **First things first:** Europe's online safety rules are not about quelling free speech rights. Both the EU's Digital Services Act and UK's Online Safety Act enshrine protections for free speech into each separate legislation. (Disclaimer: I sit on an independent committee at Ofcom, the British regulator which oversees the country's rules, and anything I say here is in a personal capacity.) At their roots, these online safety regimes are exercises in transparency which are aimed at holding social media companies to their word on how they implement internal terms of service. **If these companies don't follow mostly** internal procedures — or, in the case of X, [flagrantly disregard](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F25%5F2934?ref=digitalpolitics.co) basic transparency requirements — then they will be held responsible for those actions. Such regulatory oversight is standard in sectors from financial services to pharmaceuticals. X is appealing its fine under the EU's Digital Services Act. **Many European officials believe they can** win over American critics by explaining the basics of how these regimes operate. If only we can make them understand the inner workings of mandatory risk assessment and audit requirements, goes the theory, then they will realize that no one wants to harm free speech. **That framing misses the point.** **If this was about the specifics of these online safety** rules, then it would be obvious — based on the actual reading of the documents ([here](https://www.eu-digital-services-act.com/Digital%5FServices%5FAct%5FArticles.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/50?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) — that censorship is not at the heart of this legislation. Or, if you don't want to scroll through those pages, read this from the European rules: > *"Providers of intermediary services shallact in a diligent, objective and proportionate manner in applying and enforcing the restrictions referred to in paragraph 1, with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of all parties involved, including the fundamental rights of the recipients of the service, *such as the freedom of expression*, freedom and pluralism of the media, and other fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Charter." (Emphasis in bold is my own)* **But if you read these American criticisms** as part of a decades-old attempt to hobble Europe from regulating US tech firms — in everything from antitrust, privacy and platform governance (see above section) — then these latest attacks on the Old World's online safety rules start to make sense. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **It's not specifically about which article** within the UK's Online Safety Act is alleged to silence Americans within the US (note: there are none.) Instead, it's part of an ongoing effort — albeit one on steroids — that includes many US politicians and policymakers pushing back against European concerns that American tech giants may not be playing fairly when operating on the other side of the Atlantic. **That goes for everything from Silicon Valley's** [alleged weaponization](https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-data-protection-gdpr-general-data-protection-regulation-facebook-google/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) of EU privacy rules to cement their dominance to ongoing claims that American social media companies are not transparent about what often polarising posts show up in Europeans' feeds. **It's notable that in the Feb 4 hearing** in Washington, another topic under discussion is how the EU's Digital Markets Act and other corporate transparency rules "target American companies and hurt innovation." It's hard to square how criticism aimed at Europe's online safety rules should go hand in hand with complaints about the Continent's digital competition rules. Unless, that is, you view these discussions as part of the wider — and decades-old — pushback from Washington against Brussels' (and, to a lesser degree London's) attempt to hold some of the US' largest firms to account. **None of that excuses the ongoing attacks** aimed at destroying the EU and UK's online safety rules — all in the name of protecting American free speech. Such rhetoric from some in the US has arguably made the European online information space more dangerous and harmful, in part due to [companies' willingness](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/07/business/joel-kaplan-meta.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to pull back on their online safety protocols to align with such American criticism. --- ## What I'm reading **— A tech entrepreneur set up a Reddit-style** social media that only AI agents could post to. Humans are relegated to just watching along. Check it out [here](https://www.moltbook.com/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The European Commission open two proceedings** into Google's obligations under the Digital MarketS Act. More [here](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F26%5F202?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The Netherlands is moving toward** ditching US tech services for those created either domestically or within the EU. More [here](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/marietjeschaake%5Faan-de-slag-coalitieakkoord-2026-2030-activity-7423106352819998721-cki5/?utm%5Fsource=share&utm%5Fmedium=member%5Fdesktop&rcm=ACoAAATsaZ8BQ5eV2dLTB4ajT1y1P-2vC9wlPbU). **— Maldita, the Spanish fact-checker, found** more than 500 TikTok accounts that produced AI-generated videos of alleged political protests in violation of its commitments under the EU's online safety regime. More [here](https://files.maldita.es/maldita/uploads/2026/01/6973f8eda0e1b.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The Irish regulator in charge of the EU's** Digital Services Act published guidance on how independent researchers could apply for access to private data held within social media companies. More [here](https://mailchi.mp/cnam.ie/vetted-researcher-newsletter-issue-8571724?e=1a689328fe&ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- ### Tech policy is now industrial policy URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter083/ Last updated: 2026-02-02T12:00:46.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be in Amsterdam and Brussels during the week of Feb 16, and then back in Brussels the week of Feb 23\. If you're around for coffee, drop me a line [here](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **Also, apologies to those of you** who struggled to open/read last week's [dispatch](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter082/). It was caused by an issue with Ghost's back-end infrastructure. Hopefully, it's all working this week. **— What defines digital policymaking is fundamentally** shifting from a focus on online issues to those that directly affect the offline world. **—** **American lawmakers are again debating** if Europe's online safety rules threaten the First Amendment. What is actually going on here? **— The world's semiconductor market** remains highly concentrated within East Asia. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### When Digital Sovereignty got real URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter082/ Last updated: 2026-01-26T12:14:57.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be speaking on a webinar hosted by the Knight Georgetown Institute on Jan 28\. The topic: how to improve access to social media data to support greater transparency and accountability. You can sign up [here](https://kgi.georgetown.edu/events/better-access-data-for-the-common-good/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) (the webinar starts at 11am ET / 5pm CET / 4pm UK). **— Even some of the United States' closest allies** are re-evaluating their ties to American tech amid growing concerns about Washington's worldview. **— It's official. ByteDance sold off its** US TikTok unit. But does the fire sale actually solve the underlying national security and privacy concerns? **— Many teenagers are OK with a smartphone ban** at school. They are less keen on their devices being taken away forever. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Is the transatlantic (digital) relationship dead? URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter081/ Last updated: 2026-01-19T13:34:02.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and, thankfully, I am not in Davos this week. For those of you who are, #thoughtsandprayers. I can only hope you have secured the [right badge](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/davos-badge-system-understanding-access-during-wef-week-mark-turrell-wuu6e/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— As EU-US tensions hit boiling point,** the faltering relationship between the world's most important democracies will be felt in the online world. **— There is a month to go before India's AI Impact Summit.** Here's everything you need to know ahead of the circus arriving in New Delhi. **— The results are in: Australia crunched the numbers** on how many under-16 year olds were booted from social media since December. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The People vs Digital Omnibus URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter080/ Last updated: 2026-01-13T12:00:08.000Z **THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS**. But it's not Monday. I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I apologize for the one-day delay in this week's newsletter. I've come down with what I really hope isn't Covid-19, so please forgive any typos in the dispatch below. Normal Monday transmission resumes next week. **— New polling suggests European citizens** may not be as keen about the bloc's digital revamp as policymakers and industry. **— The United States' departure from more than** 60 international organizations is another death knell in the open, interoperable internet. **– Despite global efforts, the US** still dominates the market for data centers. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### What will happen in tech policy during 2026? URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter079free/ Last updated: 2026-01-07T12:00:01.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO THE MONTHLY** free editionof Digital Politics.I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and Happy New Year! **As I plan for the year ahead,** I'm looking to arrange more in-person events — mostly because it's great to connect with people in real life. If that sounds something you'd be interested in, please fill out this [survey](https://forms.gle/JTCKbsgHGfZ7rvbRA?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to help my planning. **Just as the** [**last newsletter**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter078/)looked back over what happened in 2025, this first edition of the new year focuses on how global tech policy will evolve over the next 12 months. I've skipped the clichés — 'AI will consume everything,' 'Washington and Brussels won't get along' — to highlight macro trends that, imo, will underpin what will likely be a bumpy road ahead. **Some of my predictions will be wrong.** That's OK — no one's perfect. **What follows is my best guess at the topics** which will dominate 2026 at a time when geopolitics, technology and economic competitiveness have become intertwined like never before. **Let's get started:** --- ## The end of US digital leadership? **AS THE LAST** [**WEEK HAS SHOWN**](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/03/us/politics/trump-capture-maduro-venezuela.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**,** we're living through a very different reality for the United States' standing in the world compared to any time since the 19th century. Donald Trump's administration has blown hot and cold on digital policy, often preferring the analogue geopolitics of traditional Great Powers over the wonkery associated with artificial intelligence governance and digital public infrastructure. **Yet Washington will assert itself in global digital policymaking** circles in three ways during 2026\. How the rest of the (democratic) world responds will determine if the US can still hold onto the claim of leading the free world. Or, in a once-in-a–generation shift, will other countries will start to form different, non-US alliances that will increasingly sideline the Trump administration and other US lawmakers/officials? **I'm still not sure how this will play out.** But I'm increasingly coming to terms that as much as non-US officials/politicians want to maintain close ties with the world's largest economy, the last 12 months has cemented many people's view that the US no longer holds a leadership position on tech policy (if, frankly, it ever did.) **But I'm skipping steps.** Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in December:** — How the child online safety battle is a proxy for a wider battle around digital platforms; The European Union is not shifting its stance on tech because of the United States; Here's the price of what your personal data is worth. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter075/). — Exclusive polling from YouGov on what Europeans think about tech policy; What the White House's National Security Strategy means for US tech policy; How Washington linked digital to a spate of new trade/tariff deals. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter076/). — How Australia's social media ban is a response to policymakers' lack of understanding about how social media works; The international implications of the White House's proposed moratorium on AI oversight; The latest rankings of AI models, based on transparency indicators. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter077/). — The five lessons about global digital policymaking that I learned in 2025\. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter078/). **First, Washington will likely take a vocal position in** promoting the US "AI Stack" to the rest of the world. That includes connecting future tariff/trade deals with pledges from third-party countries to not pass comprehensive (or any?) AI regulation or legislation. It will also see US industry work hand-in-glove with the Trump administration, via the US Commerce Department, to offer financing support so that other governments can buy the latest wares from Nvidia, Microsoft and OpenAI. Those companies [don't exactly need](https://openai.com/index/introducing-stargate-norway/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) state-backed financing to make such deals. **This combination will stand in stark contrast** to what Europe and China [are similarly doing](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter060/) to promote their own AI stacks, at home and abroad. It will also likely force countries to pick a side — either accept the current US approach of no regulation and US infrastructure, or be perceived as a potential enemy to American "AI dominance." **Second, expect a more vocal pushback** against non-US competition rules (aka: the European Union's Digital Markets Act) and any form of online safety legislation (aka: the United Kingdom's Online Safety Act.) [**As I explained in the last newsletter,**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter078/) non-US digital antitrust enforcement is a bigger issue than the "Culture Wars" dog whistling associated with unproven claims that online safety rules are akin to free speech censorship. But as other countries like Brazil and Australia push aggressively ahead with checks on social media's power, as well as the ongoing enforcement of the EU's DMA and the UK's Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act, Washington will likely call out these countries in ways that force local officials to choose a side. **Many will not want to be put in that position.** But just as we saw with US officials' [sabre-rattling](https://x.com/SecRubio/status/1996974377003319667?ref=digitalpolitics.co) when the EU [fined](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-fines-x-eu120-million-under-digital-services-act?ref=digitalpolitics.co) X $130 million under its Digital Services Act, upcoming enforcement actions (via online safety and digital competition legislation) will lead to similarly vocal rebuttals from Washington. At that point, non-US policymakers need to make a choice: either implement local laws or kow-tow to Washington's demands. **Third, the US will almost certainly connect** the EU's digital rulebook, including the soon to be pared-back AI Act, with the simmering transatlanic trade war. It's hard to see how that makes much sense, given the US' trade surplus, in services, with the 27-country bloc. But Washington has already voiced concerns that the EU's digital legislation equates to so-called [non-tariff trade measures](https://unctad.org/topic/trade-analysis/non-tariff-measures?ref=digitalpolitics.co). This year will see such talk turn into action, potentially via increased tariffs on Europe's non-digital goods (where the bloc runs a trade surplus with the US). **If/when that happens, EU officials** will again be put in a tough spot. They will have to choose to shift gears on digital rulemaking — all in the name of saving French cheese makers or German auto parts manufacturers from hefty tariff hikes — or live with the consequences of bringing the so-called "Brussels Effect" into reality. --- ## The rise of China as the internet governor **I WILL ADMIT I'M NO CHINA EXPERT.** But even with my non-China focus, it's hard not to see Beijing taking an ever increasing leadership position on internet governance in 2026. **Even for me, this may sound geeky.** Bear with me. **Internet governance (and all the global standards** that come with it) is the backbone of how the current digital world works. For decades, it was the US that led, globally, to shape those conversations around an open, interoperable internet which has become the game-changing technology that we all know and love. **Yet over the last decade, China has positioned itself** as an increasingly important player. It has reshaped the conversation so that governments — and not other stakeholders like industry and civil society — are the key decisionmakers in how the next stage of internet governance protocols are negotiated. **This year will be when Beijing's steady rise** as the go-to internet standards provider comes into its own. **In part, that's down to the significant pullback** from Washington and a failure by other democratic countries to fill the breach left by the Trump administration's decision to turn its back on such multistakeholder negotiations. It also has a lot to do with China's clever diplomacy which has seen the world's second largest economy align itself with many Global Majority countries to create a coalition of the willing behind Beijing's authoritarian approach to internet governance. **Much of this year will be about framing** China's state-first approach ahead of the upcoming World Radiocommunication Conference next year in Shanghai. This four-year event is about finalizing an international treaty for how global radio airwaves (central to mobile telecommunication) are divvied up between countries. For a much more in-depth understanding of why this matters, read [this](https://www.komaitis.org/write-share-ignite/china-wins-the-bid-for-wrc-27-and-why-it-matters-more-than-you-think?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **That set-piece event will be preceded, in 2026,** with a full-court press from Beijing — especially within United Nations agencies where tech policy has taken on increased importance — to cement a state-first approach to internet governance. Without Washington to hold the line (and other democratic countries stepping into that position), Beijing will have much of the chessboard to itself. **This closed-doors diplomacy will define how much** of the internet over the next decade will be created. Mostly in China's image. --- ## The AI slop cometh for elections **TWO YEARS AGO, I WROTE A** [**SERIES OF STORIES**](https://www.politico.eu/politico-editorial-series-bots-and-ballots-artificial-intelligence-reshape-election-2024/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)that asked everyone to calm down about the impact of artificial intelligence on the election-palazoo that was 2024\. **Now I come with a different rallying cry:** it's time to freak out. **I still find it hard to suggest AI will** unfairly skew the outcome of any election this year. That doesn't give people enough credit for the complex decisions that we all go through in deciding who to vote for. Just because you see some form of election-related AI slop on social media doesn't mean, in general, that you'll change the way that you'll vote for a candidate. **Where I am concerned, however, is the level of sophistication** that such AI-generated now represents. It's not just the fact people can upload their images to OpenAI's Sora 2 and go crazy. It's also that digital tricksters (or opposing candidates) can bombard social media with such convincing fakery that some voters will start to question everything that they read/see/listen to online. **Here's a stat for you.** In 2025, more than 150 YouTube channels accumulated 5.3 million followers and created roughly 56,000 videos, with combined total views of almost 1.2 billion, that attacked British prime minister Keir Starmer with AI-generated fakery, according to a [report](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/dec/13/fake-anti-labour-video-billion-views-youtube-2025?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from Reset Tech, an advocacy group. That, unfortunately, is not a unique event after politicians from Ireland to the Netherlands to the US and Pakistan also were targeted via AI slop to undermine their campaigns. **Fast-forward to later this year,** and the 2026 US mid-terms look set to be defined as the AI slop election cycle, mostly due to the lack of legal checks on how such AI fakery can spread across social media within the US (despite a series of voluntary corporate pledges to combat this threat.) **Many of these posts will be so outlandish** as to be called out, almost immediately. But it's the slow drip of AI slop into our collective election mindset that worries me. As with all types of disinformation, it's not a singular piece of content that you need to debunk. It's the cavalcade of ongoing and repeated attempts to undermine people's trust in electoral processes — this time, via AI slop — that has me freaking out. **One AI-generated falsehood about a candidate** is one thing. But if you do that at scale (and now, almost at zero cost), as well as use AI tools to generate legitimate electoral material, then the dividing line between real and fake becomes so blurry as to not matter anymore. **Unfortunately, this year will be the turning point** into such mass election-related AI slop. --- ## The protection of kids online get real **WE'RE LESS THAN A MONTH INTO** [Australia's effort](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter077/) to keep anyone under 16 years of age off (most) social media. It's still too early to gauge the impact. But from such bans popping up from [Virginia](https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/new-virginia-law-to-limit-social-media-screen-time-for-kids/4035930/?ref=digitalpolitics.co#:~:text=A%20new%20Virginia%20law%20that,under%20the%20age%20of%2016.) to [Malaysia](https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2025/12/malaysias-proposed-social-media-ban-for-children-how-it-compares-with-australia-and-singapore?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to countries enacting separate legislation to determine the age of people accessing some online services, 2026 marks when policymakers' attempts to keep kids safe online become real. **Personally, I would prefer to embed 'safety by design'** principles across all of these services so that everyone, and not just children, are protected online. **But officials and lawmakers have decided that kids** should receive enhanced protection, and that will have both positive and negative consequences over the next 12 months. Either way, those who have promoted such checks will have to grapple with such policymaking efforts that will inevitably lead to unexpected outcomes. **One thing is clear: the age of anonymity online** [is over](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter055/). ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **Expect to be asked, repeatedly, to prove your age** when attempting to sign into popular digital services (if you haven't already done so.) Many of these requests will come via privacy-conscious mechanisms that will involve you providing some form of ID — or allowing your device to take a photo of your image — that will be quickly deleted once it has been verified by a third-party provider. **That, in theory, is how it is supposed to work.** But technology has a sneaky way of not working how it is supposed to. And when it comes to people's personal data, such sensitive information is likely to be misused/mishandled in ways that endangers people's privacy online. I don't know exactly how that will play out. But if history has taught us anything, it's that sensitive data has a tendency of leaking out in ways that people don't expect. The quick rush to prove people's age online is unlikely to be any different. **That's the downside. Now the upside.** **By narrowing the scope of online safety protections,** lawmakers worldwide are about to provide us a live testbed to determine which privacy-by-design principles work — and which ones don't. **Does the banning of teenagers' data** from serving up targeted ads make a difference? We're going to find out. Does it make sense to keep teenagers off TikTok until they can drive (in the US, at least)? Countries will give us that answer. Do facial recognition technologies provide accuracy when determining someone's age? We'll know pretty soon. **I still remain massively skeptical that** such kid-focused online safety efforts will make the overall internet a better place to be. Nor do I think children will overly benefit from such well-meaning policymaking. But by throwing the kitchen sink at the problem in 2026, at least policymakers will provide some level of quantifiable evidence to hopefully tweak existing, and future, rules aimed at protecting children from the worst abuse online. --- ## What I'm reading **— Several US tech giants altered their terms of service** over the holiday period in ways that potentially cemented their power over the digital world, [argues](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/dionwiggins%5Fdigitalsovereignty-bigtech-ai-activity-7412380250984312833-qSx6/?utm%5Fsource=share&utm%5Fmedium=member%5Fios&rcm=ACoAAATsaZ8BQ5eV2dLTB4ajT1y1P-2vC9wlPbU) Dion Wiggins. **— So-called 'data poisoning', or where** large language model's training data is manipulated to affect its behavior, is becoming an increasing risk, based on a [report](https://www.turing.ac.uk/blog/llms-may-be-more-vulnerable-data-poisoning-we-thought?utm%5Fsource=LinkedIn&utm%5Fmedium=Text%5Flink&utm%5Fcampaign=Turing-Blog%5FLLMs-may-be-more-vulnerable-to-data-poisoning-than-we-thought) from The Alan Turing Institute. **— After the US administration imposes visa restrictions** on 5 European researchers and ex-officials, one of those individuals, Imran Ahmed, sued to stay in the country. This is his legal [appeal](https://counterhate.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Ahmed-v.-Rubio-Complaint4.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— AI systems ability to accurately fact-check** live events remains poor and can lead to harmful outcomes, according to this first-person [account](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/epistemic-laziness-cautionary-experience-ai-fact-desi--avs2e/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from a US official. **— Europe must pursue a dual strategy of promoting** local technology providers while also maintaining close ties to non-EU tech companies are part of its digital sovereignty agenda, [claim](https://www.atlantik-bruecke.org/schneller-zur-digitalen-souveraenitaet/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) two German national security officials in Atlantik-Brücke --- ### What will happen in tech policy during 2026? URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter079/ Last updated: 2026-01-05T12:00:07.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and Happy New Year! **As I plan for the year ahead,** I'm looking to arrange more in-person events — mostly because it's great to connect with people in real life. If that sounds something you'd be interested in, please fill out this [survey](https://forms.gle/JTCKbsgHGfZ7rvbRA?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to help my planning. **Just as the** [**last newsletter**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter078/)looked back over what happened in 2025, this first edition of the new year focuses on how global tech policy will evolve over the next 12 months. I've skipped the clichés — 'AI will consume everything,' 'Washington and Brussels won't get along' — to highlight macro trends that, imo, will underpin what will likely be a bumpy road ahead. **Some of my predictions will be wrong.** That's OK — no one's perfect. **What follows is my best guess at the topics** which will dominate 2026 at a time when geopolitics, technology and economic competitiveness have become intertwined like never before. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### What I learned about tech policy in 2025 URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter078/ Last updated: 2025-12-31T07:20:17.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I hope you, like me, are getting ready for [Festivus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Festivus?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on Dec 23\. (Remember: it's for the rest of us.) My household already has its Festivus pole up, and is preparing for both feats of strength and the annual airing of grievances. **In all seriousness, thank you for all** the support this year. I hope you and yours can find time to rest and recover over the final weeks of the year. **One programming note: the first Digital Politics** newsletter of 2026 will be on Jan 5, so no edition next week. Happy Holidays. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Australia: whatever you do, don't call it a ban URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter077/ Last updated: 2025-12-15T12:00:34.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and after a few weeks of feeling burned out, I am now channeling [this guy's energy](https://www.threads.com/@themarissagold/post/DSDYj3LjmPr?xmt=AQF0LrdR5ooFIDUf%5FDfaHNgGfRyyv-OCgRVD-S6LWBh46V3Tvo0Yz4yNlXiLaZ%5Fm2goGh7w&source%5Fsurface=35&slof=1&ref=digitalpolitics.co) for the final weeks of the year. Enjoy. **— Australia's social media ban for teenagers** is an imperfect solution to deal with social media harms. But it's better than doing nothing. **— The White House wants to stop US states** from overseeing most forms of artificial intelligence. It's a move other countries should be wary of. **— How do the leading AI models rank** in terms of publishing data on how they work? Here are the stats. **Let's get started.** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### What Europeans really think about tech URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter076/ Last updated: 2025-12-08T12:00:04.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and you find me this week splitting my time between Berlin and Brussels. As we hurtle toward the end of 2025, this is my [current permanent state of mind](https://www.youtube.com/shorts/bdl68%5FSFMlk?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Almost there, folks. **— What are Europeans' views on digital policymaking?** I teamed up with YouGov, the polling firm, to find out. **— The United States latest National Security Strategy** reaffirms a step change in how Washington approaches tech. **— A litany of recent trade deals highlights** how US officials are linking digital policymaking with access to the American market. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The complicated world of kids' online safety URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter075free/ Last updated: 2025-12-03T12:00:45.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO THE MONTHLY FREE EDITION** of Digital Politics.I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be splitting my time next week between Berlin and Brussels. If you're around and want to grab coffee, [drop me a line](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **— We're about to enter a new paradigm** in how children use the internet. The global policy shift is a proxy for a wider battle over platforms' role in society. **— The European Union is shifting its approach** to tech regulation. But these changes are not down to political rhetoric coming from the United States. **— How much would you sell your personal data for?** France's privacy regulator figured out the sweet spot. **Let's get started:** --- ## WE'RE NOT IN KANSAS, ANYMORE **FOR THOSE INTERESTED IN KIDS ONLINE SAFETY**, it's been a busy couple of weeks — and it's not slowing down. On Dec 10, Australia enacts its world-first [social media ban](https://www.esafety.gov.au/about-us/industry-regulation/social-media-age-restrictions?ref=digitalpolitics.co) (editor's note: Canberra calls it a 'postponement') for children under 16 years of age. On Dec 2, the US House of Representatives' subcommittee on commerce, manufacturing and trade [debated](https://energycommerce.house.gov/posts/subcommittee-on-cmt-holds-legislative-hearing-on-protections-for-children-and-teens-online?ref=digitalpolitics.co) 19 proposed bills to protect kids online. That includes a [revamped](https://www.theverge.com/news/829492/house-energy-commerce-kids-online-safety-package?ref=digitalpolitics.co) **Kids Online Safety Act**, or KOSA, and the **Reducing Exploitative Social Media Exposure for Teens Act**, or RESET, that mirrors what Australia is about to enact. **In Europe, EU member countries just agreed** to a [joint position](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/11/26/child-sexual-abuse-council-reaches-position-on-law-protecting-children-from-online-abuse/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on how social media giants should handle suspected child online sexual abuse material. The biggest takeaway is officials' decision not to force these firms to automatically detect such illegal content on people's devices after privacy campaigners warned that would be akin to government surveillance. These national officials will now have to haggle a final agreement with both the European Commission and European Parliament before the long-awaited rules come into force. **To cap things off, the European Parliament** [passed](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20251120IPR31496/children-should-be-at-least-16-to-access-social-media-say-meps?ref=digitalpolitics.co) a non-binding resolution to ban under-16s from accessing social media — a policy that everyone from [Denmark](https://apnews.com/article/denmark-social-media-ban-children-7862d2a8cc590b4969c8931a01adc7f4?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to [Malaysia](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2025/11/24/malaysia-says-it-will-ban-social-media-for-under-16s-from-next-year?ref=digitalpolitics.co) is forging ahead with. US states from [Texas](https://calawyers.org/privacy-law/supreme-court-upholds-texas-age-verification-law-in-major-free-speech-decision/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to [Missouri](https://www.techradar.com/vpn/vpn-privacy-security/missouri-to-enforce-mandatory-age-verification-in-three-days?ref=digitalpolitics.co) also have passed legislation requiring app stores to websites to verify that people are over 18-years-old before accessing potentially harmful content/services. **There's a lot of nuance to each of these moves.** Much depends on the local context of each jurisdiction. **Globally, short-term attention will now focus on how** Australia implements its social media ban (or postponement) on Dec 10\. Tech firms [say](https://newsroom.snap.com/australia-social-media-minimum-age-law?ref=digitalpolitics.co) it'll cut children off from their friends online, as well as push them toward less safe areas of the internet that won't fall under the upcoming rules. Child rights advocates say Canberra's push to keep kids off social media until they turn 16 is a basic step after many of these platforms [have been alleged](https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/meta-buried-causal-evidence-social-media-harm-us-court-filings-allege-2025-11-23/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to promote commercial interests over children's safety. Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in November:** ****—** The EU's 'Jekyll and Hyde" tech strategy; The tech industry's impact on climate change has gone from bad to worse; The collective spend of tech lobbying in Brussels. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter071/). — Here are the tech policy implications if/when the AI bubble bursts; What you need to know about Europe's rewrite of its digital rules; ChatGPT's relationship with publishers. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter072/). — The European Commission's power grab at the heart of the bloc's Digital Omnibus; We should prepare for the end of an American-led internet; What devices do children use, and at what age? More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter073/). — The US' apathy toward its G20 presidency provides an opportunity for other countries to step up; Washington again wants to stop US states from passing AI rules; Internet freedoms worldwide have declined over the last 15 years. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter074/). **These policy battles are best framed around** the unanswerable question of which fundamental right should take precedent: [privacy or safety](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter059/)? As much as I believe some lawmakers' statements about protecting kids online are a cover for other political priorities (more on that below), it now feels inevitable we're heading toward a global [digital age of majority](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter069/) in which some online goods/services will remain off-limits to those under a certain age. **For that to work, a lot will depend on** how people's ages are checked online — and how such age verification does not lead to individuals' personal data leaking out into the wider world. Yet in the coming years, children will almost certainly live within a more curtailed online environment — though one that will still include significant harms. **But let's get back to those other political priorities.** **First things first: everyone can agree** that children should be protected, both online and offline. I would argue that all online users should have the same levels of protection now being rolled out for minors. That includes limits on who can interact with people online, bans on the most egregious data collection and usage, and safety-by-design principles baked into platforms currently designed to maximum engagement. **Many of those officials pushing for child-focus** online safety rules, worldwide, would agree with that, too. They just are aware that such society-wide efforts to pare back the control, addictiveness and business models of social media giants are a current political dead-end due to the extensive lobbying from these firms to water down any legislative/regulatory efforts around online safety. **This is not just the state of play in the US** where many of the world's largest social media platforms have embraced the White House's public aversion to online safety rules. From Canberra to Brasilia to Brussels, companies have successfully argued that such legislation can be an impediment to free speech and an unfair burden on commercial enterprises. **Even in countries that have passed such** online safety rules, officials remain extremely cautious about taking a too hard line on companies, often preferring self- or co-regulation, as a first step, before rolling out aggressive enforcement. **That's why there's been a significant shift** to focus on child-specific online safety rules worldwide. Yes, kids should be protected against harms more so than adults. But in framing legislation around the specifics of child rights, lawmakers can often sidestep accusations of censorship and/or overreach that would come if they attempted similar legislation for the whole of society. **I do not want to diminish the real-world harm** that social media can pose to children. Nor do I think kids' online safety legislation should be put on the back burner until a consensus can be reached on how to oversee the platforms, more broadly. **But as we head toward the end of 2025,** the disconnect between the growing number of online child safety efforts and the diminishing impetus (outside of a few countries) to tackle the society-wide impact of social media is hard to ignore. If lawmakers consider that data profiling, addictive recommender systems and online grooming — fueled by social media — are harmful to children, then why do they believe such practices are OK for adults? **Confronted with the current political reality,** however, lawmakers have made the tactical decision to pare back expectations on passing comprehensive online safety rules to focus solely on online child safety. It's deemed as a safer political bet to pass some form of legislation whose protections, in a perfect world, would apply to both minors and adults, alike. --- ## Chart of the week **IT'S BECOME A CLICHE TO SAY** that because none of us pay for social media, then we — and our data — are actually the product (served up to advertisers). **To figure out how much people would be willing** to sell their personal information for, France's privacy regulator surveyed more than 2,000 locals about their attitudes toward what price they would be willing to accept for such sensitive information. **Roughly one-third of the respondents said** they wouldn't sell their data at any price. But among the other two-thirds of individuals, the sweet spot fell somewhere between €10-€30, or $12-$35, a month. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/11/Untitled-2-4.jpg) Source: [Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés](https://www.cnil.fr/en/monetisation-personal-data-how-much-our-data-worth?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## What is really driving the transatlantic digital relationship **TWO SIGNIFICANT EVENT IN EU-US** digital relations have occurred in the last 12 months. **First, the European Commission has embraced** a deregulatory agenda spurred on by Mario Draghi's [competitiveness report](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter004/) from 2024\. This pullback was encapsulated by Brussels' recent so-called [Digital Omnibus](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/digital-omnibus-regulation-proposal?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that proposed significant changes to the bloc's privacy and upcoming artificial intelligence rules. [Here's me](https://go.bsky.app/redirect?u=https%3A%2F%2Ftechpolicy.press%2Fwhat-the-european-commission-and-civil-society-both-get-wrong-on-the-digital-omnibus&ref=digitalpolitics.co) on why the revamp isn't as bad as many suspect. **Second, Donald Trump became the 47th president** of the United States. Among his many White House executive orders, he [took aim](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-issues-directive-to-prevent-the-unfair-exploitation-of-american-innovation/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) at global digital regulation from democratic allies, particularly those enacted in Europe, as well as [pulling back](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on all rules (and international efforts) associated with AI governance. **The perceived wisdom is that these two digital geopolitical** events are connected. That in its efforts to maintain security and economic ties to the US, the EU has thrown its digital rulebook under the bus to placate increasing criticism from Trump's administration and its allies in Congress. **This theory is wrong.** **It's not that US officials aren't vocally lobbying** their European counterparts to rethink the likes of the Artificial Intelligence Act, Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act. They are — including US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnik's [recent comments](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2025-11-24/lutnick-says-deal-on-eu-metal-tariffs-depends-on-changes-to-digital-rules?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in Brussels to that effect. (What many misremember is that such criticism, although less public, also came from Joe Biden's administration.) **But to make the binary connection between Washington's** talking points and Brussels' digital policymaking rethink is to miss the complexities behind the current transatlantic relationship. **Even before the current European Commission** took over in late 2024, there were signs that EU leaders wanted to press the pause button on new digital rules. Brussels passed a litany of new tech regulation in the previous five years. National leaders and executives from European companies increasingly questioned if such oversight was in the Continent's long-term economic interests. **Then came Draghi's competitiveness report,** the comprehensive victory of the center-right (and pro-industry) European People's Party in the 2024 European Parliament elections and the return of **Ursula von der Leyen** as European Commission president, whose own interests in digital policymaking left a lot to be desired. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **That tilted the scales significantly in favor of greater** deregulation as Europe tried to bolster its sluggish economy, take advantage of AI advances and respond to European industry's claims that EU-wide digital regulation was hampering its ability to compete against US and Chinese rivals. **While that context has become mired in the** geopolitics of Washington's seeming reduced support for Ukraine, the main driver for Brussels' about-turn on digital rules is internal, not external, political and economic pressure. **That takes us to Washington's aversion to** digital regulation. **To be clear: this did not start with Trump 2.0\.** Throughout the Biden administration, US officials routinely scolded their European counterparts about hurting the economic interests of US tech companies. That came even as the former White House administration tried, unsuccessfully, to impose greater oversight on Silicon Valley via Congress. **Under the current White House,** such criticism — and potential trade consequences — has been turned up to 11\. But if you dig into how the Trump administration [approaches](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter036/) tech regulation, much of the pushback against Europe is more performative than it may first appear. **On digital competition, it's arguable that** the US Department of Justice is going further in its efforts to break up Big Tech than the European Commission and its Digital Markets Act. Yes, recent [legal rulings](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-wins-significant-remedies-against-google?ref=digitalpolitics.co) may have hobbled American officials' efforts. But Washington remains a strong advocate for greater online market competition — even as federal officials side with Silicon Valley in their aversion to international *ex ante* regulation. **On platform governance, it's too easy to suggest** US officials are wedded to First Amendment arguments as they criticize the EU's Digital Services Act. It's true that many misunderstand how that legislation actually works — in that it doesn't pass judgement on content, but instead reviews so-called systemic risks associated with how these platforms work. **But if you look at last year's** [**request for information**](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc%5Fgov/pdf/P251203CensorshipRFI.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co)from the US Federal Trace Commission concerning alleged "platform censorship," then many of the points could be taken directly from Europe's online safety rulebook. That includes demands that social media giants explain how they make content moderation decisions, as well as provide greater redress for users who believe they have been hard done by. That's an almost word-for-word copy of what is currently available under the EU's Digital Services Act. **I'm not saying Trump's criticism has not played** into the politics of Europe's digital rethink — including when certain enforcement decisions against Big Tech companies have been announced. **But it is just not true that Europe has caved in to** American pressure when it comes to its digital policymaking u-turn. Instead, there are sufficient internal pressures — both economic and political — from across the 27-country bloc that are driving the current revamp. **As for Washington, it's less to do with officials'** dislike for digital rulemaking, though one exception could be made for the White House's stance on artificial intelligence. For me, it's more to do with oversight of American companies originating from overseas — and not from Capitol Hill. **Within that context, it's best to view the** current statements from the Trump administration less as "no regulation, ever," and more as "leave the oversight of US firms to American lawmakers." --- ## What I'm reading **— The University of Amsterdam's DSA Observatory** sketches out the current state of play for enforcement under the EU's online safety rules. More [here](https://dsa-observatory.eu/2025/11/26/waiting-for-the-dsas-big-enforcement-moment/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The United Kingdom's Ofcom regulator** outlines non-binding rules for how online platforms should handle online harms against women and girls. More [here](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/illegal-and-harmful-content/ofcom-tech-firms-must-up-their-game-to-tackle-online-harms-against-women-and-girls?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The White House published its so-called "Genesis Mission"** to jumpstart the use of federal resources for AI-enable scientific research. More [here](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/11/launching-the-genesis-mission/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The European venture capital firm Atomico** published its annual report on the state of the Continent's technology start-up technology industry. More [here](https://www.stateofeuropeantech.com/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- ### The complicated world of kids' online safety URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter075/ Last updated: 2025-12-01T12:15:13.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be splitting my time next week between Berlin and Brussels. If you're around and want to grab coffee, [drop me a line](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **— We're about to enter a new paradigm** in how children use the internet. The global policy shift is a proxy for a wider battle over platforms' role in society. **— The European Union is shifting its approach** to tech regulation. But these changes are not down to political rhetoric coming from the United States. **— How much would you sell your personal data for?** France's privacy regulator figured out the sweet spot. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### A plan for next year's G20 URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter074/ Last updated: 2025-11-24T12:00:49.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and am wishing everyone a happy Thanksgiving later this week. For those who don't do 'Turkey Day,' a reminder: it's a month until [Festivus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Festivus?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The United States takes over the G20 presidency** in 2026\. On tech, it's time other countries stepped up to fill the void. **— Washington wants to stop US states from passing** AI legislation despite Alabama to Wisconsin becoming a testing ground for digital rulemaking. **— Internet freedoms worldwide have declined** progressively over the last 15 years. **Let's get started** --- _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Brussels' digital power grab URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter073/ Last updated: 2025-11-17T12:00:17.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and am getting a serious case of [SAD](https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/seasonal-affective-disorder/symptoms-causes/syc-20364651?ref=digitalpolitics.co) now that the weather has turned. Luckily, someone created this [playlist](https://open.spotify.com/playlist/7ubETYcFg1ESzpiZnGeWUB?si=69c49ed20fc542ab&ref=digitalpolitics.co) to make everything just a little bit better. **— The European Commission has big plans** for digital. A lot of it means giving more power and control to Brussels. **— Are we reaching the end of an American internet?** **— Almost 40 percent of children under** 2-years old have access to a smartphone. Here are the figures to prove it. **Let's get started** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Tech policy when the AI bubble bursts URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter072/ Last updated: 2025-11-10T12:00:16.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?skipRedirect=true&ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I'm writing this newsletter on a Eurostar train to Brussels with patchy internet. Bear with me. **If you're interested in understanding what** digital policymaking trends will likely dominate the agenda next year, please join me for a dinner in Brussels — in cooperation with YouGov and Microsoft — on **Dec 10**. Sign up is [here](https://forms.gle/UbcC3Fo8WENT9Tk2A?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and invites will go out by the end of the week. **— Fears are growing that the artificial intelligence boom** is about to pop. There are significant policy implications if that happens. **— Brussels is readying itself for a major revamp** of the European Union's digital rulebook. Here's what you need to know. **— A look inside which publishers' content** is served up when people use ChatGPT. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Europe's 'Jekyll and Hyde' tech strategy URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter071free/ Last updated: 2025-12-03T00:39:17.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and have partnered with **YouGov** and **Microsoft** for a dinner in Brussels on **Dec 10** to recap the digital policymaking highlights of 2025 and to look ahead to what is in store for next year. If you would like to attend, please let me know [**here**](https://forms.gle/HUn6QcFqeVKqVhdj7?ref=digitalpolitics.co). The event will include exclusive insight from YouGov on Europeans' attitudes toward technology. Spaces are limited, so let me know asap. **— November will again show how much** the European Union is split over the bloc's strategy toward technology. **— The annual climate change talks begin in Brazil** on Nov 10\. The tech industry's impact has gone from bad to worse. **— Big Tech firms have massively increased their** spending on tech lobbying within the EU institutions. Here are the stats. **Let's get started:** --- ## IT'S THE EU, AND IT'S HERE TO HELP **IT'S GOING TO BE A BUSY MONTH.** On Nov 18, France and Germany will gather officials, industry executives and (just a few) civil society groups in Berlin for the so-called "[Summit on European Digital Sovereignty](https://archive.ph/e4Sng?ref=digitalpolitics.co)." The [one-day conference](https://archive.ph/KNVz3?ref=digitalpolitics.co) (as well as a [series of side events](https://archive.ph/Nkstq?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) is aimed at figuring out what the European Union's position on the topic should be — despite more than five years since the concept of digital sovereignty [started during the rounds](https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/28/europe-technology-silicon-valley-059988?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in Brussels. **Then, on Nov 19, the European Commission** is expected to announce its so-called "[**Digital Omnibus**](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-collects-feedback-simplify-rules-data-cybersecurity-and-artificial-intelligence-upcoming?ref=digitalpolitics.co)," or Continent-wide effort to simplify the bloc's tech rules, primarily focused around the Artificial Intelligence Act, General Data Protection Regulation, Cybersecurity Act and the ePrivacy Directive. It's a response to the [competitiveness report](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter004/) written by **Mario Draghi**, the former Italian prime minister, which suggested (without much evidence) that Europe's complex digital rulebook was a major reason why the Continent had failed to compete with the likes of China and the United States. **The one-two punch of the Digital Sovereignty summit** and the Digital Omnibus represent the two countervailing strategies toward technology that are battling for supremacy in Brussels and other EU member capitals. **There's a long history about why France and Germany** still don't see eye-to-eye on digital sovereignty. Paris would prefer to create national (read: French) tech champions that can then compete globally. Berlin would prefer to work with allies on tech issues, though the newly-installed government [is starting](https://www.dw.com/en/tech-first-ministry-seeks-to-redefine-german-efficiency/a-74587435?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to change its tune. Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in October:** — How social media failed to respond to the highest level of global conflict since WWII; The fight over semiconductors between China and the US is worsening the "splinternet;" DeepSeek's vaunted success may not what it first appears. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter066/). — The European Union's AI strategy is re-living mistakes of previous shifts in global technology; Domestic US politics overshadow the global attacks on online safety laws; The consequences of Big Tech's pullback on political ad transparency is a hit to free speech. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter067/). — Social media is no longer 'social.' That requires a rethink about how these platforms are overseen; How US tech companies are balancing domestic and international pledges on 'digital sovereignty;' Most governments don't have a plan to combat disinformation. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter068/). — Get ready for the rise of a 'digital age of minority;' AI-powered deepfakes are getting harder detect — even if they have yet to affect democratic elections; The global "AI Stack" is quickly consolidating around select few firms. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter069/). — The case for why everyone should double down on social media oversight despite the growing hype around artificial intelligence. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter070/). **Yet at its core, both countries are seeking** to take a more hands-on approach to digital policymaking that focuses on digital public infrastructure, incentives tied to public tenders for technology contracts and greater government support for domestic companies to compete on the global stage. That could include nudging ministries to use local alternatives to American cloud providers like AWS or Google. It may involve government support for startups to hire the best talent and access new European (and global) markets. It could see officials actively embedding themselves in industrial policy decisions so that more high-end technology is built in Europe — as part of growing public support to wean the bloc off a perceived reliance on US Big Tech giants. **There's still uncertainty about what the communiqué** that will arise from the Nov 18 event will say. US officials have been doing the rounds in EU capitals (and not just in Berlin and Paris) to warn national officials of promoting an "anti-American" slant to whatever Europe decides to do with its digital sovereignty ambitions. But, at its core, the summit will be dedicated to placing the government and policymakers at the center of digital policymaking changes to jumpstart the bloc's economy. **Contrast that to what the European Commission** is slated to announce a day later on Nov 19 (though that date has yet to be officially confirmed.) As part of the Digital Omnibus, expect a slate of announcements to pare back Europe's digital rulebook in the name of economic growth. **There are rumors that parts of the AI Act will be shelved.** I don't think that will happen. Instead, my bet is on a more protracted roll-out of the world's only comprehensive legislation for the emerging technology aimed at giving European firms more time to figure out their AI strategies. I would argue that few of these firms will be affected by the most stringent parts of the AI Act. But **Henna Virkkunen**, the European Commission's vice-president for technology sovereignty, security and democracy, has made it clear her priority when it comes to AI is about generating growth, not cumbersome regulation. **In other parts of the upcoming Digital Omnibus** we'll also likely see other retrenchment from Europe's flaunted world-class digital regulation. This will be framed as unleashing the bloc's economic potential by making it easier for small- and medium-sized enterprises to sell their wares globally without falling afoul of the perceived excesses of digital regulation. Europe's privacy rules, in particular, will likely come under scrutiny because of the misunderstanding that such rules have made it harder for small firms to compete. When it comes to European bigger firms, [that is certainly true](https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/25/how-silicon-valley-gamed-the-worlds-toughest-privacy-rules-1466148?ref=digitalpolitics.co). But I have seen little evidence to suggest that tough data protection rules, when implemented correctly, lead to burdensome oversight for smaller companies, almost all of which do not have to comply with the most stringent of oversight. **EU policymakers argue the dual events** this month go hand-in-hand. That you can have a more top-down industrial policy directed by national leaders *and* an effort to reduce the digital regulatory burden to unleash the Continent's economic potential. **I don't buy that.** **First, Europe needs to define what it wants** out of its digital sovereignty agenda that remains divided between EU member countries' diverging interests and an inability to craft a coherent policymaking agenda when global competitors like the US and China are quickly moving ahead. Yes, the bloc is not a country, and such decisions are inherently slow. But Brussels has had more than five years to conjure up a digital sovereignty ethos, and it has failed to do so. **Second, the perception driven home by** Draghi's competitiveness report that all digital regulation is harmful to the economy fundamentally misunderstands how Europe's digital economy works. It's not GDPR or the soon-to-be slow-rolled AI Act that is holding back Portugal or Sweden. It's the endemic failure of generations of EU policymakers to create a functioning digital single market that can allow European companies to leverage Continent-wide talent and financial resources. **Reining back digital rules may play into the** politics of late 2025 when national leaders all want to <> unleash the potential of AI onto society. But the Digital Omnibus will fail to grapple with the EU's underlying structural challenges that remain the main driver for why the bloc is third in the three-person race with China and the US on technology. **Until national leaders and policymakers** clearly link their digital sovereignty ambitions with a well-thought-out strategy toward digital rulemaking, Europe's also-ran status is unlikely to change. **The two events later this month represent a missed opportunity** to bring the dueling strategies — one pushing for greater government intervention, the other calling for less regulatory oversight — into one coherent message. That could have included finally articulating what a forward-looking digital sovereignty agenda would look like that focused on competitiveness, social cohesion and the promotion of Europe's fundamental values, at home and abroad. **Instead, the Nov 18 summit and the** Nov 19 announcement will likely stand in contrast to one another as a sign that, again, the EU [has failed to meet the opportunity](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter067/) presented by the US (the world's largest democratic power) pulling back from the global stage. --- ## Chart of the week **LOBBYING IN BRUSSELS HAS NEVER BEEN** at the same scale as what happens in Washington. In part, that's because the EU is not as transparent in forcing companies to disclose what they spend annually to nudge lawmakers in one way or another. **Still, tech companies have increased their collective lobbying spend** by roughly one-third, to $174 million, in the latest 12 month period compared to 2023, according to figures collected by Corporate Europe Observatory and LobbyControl, two advocacy groups. **Below is the breakdown of the top spenders** within the digital industry. It's not surprising that many on the list continue to face significant regulatory headwinds despite Brussels calming down on its appetite for more tech rules. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/11/Untitled-2.jpg) Source: [Corporate Europe Observatory; LobbyControlSource; EU Transparency Register](https://corporateeurope.org/en/2025/10/big-tech-lobby-budgets-hit-record-levels?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## TECH INDUSTRY AND CLIMATE CHANGE **THE UNITED NATIONS ANNUAL CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE** [will take place](https://unfccc.int/cop30?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in Belén, Brazil from Nov 10-Nov 21\. The outlook does not look good. As a lapsed [climate change reporter](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-12-15/dispatch-from-copenhagen-protestors-try-to-storm-talks?ref=digitalpolitics.co), it's hard not to look at the current data and weep. The ten warmest years on record have all occurred between 2015-2024, according to [data](https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-temperature?ref=digitalpolitics.co#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20annual%20report,th%2Dwarmest%20year%20on%20record.) from the US NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information. Last year was the warmest year since global records began in 1850\. **Yikes.** **The tech industry, especially those firms powering the datacenter** boom, must take responsibility for some of the current climate crisis. **Electricity consumption associated with datacenters**, for instance, is expected to more than double by 2030, based on [estimates](https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-and-ai/executive-summary?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from the International Energy Agency. By the end of the decade, that means these facilities, whose expansion is directly related to the AI boom currently engulfing the world, will need as much electricity, as a sector, as what Japan currently consumes in 2025\. That's the same amount of electricity as the world's fourth largest economy. **Again, yikes.** **Some of this datacenter boom will be powered** by renewable energy like geothermal power. But in countries from [Ireland](https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/2025/10/13/data-centres-costing-56bn-have-planning-approval-but-no-power-industry-warns/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to [Chile](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz0mlrx0jxno?ref=digitalpolitics.co), local residents are protesting the building of these facilities because of fears — and realities — that the new construction will either lead to rolling electricity blackouts or hikes in energy bills that will disproportionately harm lower income families. **The climate change risks are not just limited to electricity generation.** **On everything from lithium battery production** for electric vehicles to the waste produced by consumer electronic devices, the tech industry's effect on the wider environment can not be overstated. Yes, there are larger emitters, especially those associated with heavy industry and transport. But for a sector known for generating record profits (and now representing roughly a third of the overall market capitalization of the S&P 500 Index), the tech industry has significant cash stockpiles to address its climate change impact. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **Some firms have started to do so.** Many of the world's largest tech companies have best-in-class carbon offsetting programs and have invested billions in the reduction of so-called e-waste created by their consumer products. Still, it's not enough. **As national leaders and policymakers gather** in Brazil for what is likely to be a [damp squib](https://www.iisd.org/articles/explainer/what-expect-cop-30?ref=digitalpolitics.co) of a climate conference, it's a reminder of the growing disconnect between the tech industry's climate change footprint and its ability to play a major role in averting the most harmful environmental impact — especially when 2024 [was the first calendar year](https://climate.copernicus.eu/copernicus-2024-first-year-exceed-15degc-above-pre-industrial-level?ref=digitalpolitics.co) when the average global temperature exceeded 1.5°C above its pre-industrial levels. **Expect many of the companies to send representatives** to Belén. It's a potentially good news story for some [already investing](https://sustainability.atmeta.com/data-centers/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in greener versions of tech infrastructure. But with total investment in data centers, alone, [expected to hit ](https://thenetworkinstallers.com/blog/data-center-growth-statistics/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)almost $600 billion this year, it's hard to reconcile the growing carbon footprint of just one part of the tech industry and the stated green ambitions of the firms behind the current tech boom. --- ## What I'm reading: **— Ahead of the upcoming social media ban for minors** in Australia, the government conducted a feasibility study into whether it could implement so-called "age assurance" across the country. The results are [here](https://ageassurance.com.au/report/part-a/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The US Senate held another hearing into unproven** claims that Big Tech companies worked with the federal government to censor mostly right-wing voices. Here's the [transcript](https://www.techpolicy.press/transcript-senate-hearing-on-jawboning-with-meta-and-google-execs/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The European Commission published its work plan for** 2026, including major tech regulatory pushes like the Digital Fairness Act. More [here](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategy-documents/commission-work-programme/commission-work-programme-2026%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— More than 70 countries signed the United Nations** Cybercrime Convention on Oct 25 that had been criticized for failing to uphold basic fundamental rights. You can read the treaty [here](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/cybercrime/convention/home.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Academics from Oxford University outlined** a potential pathway forward in how the ways countries oversee artificial intelligence can be brought together. More [here](https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/oblb/blog-post/2025/06/ai-regulation-politics-fragmentation-and-regulatory-capture?ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- ### Europe's 'Jekyll and Hyde' tech strategy URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter071/ Last updated: 2025-11-03T20:57:43.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and have partnered with YouGov and Microsoft for a dinner in Brussels on **Dec 10** to recap the digital policymaking highlights of 2025 and to look ahead to what is in store for next year. If you would like to attend, please let me know [**here**](https://forms.gle/HUn6QcFqeVKqVhdj7?ref=digitalpolitics.co). The event will include exclusive insight from YouGov on Europeans' attitudes toward technology. Spaces are limited, so let me know asap. **— November will again show how much** the European Union is split over the bloc's strategy toward technology. **— The annual climate change talks begin in Brazil** on Nov 10\. The tech industry's impact has gone from bad to worse. **— Big Tech firms have massively increased their** spending on tech lobbying within the EU institutions. Here are the stats. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Looking beyond the AI hype URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter070/ Last updated: 2025-10-29T12:00:25.000Z **THIS IS A BONUS EDITION OF DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I'm breaking my rule of not discussing my day job in this newsletter. I'm in New York to present this [report](https://worldprojects.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/2025-10/building-capacity-report.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) about the current gaps in social media data access and the public-private funding opportunities to meet those challenges. **The project is part of my underlying thesis** that much, if not all, of digital policymaking is done in a vacuum without quantifiable evidence. **When it comes to the effects of social media on society** and the potential need for lawmakers to intervene, we are maddeningly blind to how these platforms operate; what impact they have on people's online-offline habits; and what interventions, if any, are required to make social media more transparent and accountability to all of us. **The report is a call-to-arms for practical steps** required to move beyond educated guesses in digital policymaking to evidence-based oversight. **It's a** [**cross-post**](https://www.techpolicy.press/the-case-for-supporting-social-media-data-access/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) **from Tech Policy Press.** **Let's get started:** --- ## THE CASE FOR SUPPORTING SOCIAL MEDIA DATA ACCESS **IN THE HIERARCHY OF DIGITAL POLICYMAKING PRIORITIES,** it’s artificial intelligence, not platform governance, that is now the cause célèbre. **From the United States’** [**public aim**](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to dominate the era of AI to the rise of so-called AI slop created by apps such as OpenAI’s Sora, the emerging technology has seemingly become the sole priority across governments, tech companies, philanthropic organizations and civil society groups. **This fixation on AI is a mistake.** **It’s a mistake because it relegates equally** pressing areas of digital rulemaking — especially those related to social media’s impact on the wider world — down the pecking order at a time when these global platforms have a greater say on people’s online, and increasingly offline, habits than ever before. **Current regulatory efforts, primarily in Europe,** to rein in potential abuses linked to platforms controlled by Meta, Alphabet and TikTok [have so far been](https://www.techpolicy.press/in-the-social-media-wars-washington-not-brussels-is-the-victor/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) more bark than bite. Social media giants [remain black boxes](https://www.techpolicy.press/survey-new-laws-mandate-access-to-social-media-data-but-obstacles-remain/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to outsiders seeking to shine a light on how the companies’ content algorithms determine what people see in their daily feeds. **On Oct 24, the European Commission** [**announced**](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F25%5F2503?ref=digitalpolitics.co) a preliminary finding under the European Union's Digital Services Act that Meta and TikTok had failed under their obligations to make it easier for researchers to access public data on their platforms. **These companies’ ability to decide how their users** consume content on everything from the Israel-Hamas conflict to elections from Germany to Argentina [is now equally interwoven](https://www.techpolicy.press/transcript-senate-republicans-hold-social-media-jawboning-hearing/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) into Washington’s attempts to roll back international online safety legislation in the presumed defense of US citizens’ First Amendment rights. **Confronted with this cavalcade of ongoing** social media-enabled problems, the collective digital policymaking shift to focus almost exclusively on artificial intelligence is the epitome of the [distracted boyfriend meme](https://imgflip.com/i/a9pfck?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **While governments, industry and civil society** compete to outdo themselves on AI policymaking, the current ills associated with social media are being left behind — a waning after-thought in the global AI hype that has transfixed the public, set off a gold rush between industrial rivals and consumed governments in search of economic growth. **But where to focus?** **In a** [**report**](https://worldprojects.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/2025-10/building-capacity-report.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) **published via** [**Columbia World Projects**](https://worldprojects.columbia.edu/?%5F%5Fcf%5Fchl%5Frt%5Ftk=HdbO9we7D2qvEnIX8IHdjHWtQsbaLETuKMBphTVOlrg-1761010799-1.0.1.1-6oNcNh0i4vF2EQ5eOIlpiKbZCFj9QYbAAvOoDMzAKHg&ref=digitalpolitics.co) at Columbia University and the Hertie School’s [Centre for Digital Governance](https://www.hertie-school.org/en/centre-for-digital-governance?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on Oct 23, my co-authors and I lay out practical first steps in what can often seem like a labyrinthine web of problems associated with social media. [**Our starting point is simple**](https://www.techpolicy.press/the-next-step-in-social-media-data-access-how-to-turn-rules-into-reality/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**: the world currently** has limited understanding about what happens within these global platforms despite companies’ stated commitments, through their terms of service, to uphold basic standards around accountability and transparency. **It’s impossible to diagnose the problem without** first identifying the symptoms. And in the world of platform governance, that requires improved access to publicly-available and private social media data — in the form of engagement statistics and details on how so-called content recommender systems function. **Thankfully, the EU and, soon,** the United Kingdom have passed the world’s first regulated regimes that mandate social media giants provide such information to outsiders, as long as they meet certain requirements like being associated with an academic institution or civil society organizations. **Elsewhere, particularly in the US, researchers** are often reliant on voluntary commitments from companies growing increasingly adversarial in their interactions with outsiders whose work may shine unwanted attention on problematic areas within these global platforms. **Our report outlines the current gaps in how** social media data access works. It builds on a year of workshops during which more than 120 experts from regulatory agencies, academia, civil society groups and data infrastructure providers identified the existing data access limitations and outlined recommendations for public-private funding to address those failings. **All told, it represents a comprehensive review** of current global researcher data access efforts, based on inputs from those actively engaged in the policy area worldwide. **At a time when the US government has pulled** back significantly from funding digital policymaking and many philanthropies are shifting gears from social media to artificial intelligence, it can feel like a hard sell to urge both public and private funders to open up their wallets to support a digital policymaking area fraught with political uncertainty. **But our recommendations are framed as practical** attempts to fill current shortfalls that, with just a little support, could have an exponential impact on improving the transparency and accountability pledges that all of the world’s largest social media companies say they remain committed to. **Some of the ideas will require more** of a collective effort than others. **Participants in the workshops highlighted** the need for widely-accessible data access infrastructure — akin to what was offered via Meta’s CrowdTangle data analytics tool before [the tech giant shut it down in 2024](https://apnews.com/article/meta-crowdtangle-research-misinformation-shutdown-facebook-977ece074b99adddb4887bf719f2112a?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — as a starting point, even though such projects, collectively, will likely cost in the tens of millions of dollars each year. **But many of the opportunities are more** short-term than long-term. **That was by design. The workshops** underpinning the report made clear the independent research community needed technical and capacity-building support more than it needed moonshot projects which may fail to deliver on the dual focus on increased transparency and accountability for social media. **The recommendations include expanded** funding support to ensure academics and civil society groups are trained in world-class data protection and security protocols — preferably standardized across the whole research community — so that data about people’s social media habits are kept safe and not misused like what happened in the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018. **It also includes programs to allow new researchers** to gain access to social media data access regimes that often remain accessible to only a handful of organizations, as well as attempts to create international standards across different countries’ regulated regimes so that jurisdictions can align, as much as they can, on approach to social media data access. **Such day-to-day digital policymaking** does not have the bells and whistles associated with the current AI hype. It's borne out of the realities of independent researchers and regulators seeking to address near-and-present harms tied to social media, and not in the alarmism that artificial intelligence may, some day, represent an existential threat to humanity. **That, too, was by design. Often, digital policymaking,** especially on AI, can become overly-complex — lost in technical jargon and misconceptions of what technology can, and can not, do. **By outlining where public and private funders** can meet immediate needs on society-wide problems tied to social media, my co-authors and I are clear where digital policymaking priorities should lie: in the need to improve people’s understanding of how these global platforms increasingly shape the world around us. --- ### A digital age of majority URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter069/ Last updated: 2025-10-27T12:00:25.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and you find me in New York this week. More on that to be published on Oct 29\. For those of you in the Big Apple, please reach out [here](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonomail.com) (even if it's to recommend your favorite coffee joints.) **— Countries are converging on the idea of setting** a "digital age of majority" for when children can access online services. **— Artificial intelligence-powered deepfakes have yet** to up-end democratic elections. But the technology is not far from becoming identical to real videos/photos. **— A select few companies are starting to take** a commanding lead in the different layers that make up the global market for generative AI. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for subscribers only._ ### The end of social media URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter068/ Last updated: 2025-10-20T11:00:06.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and in my ongoing campaign to make myself feel less old, I give you the [latest viral smartphone stand](https://www.threads.com/@beastlym5/post/DP2o0YLASUs?xmt=AQF0KJNNdug7zeujlh0Xq5yPVmJBTARfqfoV%5FCg7SWZsVQ&ref=digitalpolitics.co) doing the rounds with the youth. Get 'em while you can. **— Social media is no longer about connecting with friends.** That requires a rethink about the responsibilities these global platforms have to the wider world. **— American tech giants are walking a fine balance** between countries' digital sovereignty ambitions and their ties to the United States. — **Most governments worldwide don't have a plan** or government unit dedicated to combating the threat of disinformation. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Europe brought a knife to an AI gun fight URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter067/ Last updated: 2025-10-13T14:10:33.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and every time you (probably like me) feel you're falling behind tech trends, watch [this video](https://www.facebook.com/reel/239994067079765) and remember: you're doing just fine. **— The European Union is falling into the same trap** on artificial intelligence as did in previous global shifts in technology. **— The attacks against global online safety laws** are framed almost exclusively via the prism of domestic American politics. **— Microsoft, Meta and Google just made it more difficult** for politicians to speak directly to would-be voters in Europe. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Social media at a time of war URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter066free/ Last updated: 2025-10-08T11:00:23.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I have many feelings about Sora, OpenAI's new AI-generated social media platform. Many of which are encapsulated by [this video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I1dW-nZqhew&ref=digitalpolitics.co) by Casey Neistat. #FreeTheSlop. **— The world's largest platforms have failed** to respond to the highest level of global conflict since World War II. **— The semiconductor wars between China and the United States** are creating a massive barrier between the world's two largest economies. **— China's DeepSeek performs significantly worse** than its US counterparts on a series of benchmark tests. **Let's get started:** --- ## WHEN PLATFORM GOVERNANCE MEETS GLOBAL CONFLICT **OCT 7 MARKED THE 2-YEAR ANNIVERSARY** of Hamas militants attacking Israel, killing roughly 1,200 citizens and engulfing the region in a seemingly endless conflict. Tens of thousands of Palestinians have died, many more have been displaced, and attacks (or the threat of attack) against both Israelis and Jews, worldwide, [have skyrocketed](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd63p1djgd7o?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **I won't pretend to understand the complexities** of the Israeli-Hamas war (more on that [here](https://www.timesofisrael.com/events-to-focus-on-healing-unity-as-jews-worldwide-gather-to-mark-oct-7-attacks/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/3/is-an-end-to-israels-war-on-gaza-finally-in-sight?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/israel-hamas-gaza?ref=digitalpolitics.co)). But the last two years have seen a slow degradation of the checks and safeguards that social media companies once had in place to protect users from war-related content, propaganda and illegal content now rife wherever you look online. **First, let's be clear. This isn't just an Israeli-Hamas issue.** As we hurtle toward the end of 2025, there are currently almost 60 active state-based conflicts worldwide and global peace is at its lowest level in 80 years, according to [statistics](https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/?ref=digitalpolitics.co#/) from the Institute for Economics and Peace. **That is not social media's fault.** As much as it's easy to blame TikTok, YouTube and Instagram for the ills of the world, real-world violence is baked into generational conflicts, multitudes of overlapping socio-economic issues and other analogue touch-points that have nothing to do with people swiping on their phones. **But it's also true the recent spike in global conflicts** has come at a time of collective retrenchment on trust and safety issues from social media giants that, at the bare minimum, have failed to stop some of the offline violence from spreading widely within online communities. Again, there's a causation versus correlation issue here that we must be careful with. But at a time of heightened polarization (and not just in the US and Europe), the capacity for tech platforms to be used to foment real-world instability and violence has never been higher. **Before I get irate complaints from those of you** working within these companies, social media platforms have clear terms of service supposed to limit war-related content from spreading among users. You can review them [here](https://transparency.meta.com/en-gb/policies/community-standards/violence-incitement/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://x.com/en/tos?ref=digitalpolitics.co#:~:text=We%20reserve%20the%20right%20to,suspended%2Dx%2Daccounts%29.), [here](https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802008?hl=en&ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://www.tiktok.com/community-guidelines/en?ref=digitalpolitics.co). But there's one thing to have clear-cut rules, and it's another to actively implement them. Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in September:** — A series of legal challenges to online safety legislation challenge how these rules are implemented; The unintended consequences of failing to define "tech sovereignty;" Where the money really goes within the chip industry. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter061/). — What most people don't understand about Brussels' strategy toward technology; Unpicking the dual antitrust decisions against Google from Brussels and Washington; AI chatbots still return too much false information. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter062/). — The next transatlantic trade dispute will be about digital antitrust, not online safety; Washington's new foreign policy ambitions toward AI; The US' spending spree on data centers. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter063/). — An inside look into the United Nations' takeover of AI governance; How the United Kingdom embraced the US "AI Stack;" People view the spread of false information as a higher threat than a faltering global economy. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter064/). — Washington's proposed deal to untangle TikTok US from Bytedance is not what it first appears; How social media companies are speaking from both sides of their mouths on online safety; AI's expected boost to global trade. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter065/). **Social media companies' neglect related** to conflicts outside the Western world has been a feature for years (more on that [here](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/10/25/facebook-moderate-posts-violent-countries-517050?ref=digitalpolitics.co).) Now, that same level of omission has seeped into conflicts, including those within the Middle East and Ukraine, that are closer to home for the Western public. **There are many reasons for this shift.** **Companies like Alphabet and Meta have pared back** their commitments to independent fact-checking which provided at least some pushback to government and non-state efforts to peddle falsehoods associated with these global conflicts. A shift to crowdsourced fact-checking — initially rolled out by X, and then followed by Meta — has yet to fill that void. That's mostly because companies have found it difficult to find consensus among their users about often divisive topics (including those related to warfare) which is required before these crowdsourced fact-checks are published. **Social media platforms have similarly spent the last three** years gutting their existing trust and safety teams to the point where the industry is on life support. This was initially done for economic reasons. Faced with a struggling advertising sector in 2022, company executives sought cost savings, wherever they could, and internal trust and safety teams felt the brunt of those efforts. Fast forward to 2025, and there has been an ideological shift to "free speech" among many of these firms which makes any form of content moderation anathema to the current (US-focused) zeitgeist. **Third: politics. The current White House's aversion** to online safety is well known. So too is the US Congress' accusations that other country's digital regulation unfairly infringes on American citizens' First Amendment rights. But from India to Slovakia, there are growing local efforts to quell platforms' content moderation programs — and the associated domestic legislation that has sprouted up from Brazil to the United Kingdom. In that geopolitical context, social media firms have instituted a "go slow" on many of their internal systems — even if (at least in countries with existing online safety regulation) they still comply with domestic rules. **Making things more difficult is the platforms'** increasingly adversarial relationship with outsiders seeking to hold these firms to account for their stated trust and safety policies. (Disclaimer: My day job puts me in this category, though my interactions with the companies remain cordial.) Researchers have found it increasingly difficult to access publicly-available social media data. Others have faced legal challenges to analyses which cast social media giants in an unfavorable light. Industry-linked funding for such independent "red-teaming" of platform weaknesses has fallen off a cliff. **Taken together, these four points represent** a fundamental change in what had been, until now, a progressive multi-stakeholder approach to ridding global social media platforms of illegal and gruesome content — and not just related to warfare. **Before, companies, policymakers and outside groups** worked together (often with difficulty) to make these social media networks a safe space for people to express themselves in ways that represented free speech rights and safeguarded individuals from hate. That coalition has now disintegrated amid a combination of hard-nosed economics, shifting geopolitics and fundamental differences over what constitutes tech companies' trust and safety obligations. **Each of the above points occurred separately.** No one set out thinking that cutting back on internal trust and safety teams; ending relations with fact-checkers; kow-towing to a shift in geopolitics; and reducing ties to outside researchers would make it easier for conflict-related content to spread easily among these social media networks. **And yet, that is what happened.** **Go onto any social media platform**, **and** within a few clicks (if you know what you're doing), you can come face-to-face with gruesome war-torn content — or, at least, purportedly material associated with one of the 59 state-based conflicts active worldwide. Even if you're not seeking out such material, the collective pullback on trust and safety has raised the possibility that you will stumble over such content in your daily doomscroll. **That is the paradox we find ourselves in** at the end of 2025\. **In many ways, social media has become** even more ingrained in everything from politics to the latest meme craze (cue: the rise of OpenAI's Sora.) But these platforms are less secure and protected than they have ever been — at a time when the world is engulfed in the highest level of subnational, national and regional warfare in multiple generations. --- ## Chart of the Week **THE US CENTER FOR AI STANDARDS AND INNOVATION** ran a series of tests — across four well-known sectors associated with the performance of large language models — between services offered by OpenAI, Anthropic and Deepseek. **You have to take these results with a pinch of salt**, as they come from a US federal agency. But across the board, China's LLM performed significantly worse than its US rivals. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/10/Untitled-2.jpg) Source: [Center for AI Standards and innovation](https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2025/09/30/CAISI%5FEvaluation%5Fof%5FDeepSeek%5FAI%5FModels.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## THE AI WARS: SEMICONDUCTOR EDITION **COMMON WISDOM IS THAT YOU NEED** three elements to compete in the global race around artificial intelligence. In your "AI Stack," you need world-leading microchips, you need cloud computing infrastructure that's cheap and almost universal, and you need applications like large language models that can sit on top and drive user engagement. On that first component — semiconductors — China and the US are increasingly going down different paths. **Looking back, it almost was inevitable.** Washington has long safeguarded world-leading chips (from both American firms and those of its allies) from Beijing via export bans and other strong-arm tactics. The goal: to ensure China's AI Stack was always one step behind its US counterpart. **Yet that strategy is starting to backfire.** Yes, Western AI chips are still better than their Chinese equivalents. But the lack of access to such semiconductors has forced the world's second largest economy to invest billions in domestic production in the hopes of eventually catching up — and surpassing — the likes of Nvidia or Taiwan's Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. **What has galvanized this Chinese resolve** is the repeated efforts by both the Trump and Biden administrations to hobble Chinese firms' ability to access the latest semiconductors. In this never-ending 'will they, or won't they?' game of national security ping-pong, the Trump 2.0 administration agreed in August to allow Nvidia and AMD to sell pared-down versions of their latest chips to China — as long as they [gave the US federal government](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgvvnx8y19o?ref=digitalpolitics.co) a 15 percent slice of that export revenue. Principled diplomacy, it was not. **That plan appears to have backfired.** Nvidia [is now under an antitrust investigation](https://www.cnbc.com/2025/09/15/china-nvidia-violated-anti-monopoly-law-will-continue-investigation.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from Chinese authorities for its takeover of Israeli chipmaker Mellanox in 2020\. The Cyberspace Administration of China [has also reportedly told](https://www.ft.com/content/12adf92d-3e34-428a-8d61-c9169511915c?ref=digitalpolitics.co) the country's largest tech firms, including Alibaba, ByteDance and Baidu, to not buy Nvidia's semiconductor. Jensen Huang, chief executive of the US chip firm, said he was "disappointed" with that move (which has never been officially confirmed.) If you're interested in sponsoring Digital Politics, please get in touch on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com **Nvidia has invested millions to design** China-specific microchips that both meet the national security limitations demanded by Washington and can be sold directly into the Middle Kingdom in ways that placate Beijing. If Chinese officials close the door — and require local firms to use domestic alternatives, many of which [are reportedly almost on par](https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-war/article/3325894/tech-war-alibaba-developed-ai-processor-par-nvidias-h20-chip-cctv-report-shows?ref=digitalpolitics.co) with their Western rivals — then it's another indicator the US and China are on diverging paths when it comes to technological development. **Again, a lot of this was foreseeable.** Repeated White House administrations urged American and Western chip and equipment firms to steer clear of China. In response, Beijing invested billions into local semiconductor production, much of which has remained at the lower level of sophistication. But as in other tech-related industries, Chinese manufacturers have steadily risen through the stack to now offer world-beating hardware. It's not unusual for that, eventually, to be the case in semiconductors. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **What does this all mean for the politics of technology?** **First, Western semiconductor firms offering** pared-back versions of their latest chips to China may have the door shut on them. Beijing may need these manufacturers, in the short term. But don't expect that welcome to remain warm — especially as Western officials continue to rattle sabres. **Second, the need for Chinese firms** to rely on (currently sub-par, but rapidly advancing) homegrown chips will lead to scrappy innovation once associated just with Silicon Valley. We can debate whether the meteoric rise of DeepSeek [was truly as unique](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/kevin-klyman%5Fpublication-alert-my-team-at-the-center-ugcPost-7379142423425433602-b%5Fnl?utm%5Fsource=share&utm%5Fmedium=member%5Fdesktop&rcm=ACoAAATsaZ8BQ5eV2dLTB4ajT1y1P-2vC9wlPbU) as first believed (based on the company's ties to the wider Chinese tech ecosystem.) But relying on second-tier semiconductors will force Chinese AI firms to be more nimble compared to their US counterparts with seemingly unlimited access to chips, compute power and data. **Third, the "splinternet" will come to hardware.** I wrote [this](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/17/technology/facebook-government-regulations.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in 2017 to explain how the digital world was being balkanized into regional fiefdoms. The creation of rival semiconductor stacks — one led by the US, one led by China — will extend that division into the offline world. Companies will try to make the respective hardware interoperable. But it won't be in the interests of either party, as the separation expands between which semiconductors can work with other infrastructure worldwide, to maintain such networking capability. **In short, the global race between** [**AI Stacks**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter060/)has entered a new era. --- ## What I'm reading **— The Wikimedia Foundation published** a human rights impact assessment on artificial intelligence and machine learning. More [here](https://diff.wikimedia.org/2025/09/30/making-sure-ai-serves-people-and-knowledge-stays-human-wikimedia-foundation-publishes-a-human-rights-impact-assessment-on-the-interaction-of-ai-and-machine-learning-with-wikimedia-projects/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats** assessed the current strengths and weaknesses in the transatlantic fight against state-backed disinformation. More [here](https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/countering-disinformation-in-the-euro-atlantic-strengths-and-gaps/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The Canadian government launched an AI Strategy Task Force** and outlined its agenda for public feedback on the emerging technology. More [here](https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2025/09/government-of-canada-launches-ai-strategy-task-force-and-public-engagement-on-the-development-of-the-next-ai-strategy.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The Appeals Centre Europe**, which allows citizens to seek redress from social media companies under the EU's Digital Services Act, published its first transparency report. More [here](https://www.appealscentre.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Appeals-Centre-Europe-Transparency-Report.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Researchers outlined the growing differences** between how countries are approaching the oversight and governance of artificial intelligence for the University of Oxford. More [here](https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/oblb/blog-post/2025/06/ai-regulation-politics-fragmentation-and-regulatory-capture?ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- ### Social media at a time of war URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter066/ Last updated: 2025-10-06T11:00:48.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I have many feelings about Sora, OpenAI's new AI-generated social media platform. Many of which are encapsulated by [this video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I1dW-nZqhew&ref=digitalpolitics.co) by Casey Neistat. #FreeTheSlop. **— The world's largest platforms have failed** to respond to the highest level of global conflict since World War II. **— The semiconductor wars between China and the United States** are creating a massive barrier between the world's two largest economies. **— China's DeepSeek performs significantly worse** than its US counterparts on a series of benchmark tests. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### TikTok: The art of the (non) deal URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter065/ Last updated: 2025-09-29T11:00:54.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I bring you an [exclusive first look](https://www.facebook.com/reel/2014841812617308) at the latest Star Wars epic coming to a cinema near you later this year. **— The United States has a deal to shift** ownership of TikTok's US unit to American owners — or does it? **— Some of the biggest social media companies** are speaking out of both sides of their mouths when it comes to online safety. **— Artificial intelligence is expected to boost** global trade by at least a third by 2040, according to estimates from the World Trade Organization. **Let's get started** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The United Nations goes big on AI URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter064/ Last updated: 2025-09-22T11:00:58.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I give you [my top grammar joke of the week](https://www.instagram.com/p/DOwxf19khm6/?igsh=YzAyMDM1MGJkZA%3D%3D&ref=digitalpolitics.co). Yes, that's a thing. #GrammarPedant. **— An inside look into the United Nations' game plan** for artificial intelligence, and why that's going to lead to problems. **— The United Kingdom just signed up to the** United States' "AI Stack" in a demonstration of Washington's newly-formed foreign policy toward the emerging technology. **— The threat posed by the spread of false online** information is perceived to be greater than that associated with a faltering global economy or terrorism. **Let's get started.** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The next digital fight in the transatlantic turf war URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter063/ Last updated: 2025-09-15T11:00:32.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be heading to Washington, New York, Brussels and Barcelona in October/November. If you're around in any of those cities, [drop me a line](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonmail.com) and let's meet. **— Forget social media, the real tech battle** on trade between the European Union and United States is over digital antitrust. **— Everything you need to know about Washington's** new foreign policy ambitions toward artificial intelligence. **— The US is about to spend more money** on building data centers than traditional offices. **Let's get started** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### What most don't understand about Brussels' take on tech URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter062/ Last updated: 2025-09-08T11:40:47.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and you find me in Brussels amid a flurry of transatlantic squabbles over trade, tech and, well, almost everything else. If you see me in the EU Quarter this week, say hello! **— The European Union can appear to blow** hot and cold on digital policymaking. That's almost 100 percent down to the bloc's internal dynamics, and not its international alliances. **— Washington and Brussels just handed down** dual antitrust decisions against Google. Both tell us a lot about the diverging approach to digital competition. **— The top AI chatbots still return a lot of** false information when queried about world events. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Online safety's day in court URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter061free/ Last updated: 2025-09-03T07:00:05.000Z **WELCOME TO DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and this edition marks the [one-year anniversary](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter001/) for this newsletter. That's 61 newsletters, roughly 130,000 words and, hopefully, some useful insight into the world of global digital policymaking. **To thank all subscribers for your support**, I'm offering a discounted offer to the paid version of Digital Bridge published each Monday. You can go for either a [monthly](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/anniversary-discount-monthly) or an [annual](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/anniversary-discount-annual) subscription — at 25 percent off the regular price. You can also keep receiving these monthly free updates. **Also, for anyone in Brussels,** I'll be in town next week from Sept 8 - 11\. [Drop me a line](mailto: digitalpolitics@protonmail.com) if you're free for coffee. **— The outcome to a series of legal challenges** to online safety legislation will be made public in the coming weeks. The results may challenge how these laws are implemented. **— We are starting to see the consequences** of what happens when policymakers fail to define what "tech sovereignty" actually means. **— The vast amount of money within** the semiconductor industry comes from the design, not manufacture, of high-end microchips. **Let's get started:** --- ## LEGAL CHALLENGES TO ONLINE SAFETY RULES **WE'RE ABOUT TO FIND OUT WHERE THE** limits are to some of the Western world's attempts to rein in social media platforms and e-commerce giants. **On Sept. 3, Zalando, the German online shopping site** (my decade-old profile [here](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/technology/amazon-zalando-eu-online-shopping.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) will find out if one of the European Union's top courts agrees that it should not be designated as a Very Large Online Platform, or VLOP, under the bloc's Digital Services Act. The Berlin-based retailer [claims](https://corporate.zalando.com/en/company/zalando-files-legal-action-against-european-commission-contest-its-designation-very-large?ref=digitalpolitics.co) it doesn't represent a so-called "systemic risk" within the EU. Zalando's focus on business customers (in contrast to retailer customers) also means the platform does not technically have 45 million users within the EU, it also argues. Expect a decision from the European Court of Justice before midday CET on Sept. 3 (documents [here](https://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?nat=or&mat=or&pcs=Oor&jur=C%2CT%2CF&num=T-348%252F23&for=&jge=&dates=&language=en&pro=&cit=none%252CC%252CCJ%252CR%252C2008E%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252Ctrue%252Cfalse%252Cfalse&oqp=&td=%3BALL&avg=&lgrec=en&page=1&lg=&cid=10273192&ref=digitalpolitics.co).) **By challenging Brussels' ability to designate** which tech companies fall within its VLOP definition (in which the requirement to have at least 45 million local users is critical), Zalando is taking on a central component of the EU's online safety regime. Under the DSA, these large firm take on greater responsibilities and reporting requirements — and are overseen directly by the European Commission, and not EU national regulators — compared to their smaller counterparts. **Currently, how the bloc determines the threshold** for 45 million users is cloaked in secrecy — mostly because officials typically have to rely on company estimates to make such adjudications. Telegram, for instance, [maintains](https://www.euronews.com/next/2024/08/21/telegram-still-doesnt-meet-large-platform-requirements-under-dsa?ref=digitalpolitics.co) it has less than that benchmark, allowing it to avoid the most strenuous oversight offered by the DSA. By challenging the European Commission's (opaque) methodology, Zalando's case (no matter the outcome) will force Brussels to up its game when determining which companies fall within its VLOP definition. Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in August:** — Google and Meta's separate decisions to end political ads in Europe is a mistake; What Big Tech's quarterly earnings teach us about geopolitics; Most Brits have yet to jump on the AI bandwagon. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter057/). — Everything you need to know about India's AI Impact Summit; How Russia's propaganda machine weaponized the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska; Who's Who in the shake-up in the European Commission's DG CNECT. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter058/). — Why focusing on protecting kids online should not come at the price of breaking encryption; What Kremlin-backed media took from the Trump-Putin summit; The cottage industry of copyright lawsuits targeting AI companies. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter059/). — The US, EU and China are building rival "AI Stacks" that will split the world into competing camps; How to understand the EU-US trade framework when it comes to tech and future tensions; The "AI Divide" is playing out in global research. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter060/). **Next up are Meta and TikTok.** In a dual ruling on Sept. 10 (documents [here](https://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?nat=or&mat=or&pcs=Oor&jur=C%2CT%2CF&num=T-55%252F24&for=&jge=&dates=&language=en&pro=&cit=none%252CC%252CCJ%252CR%252C2008E%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252Ctrue%252Cfalse%252Cfalse&oqp=&td=%3BALL&avg=&lgrec=en&page=1&lg=&cid=10273109&ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?nat=or&mat=or&pcs=Oor&jur=C%2CT%2CF&num=T-58%252F24&for=&jge=&dates=&language=en&pro=&cit=none%252CC%252CCJ%252CR%252C2008E%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252Ctrue%252Cfalse%252Cfalse&oqp=&td=%3BALL&avg=&lgrec=en&page=1&lg=&cid=10273134&ref=digitalpolitics.co)), one of Europe's top courts will again decide a key part of the bloc's online safety rules. This time, both tech giants claim the so-called DSA supervisory fee, or annual levy all VLOPs must pay for the regulation's implementation, is disproportionate and opaque. **The fee — which** [**increased**](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0150&ref=digitalpolitics.co) **21 percent this year, to** €58.2 million — is based on the European Commission's calculation of up to a 0.05 percent charge on these tech firms' annual global net income. Both Meta and TikTok (and, in a separate legal challenge, Google) say those figures should only come from each firm's profit within the 27-country bloc, and not from their overall global income. In response, Brussels says such levies — a tiny slice of these firms' annual profits — do not violate companies' rights. **Depending on how the court rules,** the decision will have ramifications for the DSA's (stuttering) implementation. **Currently, the European Commission has scores** of open investigations. Temu, the Chinese online retailer, [was the latest firm](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F25%5F1913?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to be accused of breaching the rules. A [potential separate enforcement action](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-sends-preliminary-findings-x-breach-digital-services-act?ref=digitalpolitics.co) against X is expected in the coming weeks. These probes cost money. If Europe's top judges start cutting the funds available for DSA enforcement — based on TikTok and Meta's claims — then the regulation's implementation will similarly slow. **If one of Europe's top courts** sides with the tech giants, then expect Brussels to claim business-as-usual, and likely dedicate additional resources from the bloc's almost €2 trillion budget. But the ability to charge VLOPs for DSA supervision is a pillar of how these online safety rules are supposed to work. It forms the basis for the European Commission's mutlti-year work plan on DSA supervision and enforcement. To suggest everything is fine, if next week's court decision goes against Brussels, will be a fantasy. **The next legal challenge takes us across the** English Channel to the United Kingdom's **Online Safety Act**, or OSA. There is already growing disquiet after the country's so-called ["age assurance" rules](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter055/) came into force late last month. Now, 4chan and Kiwi Farms [filed a lawsuit](https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/4chan-kiwi-farms-sue-uk-age-verificaiton-law.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in a federal court in the United States to challenge how the UK's online safety rules apply to these US-based online platforms. **I'm no lawyer. But the lawsuit is worth a read** for two reasons. **First, 4Chan and Kiwi Farms — both of which** received requests from Ofcom, the UK's online safety regulator, to comply with mandatory transparency demands — relied heavily on history to suggest they did not have to comply with the British rules. (Disclaimer: I sit on an [independent advisory committee](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/structure-and-leadership/ofcom-establishes-online-information-advisory-committee?ref=digitalpolitics.co) at Ofcom, so anything I say here is done so in a personal capacity.) **"Where Americans are concerned, the Online Safety Act** purports to legislate the Constitution out of existence," lawyers for both firms wrote in the lawsuit. "Parliament does not have that authority. That issue was settled, decisively, 243 years ago in a war that the UK’s armies lost and are not in any position to re-litigate.” **Shots fired, if you will.** **Under the UK's online safety regime,** a company does not have to have a physical presence within the country to fall under the legislation. Technically, a site only needs to be accessible to British internet users for the regulatory requirements, most of which focus on mandating a base level of transparency about how companies apply their internal online safety protocols. That means thousands of sites worldwide fall under the UK's OSA — even though almost none of them will be contacted as what happened with 4Chan and Kiwi Farms. **Determining how far the UK's OSA can extend** to sites with no physical presence in the country — even if that comes via a US federal court — is a marker for how countries can extend their online safety rules in the name of protecting their citizens. **The second reason the case is important** is more political. **Expect the federal lawsuit against Ofcom** to be name-checked during a Congressional hearing, overseen by Congressman **Jim Jordan**, on Sept 3 entitled: "[Europe's Threat to American Speech and Innovation](https://judiciary.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/europes-threat-american-speech-and-innovation?ref=digitalpolitics.co)." It will start at 10am ET and the current witness list includes noted online safety expert (jk!) **Nigel Farage**. Former European Commissioner **Thierry Breton** was invited, though he preferred to respond in an [OpEd for The Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/aug/28/eu-donald-trump-tariffs-us-europe-tech?ref=digitalpolitics.co#Echobox=1756402443). **The 4Chan/Kiwi Farm lawsuit is important** as it represents a new attack from some in the US who view any form of online safety regulation as a direct threat to Americans' First Amendment rights. **These individuals — most commonly associated** with the "[Censorship Industrial Complex"](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digital-bridge/the-horsemen-of-the-censorship-industrial-complex/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — have already accused researchers of acting in unison with the US federal government and social media platforms to censor those mostly on the political right. So far, there has been no evidence to back up those allegations. **Now, many are turning to non-US online safety** legislation, most notably the EU's DSA and the UK's OSA, as a new attack vector to claim Americans' free speech rights are under attack. The 4Chan/Kiwi Farm lawsuit's arguments, including the illegal extraterritoriality of the British rules, are likely to be re-used in these ongoing efforts to thwart countries' push to protect their own citizens against online abuse and illegal content like terrorist propaganda. --- ## Chart of the Week **EVERY COUNTRY UNDER THE SUN** wants to be a semiconductor superpower. That's especially true in the global battle between rival "[AI stacks](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter060/)" reliant on next generation semiconductors. **But there's a significant difference** between those who make semiconductors and where the value resides in the overall global chip market. **The chart on the left depicts the 2024 worldwide** revenue, divided as a percentage per company, for semiconductor foundries, or facilities that manufacture microchips. The chart on the right represents overall market values for semiconductor companies (based on Dec. 31, 2024 prices), divided by companies and countries. **On manufacturing, Taiwan is the global leader**, by some margin. But in overall semiconductor value, the US (and, to a large degree, NVIDIA) are the ones to beat. **That's a reminder for any country spending** taxpayers' dollars to entice semiconductor foundries to be built locally. Just because you back such in-country manufacturing doesn't mean the overall value within the semiconductor supply chain will follow. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/09/Untitled-3.jpg) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/09/Untitled-2.jpg) Source: JPMorgan; Companiemarketcap.com. Data as of Dec. 2024 --- ## The consequences of tech sovereignty **I KNOW I'M BIASED. BUT IT'S HARD NOT TO VIEW** the first eight months of 2025 as a demonstration of what happens when countries blend politics and technology in ways that lead to bad outcomes. Think the [US-China stand-off](https://merics.org/en/comment/theres-been-shift-us-china-tech-competition-and-its-not-good-news-rest-world?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on pretty much everything. Think the [EU-US dispute over trade/digital regulation](https://www.techpolicy.press/trump-squares-off-with-brussels-over-its-digital-rulebook/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Think the [failure of Middle Powers](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter039/) to articulate a path on digital that is different to that offered by [China, the US and Europe](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter060/), respectively. **This is what happens when politicians and policymakers** put forward a vision of "tech sovereignty" without thinking through what happens when you mix national/regional political needs with the global nature of how technology actually works. **Back in March, I** [**made a plea**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter038/) **for a more** joined-up approach to that amorphous definition that, ever since European Commission president **Ursula von der Leyen** [went hard on "tech sovereignty"](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac%5F20%5F260?ref=digitalpolitics.co) five years ago, has been plagued with false starts, conflicting efforts and a failure to understand how such digital policymaking would end up playing out in the real world. **Fast forward to late(ish) 2025, and we are starting to feel** the consequences of rival and, frustratingly, allied countries implementing "tech sovereignty" concepts that will inevitably harm citizens' fundamental rights and their ability to take advantage of what technology has to offer. **For me, those concepts include:** countries asserting legal claims over the global internet; politicians subsidizing the creation/support of domestic industries that do not have the scale to compete on the global stage; the creation of artificial barriers between digital markets/goods that undermine fundamental rights; the politicization of apolitical digital regulation aimed at quelling abuse. **Some of these issues were almost inevitable**, given the vast differences between how countries approach both digital policymaking and industrial policy. The US — based on its financial muscle, deregulatory stance and domestic industry — is just in a different place to, say, Singapore, which must approach questions about how technology affects its society in ways that meet its own domestic needs. **What I worry, though, is that the push toward 'tech sovereignty'** has reached a point where it may be difficult to bring countries back from the edge of creating siloed digital worlds. That goes for everything from high-tech manufacturing that may face high import tariffs elsewhere to digital regulation aimed at safeguarding people's fundamental rights. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **As technology has become a powerful engine**, both for politics and industry, it was inevitable that politicians would want to exert greater power over digital areas of the economy and society. Where we are currently, however, is nearing a point of potentially killing the golden goose. **Technology, at its basic level, is an apolitical tool.** And ever since the Web 1.0 era, that has been based on a borderless, hand-off approach to digital oversight — something that just isn't possible given the geopolitical nature of technology in 2025. **What I've been thinking a lot about is how** can we marry the best of this laissez-faire approach to technology — one that allows firms and people to connect to each other, within seconds, across the globe — with the ability for politicians and policymakers to both protect citizens from harm and harness what technology has to offer to serve domestic economic interests. **Right now, that balance is failing, and badly.** **It is leading to the siloing of citizens within national/regional** digital fiefdoms. It is embracing a top-down approach to "tech sovereignty" that relegates people to passive spectators as their digital experiences are dictated for them. It is leaving millions behind as digital policymaking falls into three camps: led by China, the EU and US, respectively. **Watch this space for thoughts on how** to fix that. --- ## What I'm reading **— The Molly Rose Foundation analyzed** TikTok and Instagram and found an ongoing high-level risk of exposure for minors to content linked to suicide, self-harm and depression-related material. More [here](https://mollyrosefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/proof3%5FPervasivebyDesign.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Bits of Freedom, a Dutch non-profit organization,** filed a lawsuit against Meta so that its local users could access their Instagram and Facebook feeds in ways not based on user profiling. More [here](https://www.bitsoffreedom.nl/2025/08/28/bits-of-freedom-initiates-summary-proceedings-against-meta-in-run-up-to-national-elections/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Researchers from the University of Amsterdam** created a social media network based on AI agents, and discovered the platform quickly recreated levels of polarization seen in real-world networks. More [here](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2508.03385?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The White House's recent AI Action Plan** is full of contradictory policies that may lead to the concentration of power of the emerging technology, [argue](https://www.techpolicy.press/trumps-ai-strategy-is-at-war-with-itself/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) three former Joe Biden-appointed officials for Tech Policy Press. **— Meta's Oversight Board published its annual report**, including details into the 217 voluntary policy recommendations it had made to the tech firm since 2027\. More [here](https://www.oversightboard.com/news/2024-annual-report-highlights-boards-impact-in-the-year-of-elections/?%5Fhsenc=p2ANqtz--kH4gSDAYh-aOxJ%5FsIZKTc7q2LOfPQZEu-fa46%5FPaxF3GlysR%5FSQyoqW93jwACbszeY%5FVIswdqkCYI1edhWJj1oWVRs0ElnEdaroDO9wPLNk3uztY&%5Fhsmi=377715901&ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- ### Online safety's day in court URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter061/ Last updated: 2025-09-01T11:03:30.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and this edition marks the [one-year anniversary](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter001/) for this newsletter. That's 61 newsletters, roughly 130,000 words and, hopefully, some useful insight into the world of global digital policymaking. **To thank all subscribers for your support**, I'm offering a one-year additional paid subscription to someone from your network. Please [fill in this form](https://forms.gle/GByvPYdVdcPuBm896?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I will add one additional subscriber (for Digital Guru subscribers, it will be three additional users) for a 12-month period. **Also, for anyone in Brussels,** I'll be in town next week from Sept 8 - 11\. [Drop me a line](mailto: digitalpolitics@protonmail.com) if you're free for coffee. **— The outcome to a series of legal challenges** to online safety legislation will be made public in the coming weeks. The results may challenge how these laws are implemented. **— We are starting to see the consequences** of what happens when policymakers fail to define what "tech sovereignty" actually means. **— The vast amount of money within** the semiconductor industry comes from the design, not manufacture, of high-end microchips. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### My AI stack is better than your AI stack URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter060/ Last updated: 2025-08-25T11:00:39.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and a new [report](https://independenttechresearch.org/citr-report-2025/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from the **Coalition for Independent Tech Research** about the struggle to keep public-interest research alive is worth a look if your summer reading lists are running low. **— The United States, China and European Union** are squaring up with different "AI stacks" in the race for global AI dominance. **— Everything you need to know about the** US-EU trade framework when it comes to tech and the almost certain future transatlantic tensions. **— The AI Divide is real.** That's as true for where research is funded as it is for the critical infrastructure underpinning ther emerging technology. **Let's get started.** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The never-ending battle between safety and privacy URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter059/ Last updated: 2025-08-19T23:22:35.000Z **IT'S MONDAY AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and in the doldrums of (a very hot!) August, I'm already planning for September. I'll be in Brussels the week of Sept. 8\. If you're around for coffee, reach out [here](mailto: digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **— Efforts to unpick encryption in the name** of child protection are gaining ground again. The proposals are based on the fallacy that they won't undermine universal privacy rights. **— The Trump-Putin summit fall-out:** A view from the Russian propaganda machine. **— Everything you need to know about** the cottage industry of copyright lawsuits taking on AI companies. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The AI summit bandwagon heads to India URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter058/ Last updated: 2025-08-11T11:00:34.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I'm having some serious FOMO about missing out on the Oasis reunion concerts touring the United Kingdom. In honor of that, I give you [this banger](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bx1Bh8ZvH84&ab%5Fchannel=OasisVEVO&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Everything you need to know** about the upcoming AI Impact Summit to be hosted by India early next year. **— Ahead of Donald Trump's meeting** with Vladimir Putin on Aug. 15, Russia's state-based media is in a full-court propaganda press. **— Who's who in the recent shake-up** in the European Commission's Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### In defense of digital political ads URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter057free/ Last updated: 2025-08-04T13:30:53.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and here's a little plug for my day job. **As part of work I'm doing linked to the** United Kingdom's efforts around social media transparency and accountability, we'll be holding a webinar with regulators and policymakers on Aug. 6 (at 11am UK time / 6am ET — sorry!) about the country's new data access efforts. You can sign up [here](https://events.teams.microsoft.com/event/017afa82-5159-4340-b2bb-5102d37847b7@8bb7e08e-daa4-4a8e-927e-fca38db04b7e?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Google and Meta's collective pullback on** political ad transparency in the European Union harms free speech and the public's engagement with political campaigns. — **What Big Tech's recent earnings season** demonstrates about their high-wire geopolitical balance between the United States and everyone else. — **Almost half of the United Kingdom has** never used artificial intelligence tools in their daily lives. **Let's get started:** --- ## **THE END OF DIGITAL POLITICAL ADS** **LATE LAST YEAR, GOOGLE** [**PUT OUT A POST**](https://blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/political-advertising-in-eu/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that few outside of digital policy circles paid much attention to. In the 2-minute read, the search giant's head of EU government affairs said that, as of October, 2025, the tech giant would not allow advertisers to buy political ads targeted within the 27-country bloc. The reason? An obscure new rule, known as the [**EU Regulation on Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising**](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/transparency-and-targeting-of-political-advertising.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or TTPA. **The rule "introduces significant new operational** challenges and legal uncertainties for political advertisers and platforms," read the announcement. "Google will stop serving political advertising in the EU before the TTPA enters into force in October 2025." **Then, on July 25, Meta followed suit.** In an equally short and obscure [message](https://about.fb.com/news/2025/07/ending-political-electoral-and-social-issue-advertising-in-the-eu/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), the social media company said it too would be ending its political ad offering inside the EU because of the upcoming TTPA. "We continue to believe online political advertising is a vital part of modern politics," Meta said in its post. "The TTPA introduces significant, additional obligations to our processes and systems that create an untenable level of complexity and legal uncertainty for advertisers and platforms operating in the EU." **And with that, the two largest platforms** for political ads within the second largest democratic bloc (behind India) hobbled politicians' ability to talk to would-be supporters. On top of that, Google and Meta made it almost impossible to track what was being spent on political campaigns, by who, and who was the audience for these paid-for messages. Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in July:** — We are entering a new era of social media where everyone lives in digital siloes and the cost of spreading falsehoods is next to nothing. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter053/). — The EU-US trade dispute will not include digital; Where the EU and US diverge on AI governance; Tech-related risks now top people's concerns across multiple different regions worldwide. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter054/). — The rise of 'age verification' across the West is ending the era of online anonymity; All you need to know about the White House's upcoming AI Action Plan; The billions to be spent on digital in the next EU Budget. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter055/). — The US-EU trade/tariff agreement was a skirmish in a wider tech-focused war; Contrasting American and Chinese AI strategies; Energy consumption linked to AI, data centers and crypto will double between 2022-26\. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter056/). **It was a one-two punch that both hit** people's legitimate free speech rights and hamstrung wider society's obligations to understand how national elections were influenced, by domestic and foreign groups. **First, a quick synopsis of the (flawed) TTPA.** Introduced in 2024 with the other alphabet soup of EU digital regulation, the rules were aimed at giving citizens greater awareness about the types of political ads they saw online. **That included 1) ensuring political ads** were labeled as such; 2) accessible information, stored in an online repository, about who paid for each digital ad; 3) a ban on foreign entities paying for these paid-for messages in the build-up to national elections; and — most importantly — 4) new restrictions that limited platforms and advertisers in targeting people via data the firms/political groups had already collected on individuals unless they explicitly consented to receiving political ads. **The new limits on how political ads** could be targeted was a major stumbling block. It made it next to impossible for Meta and Google to help political groups to target would-be supporters. To do that, the companies and/or politicians would have to explicitly ask people if they were OK about receiving digital political ads — something that even the most ardent political supporter would likely be beige about, at best. **There are legitimate weaknesses in the TTPA** that everyone knew about from the beginning. **The definition of "political ads" varied widely** between platforms, and EU policymakers' efforts to harmonize that — alongside so-called "issues-based" ads like those around climate change, public health and other societal issues — spread the net too wide. In practice, that meant a large bucket of ads beyond traditional party political messaging would likely be caught within the TTPA. That, in turn, would hit platforms' underlying advertising business models with the potential of 6 percent fines (linked to a company's yearly revenue) for failing to comply. **Faced with that regulatory uncertainty —** and at a time when Google and Meta are trying (badly) to pull back from politics — it made sense both firms would give up a part of their business that was marginal to their collective bottom lines. Why take the risk if you could just pull the plug in a way that, in theory, would anger some politicians already falling out of love with Europe's penchant for digital regulation? **And yet, I just don't buy in.** **Negotiations were still underway about how the TTPA** would be implemented, as of October, so pulling the plug now was an active choice from both Google (in November, 2024) and Meta (in July.) The companies would argue that, at some point, they had to call it a day. And that was their choice. But after companies doubled down on their free speech *bonafides*, the decision to then limit people's free speech rights via buying political ads felt out of step. The separate decisions would be particularly hard for smaller political movements that could level the playing field with larger rivals via targeted digital political ads. **I also don't believe either company doesn't have** the internal resources (both technical and financial) to find a solution. Yes, the definition of what constitutes a "political ad" in the TTPA is bad. But both firms have been tracking various types of ads for years. To suggest that engineers — or even artificial intelligence tooling — could not figure out the line between what was allowed, and what was not, also felt too binary. **When you then look at how much these firms are making** (more on that in the section below) on a quarterly basis, this looks more like a political decision than an economic one. Alphabet (Google's parent company), for instance, [plans to spend $86 billion](https://abc.xyz/assets/cc/27/3ada14014efbadd7a58472f1f3f4/2025q2-alphabet-earnings-release.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) this year, primarily on AI-related infrastructure. That's on top of the $28 billion net profit the company made in the second quarter of 2025. **When spending/making that amount of money,** the idea that figuring out how to implement (flawed) political ad regulations was too costly doesn't add up. **There is still time, before the October deadline,** for the tech companies and the European Commission to find a solution. But that's not really how this should work. It is Meta and Google's right to pull back on services within the bloc — even if sometimes that [feels more like point-scoring](https://about.fb.com/news/2025/03/europe-meet-your-newest-assistant-meta-ai/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) than actual policymaking. **But without a coherent approach to overseeing political ads** in one of the world's largest democratic blocs, these companies are leaving a massive hole in which nefarious actors will likely continue peppering voters with political ads — but in a way that lacks transparency, accountability and oversight. That will harm legitimate political actors who will no longer have a legal way, within the bloc, to amplify their messaging to would-be supporters. **Faced with that trade-off, both companies** have made the wrong choice. Google and Meta will still play a central role in domestic European politics, even if they follow through with their respective decisions to pull out of the political ad business in Europe. **By abdicating this responsibility**, the firms are not, collectively, living up to their stated objectives (to wider society) of uplifting people's free speech rights in a way that promotes transparency and accountability for all. --- ## Chart of the Week **ROUGHLY 40 PERCENT OF BRITS** never use artificial intelligence tools as part of their daily lives, and only 10 percent of those polled by YouGov say they use it at least once or twice a day. **For those who do rely on the emerging technology,** they most regularly seek information about "a simple topic." The least used reason is to find out what is going on in the news. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/08/Untitled-2.jpg) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/08/Untitled-3.jpg) Source: [YouGov](https://yougov.co.uk/technology/articles/52617-how-many-britons-know-ai-lies?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## **BIG TECH EARNINGS, AI AND GEOPOLITICS** **AS A LAPSED** [**FINANCE JOURNALIST**](https://archive.nytimes.com/dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/pressure-in-britain-over-what-to-do-with-bailed-out-banks/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**,** I can't help but scan tech companies' earnings reports when they are published each quarter. Policymakers and politicians may not always tell the truth. But numbers don't lie, so these regular updates from Silicon Valley's biggest names offer a way to cut through the noise to understand how these firms are making and spending their money. **The figures are wild.** Meta's net income in the second quarter, or the profit that the social media giant made after taxes, was a whopping [$13.5 billion](https://investor.atmeta.com/investor-news/press-release-details/2025/Meta-Reports-Second-Quarter-2025-Results/default.aspx?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or a 36 percent yearly jump. Microsoft's figure rose 22 percent, to [$27.2 billion](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/investor/earnings/fy-2025-q4/press-release-webcast?ref=digitalpolitics.co), over the same period. Amazon — not a company known for making much profit, despite its size — recorded net income for the three months through June 30 or [$18.2 billion](https://ir.aboutamazon.com/news-release/news-release-details/2025/Amazon-com-Announces-Second-Quarter-Results/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or a 34% increase. **These profits are crazy.** But that's not where the politics lie in the companies' separate announcements. **Instead, the combination of Google, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft** said that, during the 2025-26 fiscal year, they had earmarked roughly $370 billion for spending, primarily to drive big bets on artificial intelligence. That includes massive spending on data centers, AI engineers and other AI-related costs required in what is increasingly turning into a Silicon Valley-led race toward AI dominance. **Let's put that into perspective.** **The $370 billion back-of-the-napkin figure** doesn't include spending from the second tier of AI (Western) giants, so it's an inherently conservative number. It also doesn't include other digital infrastructure spending, tax cuts and research and design expenditure already announced by the likes of the United States and EU. At best, it's a significant under-count on what has already been allocated by these firms — and that comes despite many of the companies recording significant increases in their net profits (see above.) ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **Here's another stat:** The $370 billion figure — solely linked to Big Tech capital expenditure — is the equivalent to the expected 2025 gross domestic product of the Czech Republic, or the world's 41st largest GDP. In anyone's mind, that is a lot of money. **Here's where the geopolitics comes in.** **These firms are American — and some have** lent heavily into the Red, White and Blue to win favor with the current White House administration. But much of what has been earmarked in AI-related spending is destined for outside of the US. That includes [significant expansion](https://openai.com/index/introducing-stargate-norway/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in companies' global networks of data centers to meet non-US needs. In those conversations, the companies have often played down their American roots, highlighting how they can meet the domestic objectives of national politicians eager to develop indigenous AI tooling to compete on the global stage. **In this bizarro world, two opposite, but complementary,** messages are playing out, in real time. **For US policymakers, these firms are signed** up to the American "dominance" agenda, as articulated in the White House's recent [AI Action Plan](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter055/). For non-US policymakers, the companies are pushing a "we're here to help" ethos that positions them as apolitical globalist allies that can neutrally support these countries' often contradictory policy aims to those of the US. **Central to those conversations are the megabucks** announced in the latest earnings cycle. The expected capital expenditure is the realization of these political discussions, both at home and abroad, at a time when all of Silicon Valley is desperately seeking an edge to keep competitors at bay. That means walking a tight rope between American domestic interests and the business opportunities overseas. **What many in Washington have yet to understand** is how these conversations are playing out in national capitals from Brasilia to Berlin. Once American policymakers figure that out, it's an open question if they will view the companies' international outreach as either part of American "dominance" or as a potential direct conflict with the White House's MAGA agenda. --- ## What I'm reading **— UK Research and Innovation,** a public research body, announced a $74 million program to attract world-class researchers to the UK. More [here](https://www.ukri.org/news/uk-launches-scheme-to-attract-world-class-researchers/?utm%5Fmedium=email&utm%5Fsource=govdelivery). **— An Australian court ruled that X would** have to respond to a local regulator's requests on how the social network tackled child sexual abuse material. More [here](https://www.esafety.gov.au/newsroom/media-releases/full-federal-court-rejects-x-corp-appeal?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Michael Kratsios, the director of The White House's** Office for Science and Technology Policy, spoke at the Center for Strategic & International Studies about the AI Action Plan. More [here](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jJGh5IRg%5Fwc&t=1s&ab%5Fchannel=CenterforStrategic%26InternationalStudies&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Donald Trump's administration announced tariffs** against Brazil, in part related to how the South American country approached questions around content moderation and the role of platforms in the failed 2022 coup. More [here](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/addressing-threats-to-the-us/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Italy's competition regulator announced an investigation** into Meta's potential abuse of its market position by installing an AI agent within its WhatsApp service. More [here](https://www.agcm.it/media/comunicati-stampa/2025/7/A576?ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- ### In defense of digital political ads URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter057/ Last updated: 2025-08-04T14:28:04.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and here's a little plug for my day job. **As part of work I'm doing linked to the** United Kingdom's efforts around social media transparency and accountability, we'll be holding a webinar with regulators and policymakers on Aug. 6 (at 11am UK time / 6am ET — sorry!) about the country's new data access efforts. You can sign up [here](https://events.teams.microsoft.com/event/017afa82-5159-4340-b2bb-5102d37847b7@8bb7e08e-daa4-4a8e-927e-fca38db04b7e?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Google and Meta's collective pullback on** political ad transparency in the European Union harms free speech and the public's engagement with political campaigns. — **What Big Tech's recent earnings season** demonstrates about their high-wire geopolitical balance between the United States and everyone else. — **Almost half of the United Kingdom has** never used artificial intelligence tools in their daily lives. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The tech-shaped hole in the transatlantic trade deal URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter056/ Last updated: 2025-07-29T00:48:01.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and this is [my current state of mind](https://www.instagram.com/p/DHTXz1SM31G/?utm%5Fsource=ig%5Fweb%5Fcopy%5Flink&igsh=emR3emhka2xhbHZ5) as the "summer lull" keeps on throwing up major event after major event. Pace yourself, people. **— The European Union and the United States agreed to a tariff deal.** Almost none of it will affect the digital sector, so expect further tension ahead. **— The US and China put out separate visions** for global AI governance. The differences will force countries to pick one side or the other. **— Energy consumption related to artificial intelligence**, data centers and cryptocurrencies is expected to double between 2022-2026. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The end of online anonymity URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter055/ Last updated: 2025-07-27T21:35:25.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I'm slightly regretting taking my summer vacation early now that a lot of you are downing tools for a well-deserved break. Think of me as you all catch up on your summer reading by the beach. **— A new generation of 'age verification' rules** aimed at protecting kidsis breaking the long-standing principle that everyone is anonymous online. **— What to expect from the White House's upcoming** AI Action plan to be announced on July 23 that will lay out the US federal government's thinking. **— The European Union's next seven-year budget** will likely earmark billions of dollars for next-generation technologies and digital rulemaking. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### EU-US trade war: no sign of digital URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter054/ Last updated: 2025-07-14T11:00:16.000Z **AND WE'RE BACK**. This is Digital Politics, and I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). I'm back at my desk after a two week vacation. Please bear with me as I catch up with all that's been going on ahead of the summer lull. There's certainly a lot happening. **— The ongoing transatlantic trade negotiations** are very light on tech despite digital now central to the global economy. **— The world of artificial intelligence rulemaking** is in a state of flux. Let's unpack exactly where things stand right now. **— Disinformation, AI and cybersecurity threats** are now some of the most important risks for people worldwide, according to a United Nations survey. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The Fake News Factory URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter053free/ Last updated: 2025-07-02T11:00:10.000Z **KIA ORA. IT'S WEDNESDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and this week's edition comes to you from New Zealand. I'm taking a couple weeks off, so the next newsletter (for paying subscribers) will hit inboxes on July 14. **I'm trying something different this week.** **Ahead of the 2024 global megacycle of elections,** I had the idea of explaining the links between the digital tactics that have now become all too common in how politicians get elected from Pakistan and Portugal to the United Kingdom and the United States. **Life, however, got in the way.** (The best I did was [this package](https://www.politico.eu/politico-editorial-series-bots-and-ballots-artificial-intelligence-reshape-election-2024/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) around artificial intelligence, disinformation and elections.) So, I'm taking another crack at how we all now live in the Fake News Factory. **Let's get started:** --- ## The democratization of online tools and tactics **THE LAST DECADE REPRESENTED** the second generation of social media. It was an era where the shine had significantly come off Facebook and Twitter (now X.) It was a time of [repeated whistleblower](https://www.politico.com/tag/the-facebook-papers?ref=digitalpolitics.co) reports about tech giants understanding how their content algorithms were pushing people toward polarizing and extremist content. It was a time of serious commercialization of these platforms by politicians eager to bombard would-be voters with billions of dollars of collective ad buys. **That era is now over.** It's not that Facebook and YouTube are no longer important. They are — especially YouTube which has transformed itself into a global rival for traditional television in a way that has upended the advertising industry and fundamentally reshaped how anyone under 30-years old consumes video content. But where the 2015-2025 period was primarily defined by the dominance of a small number of Silicon Valley platforms, we're now in an era where fringe platforms, niche podcasts and the likes of [vertical dramas](https://www.fastcompany.com/91335622/vertical-dramas-soap-operas-made-for-phones-popular-la?ref=digitalpolitics.co) have divided people into small online communities that rarely interact with each other. **This was happening before 2025\.** But we have reached an inflection point in how the online information ecosystem works. It has now shattered into a million pieces where people gravitate to like-minded individuals in siloed platforms. There is no longer a collective set of facts or events that form the foundation for society. Instead, most of us seek out opinions that already reflect our worldview, often demonizing those who we disagree with in an "othering" that only fuels polarization, misunderstanding and, potentially, offline harm. **And you thought this would be an uplifting newsletter.** Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in June:** — Debunking popular misconceptions around platform governance; The demise of the open, interoperable internet is upon us; How oversight over AI has drastically slowed since 2023\. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter049/). — Internal fighting among Big Tech giants has hobbled any pushback against antitrust enforcement; It's time to rethink our approach to tackling foreign interference; Tracking Europe's decade-long push to combat online disinformation. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter050/). — Why the G7 has always been a nothing-burger on tech policy; You should keep an eye out on 'digital public infrastructure' in the battle around tech sovereignty; the United Kingdom's expanding online safety investigations. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter051/). — The US is sending seriously mixed messages about its approach to tech policy; How the UK became the second place in the world to mandate social media data access; Artificial intelligence will upend how we consume news online. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter052/). **This bifurcation in how people consume online content** has made it next to impossible for foreign interference operations to flourish like they once did. See, there's a positive point. Even two years ago, the Russians could flood the zone with Kremlin talking points and receive a significant bump in online interactions. The Chinese never went in for that sort of thing — though have progressively targeted Western audiences mostly with overt propaganda in support of the Chinese Communist Party. **Now, such efforts are almost certainly** doomed to fail. The siloing of social media usage has been married with a need for authenticity — that sense of belonging and insider knowledge that can only come from deep roots in communities that can smell out an imposter from a mile off. That authenticity is something that foreign (covert) campaigns routinely do badly at. State-backed operations don't know the insider lingo; they don't have the long-standing credibility built up over months/years; and they don't have personal ties required to fully embed in the balkanization of social media. **But where state-backed actors remain a threat** is in the amplification of existing domestic influencers often by automated bot-nets and other AI-powered tools aimed at juicing social media giants' recommender systems. The companies say they are on top of these covert tactics. But every time there's a massive global political event (or local election), Kremlin-backed narratives keep popping up in people's feeds — often via local influencers whose views just happen to align with Moscow. These individuals are mostly not connected with Russia. But they have likely received a boost from Kremlin-aligned groups seeking to spread those messages to the widest audience possible. ## It's about domestic, not foreign **IN TRUTH, STATE-BACKED ACTORS** are a very public sideshow to the main event driving ongoing toxicity within the information environment: domestic actors. Be they influencers, scammers, politically-aligned media or, ahem, politicians, they are the key instigator for much of the current. Many of these domestic players see some form of benefit from spreading harm, falsehoods and, in some cases, illegality online. That, it should be added, is then amplified by social media platforms' algorithms that have been programmed to entice people to stay on these networks, often by promoting the most divisive content as possible. **Such a dynamic has been around for years.** It isn't a left- or right-wing issue — though [repeated](https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-023-00040-x?ref=digitalpolitics.co) [studies](https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abf1234?ref=digitalpolitics.co) have shown that conservative social media users promote more falsehoods than their liberal counterparts. It's a basic fact that domestic social media users both know their audience better than foreign influence campaigns and that they have greater credibility with siloed local audiences than Russia, China or Iran. **What has shifted, though, is the ability** for almost anyone to run a domestic influence campaign — or, you know, a mainstream political campaign — as if they had the resources of the Kremlin-backed [Internet Research Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet%5FResearch%5FAgency?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Over the last five years, the toolkit required to skew social media has become readily accessible and significantly cheaper than it once was. That has been spurred on even more through the rapid growth of AI-enabled tools (more on that below.) But everything from a Bangladesh-based bot farm to a Philippines-based dark arts public relations has now become an off-the-shelf product that can be bought via a few clicks on a public-facing website. **This shift has not gone unnoticed by criminals.** In 2025, the highest volume of attacks in the (Western) information environment now come from those seeking to dupe social media users out of money — and not to alter their political allegiances. Yes, the impact on politics can have significantly bigger effects. But the rise of "financial disinformation" in terms of frauds and scams promoted on social media has reached pandemic proportions. **Collectively, such digital efforts to swindle** people out of money now costs billions of dollars a year, and even that is likely a significant underestimate. It's also directly linked to a crime (aka fraud) when scammers buy social media adverts to convince people to sign up to Ponzi and other get-rich-quick schemes. I did a quick search, via Meta's ad library in six different countries, for such financial scams, and found a prolific amount of advertising that promoted such disinformation. Some of it was blatantly illegal, some of it was not (I'm not linking to it to avoid amplification.) But the fact such scam artists are openly flaunting the law should be a worry for us all. **This democratization of disinformation** has only gone from bad to worse with AI tools. Be it cloning technology to spoof a victim's voice, AI-generated images attacking a political opponent or next-generation video software that creates falsehoods from scratch within minutes, the cost for generating toxicity, hate and polarization is now almost zero. Yes, these tools can also generate joy, laughter and entertainment. But the last six months have seen a rapid rise in AI-generated slop that is quickly moving from being easy to detect to being indistinguishable from the real thing. ## Trust me, I'm a regulator **THIS YEAR MARKS THE FIRST TIME ON RECORD** that several countries' online safety rulebooks are in full operation. Yes, Australia [got things started ](https://www.esafety.gov.au/newsroom/whats-on/online-safety-act?ref=digitalpolitics.co)almost five years ago. But with the European Union's Digital Services Act and the UK's Online Safety Act, the Western world has the first signs of what a well-resourced regulatory environment looks like when it comes to keeping people safe online. **Sigh.** **It's not that the European Commission and Ofcom** (disclaimer: I sit on an [independent advisory committee](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/structure-and-leadership/ofcom-establishes-online-information-advisory-committee?ref=digitalpolitics.co) at the British regulator, so anything I say here is done so in a personal capacity) aren't doing their best. They are. It's just both are fighting a 2020 war against perceived threats within the online information environment, and just haven't kept pace with the fast-evolving tactics, some of which I outlined above. **To a degree, the time lag is understandable.** Regulators are always going to be behind the curve on the latest threats. Both agencies are still staffing up and learning the ropes of their new rulebooks. How successful either the EU or UK will be in making their online worlds safer for citizens won't be known for at least five years, at the earliest. **But there have been some serious mistakes,** especially from the European Commission. Let's leave aside the [political nature](https://www.politico.eu/article/european-union-digital-services-act-dsa-thierry-breton/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) of the first investigations under the Digital Services Act. And let's leave aside the internal bureaucratic infighting that was always going to arise from such a powerful — and well-resourced — piece of legislation. **For me, the biggest error was how Ursula von der Leyen** framed the new rules as almost exclusively a [means for combatting Russian interference](https://www.politico.eu/article/von-der-leyen-proposes-new-eu-disinformation-law-to-counter-foreign-meddling/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). That was done primarily to secure her second tenure as European Commission president. But the characterization of the Digital Services Act as an all-powerful mechanism to thwart the Kremlin's covert influence operations has continued well into this year — most notably in the [two presidential elections](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter019/) in Romania. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **Let's be clear. These online safety rules** are many things. But, at their heart, they are wonky, bureaucratic and cumbersome mandatory requirements for platforms to abide by their own internal policies against illegal content. They are not about Russian disinformation. And they certainly are not about censorship. ## Weaponization and unknown unknowns **And that takes me to the final big concern** within the Fake News Factory: the weaponization of online safety rules. Since 2016, there have been those within the US that pushed back hard against platforms' efforts to quell illegal and abusive content. That has spiralled into conspiratorial claims that a [Censorship Industrial Complex](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digital-bridge/the-horsemen-of-the-censorship-industrial-complex/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — made up of governments, social media giants and outsiders — is trying to illegally silence predominantly rightwing voices, often via new online safety legislation. **US President Donald Trump's administration** [has made it clear](https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-issues-directive-to-prevent-the-unfair-exploitation-of-american-innovation/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) what it thinks of these rules — and has pushed back hard. It has threatened retaliatory tariffs against countries with online safety rules on the books. It [has threatened to ban](https://www.state.gov/announcement-of-a-visa-restriction-policy-targeting-foreign-nationals-who-censor-americans/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) anyone who allegedly tries to censor Americans from entering the country. It has accused both the UK and EU of infringing on US First Amendment rights. **These attacks against what are, essentially,** legal commitments obligating companies to live by their own internal rules — and to demonstrate that they have done so — are now part of the conversation in other Western countries. That includes (mostly) right-wing lawmakers across Europe seeking to weaken these online safety rules, accusing others of censoring conservative viewpoints and mimicking many of the long-standing talking points from their US counterparts. **It's true, particularly during the pandemic,** that social media companies made content moderation decisions with imperfect facts. Some posts were unfairly removed or downranked as these firms responded, in real time, to government efforts to amplify scientifically correct information. But the rise of conspiracy theories, which insinuated a mass censoring of online voices, just didn't bear out with the evidence at hand. And that came after [repeated reports](https://judiciary.house.gov/documents/reports?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from the US House of Representatives select subcommittee on the weaponization of the federal government. **If there was evidence of such abuse,** then I would be the first to champion such findings. But as we enter the second half of the year, there is one core underlying fact that underpins everything I've written so far: no one has a clue about what happens on these platforms. **Long-time Digital Politics readers** [**will have heard me**](https://www.techpolicy.press/how-to-ensure-broad-access-to-social-media-data-for-maximum-transparency-and-accountability/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)go on about this for months — and, to be fair, it's part of my day job to look into this issue. But how the complex recommender system algorithms interact with people's individual posts, paid-for advertising and wider efforts to influence people online remains a black box. What I have outlined above, for instance, is based on my own research, what I understand anecdotally about how these platforms work and discussions with policymakers, tech executives and other experts. **The Fake News Factory is my own imagining** of how the current online information ecosystem interacts and shapes the world around us. But without better awareness — via mandatory requirements that these firms open up to independent scrutiny, transparency and accountability — about the inner workings of these platforms, that imagining will remain incomplete, at best. **We are entering a new generation of social media** with limited awareness, mass balkanization and an increasingly politicization of what should be clear objectives of keeping everyone safe online. How long this era will stick around for is anyone's guess. But, for now, the Fake News Factory remains as strong as ever. --- ## What I'm reading **— The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development** analyzed the so-called age assurance policies from 50 online services — most of which did not have checks in place. More [here](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/age-assurance-practices-of-50-online-services-used-by-children%5Fa19853ab-en.html?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). **— The team at the DSA Observatory did** a deep dive into how individuals, non-profit organizations and consumer groups can bring private enforcement actions under the EU's Digital Services Act. **— The UK's Competition and Markets Authority** laid out its rationale for why it had designated Google a so-called "strategic market status" under the country's new digital antitrust rules. More [here](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-takes-first-steps-to-improve-competition-in-search-services-in-the-uk?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). **— OpenAI submitted recommendations to the upcoming** US AI Action Plan. The words "freedom" and "PRC" are mentioned repeatedly throughout. More [here](https://openai.com/global-affairs/openai-proposals-for-the-us-ai-action-plan/?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). **— Researchers at USC Annenberg looked at how** the media covered the negative side of social media/technology, and found that the companies are rarely blamed. More [here](https://learcenter.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/OffTheHook%5FBigTechinMedia%5FLearCenter.pdf?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). --- ### The Fake News Factory URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter053/ Last updated: 2025-06-30T11:00:42.000Z **KIA ORA. IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and this week's edition comes to you from New Zealand. I'm taking a couple weeks off, so the next newsletter will hit your inboxes on July 14. **I'm trying something different this week.** **Ahead of the 2024 global megacycle of elections,** I had the idea of explaining the links between the digital tactics that have now become all too common in how politicians get elected from Pakistan and Portugal to the United Kingdom and the United States. **Life, however, got in the way.** (The best I did was [this package](https://www.politico.eu/politico-editorial-series-bots-and-ballots-artificial-intelligence-reshape-election-2024/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) around artificial intelligence, disinformation and elections.) So, I'm taking another crack at how we all now live in the Fake News Factory. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### What does the US want from tech? URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter052/ Last updated: 2025-06-23T11:00:14.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and here's a quick scheduling update. I'm taking the first two weeks off in July, so next week's newsletter will be the last until July 14\. **Don't worry. I've got some programming** planned for my upcoming break, but FYI. **— The United States** **is pursuing a "cake-and-eat-it" strategy** on digital policymaking. It's leaving many confused, at home and abroad. **— The United Kingdom just passed the world's second** mandate requiring social media companies to open up to outsiders in the name of accountability and transparency. **— Social media dominates how we all access information online.** But artificial intelligence tools are likely to upend that status-quo. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Where is the G7 on digital? URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter051/ Last updated: 2025-06-16T11:00:22.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and you find me juggling the completion of a 6-month project ahead of a planned vacation in early July. [Current scenes](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xImh4aGe3ok&ab%5Fchannel=DigitallyBaffled&ref=digitalpolitics.co), no joke. **— As leaders of the G7 countries gather in Western Canada** for their annual summit, the group's track record on tech is patchy, at best. **— Here's an acronym you should get used to hearing**: DPI, or digital public infrastructure that represents the latest battle in "technological sovereignty." **— The United Kingdom started nine investigations** into how potential child sexual abuse imagery was shared online. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The internal battle of digital antitrust URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter050/ Last updated: 2025-06-09T11:00:01.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be making a flying visit to Brussels this week. If you're around and want to grab coffee on June 11, drop me a line [here](mailto: digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). My colleagues are holding a webinar on June 12 about the upcoming **United Nations Internet Governance Forum**. You watch along [here](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/why-the-uns-internet-governance-forum-still-matters-twenty-years-on/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) at 9am ET / 3pm CET. **— We're entering a new era of digital competition** enforcement that pits Big Tech companies' vested interests against each other. **— The traditional approach to tackling** foreign interference is woefully out of date. It's time for a rethink. **— Europe's decade-long push to** combat state-backed online disinformation and cyber attacks. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Platform governance: myths vs reality URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter049free/ Last updated: 2025-06-04T11:22:25.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO ANOTHER DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I've joined a yearlong taskforce to help the United Kingdom figure out how to implement its upcoming social media data access rules. We're looking for a PostDoc to help with that work — check that out [here](https://jobsite.sheffield.ac.uk/job/Research-Fellow-%28UKRI-Social-Media-Data-Access-for-Researchers%29/1083-en%5FGB?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and spread the word (or apply!) **— There are a lot of misconceptions** about nascent rules to oversee social media. Let's unpack what is really going on in 2025. **— The way the internet currently operates** is under threat. That should worry us all. **— The speed of AI oversight has significantly** slowed over the last two years. Here's a chart that explains that. **Let's get started.** --- **MANY OF US SPEND A LOT OF TIME ON SOCIAL MEDIA.** There's no shade in that. It's just the truth. And despite all the great things that TikTok, Instagram and YouTube can do, there are also some serious downsides. That includes: automated algorithmic recommender systems designed to keep us scrolling; masses of coordinated spam and inauthentic behavior; hate speech, terrorist content, and child sexual abuse material; foreign interference, most notably targeted at elections. **The thing with social media is that it's a tool.** One that can be used for both good and bad. But as we hurtle toward the middle of 2025, we're living in a bizarro world where there are a lot of half-truths and falsehoods about regulator- and platform-led efforts to quell the bad stuff online. Ironically, these platform governance efforts are designed to weed out half-truths and falsehoods before they have real-world harm. **Without getting too binary, the dividing line falls** between those who believe any form of platform governance equates to illegal attempts to quell people's legitimate free speech rights and those who believe platforms must do more to stop the spread of harmful content online. The split has taken on an increasingly geopolitical turn after the Donald Trump administration [made repeated claims](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/defending-american-companies-and-innovators-from-overseas-extortion-and-unfair-fines-and-penalties/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) international platform governance regimes — in places like the European Union, United Kingdom and Brazil — were unfairly targeting US citizens and firms. **The truth is a lot more mundane than that.** In reality, the likes of the EU's **Digital Services Act** and UK's **Online Safety Act** (disclaimer: I sit on an [independent board](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/structure-and-leadership/ofcom-establishes-online-information-advisory-committee?ref=digitalpolitics.co) advising the UK's regulator, so anything I say here is done so in a personal capacity) are almost exclusively transparency efforts to 1) get social media companies to explain how they go about their business; 2) allow regulators to hold these firms to account for their internal policies; and 3) provide an opportunity for social media users to seek redress if they believe their content has been mishandled. Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in May:** — Here are three short-term ways to boost transatlantic ties on tech; the long-term effects of annulling Romania's presidential election because of alleged online hijinks; the democratic world's media ecosystems are degrading quickly. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter044/). — How Washington is giving up its role as a leader within international tech policymaking; how Brussels has embraced its inner "MAGA" to promote a more muscular approach on digital to the world. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter045/). — Western policymakers are shifting away from greater oversight of AI; the India-Pakistan conflict demonstrates how online falsehoods still affect offline conflict; companies are more responsible than governments/users for combating online hate speech. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter046/). — The tide toward digital sovereignty will lead to increased digital barriers between countries; Romania's presidential election was rife with online shenanigans; the cost of using the most advanced AI models has fallen 280-fold. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter047/). — Europe and the US are making it easier for AI companies to operate without oversight; transatlantic data flows are still on shaky ground; digital sovereignty may lead to a 4.5 percent reduction in the global economy. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter048/). **That has led to a series of uber-wonky** risk assessments and independent audits, under the EU's platform governance regime (see [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter020free/)), that outline — in too much detail, frankly — all the machinations social media companies go through to comply with their existing terms of service. Only if these firms do not live up to these internal checks and other now legally-mandated platform governance rules will regulators step in. London is expected to carry out its more targeted risk assessment asks in the coming months. **So far, only X, formerly Twitter, has been** issued a so-called [statement of objections](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-sends-preliminary-findings-x-breach-digital-services-act?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or charge sheet, under the Digital Services Act. I have no inside knowledge of when a final decision will come. But, given that Brussels announced its preliminary findings last summer, I would expect X to face a fine and series of remedies by September. If that does happen, expect a likely pushback from Washington over claims that Brussels is implementing a protectionist, free speech-bashing racket to promote its own interest because it can't create its own global tech champions. Sigh. **Such accusations miss the point.** They miss the point because if you scratch just a little below the surface, existing platform governance rules are mostly failing. What regulators are quickly finding out is that social media companies are complex machines — ones that, as of 2025, are taking a more adversarial approach to how outsiders question how they function. That means regulatory agencies, many of which have newly-minted, but as yet untested, powers, are finding themselves with too few resources to really get under the hood to mitigate potential harm. **What that has led to — as we saw in Romania's** [aborted first-round presidential election last year](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter019/) — is an often kneejerk reaction by politicians eager to use platform governance regimes in ways that they were never intended. **No, these online safety regimes are not about** limiting people's speech. No, they are not about combating (Russian) foreign interference. No, they are not about hobbling a growing economic adversary (read: the United States) via hefty fines. They should be viewed as a legally-mandated reminder to social media giants that they need to abide by their own internal content policies. **In reality, the current state of play for most Western** platform governance rules is middling, at best. Most regulators are still underpowered to do their jobs. Many of the actual oversight is not yet in place. And the growing adversarial stance of many social media platforms means that much of the goodwill necessary to conduct routine, daily oversight is waning quickly (at least in public). **Before I get angry emails, it's also true we are** still very early into these untested regimes. No one has ever tried to institute mandatory oversight for such globe-spanning platforms before. It was never going to be easy, simple or without failure. I would argue you need to view "success" over a 3-5 year time horizon — not via a first volley of fines coming out from Brussels, London or elsewhere. **What I do worry about, however, is that for most citizens** in countries with these platform governance rules, there is little, if any, demonstration of their online experiences improving through such greater oversight. Confronted with a growing minority who claim such [regulation is censorship](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter035/), the failure to show any meaningful upside to these rules for average voters leaves an opportunity for those who would seek to weaponize any form of platform governance via the lens of an illegal threat to fundamental free speech rights. **I have been critical of online safety rules** — including the growing desire to implement so-called [age verification technology](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Age%5Fverification%5Fsystem?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to ensure minors do not get access to certain types of content online. But when you take a hard look at what the likes of Brussels and Canberra are doing on platform governance, there's just no way to view that work as illegal censorship. At best, it's a faulty effort to require global tech companies to be transparent, equitable and forthcoming about how their existing internal safeguards are designed and implemented to keep users safe online. **I contrast that with a number of US state-based rules** aimed at reducing access to online content — often for somewhat valid reasons — and it's hard not to feel troubled by such rules. **Currently, 17 US states** [**have implemented**](https://www.404media.co/pornhub-is-now-blocked-in-almost-all-of-the-u-s-south/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) **age verification** rules to stop children from accessing porn sites within their borders. That is a valid choice for policymakers to make. But it also means, given the draconian nature of age verification that requires everyone to prove they are of age before accessing such material, these sites have also become inaccessible to adults — in a way, I would argue, that is an unfair restriction of their rights to access information. **It's weird to be in a position as a defender of pornography.** I make no moral judgement on such material. But I do worry that in an effort to protect children from this material, US policymakers — and, now, many of their international counterparts — are entering a platform governance quagmire that gives lawmakers too much say over what can, and can't, be accessed over the internet. **At their imperfect best, platform governance rules** are a tool to hold social media companies to account for what they have promised to do to keep people safe online. It is about transparency and accountability — and nothing more. **But this shift toward verifying who can access** content via the internet is something that we should all be concerned about. It is an over-reach — often done in the name of protecting children — that veers from the basic tenets of platform transparency toward the creation of a growing list, designed by politicians, of content that people can not access online. --- ## Chart of the Week **REGULAR DIGITAL POLITICS READERS** will already be aware of how policymakers' interest in setting new guardrails for artificial intelligence has significantly dwindled in recent months. **But researchers at Stanford and Harvard devised** this handy timeline for global AI governance that shows a steady stream of national, regional and international efforts to corral AI — until 2025. **What has come, so far this year,** is primarily White House executive orders, including one that revoked Washington's previous pledge to promote AI safeguards. **The blue bars equate to "soft laws,"** the yellow bars to "hard law proposed," the green bars to "hard law passed" and the red bars to "hard law revoked." ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/06/Untitled-2.jpg) Source: [Sacha Alanoca, et al. ](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.13673?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## The open internet is in jeopardy **FOR THOSE OF YOU WHO AREN'T GENERATION X** (or maybe [Elderly Millennials](https://www.businessinsider.com/typical-geriatric-millennial-age-digital-skills-communication-2021-7?ref=digitalpolitics.co)), you won't remember a time before the internet was omnipresent. But the digitally-focused social and economic boom over the last 30 years — as well as some serious problems created by technology — has been predicated on a few basic underlying principles. Those date back to the early days of the world wide web, and focus on: 1) a decentralized and bottom-up oversight of the online world; and 2) a multi-stakeholder model that includes companies, civil society groups, academics and governments working together. **This two-pronged strategy allowed for a rapid growth** of internet usage, the creation of international protocols to ensure underlying infrastructure communicated with each other, and the ability for anyone (caveat: with the technical and financial resources) to participate in what had been, in many ways, a golden era of digitally-powered economic and social gain. **That structure, however, is now in serious jeopardy.** **When government officials, industry executives** and civil society groups meet in Lillestrøm, Norway for the annual United Nations [**Internet Governance Forum**](https://igf2025.no/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) later this month, the future of such a decentralized, inclusive model for how the internet will develop over the next decade is in question. I get it. It's hard to get excited or animated about the inner workings of internet governance policy. But stick with me. **Ever since China became a serious player** in the world of technology twenty(ish) years ago, Beijing and its authoritarian allies have been pushing for greater government control over how the internet works. That makes sense. If you're a state that has a say over almost all aspects of citizens' lives, then giving them *carte blanche* to surf the web — often finding information about how repressive these regimes actually are — is not going to work. **In response, the US has led the pushback** against such government control. In part, that is an economic choice to support American tech firms that have been the main benefactors of a free, interoperable internet. But it also plays to Washington's long-standing pledge to promote human rights and democratic values worldwide — including via the internet. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **That status-quo is going through a major transition.** China (and, to a lesser extent Russia) has been successful in wooing other countries, many from the Global Majority, to its cause. That's why the UN's recent [Convention against Cybercrime](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/cybercrime/convention/home.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co) was such a worry. It placed, for the first time, countries in the driving seat around internet governance policy that many fear will become the new normal. **At the same time, the US is forgoing its traditional leadership** position in promoting a more open, multi-stakeholder approach to internet governance. Much is still up in the air with how the Trump 2.0 administration will approach these topics. But initial negotiations — often in opaque UN gatherings most of us have never heard of — linked to new internet standards have seen Washington pull back from its vocal backing of how the current internet model functions. **This shift will not be felt overnight.** But, gradually, countries are taking on a stronger governance position in the world of technology that is fundamentally different from how these networks developed over decades. Many politicians want greater control over digital at a time when local citizens are becoming more digitally-aware. **Without the US leading the charge to keep** the internet open, interoperable and mulit-stakeholder, it's likely China will have an easier chance to push its top-down approach in the years to come. That would be a mistake — one that will be felt across the world unless democracies (beyond the US) start to advocate publicly for a return to how the internet has worked for generations. --- ## What I'm reading **— The US State Department chastised European countries** for failing to uphold their democratic principles, including related to online speech. More [here](https://statedept.substack.com/p/the-need-for-civilizational-allies-in-europe?r=xmhbb&triedRedirect=true&utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— The Institute for Strategic Dialogue goes deep** on what the "manosphere" is and its impact on online culture. More [here](https://www.isdglobal.org/explainers/the-manosphere-explainer/?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). **— The Canadian Centre for Child Protection produced** a podcast series about Project Arachnid that detects and removes child sexual abuse images. More [here](https://open.spotify.com/show/55bFsYiyxrD1PT4U7LO9DB?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Australia's eSafety Commissioner wrote a** position paper on so-called "immersive technologies" and their potential harms. More [here](https://www.esafety.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-05/Immersive-technologies-position-statement-May-2025.pdf?v=1748863528614&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Researchers unpack the difficulties in accessing** social media data via the EU's Digital Services Act. More [here](https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.09877?ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- ### Platform governance: myths vs reality URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter049/ Last updated: 2025-06-03T09:17:46.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO ANOTHER DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I've joined a yearlong taskforce to help the United Kingdom figure out how to implement its upcoming social media data access rules. We're looking for a PostDoc to help with that work — check that out [here](https://jobsite.sheffield.ac.uk/job/Research-Fellow-%28UKRI-Social-Media-Data-Access-for-Researchers%29/1083-en%5FGB?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and spread the word (or apply!) **— There are a lot of misconceptions** about nascent rules to oversee social media. Let's unpack what is really going on in 2025. **— The way the internet currently operates** is under threat. That should worry us all. **— The speed of AI oversight has significantly** slowed over the last two years. Here's the chart that explains that. **Let's get started.** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The unstoppable ascent of AI URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter048/ Last updated: 2025-06-02T19:11:08.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS**. I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I'll be in Berlin this week at the [Re:publica conference](https://www.re-publica.com/en?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Drop [me a line](mailto: digitalpolitics@protonmail.com) if you're also in town. I'll [be on stage](https://www.re-publica.com/en/node/7350?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on May 28 at 4:15pm CET / 10:15am ET to talk about boosting transparency and accountability for social media. **— The United States and Europe are making it easier** for artificial intelligence companies to operate with fewer checks and less oversight. **— A recent court decision just made it safer** to ship data between the EU and US. That does not change the superficial status quo of transatlantic data flows. **— Full-blown 'digital sovereignty' may cost** the global economy as much as a 4.5 percent reduction in individual countries' gross domestic product. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The consequences of digital sovereignty URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter047/ Last updated: 2025-05-19T11:00:25.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). This weekend was another belter when it came to elections (we'll get to that in a minute.) But, more importantly, Austria [won](https://eurovisionworld.com/eurovision/2025?ref=digitalpolitics.co) this year's Eurovision song contest with this [entry](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4xrUFhBjGWg&ref=digitalpolitics.co) — still not as good as this Italian [winner](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RVH5dn1cxAQ&ref=digitalpolitics.co) from 2021, imo. **— Digital sovereignty is now the name of the game.** That's going to lead to increased silos between how countries approach crucial tech policy issues. **— Romanians backed a pro-EU** candidate to become the country's next president. That hasn't stopped many from crying foul play. **— The cost of using the most advanced AI models** has fallen 280-fold over the last 18 months as companies race to woo users worldwide. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### A shift away from AI rulemaking URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter046/ Last updated: 2025-05-12T11:00:46.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THAT MEANS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and hope to see some of you at the [tech policy meet-up](https://lu.ma/p5tnq06u?ref=digitalpolitics.co) I'm co-hosting in Brussels on May 15\. I also have my first meeting of Ofcom's [Online Information Advisory Committee](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/structure-and-leadership/ofcom-establishes-online-information-advisory-committee?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on May 16 — wish me luck! **— The drive to regulate artificial intelligence** has given way to a desire to harness the emerging technology for economic benefit and national security. **— India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire** in a quickly escalating regional conflict. That didn't stop waves of disinformation from spreading on social media. — **Platforms, citizens and governments should** be responsible for creating a healthy digital environment, according to a global survey. But companies are more responsible than others for combating hateful online speech. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### EU-US tech: a changing of the guard URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter045/ Last updated: 2025-05-09T11:00:34.000Z **HERE'S A BONUS DIGITAL POLITICS** to finish your week. I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and you find me on a train to York (in the north of England) on my way to a workshop to discuss social media data access. Oh, what a glamorous life. **Below are two analyses that I wrote** for Tech Policy Press where I am a contributing editor. They build on this week's [newsletter](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter044/) to drill down on different aspects of the transatlantic tech relationship. **Taken together, they offer dueling perspectives** on what is going on in Washington and Brussels. The first places Donald Trump's administration in the global context. The second explains the European Union's vibe shift on tech. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Can we fix the digital transatlantic relationship? URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter044free/ Last updated: 2025-05-11T18:42:14.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and this weekend marked May 4th — also known as [Star Wars Day](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Star%5FWars%5FDay?ref=digitalpolitics.co), for those who follow such things. This [video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cg-pnGFbwMQ&ab%5Fchannel=Trigon%27sTrailers&ref=digitalpolitics.co) plays in my head every time I have to explain the Star Wars basics to a non-fan. **For anyone in Brussels on May 15, I'll be co-hosting** a tech policy gathering in the EU Quarter. We're running a waiting list, so add your name [here](https://lu.ma/p5tnq06u?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and we'll try to open up some more slots. **— The transatlantic relationship on tech is in the** worst shape in decades. Here are some ways to improve it — even if wider political tension remain. **— A far-right candidate won the first round of** Romania's presidential election. Europe has not responded well to the digital fall-out. **— Media freedom has been significantly curtailed** over the last decade amid people's shift toward social media for their understanding of the world. **Let's get started:** --- **LET'S BE CLEAR: THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP** on tech is the worst I've seen in 20 years. The White House has already made clear it views European Union digital regulation as akin to protectionist tariffs, as well as an unfair check on free speech. The Berlaymont Building — home to the European Commission — has struggled to secure high-level meetings for its digital officials whenever they've made it to Washington. It also has doubled down on internal efforts to promote European economic interests over those from outside the bloc via public funds dedicated to the next generation of emerging technology. **In short, Brussels and Washington are talking past each other.** Even when United States and EU officials disagreed — as they often did — in the past, there was always an informal line of communication between policymakers to ease tensions. That came from individuals, on both sides, who had invested a significant amount of personal capital in building ties with each other. People met at conferences. They swapped cellphone numbers. They built professional, and sometimes personal, relationships with their counterparts in each respective city. **I wouldn't say those networks are completely gone.** But they are certainly on life support. It has left the world's two most important democratic powers at a crossroads. And on digital policymaking, I'm seeing more and more signs that the EU and other parts of the democratic world (with the significant exceptions of the United Kingdom and Japan) [now willing to distance themselves](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter042/) from their one-time trusted ally. **But after I** [**outlined that theory**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter042/) **a couple of weeks ago** in Digital Politics, many of you got in touch with a fair criticism. We get things are bad, went the emails. But where are the areas of common ground that can keep the (digital) embers alive — even if the transatlantic fire looks like it's going out? **Fair point. It's easy to criticize.** It's harder to offer solutions. So here goes. **First, one chess piece worth taking off the board.** In many European capitals, there's a growing interest in working directly with US state leaders, most notably governors who have taken on an increasing leadership position on tech just as Washington has given up that role. I wouldn't put my eggs in that basket — even if that could include working directly with California on areas like artificial intelligence standards and international data flow rules. Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in April:** — Why digital services won't be on the front line of the unfolding global trade war; Donald Trump's extension of the TikTok sale/ban doesn't solve any of the underlying problems; How different generations consume online media. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter040/). — The idea that any tech giant has a monopoly on social media misunderstands how we all use these platforms; What's behind Brussels' renewed attempt to "streamline" its digital rulebook; Annual corporate investment in AI has grown 13-fold over the last decade. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter041/). — Non-US policymakers are seriously considering how to pull back from the US on tech; The transatlantic consensus that Google is a monopoly will have long-term consequences, but it will take time to play out; Digital-focused civil society groups worldwide have been hurt by cuts in US government support. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter042/). — Canada's recent election shows the limits on how the online world can shape offline politics; How to understand the European Commission's collective $790 million antitrust fine against Meta and Apple; Brussels will spend $66 million this year to enforce its online safety regime. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter043/). **As much as many would like to bypass the current** situation in Washington (and I mean the wider morass of nothingness on tech, excluding the recent [Take it Down Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/633?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that will likely be signed by Donald Trump), few, if any, foreign governments are willing to publicly push ahead with such US state-based digital diplomacy out of fear of negating decades-old international norms that national governments speak to other national governments on such foreign policy issues. Basically, working directly with US states is a non-starter for most non-US government officials. **OK, so where can we find common ground?** Weirdly, antitrust policy feels like the most secure US-EU digital issue where both sides are forging ahead with a new collective consensus. Yes, the White House may not like the EU's **Digital Markets Act** (though it has remained mostly quiet about the [recent fines ](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter043/)against Meta and Apple, respectively.) And yes, many EU competition officials look at the decades of Washington's stalled antitrust investigations into Big Tech as a sign the US is too slow and/or too unwilling to act. **But in the last five years, there's been a growing consensus** across the Atlantic that 1) parts of Silicon Valley have abused their market dominance; 2) consumers and smaller rivals have been unfairly affected by those actions; and 3) aggressive antitrust enforcement — including the potential break-up of some of these tech companies — is the only way to re-level the market. **If that doesn't sound like a first step toward a rekindled** transatlantic relationship on tech, then I don't know what does. **Next, to the thorniest of topics: platform governance.** Trump's aversion to European-style online safety rules is well-known. It was mostly shared by his Republican and Democratic predecessors in the White House. Brussels, too, hates the fact its internal media landscape is dominated by the likes of Instagram and YouTube. **But where both sides equally agree is that** more needsto be done to protect minors for online predatory behavior, scams and potentially abusive content algorithms that have led to a series of EU and US efforts aimed at boosting digital child safety. Yes, this is not a like-for-like comparison. Some in the US have given parents too much control over what their kids can see on social media. Some in the EU want to impose age verification standards — in the name of child safety — that would fundamentally undermine how the current internet works. **But the basic premise — that children must be better** protected as they navigate the online world — is an issue that both sides of the current transatlantic divide can agree on. What better way to maintain some form of ongoing EU-US relationship on tech? **The third area goes out to all the uber-wonks among us.** Washington and Brussels should double down on the geekiest of digital technocratic standards as a means of bridging the political divide. That includes technical discussions that have thrived, for decades, in international and multi-stakeholder organizations like the [3rd Generation Partnership Project](https://www.3gpp.org/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or 3GPP, which sets global standards for telecommunications networks. Yes, I told you this stuff was geeky. **That would allow European and US officials** — and, by extension companies — to continue talking, even if their political masters ratchet up the transatlantic trade dispute. It would also provide a greater level of certainty for American and EU businesses to invest in the digital world which is, according to both Brussels and Washington, an ongoing political objective. **So there you have it:** competition, child safety and tech standards. Three areas that could be a foundation for ongoing talks and cooperation amid an increasingly geopolitical period. Runners-up tech topics also include: cybersecurity, defense and data flows. If you're interested in me unpacking those, let me know [here](mailto: digitalpolitcs@protonmail.com). **The $64 million question is whether** Washington and Brussels are willing and/or able to see beyond their short-term political fight to allow apolitical officials to continue the digital work they've been doing for years. **In normal circumstances, I would certainly hope so.** But as anyone who has spent time in either Brussels or Washington this year will attest to, we're not living in normal circumstances. And even the hope of finding non-partisan digital topics upon which the transatlantic relationship can be rekindled feels more like a hope, currently, than a legitimate policymaking objective. **For some bonus content,** here are my latest pieces for Tech Policy Press on [how the US is pulling back](https://www.techpolicy.press/assessing-the-trump-administrations-about-face-on-international-tech-policy/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from its global leadership on digital policy and [how the EU is embracing](https://www.techpolicy.press/the-european-unions-new-take-on-tech-make-europe-great-again/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) its inner Trump, on tech, to Make Europe Great Again. --- ## Chart of the Week **REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS,** a nonprofit organization, compiles a yearly index that tracks five indicators — security, social, legislative, political and economic — on the health of countries' domestic media ecosystems. **The last decade has not been good.** The chart on the left, from 2013, highlights that while the likes of China and Saudi Arabia scored poorly across the board, democratic states — including the majority of Europe and North America — were still viewed as "satisfactory" (the light orange color.) **Fast forward to 2025, and many of those** democratic countries, including the US, have fallen (see chart on the right) into the "problematic" category (the dark orange color). That includes many parts of Central and Eastern Europe, too. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/05/Untitled-2.jpg) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/05/Untitled-3.jpg) Source: [World Press Freedom Index](https://rsf.org/en/index?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## What happened in Romania? Take Two **AS DIGITAL POLITICS WENT TO PRESS** on May 4, **George Simion**, a far-right ultra-nationalist politician, had won the first round of Romania's presidential election. The leader of the anti-vaccine Alliance for the Union of Romanians secured 41 percent of the vote — less than the majority Simion would need to win outright. He will now face a run-off, on May 18, with **Nicușor Dan**, the mayor of Bucharest, garnered 21 percent of the first round vote. **For the latest on Romania's presidential election,** see [here](https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20250504-live-romanians-cast-ballots-for-critical-presidential-election-rerun?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://www.politico.eu/tag/romanian-election-2025/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://apnews.com/article/romania-election-presidential-crisis-e6ce0a674cf88bfc02c505482dc2497b?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **The reason Romania is holding a do-over on its presidential** election is because of claims, during the previous vote in November, that pro-Russian politician **Calin Georgescu** unfairly used TikTok to woo voters in his [unlikely first-round victory](https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/25/calin-georgescu-romania-election-hard-right-candidate?ref=digitalpolitics.co). The ultra-nationalist politician came out of the blue to top the first-round poll, and national regulators accused the China-linked platform of failing to uphold the country's electoral rules. **In an unprecedented step**, Romania's intelligence services then released redacted documents (overview [here](https://www.biziday.ro/304044-2/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) accusing foreign actors (they didn't mention Russia, but that was the inference) of conducting 85,000 cyberattacks on the country's election infrastructure. They also suggested there was a cross-platform influence operation involving pro-Georgescu Telegram channels that coordinated messages which people could then post to TikTok and Facebook. The spooks said similar tactics had been used in Ukraine — but, again, Moscow was never specifically mentioned in the redacted documents. Digital Politics now reaches thousands of tech-savvy readers worldwide. If you're interested in sponsoring the newsletter, get in touch [here](mailto: digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **Not surprisingly, TikTok pushed back hard** against accusations it had any role in Romania's last presidential election. It released a series of cherry-picked reports (see [here](https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-eu/continuing-to-protect-the-integrity-of-tiktok-during-romanian-elections?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-eu/protecting-the-integrity-of-tiktok-during-the-romanian-elections?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) about how the platform had removed spam accounts, promoted authoritative information to voters and took down waves of false likes and follow requests. **In December, a senior Romanian court** [annulled](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/06/romanian-court-annuls-first-round-of-presidential-election?ref=digitalpolitics.co) Georgescu's presidential first-round win, in part because of the declassified intelligence documents. That same month, the European Commission [opened an investigation](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F24%5F6487?ref=digitalpolitics.co) into TikTok's role in the Romanian vote, focusing on how the tech giant may have failed to mitigate election-related risks. In February, Georgescu was placed under investigation for mostly potential campaign financing irregularities. And in March, he was barred from standing in this week's presidential re-run. **I get it. That's a lot to take in — especially for most of us** who are not Romanian politics experts. **But what is central to the wider digital debate is that** a presidential election of democratic European country was annulled based on unsubstantiated claims that one of the candidates had unfairly benefited from a social media campaign that, potentially, had ties to Russia. That then led to both domestic and EU investigations into campaign financing irregularities and the role of a foreign-owned social media platform in a European country's nationwide vote. **To date, no one has yet to be convicted of a crime.** Brussels has yet to publish any evidence of TikTok's role in allowing a coordinated influence campaign to flourish on its platform ahead of the November election. **If true, both sets of accusations — related to** Georgescu's alleged campaign financing issues and TikTok's role in the November presidential election — would be grounds for potentially annulling the first-round presidential election. And there is an argument that given the speed of events, local judges and the European Commission had no choice but to step in, even if no actual evidence had yet to be shown to a court to prove any of the accusations. **But my fear is that in annulling the first round election** in November, and then barring Georgescu from standing in this weekend's vote, Romania's court has given ultranationalists and pro-Russian politicians an easy victory in the battle for hearts-and-minds. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **Simion, another far-right ultra-nationalist politician,** came first in the latest first-round presidential vote — and was closer to the 50 percent mark to secure an outright victory than many had expected. It's hard to argue there isn't a public groundswell of support for such opinions, now that similar pro-Russian presidential candidates have topped the polls in consecutive votes. And yes, TikTok was used again to communicate with voters. But its role in this weekend's election, based on what has been made public, was not significant compared to other means of reaching would-be supporters. **In jumping headlong into Romania's domestic politics,** the European Commission also has over-stepped its role within the bloc's online safety regime, known as the Digital Services Act. Those rules do have a remit when it comes to election-related matters. **But by pulling the emergency cord in response** to November's now-annulled election — via its ongoing investigation into TikTok's role in that vote — Brussels has made it easier for critics to claim the EU is willing to use its digital regulation to change voting decisions that officials in Brussels do not agree with. **I get it. That's not what is happening with the ongoing TikTok probe.** But the perception for many on the outside is that the European Commission is weaponizing the Digital Services Act as part of efforts to nudge Romanians to vote against pro-Russian, far-right politicians. **That's just not a good look for the 27-country bloc** as both domestic and non-EU influencers [ramp up claims](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter035/) that Europe's online safety rules are an anti-democratic effort to censor online voices with whom it disagrees. --- ## What I'm reading **— The Future of Privacy Forum breaks down** all you need to know about South Korea's new AI regulatory framework. More [here](https://fpf.org/blog/south-koreas-new-ai-framework-act-a-balancing-act-between-innovation-and-regulation/?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— Ireland's Data Protection Commission** [**fined**](https://dataprotection.ie/en/news-media/latest-news/irish-data-protection-commission-fines-tiktok-eu530-million-and-orders-corrective-measures-following?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared) **TikTok** $600 million for failing to protect Europe's data via data transfer to China. TikTok's response [here](https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-eu/our-response-to-the-irish-data-protection-commission-decision-on-data-transfers?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— International Association of Privacy Professionals** explains why Colorado is reconsidering its approach to regulating artificial intelligence. More [here](https://iapp.org/news/a/a-view-from-dc-colorado-considers-re-forging-AI-guardrails?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). **— Researchers from the University of Zurich** used AI-generated content in online discussions on Reddit to see if such content could change people's minds. The study received significant pushback for failing to gain consent of the people targeted by the AI-generated content. More [here](https://www.science.org/content/article/unethical-ai-research-reddit-under-fire?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves) and [here](https://www.reddit.com/r/changemyview/comments/1k8b2hj/meta%5Funauthorized%5Fexperiment%5Fon%5Fcmv%5Finvolving/?rdt=48005&utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— The DSA40 Data Access Collaboratory** published an in-depth FAQ on how Europe's online safety rules allow independent researchers to access platform data. More [here](http://dsa40collaboratory.eu/faq/?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). --- ### Can we fix the digital transatlantic relationship? URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter044/ Last updated: 2025-05-11T18:42:24.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and this weekend marked May 4th — also known as [Star Wars Day](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Star%5FWars%5FDay?ref=digitalpolitics.co), for those who follow such things. This [video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cg-pnGFbwMQ&ab%5Fchannel=Trigon%27sTrailers&ref=digitalpolitics.co) plays in my head every time I have to explain the Star Wars basics to a non-fan. **For anyone in Brussels on May 15, I'll be co-hosting** a tech policy gathering in the EU Quarter. We're running a waiting list, so add your name [here](https://lu.ma/p5tnq06u?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and we'll try to open up some more slots. **— The transatlantic relationship on tech is in the** worst shape in decades. Here are some ways to improve it — even if wider political tension remain. **— A far-right candidate won the first round of** Romania's presidential election. Europe has not responded well to the digital fall-out. **— Media freedom has been significantly curtailed** over the last decade amid people's shift toward social media for their understanding of the world. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The limits of misinformation: Canada election edition URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter043/ Last updated: 2025-04-28T11:00:12.000Z **HOWDY GANG. THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be in Brussels this week to interview Microsoft's president Brad Smith. You can watch along [here](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/microsofts-brad-smith-on-digital-resilience-during-geopolitical-volatility/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on April 30, or put your name down [here](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdnNfznMb1FtoydpQEm010eWxmz1WGfzfWJaiTNg%5F4Tzb0vrA/viewform?ref=digitalpolitics.co) for one of the final in-person spots. **In other news, I was also just appointed** as a member of an independent committee at the United Kingdom's Ofcom regulator to advise on issues related to the online information environment. More on that [here](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/structure-and-leadership/ofcom-establishes-online-information-advisory-committee?language=en&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Canadians go to the polls on April 28** amid a barrage of online falsehoods. That won't stop Liberal leader Mark Carney almost certainly winning. **— There's a lot of politics to unpack behind** the European Union's collective $790 million antitrust fine against Meta and Apple related to the bloc's new competition rules. **— Brussels spent $52 million in 2024** to implement its online safety regime. Those figures will rise by more than a quarter this year. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### A digital conscious uncoupling URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter042/ Last updated: 2025-04-21T13:47:24.000Z **ANOTHER MONDAY, ANOTHER DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and you find me enjoying the four-day Easter weekend here in the United Kingdom. In honor of that, I give you my new [favorite podcast](https://www.instagram.com/reel/DIbkLEkOpNn/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **In my** [**day job**](https://dfrlab.org/staff/mark-scott/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**, I'll be interviewing Brad Smith**, Microsoft's president, in Brussels on April 30 at 10am CET. You can watch along [here](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/microsofts-brad-smith-on-digital-resilience-during-geopolitical-volatility/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). For those of you who would like to attend in person, drop me a line [here](mailto: digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **— Policymakers worldwide are now seriously considering** a future where digital policymaking excludes the United States. Let's unpick what that means. **— It's official: Google is most definitely a monopoly**, on both sides of the Atlantic. That will have far-reaching consequences — but it will take time. **— Digital rights civil society groups** have been severely impacted by cuts in US government support. Here are the charts that explain the impact. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The fallacy of social media monopolies URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter041/ Last updated: 2025-04-14T11:00:18.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and with every day bringing more uncertainty in the world around us, I just can't get [this clip](https://www.instagram.com/reel/DF%5Fw4ywxdO6/?utm%5Fsource=ig%5Fweb%5Fcopy%5Flink) from South Park out of my head. Good luck with the week ahead. **Here's** [**my analysis**](https://www.techpolicy.press/why-europes-digital-rules-should-not-be-part-of-the-trade-war/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) via Tech Policy Press on why Europe's digital rules should not be part of any upcoming trade negotiations between the White House and European Commission. **— A major US antitrust trial against Meta starts on April 14\.** Its underlying premise that the tech giants holds an illegal monopoly over social media is wrong. **— Brussels is bursting with rumors about "streamlining"** digital regulation. What that actually means is anything but clear. **— Annual global corporate investment** in artificial intelligence hit $252 billion last year, a 13-fold increase over the last decade. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The digital side of the trade war URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter040/ Last updated: 2025-04-07T11:00:31.000Z **WELCOME BACK, THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I've returned to my desk after a blissful week of vacation. For those in Brussels, I'll be in town on April 29-30, May 6-7 and May 14-15 if anyone is around — drop me a line on digitalpolitcs@protonmail.com **— A global trade war is heating up.** Technology will inevitably get sucked into the chaos. But don't expect digital services to play a big role, at least not at first. **— US President Donald Trump** extended the sale/ban of TikTok's American operations for another 75 days. That doesn't solve any of the underlying problems. **— How different generations consume (online)** media is becoming more divided, leaving us with little, if any, common culture upon which to rely. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### A game plan for middle powers URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter039free/ Last updated: 2025-04-02T11:00:05.000Z SUPPORTED BY ![Sponsor Logo](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/03/Microsoft-logo_rgb_c-gray-6.png) **HELO, GWLEIDYDDIAETH DDIGIDOL YW HYN.** For those who don't speak Welsh (like me), that's 'Hello, this is Digital Politics." I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and this edition comes to you from an [unseasonably warm](https://www.bbc.co.uk/weather/2644816?ref=digitalpolitics.co) (well, for the United Kingdom) Welsh coastal village. Normal transmission will resume next week. **— The digital world is increasingly divided between Great Powers.** That has left a lot of room for so-called 'middle powers' to exert outsized influence. **— The world of trust and safety is wading through** treacherous political waters that will leave many caught between rival national governments. **— Ahead of pending US tariffs to be announced** on April 2, it's worth remembering global digital exports have doubled over the last 10 years. **Let's get started.** --- ## How to make your mark in digital policymaking **THE UNITED STATES. CHINA. THE EUROPEAN UNION.** When it comes to digital, those three make up the trifecta of global powers — for different reasons. The US is home to the world's biggest and most vibrant tech sector — but with few checks for citizens. China's authoritarian control of the internet has fast-tracked new services (and repression) like no other. The EU's world-leading digital regulation offers a third way between outright capitalism and state rule — with a lack of homegrown tech. **Yet in the Digital Great Gate that has engulfed** this year, let's take a minute to think about [middle powers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle%5Fpower?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Those are the countries like Japan, the UK and Brazil that have sizable domestic markets, exert regional clout due to their size/national expertise and often chart a different path on tech that may be more useful to others caught between the vying interests of China, the US and EU. **It's unrealistic that, say, a Philippines** (despite its 100m+ population) is ever going to sit side-by-side next to China to export its own vision of digital across Asia. Ditto goes for Argentina in Latin America. Wouldn't it be better to learn lessons from such middle powers that have created their own way (often with mixed reasons) rather than falling into one of the camps led by the world's three largest digital powers? **If you want to know what that looks like**, spend some time in Tokyo. Yes, the world's fourth-largest global economy isn't a slouch when it comes to economic prowess. But its aging population, limited linguistic prowess (sorry to all my Japanese-speaking readers!) and positioning close to China have forced Japan to take some bold swings on digital policymaking that are worth a second look. --- ***\*\*A message from Microsoft\*\**** Each day, millions of people use generative AI. Abusive AI-generated content, however, can present risks to vulnerable groups such as women, children, and older adults. In a new [white paper](https://aka.ms/AAv5hz5?ref=digitalpolitics.co), developed in consultation with civil society, we present actionable policy recommendations to promote a safer digital environment.\*\* --- **The country's recently-announced AI proposals** (overview [here](https://www.insideprivacy.com/international/japans-plans-to-adopt-ai-friendly-legislation/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) are anything but a copy-paste of the EU's AI Act — unlike, ahem, what South Korea [tabled](https://techinsights.linklaters.com/post/102js56/koreas-wonsouth-koreas-ai-basic-act-asias-first-comprehensive-ai-legislatio?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Some may not think Tokyo has gone far enough by only requiring AI companies to cooperate with government AI efforts. But the title of the legislation — "*Bill on the Promotion of Research, Development and Utilization of Artificial Intelligence-Related Technologies*" — makes clear the proposed rules are more about enabling the emerging technology within the economy, and not about curtailing its use due to concerns AI will undermine society. **The proposals also require Japan to** align with "international standards." What those AI standards will be is currently unclear. But it's a hat tip to the wider global (read: Western) policymaking conversation around AI where Japan has continued to punch above its weight. That goes for everything from Tokyo's work around the so-called [**Hiroshima Process**](https://www.japan.go.jp/kizuna/2024/02/hiroshima%5Fai%5Fprocess.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on generative AI to its closed-door leadership via the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on global data governance standards (crucial for the ongoing sharing of data internationally). **There are a couple of lessons from Japan's digital policymaking** that apply to other countries seeking to make their mark. **First, don't try to do everything at once.** Tokyo doesn't want to convince everyone to follow its lead. Instead, it often takes a pragmatic view on a small number of issues where it believes it can make a difference and that will benefit its local businesses/citizens. **Second, a willingness to play host** to the bigger powers, which is what Japan did with the Hiroshima Process, can buy you international political capital, on both digital and non-digital issues, that you can tap into further down the line. Recognizing where a country can add value — as a convener, for instance — allows local officials to navigate the inherent difficulties when trying to balance the interests of the Great Digital Powers. Thanks for reading the free monthly version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). ****Here's what paid subscribers read in March:** — Claims that online safety rules are censorship have gone global; Europe's digital rules are not seen to help its citizens; Global data flows are not slowing down. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter035/). — A readout on Trump 2.0's approach to digital policy; Why Canada worries about US interference in its election; A debrief on the EU's AI 'gigafactories.' More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter036/). — Four ways that social media can be made more transparent and accountable via supporting how outsiders access platform data. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter037/). — Why we need to come up with a better version of 'tech sovereignty;' Apple's antitrust loss in Brussels is good for (most) Big Tech; AI models' lack of regional diversity. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter038/). **That's where middle powers can truly come into their own.** By outlining a nimble digital policy agenda that centers on a small number of targeted objectives — versus trying to boil the ocean with an overly-complex and broad agenda — countries beyond the EU, China and the US can find niche tech issues that benefit their local constituencies. **That's the positive view. Now for the negative: the UK.** **I've already** [**expressed**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter027free/) **my reservations** for London's quixotic approach to digital policy. In short: the only thing that matters, really, is boosting foreign direct investment into the country's region-leading tech sector. And, to be clear, there's nothing wrong with that. **But that hasn't stopped British politicians** and policymakers from trying to bite off more than they can chew on everything from online safety to artificial intelligence to digital competition. In recent years, the UK has swung for the fences on all three of those areas, promoting itself as a world-leading center of digital regulation and tech-related industry. You can have the [Online Safety Act](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-act-explainer/online-safety-act-explainer?ref=digitalpolitics.co) AND be home to scores of global platform workers. You can pass sophisticated digital [antitrust rules](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-sets-out-initial-plans-as-new-digital-markets-competition-regime-comes-into-force?ref=digitalpolitics.co) AND support the acquisition of local startups by Big Tech giants. **Frankly, I just don't buy it.** Unlike Japan, the UK tries to play in the same realm as the US, China and the EU, but doesn't have the economic firepower or the regulatory muscle to do that well. Instead, London finds itself in the worst of all worlds. A middle power (with a lot of strong attributes upon which to call) that is too small to play in the Big Leagues but is unable — or unwilling? — to relegate itself to the second tier where it could really make a difference. **That should be a warning to other countries** seeking to find their own path on digital policymaking. Don't pretend you can go head-to-head with global powers when you'll only end up on the worse side of that encounter. **More importantly — and this is especially true** for London and its longstanding desire to remain in lockstep with the US — don't change your own digital agenda to fit into the ever-changing policies of longstanding allies. **London's decision, at the last minute, not to sign** the [communiqué](https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2025/02/11/statement-on-inclusive-and-sustainable-artificial-intelligence-for-people-and-the-planet?ref=digitalpolitics.co) at the recent [Paris AI Action Summit](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter029free/) because the US had decided not to hurt that country's global reputation with not much upside gained with Washington. The UK's "will they, or won't they" approach to pulling back on exiting digital regulation equally has not positioned the Brits as a safe pair of hands in the ever complex world of global tech policy. **In short, when it comes to navigating** a country's own path on digital policy, be more like Japan, and less like the UK. --- ## Chart of the Week **DONALD TRUMP'S ADMINISTRATION WILL UNVEIL** a cavalcade of global tariffs on April 2 which some in the White House are calling "Liberation Day." **Thankfully, much of the digital world** has escaped these threats as [negotiations](https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/wto-extends-e-commerce-tariff-moratorium-broader-negotiations-continue?ref=digitalpolitics.co) via the World Trade Organization [mostly exempted](https://www.iisd.org/articles/policy-analysis/wto-moratorium-customs-duties-electronic-transmission?ref=digitalpolitics.co) so-called "electronic transmissions" (read: online purchases) from such duties. **It's a good thing, too.** At least for global trade. Over the last decade, trade via so-called "digitally-delivered services" has roughly doubled, based on global exports (see left chart) and imports (see right chart.) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/03/Digital-exports.jpg) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/03/Digital-Imports.jpg) Source: [World Trade Organization ](https://www.wto.org/english/res%5Fe/statis%5Fe/gstdh%5Fdigital%5Fservices%5Fe.htm?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## Geopolitics is coming for Trust & Safety Inc **LAST WEEK WAS THE** [**SECOND INSTALLMENT**](https://lu.ma/e629hs6l?ref=digitalpolitics.co)of my (London-based) tech policy meet-up series known as "Marked as Urgent." I run it alongside **Ben Whitelaw** (and his [Everything in Moderation](https://www.everythinginmoderation.co/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) newsletter) and **Georgia Iacovou** (and her [Horrific/Terrific](https://www.horrific-terrific.tech/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) newsletter.) Photos [here](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/markscott82%5Fthanks-to-everyone-who-joined-ben-whitelaw-activity-7311311106956759044-pIu7?utm%5Fsource=share&utm%5Fmedium=member%5Fdesktop&rcm=ACoAAATsaZ8BQ5eV2dLTB4ajT1y1P-2vC9wlPbU) — and let me know if you're down for us bringing the roadshow to your city. We're game. **The topic of the night was:** "What next for Trust & Safety?" Disclaimer: I can be a little like a one-trick pony. But I spoke about how the world of (international) politics is almost certainly going to hit the T&S industry like a ton of bricks in the coming months. I'm not sure many in the sector either know or are prepared for what is coming down the pike. **Let's walk through this.** **First, there is a growing divide, in the democratic world,** between the US and everyone else. No, I'm not talking about Washington's overall shift in policy. Instead, the likes of Australia, Canada and South Korea are quickly moving to impose rules on online platforms to moderate illegal speech — and force companies to explain exactly how they are doing that. **In the US, Trump's position on any form** of content moderation — that it is a form of illegal censorship — is well known. It's now getting implemented via Congressional [hearings](https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/the-censorship-industrial-complex?ref=digitalpolitics.co), White House [directives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/defending-american-companies-and-innovators-from-overseas-extortion-and-unfair-fines-and-penalties/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [efforts](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc%5Fgov/pdf/P251203CensorshipRFI.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) by US federal agencies. That comes despite a growing sophistication in the US-based trust and safety sector that remains arguably the largest, globally, despite the recent shift in political winds. **Second, this split between the US and everyone else** on content moderation will force companies to pick sides. Some will do it happily ([looking at you, Meta](https://www.reuters.com/technology/meta-ends-third-party-fact-checking-program-adopts-x-like-community-notes-model-2025-01-07/?ref=digitalpolitics.co).) Others will shift gears out of either regulatory necessity or political calculation to keep them on the right side of specific world leaders. Yet there will be inherent conflicts when rank-and-file trust and safety experts continue the daily work of complying with national online safety rules, while companies' top executives make public statements about why they believe such work should be stopped. --- ***\*\*A message from Microsoft\*\**** New technologies like AI supercharge creativity, business, and more. At the same time, we must take steps to ensure AI is resistant to abuse. Our latest white paper, "[Protecting the Public from Abusive AI-Generated Content across the EU](https://aka.ms/AAv5hz5?ref=digitalpolitics.co)," highlights the weaponization of women’s nonconsensual imagery, AI-powered scams and financial fraud targeting older adults, and the proliferation of synthetic child sexual abuse. The paper outlines steps Microsoft is taking to combat these risks and provides recommendations as to how the EU's existing regulatory framework can be used to combat the abuse of AI-generated content by bad actors. We thank Women Political Leaders, the MenABLE project, the Internet Watch Foundation, the WeProtect Global Alliance, and the European Senior’s Union for their important work and support. Click [here](https://aka.ms/AAv5hz4?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to read more.**\*\*** --- **I don't envy those inside the platforms** who will be stuck between those public statements and the day-to-day requirements of regulatory compliance. **Yet for those outside of the US,** don't expect the political world to leave you alone, either. **Now that we are a couple of years into mandatory** online safety regimes (well, almost a decade [if you're in Australia](https://www.esafety.gov.au/newsroom/whats-on/online-safety-act?ref=digitalpolitics.co)), there are few lawmakers who are making the case, publicly, about why such rules are good for voters. Sure, national leaders make statements about online kids safety, digital terrorism or (Russian) foreign interference whenever a big news event happens. But there's no elected official really explaining to people why trust and safety is crucial to both creating a more inclusive online environment and (important for any politician) why it's in the country's national interest. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **That's a problem. It's a problem because, at some point,** the White House is likely to impose retaliatory tariffs on a country that announces some form of fine and/or remedy on an American social media giant. The Trump 2.0 administration specifically [called out](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/defending-american-companies-and-innovators-from-overseas-extortion-and-unfair-fines-and-penalties/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) the UK and EU online safety regimes for undermining freedom of speech. At this point, we should take Washington at its word about taking such future action. **If/when those tariffs start,** which politician in those targeted countries is going to stand up for these regimes? Which leader will be willing to go to the mattresses to defend a national online safety regime so that it doesn't become a bargaining chip in wider trade negotiations with the US? **Currently, I don't see clear support from** non-US politicians on those points. It should concern anyone working in the trust and safety industry that there is no mainstream politically buy-in for the work that they do. Especially, as stated above, when there's also growing internal apathy in many of these companies for that work, too. **In the coming months, I'm still unclear how this will play out.** Both inside social media giants and within countries' political establishments. But what I do know is that all forms of platform governance will become increasingly intertwined with geopolitics in the months ahead. Thanks for getting this far. If you're interested in sponsoring future editions of Digital Politics, please get in touch on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com --- ## What I'm reading **— The European Commission announced $1.4 billion** in financial support for artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and digital skills across the 27-country bloc. More [here](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/work-programme-2025-2027-digital-europe-programme-digital?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace** goes deep into how decentralized versions of social media platforms represent a new way to govern online spaces. More [here](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/fediverse-social-media-internet-defederation?center=embargo&lang=en&utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). **— The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence** published its annual threat assessment, including areas associated with tech. More [here](https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). **— Researchers from the University of Münster** in Germany delved into how TikTok audio clips were used in disinformation campaigns related to the war in Ukraine. More [here](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14614448241251804?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). **— British regulators explained why they believed** the country's existing rules would foster the development of next-generation AI models. More [here](https://www.drcf.org.uk/publications/blogs/harnessing-innovation-and-growth-opportunities-from-ai-foundation-models?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— The International Association of Privacy Professionals** and Harvard's Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society are organizing a two-day retreat for digital policy leaders in June. They've just opened up registrations [here](https://iapp.org/conference/navigate-leadership-retreat/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). ### A game plan for middle powers URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter039/ Last updated: 2025-03-31T11:00:42.000Z SUPPORTED BY ![Sponsor Logo](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/03/Microsoft-logo_rgb_c-gray-5.png) **HELO, GWLEIDYDDIAETH DDIGIDOL YW HYN.** For those who don't speak Welsh (like me), that's 'Hello, this is Digital Politics." I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and this edition comes to you from an [unseasonably warm](https://www.bbc.co.uk/weather/2644816?ref=digitalpolitics.co) (well, for the United Kingdom) Welsh coastal village. Normal transmission will resume next week. **— The digital world is increasingly divided between Great Powers.** That has left a lot of room for so-called 'middle powers' to exert outsized influence. **— The world of trust and safety is wading through** treacherous political waters that will leave many caught between rival national governments. **— Ahead of pending US tariffs to be announced** on April 2, it's worth remembering global digital exports have doubled over the last 10 years. **Let's get started.** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Rethinking tech sovereignty URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter038free/ Last updated: 2025-03-26T12:49:28.000Z SUPPORTED BY ![Sponsor Logo](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/03/Microsoft-logo_rgb_c-gray-4.png) **THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and continued my Euro-trash existence this week in Geneva where I'm moderated a [panel](https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/events/digital-data-sovereignty-definitions-and-technologies-independence-and?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on March 24 on tech sovereignty and data governance. I'll include a write-up in next week's newsletter. **Talking of events, I'll also be co-hosting** a tech policy meet-up in hipster East London on March 27 at 6:30pm. There are a few spots left for this (free) event. Sign up [here](https://lu.ma/e629hs6l?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— We're living through an era of 'tech sovereignty.'** No one knows what that concept means — and that's quickly turning into a problem. — **Brussels forced Apple to open up to competitors.** That's going to help many US firms that, in principle, oppose the bloc's competition revamp. **— In what must be the least-shocking fact** about the latest AI models, almost none of the data used to train these systems comes from Global Majority countries. **Let's get started.** --- ## Tech sovereignty in an era of zero-sum geopolitics **MAYBE IT'S BECAUSE I WAS IN SWITZERLAND** to talk about this topic, but we need to focus on tech sovereignty. Bear with me. For most of us, this concept is either unknown or irrelevant. Or possibly both. But over the last five years, policymakers and lawmakers — first in Europe, but increasingly everywhere — [have embraced](https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-ursula-von-der-leyen-tech-brussels-digital/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) this catch-all term for efforts by individual governments to regain control over parts of the technology industry that have historically been left to the private sector. **Think the United States (or European Union)** [**Chips Act**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CHIPS%5Fand%5FScience%5FAct?ref=digitalpolitics.co#:~:text=The%20CHIPS%20Act%20includes%20%2439,%248.5%20billion%20of%20that%20total)**,** or efforts to bring back high-end semiconductor manufacturing to the "homeland." Think Washington's Joe Biden-era [export controls](https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-biden-administrations-updated-export-controls?ref=digitalpolitics.co#:~:text=In%20early%202024%2C%20ASML%20was,reducing%20the%20incentive%20to%20leave.) to stop Beijing getting hold of next generation chip manufacturing equipment. Think Brussels' litany of initiatives — from the creation of so-called '[data spaces](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/data-spaces?ref=digitalpolitics.co)' to the (badly named) [AI 'gigafactories'](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F25%5F467?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — to give itself a seat at the global table of tech powers. **At its core, tech sovereignty is a realization** by elected officials that they are no longer in control. They see complex technological global supply chains, the rise of world-spanning tech giants and the influx of billions of dollars in private capital and worry their voters (and homegrown companies) won't see the economic and social benefits of how tech has become so ingrained in everything from buying a car to sending your child to school. **Well, maybe that's one (slightly cynical) definition.** After more than five years since 'tech sovereignty' [became a thing](https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-digital-technological-sovereignty-facebook-google-amazon-ursula-von-der-leyen/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), governments are still grappling with exactly what it means, how to implement it and what the consequences will be when everyone from London to Brasilia wants to "onshore" tech to boost their local interests. **Before 2025, that remained almost exclusively** a headache for uber-policy types (like myself.) But this year [has shown](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter030/), already, that we are living in a more transactional, zero-sum mercantilist world where all elected leaders — and not just US President **Donald Trump** — are willing to use all the levers at their disposal to reshape the world order to their needs. --- ***\*\*A message from Microsoft\*\**** Each day, millions of people use generative AI. Abusive AI-generated content, however, can present risks to vulnerable groups such as women, children, and older adults. In a new [white paper](https://aka.ms/AAv5hz5?ref=digitalpolitics.co), developed in consultation with civil society, we present actionable policy recommendations to promote a safer digital environment.\*\* --- **That means, inevitably, revisiting how we define** 'tech sovereignty' because, like it or not, how we collectively approach the topic will have significant real-world implications for how technology is developed, governed and used in the years to come. **If done well, it could build upon the core tenets** of what made the internet such a game-changing technology: open, rights-based core infrastructure that allowed anyone (read: with money and technical capacity) to build whatever they wanted, however they wanted. **If done poorly, it could undermine those key principles** that have made technology crucial to both economic and social benefits for all. **Case in point: if a country decides to keep all** of its citizens' data within national borders — a term known as [data localization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data%5Flocalization?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — for either commercial or national security reasons, then it makes it harder to trade, based on a reduction of global data flows, and starts to cut off specific countries from the now-fraying world order. This is not hypothetical: Russia, Nigeria, India and China are among states that already have such rules on the books. **What is urgently needed is an honest conversation** about what people mean by 'tech sovereignty.' Currently, that falls into two camps. **Camp One leans toward isolationism.** In this world, politicians funnel public cash into homegrown 'tech champions' that use siloed-off local data and technical skills to create services/products that are then sold worldwide in a race to build global giants. **Camp Two relies on each country shifting** to tech-related areas where it can compete globally (eg: Taiwan/South Korea on microchips; Vietnam on device manufacturing), and then opening up each market to overseas competition. The goal isn't to own everything in tech. It's about figuring out where you can compete, globally, while giving local citizens access to (cheap) outside services/products that improve their daily lives. **You can probably figure out which** version of 'tech sovereignty' would be my preference. **Before I get angry emails, I realize there's** a lot of nuance that lies between those two extreme positions. Those who want to create a so-called "[Euro stack](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter029free/)," for instance, would probably argue their efforts are about giving Europe greater autonomy at a time when the US is not perceived as a trusted partner. Those in Brazil supportive of the country's data localization mandate would likely say such provisions are about keeping local's personal information safe under national laws. **I get it. Everyone has a reason why their version of** "tech sovereignty" is OK, while everyone else's take is blatant protectionism. Thanks for reading Digital Politics. If you've been forwarded this newsletter (and like what you've read), please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/postcard-from-washington-maga-on-tech/#/portal/). For those already subscribed, reach out on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com **But here's the problem with that.** This ongoing nibbling at what has made technology an inherent force for good (despite, ahem, some significant downsides) has placed increased onus on equating national power as the only mechanism to get things done. That is especially true, in 2025, when long-standing allies are starting to not trust each other, and retaliatory tariffs are leading us toward a potential global trade war. **What I would prefer to see is a recognition** by lawmakers about what they can — and what they can not — change when it comes to tech. Yes, much of the current global power dynamics mean the likes of the US, China and Europe have more say than other parts of the globe. That is not something, unfortunately, that will change overnight. **But while it's 100 percent legitimate for** national leaders to want greater control of various forms of technology, I don't see how the ubiquitous calls to spend public money to "bring back" global supply chains to national shores as something that will achieve that. **First, it won't — given that these complex systems** have grown over decades and won't just change quickly. And second, it will lead to short-term higher prices for consumers because of the inevitable cost hikes that will result from spending over the odds to onshore manufacturing when other countries can just do it cheaper (and faster.) **"Tech sovereignty" is a concept that sounds good** as a talking point, but fails to deliver when confronted with reality. Yes, some form of greater control (or, at least, the semblance of control) over global tech forces is probably good for democracy, writ large. That's especially true for countries beyond the US and China that are net-takers of technology, at a global stage. **But you don't achieve that by putting up barriers** to outsiders and investing public funds to develop clunky national champions that will struggle to compete worldwide. **What would be better is to set out** a positive definition of 'tech sovereignty' that builds on what has worked for almost everyone over the last 80 years. Caveat: I understand that is a difficult pitch, politically, given the current geopolitical climate. **That would include:** reaffirming open global markets based on right-based digital regulation that allows each country to 1) promote their own unique tech-related specialisms, both home and abroad and 2) allow national lawmakers to step in, where appropriate, when global tech forces undermine the rule of law or other key tenets within a nation state. **We already have such systems in other** sectors like financial services and pharmaceuticals — and no one (at least not yet in 2025!) makes much political capital in undermining how those industries currently operate. Yes, tech is somewhat different as it's nominally not a separate industry. But, I would argue, neither is financial services. **Unfortunately, I don't see that positive agenda** in any of the ongoing 'tech sovereignty' discussions that have become embedded in the geopolitical tensions of early 2025\. That goes from Trump's [MAGA approach](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter036/) to maintaining "US dominance" over AI to European Commission president **Ursula von der Leyen**'s pitch to make the EU the hub for the next technological revolution. **That is a shame.** **It's a shame because it undermines** what has been built over the last 80 in so many tech-related fields that have benefited so many people worldwide. And it's a shame because it equally foretells a growing "splinternet" between countries/regions that solely focus on their short-term interests — without recognizing what damage that will produce over the mid-term. --- ## Chart of the Week **THE LATEST ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MODELS** already skew toward more developed countries. But researchers analyzed the most common datasets used to build these systems, from 1990 to 2024, to figure out where that information actually came from. **Not surprisingly, regions like Africa and South America** were massively underrepresented, both on the number of datasets (see "by count" below) from those regions and the amount of information (see "by tokens or hours" below) included from those parts of the world. **That's a problem when next generation AI models** are being rolled out globally in ways that won't meet regionally-specific needs because of a lack of local data baked into these complex systems. **The darker the part of the maps below**, the more data was used from that region to train AI models. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/03/Untitled-2-4.jpg) Source: The [Data Provenance Initiative](https://www.dataprovenance.org/Multimodal%5FData%5FProvenance.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## The complexities of antitrust enforcement **WHEN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION** [**ANNOUNCED**](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F25%5F816?ref=digitalpolitics.co)last week it had forced Apple to make changes to comply with the bloc's new competition rules, the iPhone maker was quick to cry foul. The decision, according to the company, "wraps us in red tape, slowing down Apple's ability to innovate for users in Europe and forcing us to give away our new features for free to companies who don't have to play by the same rules." **Yet in many parts of the global tech world** — including inside companies that equally dislike the EU's [**Digital Markets Act**](https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/index%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co)— there were cheers of victory. The split response highlights how these new competition rules, which allow European regulators to step into online markets before one specific company becomes too dominant, aren't as easy to define as many first thought. **First, a quick backstory**. Last year, the European Commission's competition enforcers [opened an investigation](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F24%5F3433?ref=digitalpolitics.co) into how Apple allowed rival firms to interact with its products. On March 19, Brussels then [ordered](https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/questions-and-answers/interoperability%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co) the iPhone maker to make it easier for non-Apple devices to connect to the company's products. It also demanded the Cupertino-based firm to provide its technical specs to outsiders so they could build services which more easily interact with Apple's operating systems. --- ***\*\*A message from Microsoft\*\**** New technologies like AI supercharge creativity, business, and more. At the same time, we must take steps to ensure AI is resistant to abuse. Our latest white paper, "[Protecting the Public from Abusive AI-Generated Content across the EU](https://aka.ms/AAv5hz5?ref=digitalpolitics.co)," highlights the weaponization of women’s nonconsensual imagery, AI-powered scams and financial fraud targeting older adults, and the proliferation of synthetic child sexual abuse. The paper outlines steps Microsoft is taking to combat these risks and provides recommendations as to how the EU's existing regulatory framework can be used to combat the abuse of AI-generated content by bad actors. We thank Women Political Leaders, the MenABLE project, the Internet Watch Foundation, the WeProtect Global Alliance, and the European Senior’s Union for their important work and support. Click [here](https://aka.ms/AAv5hz4?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to read more.**\*\*** --- **What does that mean?** Over the next 12 months (caveat: Apple may still appeal these changes), it will become easier, say, for Garmin smartwatches to connect seamlessly with your iPhone — just as an Apple watch currently does. Rival apps will also be able to take advantage of Apple's technical wizardry to compete more directly with the company's own services that work hand-in-glove with its in-house software. **You can understand why Apple is not a fan.** But, equally, it will be a boon for the likes of Meta and Alphabet, as well as scores of smaller tech firms, that have long complained that Apple creates artificial technical barriers so that rival devices/apps just don't work as well as the iPhone maker's own offerings. **Mark Zuckerberg**, Meta's chief executive, [even called out Apple](https://mashable.com/article/mark-zuckerberg-joe-rogan-apple?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in January over how it didn't allow other headphones to connect as well as the firm's (expensive) devices. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **Yes, you read that right.** The European Commission and Zuckerberg are on the same page when it comes to digital competition. **That complexity can make my brain hurt.** In the ongoing lobbying around new digital competition rules ([looking at you](https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/uk-expands-its-merger-control-regime-and-cmas-powers-digital-markets-competition?ref=digitalpolitics.co), United Kingdom), the playbook often relies on claiming such legislation places regulators too squarely at the heart of business decisions of some of the world's largest tech companies. "It's killing innovation!," comes the claim. "Officials should keep their noses out of our business!" **I have some sympathy for that argument**, especially when it comes to so-called *ex ante* regulation, or policy efforts to curb unfair dominance before a firm becomes too entrenched in a digital market. But I can also see a massive upside for consumers if a non-Apple product/service works as effortlessly as an in-house device designed in Cupertino. **For what such competition decisions lead to,** we only have to look at a previous European Commission [ruling](https://commission.europa.eu/news/eu-common-charger-rules-power-all-your-devices-single-charger-2024-12-28%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to force the iPhone maker to switch all of its devices over to USB-C technology. Apple executives equally met that 'common charger' ruling with derision. But now, USB-C is the de fault global standard, allowing one cable to connect everything from iPhones to Samsung tablets. **It's still unclear if the recent Apple decision** will lead to US pushback after the White House threatened retaliatory tariffs on countries/regions that went after American tech firms. But beyond the iPhone maker, many US companies remain supportive of this specific European Commission competition decision — mostly because it's good for their own business interests. --- ## What I'm reading **— A subcommittee of the US Senate Committee** on the Judiciary will hold a hearing on the "Censorship Industrial Complex" on March 24\. Watch along [here](https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/the-censorship-industrial-complex?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). A [counterpoint](https://thereformcompass.substack.com/p/first-they-came-for-civil-society) to that subcommittee's focus. **— Company responses to the White House's call** for input on a "[AI Action Plan](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/06/2025-02305/request-for-information-on-the-development-of-an-artificial-intelligence-ai-action-plan?ref=digitalpolitics.co)." [Palantir](https://blog.palantir.com/palantirs-recommendations-to-the-white-house-ostp-on-developing-an-ai-action-plan-80d2f1821e8b?ref=digitalpolitics.co). [OpenAI](https://cdn.openai.com/global-affairs/ostp-rfi/ec680b75-d539-4653-b297-8bcf6e5f7686/openai-response-ostp-nsf-rfi-notice-request-for-information-on-the-development-of-an-artificial-intelligence-ai-action-plan.pdf?ref=platformer.news&utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). [Alphabet](https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/publicpolicy.google/en//resources/response%5Fus%5Fai%5Faction%5Fplan.pdf?utm%5Fsource=substack&utm%5Fmedium=email). [Microsoft](https://cdn-dynmedia-1.microsoft.com/is/content/microsoftcorp/microsoft/msc/documents/presentations/CSR/RFI-AI-Action-Plan-Submission-pdf.pdf?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). [Frontier Model Forum](https://www.frontiermodelforum.org/updates/fmf-response-request-for-information-on-the-development-of-an-ai-action-plan/?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). [Anthropic](https://assets.anthropic.com/m/4e20a4ab6512e217/original/Anthropic-Response-to-OSTP-RFI-March-2025-Final-Submission-v3.pdf?ref=platformer.news&utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). If anyone has seen Meta's submission, please let me know. **— AI Now gives the European Commission a report card** on tech for the Berlaymont Building's first 100 days. More [here](https://euaipolicymonitor.substack.com/p/the-eu-commissions-first-100-days?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— The UK regulator Ofcom outlined what companies** must now do after a deadline passed for firms to conduct illegal harms risk assessments. More [here](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/illegal-and-harmful-content/enforcing-the-online-safety-act-platforms-must-start-tackling-illegal-material-from-today?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— Small AI language models offer a cheap option** for indigenous communities to take advantage of this emerging technology, [argue](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/can-small-language-models-revitalize-indigenous-languages/?b=1&utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves) Brooke Tanner and Cameron Kerry for the Brookings Institution. --- ### Rethinking tech sovereignty URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter038/ Last updated: 2025-03-26T12:49:37.000Z SUPPORTED BY ![Sponsor Logo](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/03/Microsoft-logo_rgb_c-gray-3.png) **IT'S MONDAY, SO THIS MUST BE DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and am continuing my Euro-trash existence here in Geneva where I'm moderating a panel on March 24 on tech sovereignty and data governance. Watch along [here](https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/events/digital-data-sovereignty-definitions-and-technologies-independence-and?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from 12:30 CET / 11:30 UK / 7:30 ET. **Talking of events, I'll also be co-hosting** a tech policy meet-up in hipster East London on March 27 at 6:30pm. There are a few spots left for this (free) event. Sign up [here](https://lu.ma/e629hs6l?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— We're living through an era of 'tech sovereignty.'** No one knows what that concept means — and that's quickly turning into a problem. — **Brussels forced Apple to open up to competitors.** That's going to help many US firms that, in principle, oppose the bloc's competition revamp. **— In what must be the least-shocking fact** about the latest AI models, almost none of the data used to train these systems comes from Global Majority countries. **Let's get started.** --- _This post is for subscribers only._ ### Social media is a black box. Here's how to fix that URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter037/ Last updated: 2025-03-20T12:14:58.000Z **THIS IS A BONUS EDITION OF DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I don't usually speak about my day job in this newsletter. But today, that changes. **One of my goals this year is to help** open up social media platforms to greater outside transparency. To do that, I'm working on ways to jumpstart data access to these platforms, or efforts to allow independent researchers to delve into the public data that these firms collect on all of us. **It's not an easy task** — especially because any form of such data access must protect people's privacy, at all cost, and uphold the highest levels of security. **But, for me, it's a fundamental step in** filling the democratic deficit associated with how social media may (or may not) affect our everyday lives. **Below gives you a glimpse about what** I've been up to in recent months. It's a [cross-post](https://www.techpolicy.press/the-next-step-in-social-media-data-access-how-to-turn-rules-into-reality/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from Tech Policy Press. **Let's get started.** --- ## **What happens online doesn't just stay online** **IT'S HARD TO REMEMBER A WORLD WITHOUT SOCIAL MEDIA.** From the United States to Brazil, people now spend hours on TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube each day, and these platforms have become embedded in everything from how we talk to friends and family to how we elect our national leaders. **But one thing is clear: despite researchers’ efforts** to decipher social media’s impact, if any, on countries’ democratic institutions, no one still has a clear understanding of how these global platforms work. What’s worse — we have less awareness about what happens on these platforms in 2025 than we did five years ago. **This is a problem.** **It’s a problem for those who believe** these tech companies censor people’s voices online. It’s a problem for those who believe these firms do not do enough to police their platforms for harmful content. And it’s a problem for democratic countries whose political systems are fracturing under increased polarization — some of which is amplified via social media. **In 2025, there is a fundamental disconnect** between what happens on social media and what academics, independent researchers and regulators understand about these platforms. **That has led to a democratic deficit.** No one can quantify the effect, if any, of these platforms’ impact on public discourse. It has also led to a policymaking void. Lawmakers worldwide don’t know what steps are needed via potential new legislation, voluntary standards or the doubling down on existing efforts to reduce online harm on social media while upholding individuals’ right to free speech. **In short, we just don’t know enough** about social media’s impact on society. Thanks for reading Digital Politics. If you've been forwarded this newsletter (and like what you've read), please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/postcard-from-washington-maga-on-tech/#/portal/). For those already subscribed, reach out on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com **Without quantifiable evidence of harm (or lack of it)** — driven by independent outside access to platform data, or the ability for people to research the inner workings of these social media giants — there is no way to make effective online safety legislation, uphold people’s freedom of expression, and hold companies to account when, inevitably, things go wrong. **And yet, there is a way forward.** One that relies on the protection of people’s privacy and free speech. One that limits government access to people’s social media posts. And one that gives outside researchers the ability to kick the tires on how these platforms operate by granting them access to public data in ways that improves society’s understanding of these social media giants. --- ## What are we going to do about it? **To meet this need,** [**Columbia World Projects**](https://worldprojects.columbia.edu/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) at Columbia University and the [Hertie School’s Centre for Digital Governance](https://www.hertie-school.org/en/centre-for-digital-governance?ref=digitalpolitics.co) have been running workshops with one aim in mind: How to build on emerging online safety regimes worldwide — some of which allow, or will soon allow, for such mandatory data access from the platforms to outside groups — to fill this democratic deficit. **With support from the Knight Foundation,** that has involved bringing together groups of academic and civil society researchers, data infrastructure providers and national regulators for regular meetings to hash out what public and private funding is required to turn such data access from theory into reality. **The initial work has focused on the European Union’s** Digital Services Act, which includes specific mandatory requirements for outsiders to delve into platform data. **But as other countries bring online similar** data access regimes, the hope is to provide a route for others to follow that will build greater capacity for researchers to conduct this much-needed work; support regulators in navigating the inherent difficulties in opening up such platforms’ public data to outsiders; and ensure that people’s social media data is protected and secured, at all cost, from harm and surveillance. **As with all research, much relies on funding.** Just because a country’s online safety laws dictate that outsiders can access social media data does not mean that researchers can just flick on a switch and get to work. **At every turn, there’s a need for greater public and private backing.** **As part of the ongoing workshops,** the discussions have focused on four areas where we believe targeted funding support from a variety of public and private donors can make the most impact. Taken together, it represents an essential investment in our wider understanding of social media that will ensure companies uphold their stated commitments to make their platforms accountable and transparent to outside scrutiny. --- ## **Four ways to make social media giants more accountable** **The first component is the underlying infrastructure** needed to carry out this work. Currently, accessing social media data is confined to the few, not the many. Researchers either need existing relationships with platforms or access to large funding pots to pay for cloud storage, technical analysis tools and other data access techniques that remain off limits to almost everyone. **Currently, there is a cottage industry of data providers** — some commercial, others nonprofit — that provide the baseline infrastructure, in terms of access to platforms, analytics tooling and user-friendly research interfaces. Yet to meet researchers’ needs, as well as the growing regulatory push to open up social media giants to greater scrutiny, more needs to be done to make such infrastructure readily accessible, particularly to experts in Global Majority countries. **That includes scaling existing data infrastructure,** making analytical tools more universally available to researchers, and using a variety of techniques — from using Application Programming Interfaces, or APIs, that plug directly into platform data to allowing researchers to scrape social media sites in the public interest to promoting “data donations” directly from users themselves — to meet different research needs. **The second focus has been on the relationships** between researchers and regulators. As more countries pursue online safety legislation, there is a growing gap between in-house regulatory capacity and outsider expertise that needs to be closed for these regimes to operate effectively. Yet currently, few, if any, formal structures exist for researchers and regulators to share best practices — all while maintaining a safe distance via so-called “Chinese Walls” between government oversight and researcher independence. **What is needed are more formal information-sharing** opportunities between regulators and researchers so that online safety regimes are based on quantifiable evidence — often derived from outside data access to social media platforms. That may include regular paid-for secondments for researchers to embed inside regulators to share their knowledge; the development of routine capacity building and information sharing to understand the evolving research landscape; and a shift away from informal networks between some researchers and regulators into a more transparent system that is open to all. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **For that to work, a third element is needed in terms** of greater capacity building — in the form of technical assistance, data protection and security training and researcher community engagement. Currently, outside experts have varying levels of technical understanding, policy expertise and knowledge of privacy standards that hamstring greater accountability and transparency for platforms. If people’s public social media data is not secured and protected against harm, for instance, then companies will rightly restrict access to safeguard their users from Cambridge Analytica-style leakages of information. **What is needed is the expansion of existing research** networks so that data access best practices can be shared with as many groups as possible. Technical support to maintain the highest data protection standards — in the form of regular training of researchers and the development of world-leading privacy protocols for all to use — similarly will provide greater legal certainty for social media users. The regular convening of researchers so that people can learn from each other about the most effective, and secure, way to conduct such research will also democratize current data access that has often been limited to a small number of experts. **The fourth component of the workshops** is the most important: how to maintain independence between outside researchers and regulators in charge of the growing number of online safety regimes worldwide. It is important for both sides to work effectively with each other. But neither researchers nor regulators should become beholden — or perceived to be beholden — to each other. Independence for regulators to conduct their oversight and for researchers to criticize these agencies is a fundamental part of how democracies function. **That will require forms of public-private funding** to support ongoing data access work to create strict safeguards between researchers and regulators. That’s a tricky balance between supporting close ties between officials and outsiders, while similarly ensuring that neither side feels subordinate to the other. To meet that balance, a mixture of hands-off public support and non-government funding will be critical. **Such structures already exist in other industries,** most notably in the medical research field. They represent a clear opportunity to learn from others as outside researchers and regulators push for greater accountability and transparency for social media companies. --- ### Postcard from Washington: MAGA on tech URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter036/ Last updated: 2025-03-19T21:39:44.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and the newsletter skews hard toward North America this week. As a counterweight: I'm in Geneva on March 24 to talk about [data governance and tech sovereignty](https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/events/digital-data-sovereignty-definitions-and-technologies-independence-and?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — if anyone is in town and wants to say hi. **— The new White House administration is finding** its feet on digital policy. Its approach to greater oversight (or lack of it) is not as clear cut as you may think. **— Canada is gearing up for a snap nationwide election.** Officials are worried about foreign interference from Russia, China... and the United States. **— The European Union announced a series** of 'AI Factories' to jumpstart the bloc's use of artificial intelligence infrastructure to boost growth. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The censorship battle goes global URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter035/ Last updated: 2025-03-11T09:21:50.000Z Unsubstantiated claims that online safety rules restrict people's free speech have spread worldwide. Regulators are not prepared to respond. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### How to navigate Washington and Brussels: a tech policy guide URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter034free/ Last updated: 2025-03-05T12:00:10.000Z **ANOTHER WEEK, ANOTHER DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be in Washington next week — come say hello at an [event](https://lu.ma/w15doyqb?ref=digitalpolitics.co) I'm co-hosting on March 11 with Katie Harbath (and her excellent Anchor Change [newsletter](https://anchorchange.substack.com/).) **I'll also be in Geneva on March 24 for a discussion** on tech sovereignty and data governance (sign up [here](https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/events/digital-data-sovereignty-definitions-and-technologies-independence-and?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) and will be co-hosting another tech policy gathering in London on March 27 (sign up for more upcoming details [here](https://lu.ma/e629hs6l?ref=digitalpolitics.co).) **— Under the Trump 2.0 administration,** tech policy is now inextricably tied to trade and foreign policy. That's not so different than from before. **— The European Commission is reassessing** its focus on digital regulation. That change is almost exclusively down to internal, not external, pressures. **— Artificial intelligence companies are in an arms race** to sign up as many publishers worldwide to feed their large language models. **Let's get started:** --- ## Washington: same message, different delivery **AFTER DONALD TRUMP'S MEETING WITH** Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office last week, tech policy is certainly not at the top of anyone's agenda when it comes to souring transatlantic relations. But as I get ready for a week in North America (Washington: March 10-12; Montréal: March 13-14), it's time to unpack what the first six weeks of the new Trump administration means, both for America and the rest of the world, when it comes to digital. **At first glance, there appears to be a significant shift.** In repeated White House executive orders, directives and policy decisions, the US president has signaled his dislike for greater checks on (American) tech companies. [Gone](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/the-organization-for-economic-co-operation-and-development-oecd-global-tax-deal-global-tax-deal/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) is United States support for the global tax revamp, negotiated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). [Gone](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/defending-women-from-gender-ideology-extremism-and-restoring-biological-truth-to-the-federal-government/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) is the support for greater content moderation on social media platforms — and the [rise of threats](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/defending-american-companies-and-innovators-from-overseas-extortion-and-unfair-fines-and-penalties/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) if other countries follow that path. [Gone](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/removing-barriers-to-american-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) is Washington's support for checks on artificial intelligence, including parts of an White House executive order from a Joe Biden-era. [Gone](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/application-of-protecting-americans-from-foreign-adversary-controlled-applications-act-to-tiktok/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) is support for TikTok's ban within the US — a policy that Trump championed during his first term. **Taken as a whole, it feels like a upending of** Washington's consensus that technology firms needed to be reined in; that cooperation with like-minded allies helped promote US economic interests; and that pushing back against foreign adversaries, in the online world, was a national security priority. **And yet, I'm not so sure.** **It's sometimes easy to forget how past administrations** acted when a new White House resident has his feet under the table. Dating back to Barack Obama's time in charge, consecutive US presidents have repeatedly pushed back against greater checks — from non-US countries — even when they promoted potential curbs at home. Obama, for instance, famously [chided](https://www.vox.com/2015/2/13/11559038/obama-says-europes-aggressiveness-towards-google-comes-from?ref=digitalpolitics.co) members of the European Parliament when they suggested that Google should be broken up. Let's leave aside the fact those lawmakers didn't have such powers. But fast forward a decade, and the European Union has never realistically considered forcing the split of these tech giants. But do you know who has? The US Department of Justice and its [ongoing antitrust lawsuit](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-department-calls-for-break-up-of-google-sale-of-chrome/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) against Alphabet and its dominance over search. **Let's look at other examples.** Both Trump 1.0 and Biden's administrations, collectively, were never that excited about revamping the world's global tax regime — mostly because it would allow others to levy taxes against US tech firms. Washington would still come out net positive under those proposals, based on OECD calculations, as the US would earn additional revenue from taxing non-American firms, too. But the idea that pesky foreigners would impose levies on some of the most prominent US companies was something that garnered bipartisan anger. Thanks for reading the free version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). Here's what paid subscribers read in February: — How changing geopolitics affects platform governance, digital competition, internet governance, trade and data protection. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter030/) — What happens when the US doesn't follow the game plan in combating 'hybrid warfare?;' What lessons to take from the Paris AI Action Summit?; Fact-checkers underpin crowdsourced 'community notes.' More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter031/). — Germany's federal election is reminder we don't know what happens on social media; The first transatlantic fight over digital won't come around social media rules; What the global tax overhaul would have meant for tech. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter032/). — In the wake of the German election, we shouldn't claim 'mission accomplished' when it comes to fighting foreign interference. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter033/). **I can go on. Yes, the Trump administration** has a longstanding opinion that all forms of online safety/content moderation regulation represent an illegitimate attack on free speech. I would disagree with that assessment, but that is the current White House's starting point. And yes, current US officials are open about their willingness to use trade sanctions against regions/countries (the EU and United Kingdom have been specifically name-checked for attention) that impose such regimes that Trump 2.0 believes represent unfair trading practices against US firms. **But as someone who had a front row seat** to the crafting of the EU's Digital Services Act, I remember well that the former Biden administration equally pushed back hard against what it similarly believed was unfair practices from Brussels primarily targeted at Silicon Valley. Yes, these officials did it mostly behind closed doors and in support of some tech firms. But the message — while not as vocal or transactional as the current White House — was clear: these content moderation rules are bad, and the EU should cut it out. **Where I do get confused is how part of the Trump 2.0 team** appears to be copying, almost word for word, the transparency and accountability parts of international online safety regimes. The same rules, it should be pointed out, that allegedly represent a fundamental threat to people's free speech. The US Federal Trade Commission's recent [request for information](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc%5Fgov/pdf/P251203CensorshipRFI.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) "regarding technology platform censorship," for instance, includes language around how these firms made their content moderation decisions that would not be out of place in European-style legislation. **"Did the policies or other public-facing representations** describe how, when, or under what circumstances the platform would deny or degrade users’ access to its services?," one of the FTC question asks. "Did the platform offer a meaningful opportunity to challenge or appeal adverse actions that deny, or degrade users’ access, consistent with its users’ reasonable expectations based on its representations?," says another. Those questions are equally at the center of what non-US officials want to understand, too. **I get the public differences between how Trump 2.0** and previous administrations have approached these issues. And on other aspects — particularly in relation to artificial intelligence and short-term equality issues on datasets — there are significant differences. **But when I peel back the rhetoric and look at the underlying policies**, what are the differences in how the current White House approaches digital compared to its predecessors? In officials like **Michael Kratsios**, director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, and **Gail Slater**, the new head of the US Department of Justice's antitrust division, Trump 2.0 has picked well-qualified policymakers that aren't that different from who was in charge, only months ago, during Biden's time in charge. **One group I haven't mentioned is lawmakers** in Congress. Sigh. The US House of Representatives and Senate certainly like to talk a good game on digital policy. (Anyone remember Chuck Schumer's [AI Insight forums](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A.I.%5FInsight%5Fforums?ref=digitalpolitics.co)?) But I remain skeptical about any form of tech legislation making its way through Congress — mostly because it's not a high priority in the current political climate. **Some officials talk about renewed impetus** for federal privacy rules ([I've heard that before](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digital-bridge/is-the-us-congress-about-to-do-the-unthinkable/?ref=digitalpolitics.co).) Others say more targeted legislation around online kids safety could win bipartisan support. Again, I have doubts. **But, if you take the recent** [**US Inflation Reduction Act**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inflation%5FReduction%5FAct?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [US Chips Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CHIPS%5Fand%5FScience%5FAct?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — and their impact on the American domestic tech industry, as whole — then the view of Congress doesn't look too bad. Yes, the future of some of that legislation [is in jeopardy](https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en-us/posts/corporates/ira-uncertain-future/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) under Trump 2.0\. But, combined, the laws doubled down on US tech investment; provided federal subsidies to entice companies to spend locally; and positioned the country on a favorable footing in the increasingly geopolitical world that encompasses tech in 2025. **To me, that feels like a pretty familiar pitch** no matter who currently resides in the White House. --- ## Chart of the Week **TO COMPETE IN THE CUT-THROAT AI RACE**, companies are rushing to pen deals with some of the largest newsletters and media outlets in the world. **The goal? To feed these firms' large language models** with high-quality content that can make sophisticated systems more lifelike when they respond to real-world queries. **For publishers, it's a race for survival.** Many have argued that AI companies have already scraped their sites — and the New York Times [has sued](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/27/business/media/new-york-times-open-ai-microsoft-lawsuit.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co) OpenAI and Microsoft. But for others, these tech companies offer a new revenue opportunity to keep their legacy media businesses afloat. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/03/Untitled-2-copy-1.jpeg) Source: [Ezra Eeman](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/ezra-eeman-8a5ba64%5Fi-feel-ive-updated-this-slide-more-times-activity-7297727752466497536-mmVx/?utm%5Fsource=share&utm%5Fmedium=member%5Fdesktop&rcm=ACoAAATsaZ8BQ5eV2dLTB4ajT1y1P-2vC9wlPbU) — which publishers have signed partnerships with individual AI firms --- ## Brussels: different message, same delivery **CONVENTIONAL WISDOMS DICTATES** that Brussels is firing on all cylinders. The EU has its shiny online safety rules (the [Digital Services Act](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) and digital antitrust legislation (the [Digital Markets Act](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-markets-act-ensuring-fair-and-open-digital-markets%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co)), as well as the upcoming Artificial Intelligence Act — the world's first comprehensive rulebook for the emerging technology. In **Ursula von der Leyen**, the returning German head of the European Commission, the EU's executive branch, the 27-country bloc has a leader who helped pass those rules. Now, she's ready to wield them aggressively. **That is outdated thinking.** **Yes, the EU is in the midst of implementing** new digital rules, many of which have never been tested before. The Digital Markets Act's shift to *ex ante* oversight, or allowing regulators to determine where market abuse may happen before it occurs, is a significant departure from decades of competition jurisprudence, for instance. The Digital Services Act's [transparency and accountability provisions](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter020free/) for social media companies and search engines — that do not require platforms to remove legal content, to be clear — are being watched by other countries eager to follow that approach. **And yet, the political and economic winds have significantly** shifted in Brussels. **For now, let's leave aside the increasingly fraught relationship** between the EU and US after decades of close ties. Within the bloc, ongoing sluggish economic output and a failure to capture the next generation of technology advances by European firms have fundamentally altered how EU officials now approach questions around digital policymaking. At the center of that switch is last year's report from **Mario Draghi,** the former head of the European Central Bank. In his [analysis](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter004/), the ex-Italian prime blamed overburdensome regulation — including the AI Act and the EU's General Data Protection Regulation, or comprehensive privacy regime — for hamstringing the bloc's economy compared to international rivals. **That ethos has taken hold at the top of the European Commission.** I would disagree that all regulation/legislation leads to poor economic outcomes, especially in the digital space. Personally, a lack of coordination EU-wide capital markets and a failure to create a "digital single market" across the 27 countries is more to blame for Europe's lack of tech champions. For me, generations of tech regulation is a secondary issue when, say, a Swedish startup founder can not easily reach out to an Italian investor to back her company to sell into a unified online market from Finland to Greece. But hey, I'm not a former head of the European Central Bank. **This 'de-regulate at all costs!' mantra is now playing out** in how Brussels approaches digital. When I saw **Henna Virkkunen**, the newly-appointed European Commission executive vice president in charge of tech, at the [Paris AI Action Summit](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter029free/), the Finnish politician wanted to talk about the EU's **Apply AI Strategy** and **AI Factories initiative** — policies aimed at using public funds to jumpstart European companies' use of the emerging technology. In her 10 minute speech, I counted at least 10 references to "innovation," and only a couple of mentions of "regulation." It's not a perfect metaphor for what's happening. But it's pretty close. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **To a degree, this makes sense.** The EU's economy remains sluggish, and Brussels can't realistically compete with Beijing and Washington on the global stage if it doesn't have a homegrown tech industry. That goes for everything from AI startups to industrial champions making electric vehicles. All the best (or worst?) digital rules in the world don't matter if non-EU countries look at how that legislation hasn't helped local businesses, and say 'no thanks.' Caveat: such legislation is also about protecting citizens' from harm, but I digress. **This change of focus — where even returning EU officials** who helped to craft these rules in the previous European Commission's tenure are shifting their policymaking approach — will inevitably have an impact on how digital rules are created. **Already, Brussels has shelved its so-called** [**AI Liability Directive**](https://www.euractiv.com/section/tech/news/commission-withdraws-ai-liability-directive-after-vance-attack-on-regulation/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) over concerns it would harm growth. I have questions about how future investigations, under the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act, will be pushed if such probes signal to all countries (both EU and non-EU) that the bloc isn't open for business. The AI Act's full implementation is still about 18 months away, and I equally question what resources will be provided to make sure those rules are effective given the change in political priorities at the top of the European Commission. **Much of this nuance is getting lost in the EU-US diplomatic spat** over Washington's aversion to Brussels' regulatory rulebook. European fears over American retaliatory tariffs are certainly worrying many within the EU — both inside the so-called Brussels Bubble and across national capitals. **But it's the 180-degree internally-focused turn** within the 27-country bloc that's driving the wider change in the EU's mood music around digital regulation. **No, the existing rules aren't going away —** and will lead to likely enforcement actions against (some) American firms, given the ongoing probes into Meta, Alphabet and X, among others. Yet the era of 'let them have more digital rules!' is over within the EU. And that shift is coming from within, not from outside. --- ## What I'm reading **— The geopolitical race on AI is fundamentally reshaping** international data flows and leading to regulatory fragmentation, [argue](https://fpf.org/blog/geopolitical-fragmentation-the-ai-race-and-global-data-flows-the-new-reality/?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared) Christopher Kuner and Gabriela Zanfir-Fortuna for the Future of Privacy Forum. **— Japan approved new AI legislation** that represents a so-called 'light touch' approach to the technology, and will require companies to voluntarily cooperate with Tokyo's safety measures. More [here](https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/politics-government/20250228-241005/?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared) and [here](https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-government-policy-shows-japan-favors-light-touch-ai-regulation?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The European Union and India held their second** Trade and Technology Council meeting in New Delhi on Feb 28\. [Here are the outcomes](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/key-outcomes-second-eu-india-trade-and-technology-council?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— OpenAI updated its analysis on how malign actors** were using its technology for 'malicious uses.' More [here](https://cdn.openai.com/threat-intelligence-reports/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-our-models-february-2025-update.pdf?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). **— The European Fact-Checking Standards Network** condemned a recent police raid on its Serbian member organization Istinomer.rs. More [here](https://efcsn.com/news/2025-02-25%5Fefcsn-condemns-police-raid-on-serbian-member-istinomer-rs/?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). --- ### What Germany's election teaches us about foreign interference URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter033/ Last updated: 2025-03-01T12:00:07.000Z **Good morning! There's a bonus edition** of Digital Politics this week. I'm [Mark Scott,](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and I've spent the last six days assessing what to make of the recent German federal election on Feb 23\. **Despite fears of record levels of foreign interference**, the outcome was what almost everyone predicated. Already, some are claiming victory in the fight against online disinformation aimed at undermining the country's democratic institutions. **That would be a mistake.** Below is a cross-post from [my analysis](https://www.techpolicy.press/why-claiming-mission-accomplished-after-german-election-is-a-mistake/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) for Tech Policy Press. **Let's get started:** --- ## Lessons from Germany's federal election **A week has passed since Germany’s federal election,** and many are breathing a sigh of relief. **Friedrich Merz, a 69-year-old center-right politician,** will almost certainly become the country’s next Chancellor, though a ruling coalition government — between Merz’s Christian Democrat Union (CDU) and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SDP) — won’t be formed until mid-April, at the earliest. **Alternative for Deutschland (AfD), a far-right party** that garnered support from the likes of US Vice President JD Vance and Elon Musk, finished second in the election with just under 21 percent of the national vote. That party had found vocal support with younger, male voters, particularly in the Eastern parts of Germany, and [had garnered significant traction](https://dfrlab.org/2025/02/20/the-musk-effect-xs-impact-on-germanys-election/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) across social media — particularly on Musk’s X, formerly known as Twitter. **Yet widespread fears around online election interference,** either promoted by foreign countries like Russia or amplified by fringe domestic groups spreading conspiracy theories around alleged voter fraud or Germany’s supposed misguided support for Ukraine, did not materialize. **The result of Germany’s Feb 23 election** was as many had predicted. The country’s vote now joins a growing list of national elections — including scores during 2024 in which more than two billion people voted globally — where close scrutiny from regulators, national security officials and outside researchers has discovered that foreign actors’ both overt and clandestine efforts to sway voters’ decisions proved less successful than first imagined. Thanks for reading Digital Politics. If you've been forwarded this newsletter (and like what you've read), please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter028/#/portal/). For those already subscribed, reach out on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com **Yet the relief now felt in Germany** — that the country’s democratic institutions withstood what national officials and outsiders [claimed](https://www.newsguardtech.com/de/special-reports/kremlin-propagandist-john-mark-dougan-deutsche-bundestagswahl/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) were [unprecedented levels](https://www.politico.eu/article/german-authorities-prepared-social-media-election-interference-tiktok-meta-x/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) of election-related foreign interference — is misplaced. It fundamentally misunderstands that digital attacks on countries’ electoral processes can not be combatted solely during short election campaign cycles during which heightened attention is aimed at such malign actors. Instead, foreign adversaries and domestic groups that often amplify state-backed online propaganda are in this for the long haul — and their activities should be viewed over years, if not decades. --- ## Why no one should claim 'mission accomplished' **Any claims — in Germany or other democratic countries —** that national officials, tech companies and civil society groups were able to thwart digital interference attacks ahead of individual elections represent a false economy. For one, it’s almost impossible to link specific examples of online state-backed propaganda and covert influence campaigns to how voters cast ballots. For another, those online attacks don’t just stop because a country’s election cycle has come to an end. **Even as Merz’s CDU political party began** haggling with the center-left SPD over a new coalition government, Russia’s state-backed media continued to sow dissent and division within Germany for its own political gain. **RT Deutschland — a Kremlin-back media organization** that, while banned within the European Union, is still widely accessible in Germany — pumped out article after article about how the Feb 23 election was unjust; that the failure to include AfD in the coalition government was anti-democratic; and that Germany’s ongoing support for Ukraine represented unjustified war-mongering. **If promoted by domestic actors, such talking points** would be legal under the country’s free speech rules. But they were instead amplified by a foreign state adversary whose Kremlin-backed media outlets [have been sanctioned](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/eu-imposes-sanctions-on-state-owned-outlets-rtrussia-today-and-sputnik-s-broadcasting-in-the-eu/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) because of “disinformation and information manipulation against the EU and its member states.” **Under long-standing political norms dating** back to the aftermath of World War Two, Germany’s mainstream political parties have created a so-called “firewall” in which politicians [will not allow](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/23/world/europe/germany-election-firewall-afd.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co) groups associated with extremist movements, including the AfD, to join coalition governments. **Vance, the US Vice President, recently criticized** such practices in a speech in Munich. “Democracy rests on the sacred principle that the voice of the people matters,” he [said](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pCOsgfINdKg&ab%5Fchannel=TheWhiteHouse&ref=digitalpolitics.co). “There’s no room for firewalls.” **It’s not just foreign adversaries that have continued** to cast doubt on Germany’s election — even after the outcome was a foregone conclusion. **Across multiple Telegram channels, some of which** have hundreds of thousands of followers, domestic influencers have spread false claims about rigged ballots; accusations that Germany should not support Ukraine because of its alleged starting of the war with Russia; and allegations the CDU wants to outlaw the AfD. Those messages have been further amplified, primarily on X, where some have garnered attention from non-German social media users and have been picked up by Russia’s state media. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **Again, none of these falsehoods are illegal** under German law, and can not be removed by platforms under the EU’s Digital Services Act. But this slow dripping of inaccurate information — often within fringe social media communities where fact-checking does not exist — represents an ongoing threat to national democratic institutions, particularly when those domestic messages are further amplified by foreign adversaries. **Ahead of Germany’s Feb 23 election,** the country’s officials held a so-called ‘stress test’ with the likes of Meta, TikTok, and X to war-game potential threats to the national vote. Klaus Müller, head of the national regulator in charge of the exercise, said his agency [was “well prepared”](https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2025/20250131%5FDSC.html?nn=694186&ref=digitalpolitics.co) to combat election-related problems. The European Commission [also published advice](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/dsa-elections-toolkit-digital-services-coordinators?ref=digitalpolitics.co) for how national regulators should protect national elections. **Such efforts should not be prioritized** for when countries hold elections. **In the ongoing whack-a-mole fight between** national officials seeking to defend countries’ democratic institutions and foreign adversaries eager to undermine those norms via covert influence campaigns and outright online propaganda, it’s now a 24/7, 365-day battle — one that doesn’t just come to an end when the votes have all been counted. --- ### We don't know what happens online: German election edition URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter032/ Last updated: 2025-02-24T14:06:34.000Z **GUTEN TAG! WELCOME BACK TO DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and Feb 24 marks the three-year anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Roughly 150,000 people have died so far. For more on what the ongoing war has done to Ukraine, Russia and global relations, read [here](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/survival-online/2025/02/war-or-peace-in-ukraine-us-moves-and-european-choices/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russia-ukraine-after-three-years-of-large-scale-war/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-fact-sheet-february-21-2025?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160356?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Germany's federal election will now lead to** haggling over a new coalition government. In the aftermath of the Feb 23 vote, social media's impact on voting remains unclear as ever. **— Don't expect the first transatlantic spat** over digital regulation to come from social media rules. You should focus on digital competition, data protection and digital services taxes. **— The world almost got a new global tax regime**, primarily focused on new levies on Big Tech, over the line. It would have generated $100 billion in additional government revenue a year. It's now kaput. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The US just blew a hole in combatting 'hybrid warfare' URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter031/ Last updated: 2025-02-17T12:00:52.000Z **HELLO. THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I bring you [actual scenes](https://www.instagram.com/p/DFqTghjSEpM/?igsh=aHc2YzNpYmRjdXI0&ref=digitalpolitics.co) from my attempts to coordinate with colleagues via Microsoft's SharePoint. True story. **— The pending peace negotiations** over the Ukraine-Russia war demonstrate a major failure in confronting so-called 'hybrid warfare' when politicians play directly into Kremlin narratives. **— The recent AI Action Summit in France** made it clear that countries' priorities are shifting from safety to economic development. **— Fact-checking organizations represent** a significant source for crowdsourced 'community notes' on social media platforms. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for subscribers only._ ### When tech meets realpolitik: the new reality URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter030/ Last updated: 2025-02-10T12:00:19.000Z The global status quo on everything from artificial intelligence governance to platform accountability to digital trade is being rewritten. _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### What you need to know about France's AI Action Summit URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter029free/ Last updated: 2025-02-05T12:00:21.000Z **BONJOUR, MES AMIS!** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be heading to Paris on Feb 10-11 for the upcoming [AI Action Summit](https://www.elysee.fr/en/sommet-pour-l-action-sur-l-ia?ref=digitalpolitics.co) (more on that below.) If you're also going and want to grab a coffee (or croissant?), reach out [here](mailto: digitalpolitics@protonomail.com). **Also, for people in Washington**, I'm teaming up with **Katie Harbath** (and her excellent [Anchor Change newsletter](https://anchorchange.substack.com/)) for a tech policy event in Washington the week of March 10\. If you're interested, let me know [here](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSe3wuXEdThYTdo-ovYl7i8ZuOVlVaBGCXIKNBmlnH0ovqnNow/viewform?usp=sharing&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The French pow-wow on artificial intelligence** should be seen for what it is: an effort by the country to position itself a global AI leader. **— Here's a new concept you're going to hear** a lot about in the years ahead: "Euro stack." Let's unpack what that actually means. **— Just under 20 percent of teenagers are now** addicted to YouTube and TikTok. Don't believe me? Check out the chart below. **Let's get started:** --- ## We're good at AI too, say the French **ON FEB 10-11, EMMANUEL MACRON**, the embattled French president, will host heads-of-state, policymakers, tech executives and civil society groups (and me) at the [AI Action Summit](https://www.elysee.fr/en/sommet-pour-l-action-sur-l-ia?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in Paris. It's the third iteration of this now-regular summit that the United Kingdom kicked off, in late 2023, and then the South Koreans continued last year. Expect a Global Majority country (my bet is on India, a co-host for next week's conference in France) to host the subsequent event, most likely in early 2026. **First, the basics. On day one,** there will be a series of official events (full agenda [here](https://www.elysee.fr/admin/upload/default/0001/17/4da94483c7225fc19dd08c3a2a4f05ffba5b114e.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) on everything from international AI governance to the emerging technology's impact on the workforce to its environment footprint. Expect a lot of talk about "inclusivity," "innovation," and "trustworthy AI." "We must enable artificial intelligence to fulfil its initial promise of progress and empowerment in a context of shared trust that contains the risks inherent to technological development, while seizing every opportunity," [according to the French government](https://www.elysee.fr/en/sommet-pour-l-action-sur-l-ia/presentation?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Cue: AI policy buzzword bingo. **Day two is just for governments.** The rest of us will scatter across Paris for side events on topics like AI's impact on the information environment, trust and geopolitical relations. Countries will then publish a summit communiqué — akin to previous summits ([here](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-safety-summit-2023-the-bletchley-declaration/the-bletchley-declaration-by-countries-attending-the-ai-safety-summit-1-2-november-2023?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://aiseoulsummit.kr/press/?uid=41&mod=document&pageid=1&ref=digitalpolitics.co).) I wouldn't expect much. Based on the French government's public statements — officials have been traveling the world ahead of the February event — I would expect a reaffirmation of embedding human rights and openness into AI's development; the need to promote innovation without allowing a few (American) firms to dominate; and tackling the environmental and social impact of a technology that has caught the public's imagination. **As the upcoming event will be held in Europe,** I would also put good money on at least a name-check to greater AI governance and regulation. "The Summit will therefore reflect a balanced European approach to artificial intelligence that combines support for innovation, adequate regulation and respect for rights," based on France's stated objectives. That's somewhat ironic after Macron tried to water down the European Union's [**Artificial Intelligence Act**](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai?ref=digitalpolitics.co), at the last minute, over fears it would hobble the country's nascent AI industry. Those comprehensive rules won't come into full force until late 2026\. So, for now, Paris is willing to at least publicly support legislation that, privately, it remains skeptical about. Thanks for reading the free version of Digital Politics. Paid subscribers receive at least one newsletter a week. If that sounds like your jam, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). Here's what I wrote about in January: — The lessons platforms learned about Jan 6 riots was to pull back on content moderation; 2025 will see a stalling of AI governance. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter023free/). — The proposed TikTok ban isn't about free speech or national security. It's about the geopolitical clash between Washington and China. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter024/). — How Brussels will respond on digital regulation to the Trump 2.0 administration; Community Notes aren't good at fact-checking. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/). — A Who's Who guide to tech policy officials in Washington; Why national security doesn't make for good digital policymaking. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter026/). — The United Kingdom does not have a clear strategy when it comes to digital. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter027free/). — In the global AI fight, bigger (infrastructure) doesn't always mean better results; Why transatlantic data flows are again in jeopardy. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter028/). **What won't be a priority for France is AI safety.** That was the sole focus when the UK started this summit-a-palooza 18 months ago. During that event just outside of London, the then-British prime minister **Rishi Sunak** went hard on the existential risk of the technology, including the creation of the country's [AI Safety Institute](https://www.aisi.gov.uk/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). In Seoul last year, the South Koreans (with the somewhat [strong-willed support](https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/ai-seoul-summit-2024?ref=digitalpolitics.co) of the Brits) shifted to include "inclusivity" and "innovation." On Feb 10-11, the French will go hard on that last concept, relegating AI safety to an also-ran concept lumped into wider discussions around governance. **It's not that Macron & Co aren't concerned** about AI's downsides. But they haven't fallen completely — as the former UK government did — for the belief that the existential threat of the emerging technology is the main long-term risk. For Paris, the consolidation of power, including within the underlying infrastructure required to build next-generation AI systems, is a more paramount threat. That's why you'll hear a lot next week about so-called "[public interest AI](https://www.elysee.fr/en/sommet-pour-l-action-sur-l-ia/public-interest-ai?ref=digitalpolitics.co)," or a more inclusive, decentralized version of how AI can developed. One that is based on open source technologies, a community-led approach to solving societal problems and a counterweight to the Silicon Valley tech bro brigade. **What's not to like, right?** Well maybe. The Feb 10-11 summit also provides France, Inc with an opportunity to flog its wares to a global audience descending on Paris to talk AI. And there's a lot to flog. The French AI tech darling [Mistral](https://mistral.ai/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) will get more shout-outs than people saying "*autre vin rouge, s'il vous plaît."*(That's my last French stereotype, promise.) But the country has world-leading research hubs in places like [Lyon](https://www.ens-lyon.fr/en/article/about-us/ailys-ai-cluster-project-lyon-saint-etienne-site-coordinated-ens-de-lyon?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [Toulouse](https://en.univ-toulouse.fr/node/2377?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Both [Alphabet](https://techcrunch.com/2024/02/15/googles-new-ai-hub-in-paris-proves-that-google-feels-insecure-about-ai/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [Meta](https://ai.meta.com/research/fair-paris/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) have separate AI research teams in Paris. In an event — entitled "[Business Day](https://francedigitale.org/agenda/business-day-2025?ref=digitalpolitics.co)" — on Feb 11 at Station F, a sprawling startup center in the French capital, local techies will vie for attention as part of the country's wider efforts to pitch itself as the center of Europe's AI industry. **Again, there's nothing wrong with some** American-style bravado to celebrate France's local AI champions. But it's not exactly what these summits were supposed to be. The UK may have gone too hard with its AI safety focus in 2023\. But it was at least an effort to bring countries, including China, into a room to talk through how to collectively combat the doomsday scenarios. Fast forward 18 months, and the AI Action Summit is now more a roadshow for Macron to drum up foreign direct investment. Concepts like governance, inequalities and sustainability — ideas that are, in principle, still part of the event — have been quickly overshadowed by the unending need to boost France's domestic economy. **Before I get angry emails from French officials,** the Summit's communiqué, based on public statements from the country's officials in the build-up to the event, will likely still highlight the wider societal goals of AI governance. I would be particularly focused on what may come from any efforts to promote public interest AI as a counterweight to the growing concentration of economic power among a few Silicon Valley giants (and China's Deepseek, if you believe the [recent hysteria](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-025-00259-0?ref=digitalpolitics.co).) **In 2025, my bet is that further government oversight** of the emerging technology [will be put on the back burner](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter023free/) in the name of global competitiveness. That will even happen in places like the EU and South Korea where lawmakers have passed comprehensive AI rules. **In that context, a voluntary statement from countries,** in the form of an AI Action Summit communiqué, won't be worth much. **A more positive view of next week's summit** is that France is actually building AI products, based on governance principles, instead of just talking about the need for oversight. A more negative perspective is that the Feb 10-11 conference is an effort by Macron — suffering from shifting political winds at home — to regain the advantage by demonstrating his role as a global leader on AI. --- ## Chart of the week **POLICYMAKERS WORLDWIDE NOW OPENLY** fret about how addicted children have become to digital services. Some, like those in Australia, have gone so far as to ban access to social media platforms for minors. **To be clear, there is no** [**empirical evidence**](https://www.manchester.ac.uk/about/news/social-media-bans/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)to connect growing levels of mental health illnesses, among kids, to access to digital services. That doesn't mean children should be let loose on the likes of YouTube and TikTok. **And yet, roughly 15 percent of American teenagers** are now almost constantly glued to those services — with addiction to Instagram and Snapchat (but not Facebook) not far behind. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/01/Untitled-2-3.jpg) Source: [Pew Research Center](https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2024/12/12/teens-social-media-and-technology-2024/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## Make Europe Great Again! **THERE'S NO DENYING GEOPOLITICS** has taken over technology. The United States now vies openly with China on everything from high-end semiconductors to critical raw materials. In that bipolar world, Europe — and its focus on principles-based digital regulation that promotes fundamental rights — may represent a third way, according to [**Anu Bradford**](https://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/anu-bradford?ref=digitalpolitics.co), who coined the "Brussels Effect" concept. **Yet there is now a rival theory** about how the EU can compete globally that's gaining traction in European policymaking circles. And that involves building a so-called "[Euro Stack](https://euro-stack.eu/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)" of digital infrastructure, tooling and services that is both made within, and run solely from, the 27-country bloc. For those who attended the inaugural "Marked As Urgent" tech policy event on Jan 30, thank you. You can see photos from the meet-up in London [here](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/markscott82%5Fcontentmoderation-activity-7290993568469458945-gNM3?utm%5Fsource=share&utm%5Fmedium=member%5Fdesktop). We'll have another event for you on March 27\. Sign up [here](https://forms.gle/xriBth9bj2XD4xkR7?ref=digitalpolitics.co) for details. If you're interested in sponsoring or partnering with Digital Politics as I develop the newsletter and future events in 2025, please reach out at digitalpolitics@protonmail.com **Leading that charge is an Italian economist** called [**Cristina Caffarra**](https://cristinacaffarra.com/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**.** She earned her spurs in the cut-and-thrust world of digital competition, advising companies like Apple, Microsoft and Amazon, as well as a series of European and US antitrust officials. Caffarra and others want an industrial policy to meet the new geopolitics where competitiveness and economic growth — as outlined in [Mario Draghi's report](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter004/) for the European Commission last year — is the new name of the game. Donald Trump's return to the White House, from this worldview, has made the Euro stack more important than ever. **"It's a massive disgrace that when I have a video conference** with the Commission, I use (Microsoft) Teams," Caffarra told an audience in Brussels on Jan 31\. "Buy European. Europe First." That last comment received a massive applause from the European crowd. "The reality today is that we are a colony," the Italian economist continued. "The energy was focused on digital regulation as the only thing we had, it was a massive mistake." To make that point even clearer, the Italian also held [her own conference](https://bruxconference2025.com/event-photos-and-videos/videos/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — dubbed "The Perfect Storm: A Time of Truth for Europe?" — in Brussels on Jan 30\. **There's a lot to unpack here.** For those promoting the Euro stack concept, they worry about the dominance of American tech giants in key digital infrastructure areas like cloud and quantum computing. Without homegrown alternatives, the theory goes, Europe (and other parts of the world, too) will always be beholden to the US' commercial and/or political whims. To fix that, the EU must build its own rival infrastructure — preferably based on open source principles to avoid future industrial capture — to meet European needs. For what that could look like, see [here](https://euro-stack.eu/a-pitch-paper/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://euro-stack.eu/2024/12/31/eurostack/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **I have some sympathy for that argument.** But only to a point. Yes, there needs to be greater offerings from diverse actors when it comes to building the underlying infrastructure for the global digital economy. A reliance on a small number of companies — be they American or not — is not sustainable. **But where I disagree with the Euro stack pitch** is its jingoistic approach that tries to Make Europe Great Again. We've already seen the bloc try to create its own version of Google. [That failed miserably](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quaero?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Euro stack supporters would say this is about creating homegrown infrastructure, and not just replicating what already exists. Sure, I get that. But when I hear the likes of Caffarra speak, it sounds a lot like people complaining that Europe didn't get the economic bump from existing digital services. If Meta was, for instance, based in Paris and not Menlo Park, would they have a similar critique of the dominance of the online world by a small number of — in this alternate reality — European champions? I doubt it. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. The first two weeks of any paid subscription are free. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **There's also a misreading of the Euro stack crowd** of what India achieved with its [own version of this concept](https://proteantech.in/articles/understanding-india-stack/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). For more on the so-called "India Stack," read [this](https://indiastack.org/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [this](https://www.clearias.com/india-stack/?srsltid=AfmBOoo7DkTxomQQhrp08fD9bxbczLgPQYb4iRSA5qde-%5Ft04H0Xg94L&ref=digitalpolitics.co). But, in essence, New Delhi created a series of easily-accessible public data access points on which private companies and the government could then provide new services. That has [led to problems](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S016740482400083X?ref=digitalpolitics.co), most notably around people's privacy. But — and I'm not an expert in this policy area — India's approach to create homegrown alternatives was more about opening up existing data, which had been siloed, for new commercial and social opportunities. It was not, as envisioned in Europe, as a like-for-like retrofit of existing (mostly American) infrastructure for domestic alternatives. **I have more questions.** If the Euro stack is about investing billions, if not trillions, of dollars in European-owned infrastructure, who is going to pay for it? And if such alternatives can be funded — most likely via public resources, given that buckets of private capital have already had years to invest in this opportunity, but didn't — are we OK that citizens will likely pay more compared to what they already have access to via existing infrastructure? Even in the current more transactional geopolitical environment, is Europe willing to put up the borders to outsiders — even if they can offer European citizens (cheaper) services that meet their needs? **My largest criticism of the Euro stack movement** is not their frustration with the status-quo. I get it. American tech companies now dominate much of the digital world (outside of China.) To boost Europe's long-term economic and societal interests, reducing that dependence makes good politics. **But in their breathless attempt to frame** the existing situation as a mere failure of digital regulation and an unwillingness of EU officials to get tough against the US, the likes of Caffarra are missing how you "win" (note: I wouldn't view this as a zero-sum game) in the global fight over digital. **If their underlying criticism is of an industrial model** that has reinforced power around a small group of Silicon Valley giants, you don't overcome that by replicating such structures — but just with French, German or Swedish firms. You do it by taking what non-Europeans (including non-US countries like Japan and South Korea) do best, and overlaying that with local solutions created, and championed, by local citizens. --- ## What I'm reading **— Chinese covert influence operations impersonated** human rights organizations critical of Beijing to discredit these groups' activities, according to a [report](https://graphika.com/reports/chinese-state-influence?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared) from Graphika. **— The law firm Arnold & Partner analyzed** what Trump's new executive orders on AI mean for developers of this emerging technology. More [here](https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/advisories/2025/01/the-trump-ai-executive-order?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— The European Commission announced a series** of measures, called the Competitiveness Compass, to boost the bloc's growth. More [here](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F25%5F339?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). **— Elon Musk remains immensely unpopular** in both Germany and the UK despite his efforts to wade into those countries' domestic politics, according to a [YouGov poll](https://yougov.de/politics/articles/51443-deutsche-und-briten-weisen-die-jungsten-ausserungen-von-elon-musk-zur-deutschen-und-britischen-politik-zuruck?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— The Chinese large language model DeepSeek** performed well when a research asked it to respond to X posts as if it was a propagandist for the Russian government. More [here](https://opensourcesoul.substack.com/p/the-guardrails-2-asking-deepseek). --- ### We need to talk about AI infrastructure. Really. URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter028/ Last updated: 2025-01-27T12:41:59.000Z **WELCOME BACK, THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I bring you this class-A tech-related [dad joke](https://www.instagram.com/reel/DArbWjwx5Bp/?igsh=MTNwbXF4YXBxeW0wcw%3D%3D&ref=digitalpolitics.co) to get your week going. Chortle. **For those of you in London, I'm co-hosting** a tech policy gathering (or 'knees-up,' to borrow from British slang) on Jan 30 from 6:30pm onwards. Come join us (it's free!) by RSVPing [here](https://lu.ma/4qovwbkj?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— In the geopolitical fight around tech, everyone wants** to build the digital highways of the future. But, for many, bigger won't mean better. **— Here we go again: transatlantic data flows** are in jeopardy amid a shake-up in how Washington allows European citizens to file complaints about how their data is handled. **— Where are the world's most powerful computers located?** I've got an answer for that. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Postcard from London: Will the UK's real digital policy please stand up? URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter027free/ Last updated: 2025-01-23T14:00:17.000Z **THIS IS ANOTHER BONUS EDITION** of Digital Politics. I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I've been scratching my head about the United Kingdom's stance on tech — ever since the new government, under the Labour Party's **Keir Starmer**, took over in July, 2024. **I'll be unpacking that and a whole bunch more** on Jan 30 when **Ben Whitelaw** (from the [Everything in Moderation](https://www.everythinginmoderation.co/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) newsletter), **Georgia Iacovou** (and her [Horrific/Terrific](https://www.horrific-terrific.tech/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) newsletter) and I host a discussion/drinks in central London. **If that sounds like your cup of tea** (see what I did there?), please RSVP [**here**](https://lu.ma/4qovwbkj?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **What's clear is that London is taking a 'cake and eat it'** approach to everything from platform governance to artificial intelligence oversight. That's not a strategy that will stand the country in good stead in the years to come. **Click** [**here**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter018free/) **for my take on France and** [**here**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter017/) **for my** views on Germany. I'll be in Washington in March, so expect another postcard from the Beltway then. **Let's get started:** --- ## What does the UK government want from tech? **EVEN THOUGH I LIVE IN LONDON,** I feel like an outsider when it comes to UK tech policy. In truth, much of what has happened in the country — from its [**Online Safety Act**](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/50?ref=digitalpolitics.co)to its [**Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act**](https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3453?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to its attempt to rewrite the [**UK's General Data Protection Regulation**](https://www.gov.uk/data-protection?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — has been overshadowed by developments in both the European Union and the United States. That's no shade on what London wants to do on tech. It's just the realpolitik for a country no longer viewed as part of the top geopolitical tier. **The new(ish) Labour government has now** been in power for seven months. Its priorities, above all, are to turn around a [sluggish domestic economy](https://www.statista.com/statistics/941233/monthly-gdp-growth-uk/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to meet local politicians' [pledge](https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Mission-Economy.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to make it the fastest growing of any G7 country. A stuttering national health service – still on its knees in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic — and an increasingly polarized electorate — [spurred on](https://www.ft.com/content/dd4b066c-30a1-4ce4-a95e-82c334a740cf?ref=digitalpolitics.co), to a degree, by Elon Musk — have captured much of Westminster's attention. In short, tech, and tech policy, has barely resonated. **That's starting to change. Earlier this month,** the UK government unveiled an "[**AI Opportunities Action Plan**](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-opportunities-action-plan/ai-opportunities-action-plan?ref=digitalpolitics.co)" aimed at harnessing the emerging technology to bolster the country's economy and well-being. That included plans to double down on domestic technical infrastructure; open up public datasets for commercial use (cue: heckles about data protection abuses); and train a new generation of scientists to commercialize these new-founded "AI opportunities." Thanks for reading Digital Politics. If you've been forwarded this newsletter (and like what you've read), please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/#/portal/). For those already subscribed, reach out on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com **I read these statements and couldn't help but ask**: what is the UK trying to achieve? I've covered global tech policy for more than a decade, and I have always viewed the country's approach to digital very much similar to that of Israel. And that is, above all, to direct as much foreign direct investment into the local tech industry — still one of the largest globally, see charts below — as possible. **Questions around the need for further regulation,** online safety provisions and digital competition safeguards often capture the public's (and politicians') imagination. But I've never understood what is the guiding principle for London when it comes to tackling these often complex and thorny issues. This goes beyond domestic partisan politics. I would say the same for the previous Conservative Party-led government as I would for the new Labour one. **In short: what is the UK trying to achieve** when it comes to digital policymaking? --- ## The UK remains Europe's largest tech player ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/01/vc-investment-across-europe-2024.png) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/01/leading-european-ecosystems-by-vc-investment-2024.png) Source: DealRoom --- ## A country without a vision **On that question, I hold up my hands and say** 'I don't know.' London has passed some of the most progressive digital rules across the West, especially when it comes to digital competition. But just as you think there's a groundswell of political buy-in to do something innovative and forward-looking, the UK government shifts gears in ways that undermine what it has already achieved. **Let's take the country's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)**, or local competition regulator. On Jan 14, the agency [started an investigation](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-to-investigate-googles-search-services?ref=digitalpolitics.co) into Google under new powers that allow it to give certain tech giants a so-called "strategic markets status designation." If a company is deemed to meet such a threshold (basically, confirming it holds a dominant position), then the CMA can subsequently develop a bespoke *ex ante* oversight regime — in this case, for Google — to ensure the search giant doesn't subsequently abuse its existing powers. **It's a middle ground between the EU's** one-size-fits-all approach, under the bloc's **Digital Markets Act**, and the let-the-courts-decide strategy in the US. For me, it's a smart way to tackle a difficult policy area. If done well, it could position the UK as a global regulatory leader and incentivize other countries to follow suit. **But then, only days later,** the agency [announced](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/former-amazon-boss-named-interim-chair-of-cma?ref=digitalpolitics.co) it had appointed **Doug Gurr**, a former Amazon executive, as its interim chair with a mandate to "support growth for the UK." I don't know Gurr personally — he was previously the tech giant's UK country manager and one-time president of Amazon China. But his appointment came after **Rachel Reeves**, the UK's finance minister, or Chancellor, [suggested](https://www.ft.com/content/976ca0e3-b47b-44c4-9583-a3fcdd713283?ref=digitalpolitics.co) Gurr's predecessor, **Marcus Bokkerink**, did not share "the strategic direction this government is taking." **Translation: the CMA's previous leadership was not signed up** to boosting economic growth, above all. Time will now tell if a former Amazon executive is willing to use all the powers available to the agency, under the UK's new digital competition regime, to stop digital anticompetitive practices. **The list goes on.** The country's newly-minted [AI Safety Institute](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ai-safety-institute?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — the first of its kind, and aimed at providing quantifiable oversight to the most advanced foundation models — was met with great fanfare when it was announced during the UK's [AI Safety Summit](https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/ai-safety-summit-2023?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in 2023\. With an initial [multi-million dollar](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65438d159e05fd0014be7bd9/introducing-ai-safety-institute-web-accessible.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) budget, the agency had great hopes of testing the latest wares of the likes of Google's Deepmind, OpenAI and others before they were released to the public. **Yet a mixture of limited actual powers** (few AI companies signed up for oversight); a shifting political landscape (which moved from AI safety to AI innovation); and no clear legislative agenda to pass AI-related rules has left the UK's AI Safety Institute in a difficult position. It hired world-leading experts — and is [still hiring now](https://www.aisi.gov.uk/careers?ref=digitalpolitics.co). But it's mostly beholden to its US namesake whose ability to bring the biggest American AI companies to the table is just not something its British counterpart has any power to do. --- ## UK's Online Safety Act: what comes next ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/01/Untitled-2.jpg) Source: Ofcom --- ## What London should do on digital policy **WHEN I TALK TO OFFICIALS, POLITICIANS** and others within the UK's tech policy scene, there remains a disconnect between the short-term policy objectives around the country's litany of new digital rules and the lack of a long-term strategy about what the actual point of these efforts are. There are a lot of well-meaning policymakers beavering away. But there's no political leadership to frame the UK's ambitions on tech. **My fear, given the shifting geopolitical winds** and London's traditional willingness to bend to whatever Washington's agenda may be, is that the country's new generation of digital rules — borne out of a desire to offer greater online protections, akin to those of the EU, but with greater Anglo-Saxon flexibility — are sacrificed on the altar of transatlantic relations. **But here's the thing. There is a way forward.** One that could potentially position the UK as a leader in practical — and replicable — digital regulation that marries a principles-based approach to greater oversight with regulatory certainty that boosts Britain's world-leading tech industry. It would allow the country to mirror what the EU is attempting, via its alphabet soup of new digital rules, but in a way that is more market-friendly and more flexible. **Dare I say it: it would be a potential opportunity** to benefit from Brexit by forging a middle way that combines Europe-style online protections with American-style market economics. **So what would that look like?** First, the Labour government should double down on existing digital rules as part of what the UK has to offer, both to its citizens and the wider world. The likes of the Online Safety Act and Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act could be gold-standards to be copied by other countries. To do that, they need to be implemented in a way that demonstrates benefits to both people and UK Inc. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **If done well, such rules could position the country** as a "RegTech" superpower by demonstrating the benefits of what well-designed, principles-based online oversight can accomplish. That could include turning the country into a "sand box" to allow firms to test out their new digital services/products within a digital regulatory regime open to such innovation. To date, no one is offering that globally. **Second, the UK has what few in the world can boast of**: a vibrant domestic tech sector — and not just an outsourced call center for US tech giants (sorry, Ireland!). Make use of it via greater public sector funding and commercial incentives for pension funds and other long-term investors to invest in homegrown companies. The country's financial services industry, including the FTSE100, also needs to do a better job at keeping these UK tech companies within the country, and not see them scamper off to the US whenever they want to go public. **Third, don't give up on digital rules.** Regulation isn't there just for the sake of it. The UK has crafted some of the most innovative efforts to corral online abuses, even if such legislation developed without a meaningful long-term plan. British leaders shouldn't now give up on that, just because of shifting geopolitical winds. If greater online safety, privacy and competition protections were a worthwhile aim a few years ago, what has changed now to potentially roll back on that agenda? London, be confident in your approach to digital policymaking. **Alas, I don't see a game plan for any of this coming** from the UK's Labour government. That is a shame. And not because I'm a cheerleader for the country where I live. But because a British alternative on tech policy — compared to those offered by the EU, US and China — makes others, elsewhere, up their game in the global crucible of ideas around platform governance, digital competition and artificial intelligence. **For now, London is missing a trick** by failing to outline, clearly, what it wants to achieve on digital. That is a disservice, both to the UK and its allies worldwide. --- ### Who's who on tech policy in Trump 2.0 administration URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter026/ Last updated: 2025-01-21T18:49:42.000Z **WELCOME BACK. THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and as many of us unpack the impact of Meta's recent decision to roll back its content moderation policies, here's a [reminder](https://www.instagram.com/economicarchive/reel/DE9Iy3cNvrK/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that Mark Zuckerberg, the company's chief executive, once had an extremely awkward interaction with astronauts. Enjoy. **— Jan 20 marks the start of Donald Trump's** second term in the White House. Here are the people you need to know that will shape tech policy over the next four years. **— The 'will they, or won't they' ban on TikTok** in the United States is a reminder, to all countries, that you shouldn't mistake national security for digital policymaking. **— In case it wasn't clear,** the US dominates the world of 'online platforms.' But countries from Singapore to Turkey are making a play, too. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Europe's response to the US on digital regulation URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter025/ Last updated: 2025-01-13T12:00:35.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and you find me halfway between London and Brussels on a Eurostar with extremely patchy wifi. #FirstWorldProblems. **— Tensions are skyrocketing between** Washington and Brussels on digital regulation. Here's how I think that will play out over the next 18 months. **— Meta will replace its global fact-checking program** with crowd-sourced "community notes." One problem: that approach isn't the panacea many would hope it to be. **— Artificial intelligence private investment** went through the roofin 2023, the most recent full-year figures available. The United States is still way ahead. You may be surprised who came second. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### TikTok goes to court URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter024/ Last updated: 2025-01-13T10:07:18.000Z **THE YEAR IS STILL YOUNG.** But it's time for a bonus **Digital Politics**. I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and on Jan 10, the US Supreme Court will hear oral arguments over whether TikTok's should be banned in the United States on Jan 19 (if it's not sold by then.) **It marks the second event in a pretty eventful week** in the world of social media. Meta [announced on Jan 7](https://www.facebook.com/zuck/videos/1525382954801931/) it was ending its fact-checking program and overhauling its content moderation policies. My take on that [here](https://dfrlab.org/2025/01/08/analysis-metas-fact-checking-pullback-will-have-global-consequences/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **At stake in the TikTok hearing, at least on paper,** is whether the US governmenthas the right to outlaw a foreign-owned social media company — all in the name of national security. In response, TikTok and some of its users accuse Washington of illegally constraining their free speech rights under the First Amendment. **You'll likely hear a lot about the case**, both on Jan 10 and in the build-up to the prospective ban/divestiture ahead of the Jan 19 deadline within the [**Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act**](https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/7521?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**.** You can watch the oral arguments from 10am ET / 5pm CET [here](https://www.supremecourt.gov/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **Much of what will be said won't get to the nub of the issue**: That TikTok (and its popularity with mostly young Americans) is now entrenched in an increasingly open geopolitical dispute between the US and China. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The miseducation of Jan 6 URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter023free/ Last updated: 2025-01-06T14:00:45.000Z **HAPPY NEW YEAR**. This is Digital Politics. I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and as many of us head back to work after the holiday season, I bring you [live footage](https://www.instagram.com/reel/DEQBr7pOGch/?igsh=ZHhjd3FqeWQwbG90&ref=digitalpolitics.co) of my first day in the office. Be gentle. **Before we begin, a logistics note**: I'm teaming up with **Ben Whitelaw** (and his excellent [Everything in Moderation](https://www.everythinginmoderation.co/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) newsletter) and **Georgia Iacovou** (and her equally good [Horrific/Terrific](https://www.horrific-terrific.tech/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) newsletter) and for an in-person discussion/drinks about tech policy in 2025\. **If you're in London on Jan 30,** sign up to attend, for free, [here](https://forms.gle/pKxt8pQdA59R4ujU8?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Jan 6 marks the four-year anniversary** of the deadly attack on Capitol Hill. Social media's willingness to police content in the United States has only diminished since then. **— The New Year brings renewed efforts to corral artificial intelligence**. Not all these governance attempts will work out. **— Ever wondered how the European Union's** Digital Services Act actually works? I've got a chart for that. --- ## Beware those who say all is well **JAN 6 MARKS ONE OF THE DARKEST DAYS** in modern US history. Just two months after Joe Biden beat Donald Trump in securing the White House, a violent mob of roughly 2,000 people attacked the United States Capitol Building. Many believed the November 2020 election had been stolen from Trump — and they wanted to take it back. The insurrection eventually cost the lives of 9 individuals, including four police officers who committed suicide in the aftermath. Around 1,600 defendants have pleaded guilty to charges related to Jan 6, and another 200 have been convicted after trials. For a full breakdown, read the US House Select Committee to Investigate the Jan 6 Attacks final [report](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-J6-REPORT/pdf/GPO-J6-REPORT.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **You're probably familiar with all these facts —** many of which are [now openly questioned](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/05/us/politics/january-6-capitol-riot-trump.html?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared) by those seeking to rewrite history. But, over the break, I found myself revisiting the leaked internal Facebook documents from **Frances Haugen**. Yes, it was quite a vacation. I [had access](https://www.politico.com/tag/the-facebook-papers?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to them, during my time at POLITICO, after we joined a consortium of other media outlets that were also granted access to this treasure trove of information — much of which related to how Facebook handled crises like that of Jan 6\. The Wall Street Journal's Jeff Horwitz [had been given](https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-facebook-files-11631713039?ref=digitalpolitics.co) a first crack at the documents. Thanks for reading Digital Politics. If you've been forwarded this newsletter (and like what you've read), please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter019/#/portal/). For those already subscribed, reach out on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com **Re-reading Facebook's approach to the build-up to Jan 6** (and subsequent violence on the day)**,** based on these leaked documents, was troubling. They paint a picture of a social media giant struggling to come to terms with the coordinated efforts to spread the "Stop the Steal" message on its platform; an unwillingness to tackle so-called 'harmful non-violating narratives,' or posts that did not explicitly break the company's terms of service; and internal content algorithms that, within days, promoted QAnon theories to a mass audience. Meta subsequently [banned](https://about.fb.com/news/2020/08/addressing-movements-and-organizations-tied-to-violence/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) QAnon-linked posts from its platforms. **"We recently saw non-violating content delegitimizing** the US election results go viral on our platforms," according to an internal analysis of what happened on Facebook in the build-up to Jan 6\. "Retrospectively, external sources told us that the on-platform experiences on this narrative may have had substantial negative impacts, including contributing materially to the Capitol riot." **Well, duh.** **To be fair to Facebook, the platform was not** the only engine for how conspiracy theories around the 2020 election spread. As someone [enmeshed in that world four years ago](https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/05/sharpie-ballots-trump-strategy-arizona-434372?ref=digitalpolitics.co), social media, writ large, was a major catalyzing factor in how those lies circulated. At the center of that coordination were fringe platforms — [most notably Telegram](https://www.politico.eu/article/after-us-election-extremists-use-fringe-social-networks-to-push-fraud-claims-violence/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — where little, if any, content moderation existed or, even now, exists. Such sophisticated online communities [had flourished](https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/12/trans-atlantic-conspiracy-coronavirus-251325?ref=digitalpolitics.co) during the Covid-19 pandemic. **Within that context, Facebook should be considered** a good corporate citizen, even if internal documents revealed it failed to clamp down on how election-related conspiracies fueled, in part, online anger and, eventually, offline violence. **For more on social media's impact on Jan 6,** read the House Committee's own findings [here](https://cdn.sanity.io/files/3tzzh18d/production/8442d8daf710582225b8c7fcd5171877b51d277d.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and an analysis of that investigation [here](https://www.techpolicy.press/insiders-view-of-the-january-6th-committees-social-media-investigation/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **It's indisputable that social media** emboldened those who disliked the outcome of the 2020 US presidential election to take to the streets on Jan 6\. What the Haugen documents reveal, at least within Facebook, was internal processes not adequately set up to handle such unprecedented domestic US political events. They show legitimate concerns around infringing people's free speech becoming entangled in the political realities of Facebook executives not wanting to be seen as taking sides in a highly contentious election. They highlight internal Facebook teams — whose counterparts also existed at YouTube and Twitter — struggling to get senior managers to respond quickly enough to dampen conspiracy theories that morphed into real-world violence. **But one overriding niggle I couldn't shake** when re-reading these hundreds of pages of internal Facebook angst was that, in early 2025, they sounded exceedingly quaint given how much social media giants have changed over the last four years. **Yes, the likes of YouTube, Instagram and TikTok** still have strong approaches toward foreign interference, even when state-backed meddling outside the US remains rife on these platforms. They also have highly robust terms of services about how illegal online content like hate speech and overt calls to violence will not be tolerated. They speak eloquently about the threat of disinformation created via generative AI, and how they [are working](https://www.aielectionsaccord.com/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), as an industry, to thwart such abuse. **And yet, would any of these platforms take similar measures**, in 2025, to throttle the spread of overtly political conspiracy theories – even those associated with offline actions — as they did so four years ago? Honestly, I'm not so sure. You're reading the free version of Digital Politics. Here's what paid subscribers had access to over the last month: — What role did TikTok really play in Romania's presidential election?; The new and old digital policy faces in Brussels and Washington; Western countries' split digital ambitions. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter019/). — Lessons from the 2024 (digital) election-palooza: Everything you need to know about how tech shaped last year's global election cycle. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter021/). — Digital Politics' 2025 predictions: A renewed focus on national security; AI lobbying leads to governance results; Efforts to quell online competition abuse falter. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter022/). If that sounds up your street, you can upgrade your subscription [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter019/#/portal/). **Many of the election integrity and trust and safety teams** at these platforms have been culled to almost insignificance. Some firms, like Elon Musk's rebranded X, have embraced an all-or-nothing vision of free speech that fundamentally misunderstands how the First Amendment applies to such private networks. With Trump's return to the White House only weeks away, many of these platforms' chief executives [are doing whatever they can](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mark-zuckerberg-donald-trump-mar-a-lago-meta/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to stay on the right side of arguably the most powerful person in the world. A politician, it is worth noting, who [was banned](https://about.fb.com/news/2023/01/trump-facebook-instagram-account-suspension/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) from all mainstream social media platforms in the wake of Jan 6. **In this new political environment,** two things are happening. First, there is an ongoing effort to reshape the content moderation discussion within the US — one that was most evident in social media's role around Jan 6 — that platforms have gone too far in quelling people's free speech. (We'll come back to why that's happening in subsequent newsletters.) Second, given this emphasis on free speech fundamentalism, social media giants are now unwilling to "[break the glass](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/22/jan-6-capitol-riot-facebook/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)" to throttle people's problematic online posts in times of emergency. **Before I get angry emails, I understand that** companies say they will enforce existing terms of service on all users, and that content moderation, especially around elections, is paramount. I also understand that people within these firms are still trying to live by that ethos. --- ## Chart of the Week **The EU's social media laws are almost one year old.** Investigations into the likes of Meta, X and TikTok abound. But how does the bloc's rulebook actually operate? **Cardiff University's** [**Nora Jansen**](https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/people/view/2470661-jansen-nora?ref=digitalpolitics.co) put together this (very complicated) overview of how all the pieces of the DSA puzzle interlink. **It includes regulators like the European Commission** and national Digital Services Coordinators. It includes outside groups like auditors and 'trusted flaggers.' It includes the Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines. **To say the structure is complex** would be an understatement. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2025/01/DSA-Chart--1-.jpg) Source: [https://shorturl.at/XyZ1V](https://shorturl.at/XyZ1V?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## They said what, now? *"As a new year begins, I have come to the view that this is the right time for me to move on from my role as President, Global Affairs at Meta,"* **Nick Clegg**, the former UK deputy prime minister, [wrote](https://www.facebook.com/nickclegg/?locale=en%5FGB) on his Facebook page. *"And no one could pick up from where I’ve left off with greater skill and integrity than my deputy, Joel Kaplan."* --- ## AI governance at the beginning of 2025 **I HAVE GOOD NEWS AND BAD NEWS** for those interested in the policing of next generation artificial intelligence systems. In late December, South Korea became the second jurisdiction after the EU to pass [comprehensive AI rules](https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=PRC%5FR2V4H1W1T2K5M1O6E4Q9T0V7Q9S0U0&ref=digitalpolitics.co). That's no mean feat given the country's [recent political turmoil](https://www.vox.com/world-politics/393403/korea-politics-yoon-park-impeachment-moon-insurrection-protest?ref=digitalpolitics.co). The AI Safety Institutes of the US and United Kingdom [also conducted](https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/12/pre-deployment-evaluation-openais-o1-model?ref=digitalpolitics.co) a joint evaluation of OpenAI's latest model in what is expected to become standard practice before other firms release their own models into the wild. In early February, French President **Emmanuel Macron** will welcome the great-and-the-good (and me) to Paris for the country's [AI Action Summit](https://www.elysee.fr/en/sommet-pour-l-action-sur-l-ia?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or effort to shepherd the technology toward the light and away from apocalyptic uses. **This year will also see AI governance efforts** gain steam in the EU, via its [AI Act](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai?ref=digitalpolitics.co), the Council of Europe, via its [AI Convention](https://www.coe.int/en/web/artificial-intelligence/the-framework-convention-on-artificial-intelligence?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and in other regions where policymakers [are charting their own path](https://au.int/en/documents/20240809/continental-artificial-intelligence-strategy?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to harness the technology for economic development. **That's the good news. Now here comes the bad.** I'm not sure this will end well. I had promised not to be a '[fun sponge](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/fun-sponge?ref=digitalpolitics.co)' this year, and I do believe we'll see new forms of AI governance take root in 2025\. I'm just not convinced it's the type of governance many of us had envisioned. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. **Let's take the EU's AI Act.** If you listen to the bloc's leaders, the legislation will both corral the worst-case scenarios while unleashing Europe's economic potential. It is expected to be the gold standard on which others — like South Korea — will base their own legislation. It will equally be a hands-off means to jumpstart growth and a regulatory deterrent to stop firms from abusing the technology. What's not to like? **And yet, in early 2025, we're still 18 months away** from all parts of the AI Act coming into force. Yes, some of the most stringent provisions, including on banned AI use cases, will kick in next month. But we're still a long way away from a meaningful regulatory rulebook — and even Brussels' [AI Office](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-office?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or linchpin for the European Commission on the AI Act's implementation, is still working with a skeleton crew ([it's still hiring](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/job-opportunities-european-ai-office-legal-and-policy-backgrounds?ref=digitalpolitics.co)). Effective regulatory oversight, as of Jan 6, 2025, it is not. **That takes us to the other side of the Atlantic** where the future of the US AI Safety Institute — and pretty much all of Joe Biden's White House [Executive Order on AI](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/10/30/executive-order-on-the-safe-secure-and-trustworthy-development-and-use-of-artificial-intelligence/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — is up in the air ahead of Donald Trump's swearing in ceremony on Jan 20\. Publicly, the future US president has said he will kill his predecessor's AI governance plans. I'm not so sure. The Trump 1.0 Administration passed its own [Executive Order on AI](https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/ai/executive-order-ai/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and incoming tech policymakers like [**Lynne Parker**](https://research.utk.edu/lynne-e-parker/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) may temper efforts to quash all forms of AI governance. **And yet, that leaves the US AI Safety Institute**, whose [mandate](https://www.nist.gov/aisi?ref=digitalpolitics.co) includes spearheading much of this policy work, in limbo until those political decisions are made. It also places Washington's position in broader global discussions around AI governance — including those to be held in Paris on Feb 10-11 at the AI Action Summit — on equally shaky ground. **My best guess is that Trump 2.0** keeps some, but not all, of Biden's AI efforts, especially those related to national security and economic productivity. Having AI experts in senior positions in all federal agencies, for instance, is just good politics. **Given the US AI Safety Institute sits** within the US Commerce Department, I would also bet it survives under the incoming administration. But I wouldn't put much money on the White House pushing anything more than voluntary commitments for AI companies when it comes to transparency, accountability and greater oversight. **Here's one wild card for you:** the United Nations. Its AI Advisory Body [has already called](https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/governing%5Fai%5Ffor%5Fhumanity%5Ffinal%5Freport%5Fen.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) for global AI governance efforts to mostly fall under the international body's remit. That would allow the likes of China and Russia to have equal say as democratic countries. Something that [hasn't exactly worked out](https://www.politico.com/news/2024/09/26/un-cybercrime-treaty-white-house-russia-00181271?ref=digitalpolitics.co) well for the UN's separate [Cybercrime Treaty](https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/12/1158521?ref=digitalpolitics.co#:~:text=The%20Convention%20against%20Cybercrime%20acknowledges,scale%2C%20speed%2C%20and%20scope.). **Watch out for more power grabs** by the UN over how AI systems are governed during 2025\. It's 100 percent legitimate that the international body wants to make such discussions more equitable, including for Global Majority countries. But if these negotiations lead to authoritarian governments running roughshod over fundamental rights, then we will start to have a problem. --- ## What I'm reading **— The US Treasury Department added** a number of Russian and Iranian nationals to its sanction list related to cyber attacks and foreign interference. More [here](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241231?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— Julie Inman Grant, Australia's eSafety Commissioner**, explained the importance of newly-created codes of practice under the country's Online Safety Act. More [here](https://www.esafety.gov.au/newsroom/blogs/australia-leads-the-world-in-setting-new-standards-for-online-child-safety?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— The outgoing Italian G7 Presidency finalized reporting frameworks** for how the most advanced forms of AI would be overseen. More [here](https://innovazione.gov.it/notizie/articoli/en/g7-digital-tech-working-group-finalizes-reporting-framework-for-advanced-ai-syste/?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— Researchers at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom** outlined China's ever-evolving tactics to cyber operations and disinformation. More [here](https://shop.freiheit.org/?ref=digitalpolitics.co#!/Publikation/1855). **— Ahead of the TikTok hearing in the US Supreme Court** on Jan 10, here's an [overview](https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/01/parties-file-final-briefs-before-supreme-court-hears-tiktok-case/?utm%5Fsource=substack&utm%5Fmedium=email) of the amicus briefs related to the case. --- ### Digital Politics: 2025 predictions URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter022/ Last updated: 2024-12-23T12:00:20.000Z **WELCOME TO DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and this is the final newsletter of the year. Normal transmission will resume on Jan 6. **As we all stagger to the end of 2024,** I want to thank you all for supporting me during my transition from journalist to think tanker. This newsletter is a labor of love. I hope you find it at least as half as interesting to read as I do to write. **While not everyone will be celebrating Christmas** (I, for one, am in Team [Festivus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Festivus?ref=digitalpolitics.co)), I send [this](https://www.instagram.com/reel/DDobr08qy3W/?igsh=eTl0YXh6NTl0Mzh5&ref=digitalpolitics.co) as season's greetings to you and yours. **For those in the United Kingdom, I'm teaming** up with [Ben Whitelaw](https://www.linkedin.com/in/benwhitelaw/?originalSubdomain=uk&ref=digitalpolitics.co) and his [**Everything in Moderation**](https://www.everythinginmoderation.co/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) newsletter for an in-person (free) evening event on Jan 30\. More details to come in the New Year. But mark your calendars. **Let's get started.** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The global election-palooza comes to an end URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter021/ Last updated: 2024-12-16T12:00:21.000Z **HELLO. THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and this is the penultimate newsletter of the year. The final edition will land on Dec 23 — which, as everyone should know, is [Festivus](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1ss9OxRtdo&ab%5Fchannel=FestivusGames&ref=digitalpolitics.co). (It's for the rest of us). **I'm doing something a little different this week.** As 2024 nears its end, over two billion people across more than 80 countries have voted in the largest ever demonstration of democracy in the history of the world. **What role did digital play in elections from** Pakistan to the European Union to the United States? What lessons can we take in how online campaigning, emerging technologies like generative AI and nascent online safety regulatory regimes handled the complexities of this global election megacycle? **I may not have all the answers.** But I've certainly got some ideas. **Let's get started.** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### 5 Things to know about the DSA risk assessments and audits URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter020free/ Last updated: 2024-12-11T17:26:53.000Z **TIME FOR A BONUS EDITION OF DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I delved into the inner workings of the first round of mandatory risk assessments and audits produced under the European Union's Digital Services Act. **These documents — from the likes of** Meta, TikTok and Alphabet — represent the first time these companies have been ordered to assess how their platforms may promote so-called 'system risks' within the 27-country bloc. **Outside auditors then assessed how each firm's** internal processes handled these risks, and scored responses, as either 'positive' or 'negative,' in line with companies' legal commitments under Europe's new digital rulebook. **What follows is my first analysis of what is** in these documents. It also [was published](https://www.techpolicy.press/5-things-to-know-about-the-digital-services-acts-first-risk-assessments-and-audits/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on Tech Policy Press. **Let's get started:** --- **When the European Union created its new social media laws,** known as the Digital Services Act, officials had one clear goal: to boost accountability and transparency for some of the world’s largest tech companies. Those ambitions are getting their first test. The likes of Alphabet, Meta and TikTok just published the first-ever risk assessments and outside audits into how these companies handled potential illegal content and material harmful to individuals’ fundamental rights that represented “[systemic risks](https://www.techpolicy.press/unpacking-systemic-risk-under-the-eus-digital-service-act/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)” to the 27-country bloc. Here’s a [full list](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/12hJWpCFmHJMQQlz1qkd6OgGsMW82YcsWgJHXD7BHVps/htmlview?ref=digitalpolitics.co) of the available reports. In lengthy — and often unwieldy — documents, company executives and independent auditors scoured the platforms to understand how these Big Tech giants tackled thorny and often complicated problems, including how to reduce the amount of illegal content like terrorist and child sexual abuse material accessible online. They also outlined how firms can give users a greater say in how content is displayed in their feeds, as well as what areas need to be improved upon to ensure companies’ compliance with Europe’s new rules. It marks the first time that such legally required risk assessments and audits into social media companies’ impact on wider society have ever been conducted. These reports will now be published annually. The European Commission and EU national regulators will release a separate analysis, based on their own review of these reports, during the first half of 2025. Thanks for reading Digital Politics. If you've been forwarded this newsletter (and like what you've read), please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter018free/#/portal/). For those already subscribed, reach out on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com Below are five key takeaways to help you understand these risk assessments and audits: --- ## **1) Step forward in accountability and transparency** **By publishing these mandatory insights into how platforms operate,** the firms and their outside auditors provided the most comprehensive and independent analysis of the good, bad, and ugly of so-called Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines. The documents range up to more than 200 pages. They now represent a baseline for regulators, both within and outside the EU, to make judgments on whether these firms are reducing legally defined online harms. The risk assessments and audits are inherently complicated. You need a crash course in the inner workings of EU regulation and global content moderation policies to unpick what is in them. On average, the independent audits — still paid for by the companies but nominally shielded from firms’ interference — are more useful than the risk assessments. The audits break down, per each DSA Article, what platforms are doing to reduce systemic risk, or an unclear term used by the EU to define illegal content and counterfeit goods that may endanger those within the 27-country bloc. Companies then submitted rebuttals to these audits to explain how they would improve internal systems to bring services in line with the EU’s DSA. All firms except Wikipedia were given “negative” overall valuations by their outside auditors for failing to comply with all mandatory provisions within the new social media rulebook. On average, though, companies were assessed to have complied with more than 85 percent of the legislation’s requirements. The company-led risk assessments, which outlined how they were handling illegal content and goods under the EU regime, provided little, if any, additional information that had not already been published in firms’ content policies and terms of service. They represented a comprehensive overview of existing internal practices that, while helpful, did not offer further insight into how these platforms functioned. --- ## **2)** **A lot is left to the companies and auditors** **Under the EU’s DSA, companies are obliged to carry out** their own internal risk assessments and hire outside experts to conduct independent audits. The second task almost exclusively fell to global accountancy and consultant firms KPMG, Deloitte, and EY — many of which have existing relationships with the platforms. Only two smaller firms, FTI Consulting and Holistic AI, respectively, conducted separate audits for two of the firms (X and Wikipedia). In the audits, the outside consultants outlined how each company met its DSA obligations. In Facebook’s [document](https://scontent-lhr8-2.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t39.8562-6/468556126%5F544803875088152%5F2594679734771781492%5Fn.pdf?%5Fnc%5Fcat=103&ccb=1-7&%5Fnc%5Fsid=b8d81d&%5Fnc%5Fohc=KYSsulVh9Z4Q7kNvgGs25z5&%5Fnc%5Fzt=14&%5Fnc%5Fht=scontent-lhr8-2.xx&%5Fnc%5Fgid=AuEn41nrFsCasGGCGWiI1wC&oh=00%5FAYD7N2c82RR2-L3MzDnSb5hF-Q4L-EQwNyXghlMkbwFWyQ&oe=6752D193&ref=digitalpolitics.co), for instance, EY detailed how internal processes within the social media giant ensured people were not shown online advertising based on sensitive personal information like individuals’ religious beliefs or ethnicity. In the separate [audit](https://storage.googleapis.com/transparencyreport/report-downloads/dsa-audit-google-search%5F2023-8-28%5F2024-5-31%5Fen%5Fv1.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) of Google’s search product, EY explained, based on an internal review of the company’s processes, how the tech giant allowed users to access search results and other information that was not based on data the company collected on them for profiling. A key question arising from these audits was whether such checks were adequate. Auditors were almost exclusively reliant on existing processes within these firms to assess compliance. It was unclear, based on the review of these audits, how such information was collected; what pushback, if any, the auditors received when asking for the required data; and what steps were taken to go beyond firms’ existing internal compliance structures to meet the overarching obligations of Europe’s rules. Such transparency was inevitably reliant on the goodwill of both companies and auditors. Yet in X’s [document](https://transparency.x.com/content/dam/transparency-twitter/dsa/dsa-audit/TIUC-DSA-Audit-Report-2024-08-27.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co), FTI Consulting explicitly stated that, based on its review of the company’s internal processes, Elon Musk’s platform was compliant with its DSA obligations to provide outside researchers with real-time access to its public data. That, however, was in direct contradiction to [preliminary charges](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F24%5F3761?ref=digitalpolitics.co) filed by the European Commission, which accused X of failing to comply with such outsider data access. --- ## **3) Negative audits, but the devil is in the detail** **Overall, every platform, excluding Wikipedia, received a negative** evaluation based on the DSA’s strict criteria for assessing compliance with the EU’s new rules. But in each of the companies’ audits, most firms successfully demonstrated, based on existing internal processes, that they had reduced the potential for their goods and services to worsen systemic risks within the 27-country bloc. Despite almost all the firms relying on just three outside auditors, it remains impossible to compare one platform to another because companies used different reporting periods to assess their compliance via the audits. Most of the separate risk assessments covered the period between September 2022 and August 2023\. But some, such as Booking.com and Zalando, also produced reports for 2024 alongside the earlier reporting period. Others, including Meta and China’s Alibaba, only published risk assessments for the most recent year (2023-2024.) Firms that have yet to publish their most recent risk assessments — including TikTok, the China-owned social media company currently at the center of a political storm engulfing Romania’s annulled presidential election — are expected to do so by the end of the year. --- ## **4) Where the companies failed** **Based on companies’ DSA obligations, firms successfully** complied with most of the rules’ requirements. That includes basic obligations like making it easy for people to communicate with company representatives and more complex requirements like conducting internal assessments to reduce systemic risks. Yet failures still arose. For Meta, both [Instagram](https://scontent-lhr8-1.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t39.8562-6/468562318%5F2548652918858554%5F7920553818496711968%5Fn.pdf?%5Fnc%5Fcat=107&ccb=1-7&%5Fnc%5Fsid=b8d81d&%5Fnc%5Fohc=QYgZ3FdyJaIQ7kNvgHF9CZA&%5Fnc%5Fzt=14&%5Fnc%5Fht=scontent-lhr8-1.xx&%5Fnc%5Fgid=ALOxG2lkH3tKojRNWBNSd81&oh=00%5FAYBW%5Fn--R6L8PUuGoFUp736VfLojHaoRz8%5FdLc%5FsjaO-WA&oe=675DE0FB&ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [Facebook](https://scontent-lhr8-1.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t39.8562-6/468562318%5F2548652918858554%5F7920553818496711968%5Fn.pdf?%5Fnc%5Fcat=107&ccb=1-7&%5Fnc%5Fsid=b8d81d&%5Fnc%5Fohc=1am3hcA7CbYQ7kNvgHvyk7U&%5Fnc%5Fzt=14&%5Fnc%5Fht=scontent-lhr8-1.xx&%5Fnc%5Fgid=ApgrWEqOHIhy6LiEENY07Gw&oh=00%5FAYADLv0jSsgJYi%5FUgtvDaHwxG2Kg%5FTBhD1qrsEaxcfRkQQ&oe=6752AC3B&ref=digitalpolitics.co) did not accurately report the number of user accounts that had been suspended for posting or sharing illegal content. Nor did either platform provide sufficient information on how each made content moderation decisions. That included a lack of granular data on how such material was found on the platform and what types of illegal content, per the platform’s terms of service, was discovered. On TikTok, auditors [discovered](https://sf16-va.tiktokcdn.com/obj/eden-va2/zayvwlY%5Ffjulyhwzuhy%5b/ljhwZthlaukjlkulzlp/DSA%5FH2%5F2024/TikTok-DSA-Audit-Assurance-Report-Sep-2024.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) the social network had not clearly explained, within its terms of service, how its so-called recommender systems, or algorithms used to display short videos in people’s feeds, could be modified. The platform equally did not give users enough clarity on how these algorithms could be changed if individuals decided, under their legal rights within the DSA, to alter how specific posts were chosen to be displayed in their feeds. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. For Apple, whose App Store falls under the DSA’s obligations, auditors [detailed](https://www.apple.com/legal/dsa/20242708%5Fapp-store%5Freasonable-assurance-report%5Fnon-confidential.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that the iPhone maker had not acted swiftly enough at the beginning of 2024 to remove apps from its online store that had failed the company’s verification process. Apple also initially approved other app developers that had also failed, during the self-certification process, to provide necessary information under Europe’s new laws. After the audits were published, all companies agreed to update their internal procedures to fix these issues. --- ## **5) Where do we go from here?** **For those looking for a smoking gun within these risk assessments** and external audits to confirm bad behavior, you will be disappointed. At best, the documents are an initial starting point for how the EU’s new legislation can improve accountability and transparency by forcing companies to document how they are removing illegal content from users’ feeds. At worst, they are a public relations exercise to highlight ways that these platforms have reduced the spread of illegal content and products while papering over the ongoing levels of hate speech, Russian and Chinese disinformation and terrorist content that many, including my colleagues at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, continue to detect on these platforms. As the European Commission and national regulators prepare their own assessments of these reports, to be published in early 2025, there are ways to improve these risk assessments and audits. A first step would be to include more outside groups, including those within civil society organizations whose members are often targeted with online abuse and hate, in how these documents are produced. So far, that outreach, beyond a small number of bodies, has been lacking from tech firms and auditors. Companies should also provide these often lengthy and jargon-laden reports in formats that are both machine-readable and formatted in identical ways to offer like-for-like assessments by both regulators and other interested parties. Currently, firms submit dense PDF documents, and a shift to a format that can be read and processed by a computer would be a significant step forward to fast-track analysis. A third improvement would be for all tech companies to be more forthcoming about how they and independent auditors reached their conclusions. Currently, how complex internal processes function — ranging from how recommender systems serve up content to how firms mitigate content moderation issues — are reduced to a few lines in reports with little, if any, granularity on how such decisions were made. Providing greater detail on these often tricky decision-making processes would go a long way to boost platforms’ accountability and transparency — the main aim, after all, for why European officials created the risk assessments and audits in the first place. --- ### What just happened in Romania? URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter019/ Last updated: 2024-12-09T20:17:08.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and as we count down the days until the end of 2024, [this](https://www.instagram.com/reel/DDM9imjJF%5F0/?igsh=MWo1MnR6emdjbXNwYw%3D%3D&ref=digitalpolitics.co) must be one of the best examples of a parent embarrassing their child I've ever seen. Kudos. **— Romania's constitutional court annulled the first round of the country's presidential election** amid allegations of digital foreign interference and illegal tactics across social media. I remain skeptical such tactics skewed voter outcomes. **— Some new (and some old) faces are popping up in both Washington and Brussels** to oversee digital policy over the next five years. Here are the people you should know about. **— Countries' digital ambitions are split between tech-focused government agencies** and national leaders eager to stamp their mark. It's a recipe for disaster. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Postcard from Paris: politics vs policy URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter018free/ Last updated: 2024-12-02T12:00:25.000Z **BONJOUR. THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and like many of you, I'm part of the X-odus to BlueSky. You can follow me [here](https://bsky.app/profile/markscott.bsky.social?ref=digitalpolitics.co). I look forward to future episodes of this newsletter dissecting the inevitable fall of another social network. **— The French coalition government may fall** as early as this week. That hasn't stopped Paris from flexing its muscles on digital policy — with varying results. **— Australia just banned anyone under 16 years old** from having a social media account (sort of). This is a bad law that will lead to bad outcomes. **— Accusations abound that TikTok skewed** the first round of Romania's presidential election for a far-right candidate. So far, there's no actual evidence to prove that. **Let's get started:** --- ## French digital swagger takes a hit **HELLO FROM THE EUROSTAR LOUNGE** in Paris where I'm heading back to London after [speaking at an event](https://www.ifri.org/en/shaping-europes-technological-sovereignty?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on how Europe can reduce (or not) its digital dependency on the United States. As we enter the week of Dec 2, the country's coalition government — led by archetypal French politician [Michel Barnier](https://en.wikipedia.org/w?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — is about to be toppled over a political fight about its proposed budget. I'm no expert on French politics (for more on that, see [here](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241202-french-pm-risks-tumbling-in-hostile-parliament-vote?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://www.politico.eu/article/everything-you-need-to-know-france-political-crisis-that-could-plunge-eurozone-marine-le-pen-michel-barnier/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://www.rtl.fr/actu/politique/invite-rtl-budget-2025-oui-le-rn-censura-le-gouvernement-barnier-sauf-miracle-de-derniere-minute-indique-jordan-bardella-7900446288?ref=digitalpolitics.co)). But my time in Paris this week is a clear reminder, just like I [outlined last week](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter017/) when it came to Berlin, that France is struggling between its aims for tech policy and the political reality in which French president **Emmanuel Macron** finds himself. **Much of this inevitably comes down to politics.** Again, I'm not going to delve into the inner workings of why Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally political party has gained so much traction domestically (more on that [here](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/25/world/europe/france-national-rally-rebranding.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co)). But what we're seeing in France, like what we've seen in almost every country's election this year, is incumbents getting a kicking at the ballot box amid ongoing domestic anger against skyrocketing costs, a sense the Establishment has failed voters and a willingness for citizens to embrace populism. **But what does this have to do with digital policy?** France has been the loudest advocate for a more insular approach to tech regulation and investment that focuses on championing local (read: French) champions to take on global competitors, primarily from the US and China. It's why **Ursula von der Leyen**, the returning president of the European Commission, embraced that concept in 2014 when she relied heavily on Macron to secure her position in the Berlaymont Building in Brussels. It's also why there were continued efforts, over the last five years, to tilt European public investments toward French priorities like the creation of European Union-based cloud computing infrastructure. Why? Because Macron had the political muscle to (mostly) get what he wanted — even if other EU countries opposed such a Gallic vision of digital policy. Thanks for reading Digital Politics. If you've been forwarded this newsletter (and like what you've read), please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter007/#/portal/). For those already subscribed, reach out on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com **Before I get angry emails, I understand that I'm over-simplifying** the political dynamics at work here. But it's also true that, since Macron suffered a dual political humiliation during, first, the [European Parliament elections](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/09/eu-elections-far-right-gains-germany-austria-netherlands-exit-polls?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in June and, second, in [domestic elections](https://www.politico.eu/article/france-election-results-2024-map-constituencies-emmanuel-macron-marine-le-pen-live-new-popular-front-national-rally/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) a month later, he is not the same omnipresent shadow on tech policy as he once was. Again, this isn't just a digital issue. The French president's hobbled status — especially in light of the [political meltdown](https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-2025/t-70794502?ref=digitalpolitics.co) engulfing Germany — also has knock-on effects on the EU's approach to Ukraine, climate change and immigration. But more than one EU policymaker has told me, in recent weeks, that a weakened Paris provides greater breathing space for Brussels to take a somewhat different approach to critical digital policy issues than would have been possible when Macron was in his full pomp. **What does that look like?** In Paris, officials are abuzz about the upcoming [**AI Action Summit**](https://www.elysee.fr/en/sommet-pour-l-action-sur-l-ia?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or spectacle on Feb 10-11, 2025 that is the third global AI gathering after previous editions in the [United Kingdom](https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/ai-safety-summit-2023?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [South Korea](https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/ai-seoul-summit-2024?ref=digitalpolitics.co), respectively. Interestingly, the French are shifting away from a sole focus on safety — much to the annoyance of London where officials still believe these summits are their brainchild. **Instead, the focus will be on artificial intelligence's impact** on 1) work; 2) innovation and culture; 3) the 'public interest;' 4) trust; and 5) governance. Expect some high-profile sums of money to be announced around these topics — as well as glitzy presentations across Paris to showcase France as, legitimately, the center of AI for Europe. In reality, Macron and his officials are using the now annual AI gathering as a showcase for France, Inc. The hope: to drum up significant amounts of inward investment and secure the country's position as one of the global leaders on everything from generative AI (hello, [Mistral AI](https://mistral.ai/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) to AI governance (the **Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development**, whose work on that topic has been world-leading, is based in the French capital.) **This all sounds like top-level Macron peacocking.** All world leaders want to be viewed as championing the most interesting causes. And, in AI, the French president can be associated with something that has caught the public's imagination ever since OpenAI released ChatGPT just over two years ago. But what will likely go unsaid in February — especially if the coalition government led by Barnier, the prime minister, falls this week — is that Macron's political capital is not what it once was. It's one thing to hail France as an AI champion when everything is going your way. It's something else when you invite the world's great-and-the-good (and me, hopefully) to Paris amid swirling questions about whether you're a lame duck president. **This divide between politics and policy** also can be felt elsewhere. The French have been vocal champions, in Brussels, for the so-called [**Digital Networks Act**](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F24%5F941?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Those are efforts to rewrite how the Continent's telecommunications infrastructure is paid for to force US tech companies to fork out extra cash to support the bloc's legacy carriers. It's a political hot potato that has pitted the likes of [**Telefónica**](https://connecteurope.org/news/gsma-and-etno-welcome-announcements-new-digital-networks-act-call-urgent-action?ref=digitalpolitics.co), the Spanish carrier, and [**Deutsche Telekom**](https://connecteurope.org/news/gsma-and-etno-welcome-announcements-new-digital-networks-act-call-urgent-action?ref=digitalpolitics.co), its German rival, against some of Silicon Valley's biggest names. Yet without a strong Paris to nudge other European capitals to support these proposals, Brussels is shifting away from a hard-nosed approach that, in essence, would require the likes of Meta and Alphabet to hand over some of their profits to cash-strapped European telecom giants. **The list continues. France's incoming European commissioner** Stéphane Séjourné — in charge of 'prosperity and industrial strategy' in Brussels — [wants to promote](https://www.ft.com/content/f11247e5-9594-4134-9b79-e008aa4429c6?ref=digitalpolitics.co) a "Europe first" industrial strategy, in part as a response to Donald Trump's upcoming second term in the White House. To be fair, the former French Europe minister acknowledges the bloc must remain open to outsiders. But Séjourné's position would be stronger, in likely tense negotiations in Brussels on how to define such a 'Europe first' strategy, if Macron's own standing in Paris was more secure than it currently is. **How will this play out in the months ahead?** A lot will depend on whether Barnier's coalition government survives (my bet is that it won't.) France's next presidential election will be held in 2027, meaning Macron will stick around — albeit in a more muted position than he once had. That will likely tilt the scales, at the least on tech policy, away from a more Paris-led interventionist/'let's pick winners' approach from Brussels where political leaders are already shifting away from digital policy to focus on defense and climate change. **The one major unknown, though, is** what happens in Germany after that country's elections in February. If the EU's two most important countries fall into political chaos, all bets are off. If that does happen, expect the European Commission to strike out on its own to define the next five years on tech policy — without waiting around to see what unfolds in either Paris or Berlin. --- ## Chart of the Week **When Călin Georgescu, a pro-Russia ultranationalist,** went from nowhere to winning the first round of Romania's presidential election at the end of last month, many were in shock. **Attention quickly turned to how Georgescu used** social media — particularly TikTok — to reach would-be voters and how his online presence may have been promoted by either domestic or foreign actors. **One of the country's regulators** [**even asked**](https://www.ancom.ro/supravegherea-platformelor-online-foarte-mari-si-a-motoarelor-de-cautare-foarte-mari-in-contextul-dsa%5F7354?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared) the European Commission to look into it via the bloc's Digital Services Act. **But despite the smoke, there's currently no fire** to suggest Georgescu had significant outside help — as you can see from the analysis, below, of all the main TikTok accounts from Romania's leading presidential candidates. **Since these figures were produced (just before the Nov 24 vote)**, Georgescu's TikTok following has jumped to 519,000\. But his opponents also had sizable audiences on the China-linked platform. **"ExoScore" refers to a combined metric,** based on how active the account is, the size of the account's following, and how much engagement the account receives. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/12/Untitled-2.jpg) Source: Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory of Digital Media; Exolyt --- ## Why banning social media for kids is counterproductive **WHEN I MET MICHELLE ROWLAND**, the Australian politician in charge of the country's online safety regime, earlier this year, the former telecom lawyer didn't beat around the bush. "More needs to be done by platforms to keep Australians safe," [she told me](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter007/). Fast forward to late 2024, and Canberra [just passed new rules](https://x.com/AboutTheHouse/status/1862266256323489874?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to ban anyone under 16 years old from having a social media account. Here's the [amendment](https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/r7284%5Ffirst-reps/toc%5Fpdf/24150b01.PDF;fileType=application%2Fpdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co#search=%22legislation/bills/r7284%5Ffirst-reps/0000%22) to the country's [Online Safety Act](https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2021A00076/latest/text?ref=digitalpolitics.co). It's the first time, anywhere in a Western country, that politicians have gone so far to stop minors from accessing social media. For campaigners, the updates — which carry potential fines of tens of millions of dollars if tech companies fail to act — are long over due to keep children safe online. This is what paid Digital Politics subscribers read this month: 1) Europe's new digital leadership; What Donald Trump's victory means for global internet governance. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter015/). 2) Microsoft's Natasha Crampton on AI Safety Institutes; What next for these national AI bodies?; Debrief of European Commission's digital hearings. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter016/) 3) Germany's failed approach to digital policy; How Big Tech's tax revenue is Ireland plays into that country's national election. More [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter017/). Interested in reading more? Sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter007/#/portal/). **Unfortunately, that approach is wrong.** We'll get into the inner workings of the law in a minute. But the main problem with Australia's new law is that it fails to tackle the underlying issue with social media, while treating all children with a level of paternalism that is out of touch with how kids use technology in 2024\. Instead of forcing tech giants to take a 'safety-by-design' approach to how they develop so-called recommender system algorithms and thwart online hate, Australian lawmakers decided to create a binary choice that will have little real impact on how those under 16 years old access and consume social media content. **When it comes to kids' use of the internet,** things get difficult very quickly. Almost all tech companies require users to be at least 13 years old to have an account, though how firms verify those ages [leaves much to be desired](https://edri.org/our-work/italy-age-verification-digital-identities-social-media/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Parents should make the right choice for their own families on how children both access devices and online services. Most, let's be clear, are clueless on both fronts — often because they themselves are addicted to smartphones/social media accounts in a way that bleeds into how their kids similarly want access. High-profile and tragic incidents like [the death of British teenager Molly Russell](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-67556756?ref=digitalpolitics.co) have led to a global movement, by some parents, to ban kids' access to both phones and social media. **I sympathize with many of these points.** But Australia's new laws highlight how people's goodwill to protect children can often get lost in the granularity of how such blanket bans actually work. When Canberra's ban comes into force (most likely within 12 months), it will be down to the social media companies to determine which of their users are under the 16-year-old threshold. How will they do that? Either by requiring everyone to provide government-issued identification; relying on people to upload a credit card as proof of age; or trialing untested facial recognition technology. **For why all of those options are bad, read** [**this**](https://humanrights.gov.au/about/news/opinions/australian-parents-and-kids-deserve-better?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**.** But my fear is that, in the knee-jerk effort to keep children safe online, Australia is removing a level of anonymity from online users (via age verification requirements) that can quickly lead to massive potential government overreach of the digital world. Worse still, dubious facial recognition technology — if rolled out poorly — could lead to significant harm if such sensitive and personal data is not protected securely, at all costs. **The questions just keep coming.** Australia still hasn't determined which social media companies should comply with the age standards — and apparently YouTube may [may be out of scope](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-11-21/youtube-allowed-under-social-media-ban-under-16s/104629944?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Cue: endless lobbying as tech companies do whatever they can to define their services so they don't have to comply. The law also doesn't detail if messaging services like WhatsApp or gaming platforms like Microsoft's Minecraft will be in scope. The Online Safety Act amendment is so wooly on detail that much will be left to local regulators/officials to figure out on the fly. For me, that's not how good policy should be developed. **What's a better option?** Let's take, as our starting point, that social media comes with both harms and benefits. As much as children may be shown graphic images, via their feeds, they also may find supportive online communities at a time when their offline worlds are imploding. To suggest it's either one or the other is to negate how social media actually works.A second point: we should protect children, both online and offline. But reducing harm for all using these services is also something to be championed. **That's why creating a basic principle**, for all tech companies, that they should embed safety and privacy in all their services — and that they will be policed to ensure compliance — would be a more effective way to reduce social media harm. **What does that look like? Demanding that** social media algorithms aren't tweaked to maximize engagement (often by displaying polarizing or harmful content) would be a start. So, too, would developing policies that require companies to reduce people's addiction to social media (by dampening down the dopamine-style user interfaces, for instance.) **That's not as binary as a 'let's ban social media!' policy** that is easily digestible to voters whose fears for how kids use devices and social media are growing. But it would lead to what those concerns are based upon: a growing realization that something must change in how we all interact with digital services that now dominate our daily lives. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Thanks for getting this far. Enjoyed what you've read? Why not receive weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. --- ## What I'm reading **— Stanford University's Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence** published its annual AI Index Report. There's a lot to unpack. [Enjoy](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/HAI%5FAI-Index-Report-2024.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The European Commission asked TikTok to provide** more information on how it handled potential manipulation of its platform. More [here](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-sends-additional-request-information-tiktok-under-digital-services-act?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— Interpol announced its partners in 40 countries** had arrested more than 5,500 individuals and seized more than $400 million as part of a major global cybercrime operation. More [here](https://www.interpol.int/News-and-Events/News/2024/INTERPOL-financial-crime-operation-makes-record-5-500-arrests-seizures-worth-over-USD-400-million?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The US Commerce Department published an overview** of last month's gathering of domestic AI Safety Institutes in San Francisco. More [here](https://www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2024/11/fact-sheet-us-department-commerce-us-department-state-launch-international?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— Companies published their inaugural risk assessments** and audits under the EU's Digital Services Act. I've put together a running tally of all the documents [here](https://bsky.app/profile/markscott.bsky.social/post/3lbtqpvnyks2n?ref=digitalpolitics.co). ### Postcard from Berlin: Germany's digital missteps URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter017/ Last updated: 2024-11-30T17:30:56.000Z **GUTENTAG, THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and you find me waiting for my flight back home from Berlin's Brandenburg airport. I'm in Paris this week (Nov 27-28) to [speak about tech sovereignty](https://www.ifri.org/en/shaping-europes-technological-sovereignty?ref=digitalpolitics.co). If you're around, get in touch [here](mailto: digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **I'm also speaking about AI-generated disinformation** (or, frankly, the lack of it) during the 2024 global election cycle — just about now (1pm CET/noon GMT/7am ET). Watch along [here](https://www.eventbrite.nl/e/unraveling-the-role-of-ai-enabled-disinformation-in-an-election-year-tickets-1076531928979?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Despite its economic and political clout**, Germany is punching well below its weight on digital issues. That's a missed opportunity. Both for Berlin and other Western capitals. **— Ireland holds a nationwide election on Nov 29\.** Big Tech's role in propping up the country's finances — and whether that will continue under the incoming Trump presidency — is in the spotlight. **— The US Chips Act has led to a combined $51.6 billion** in public grants and loans for 23 companies working on 35 projects in 20 US states. **Happy early Thanksgiving, everyone.** **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### What next for AI Safety Institutes? URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter016/ Last updated: 2024-11-18T12:06:00.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be on the road over the next couple of weeks. I'm in Berlin on Nov 21-22 and then Paris on Nov 27-28\. If you're in town and want to meet, drop me a line [here](mailto: digitalpolitics@protonmail.com). **— Officials from nine countries and those from the European Union** gather in San Francisco this week to hash out AI safety. I talk to **Natasha Crampton**, Microsoft's chief responsible AI officer. **— We're weeks away before Europe's new digital bosses** take their seats in the Berlaymont Building in Brussels. Let's unpack last week's hearings at the European Parliament. **— The annual United Nations climate change talks** finish up in Azerbaijan on Nov 22\. The carbon footprint for the latest AI models is pretty bad. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Europe's new digital leadership URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter015/ Last updated: 2024-11-11T12:00:19.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and here's a date for your diaries. I'll be speaking about the impact on AI-fueled disinformation during the global 2024 election cycle **on Nov 25** at 1pm CET / 7am ET. Watch along [here](https://www.eventbrite.nl/e/unraveling-the-role-of-ai-enabled-disinformation-in-an-election-year-tickets-1076531928979?aff=oddtdtcreator&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Two key politicians in charge of** Europe's digital future get grilled on Nov 12 about what they want to accomplish. It will be a mixture of the old and the new. **— Now that Donald Trump has won a second term** in the White House, there's a dire need for greater coordination among like-minded democracies on global internet governance. **— Almost three-quarters of Americans polled** want social media companies to stop the spread of false claims, even if that limits some online speech. **Let's get started.** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The US election goes digital URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter014free/ Last updated: 2024-11-04T12:55:54.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and as artificial intelligence continues to consume the world, [this cartoon](https://x.com/tomfishburne/status/1833225807491436878?ref=digitalpolitics.co) is a reminder that not everything can be solved via the perceived magic of AI. **We're going deep on the US election today**. Millions across the country will vote on Nov 5 (after many more millions already voted in recent weeks.) The [result](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/us/elections/polls-president.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co) is anything but certain. Accusations of foreign interference, electoral fraud and voter suppression abound. **This is my effort to unpack the online campaign.** It's not comprehensive. But one feeling I can't shake is that we know less now, in 2024, about the digital side of elections than we did a decade ago. **Let's get started.** --- ## Campaigns, government and platforms **FIRST THINGS FIRST.** We're going to focus primarily on the US presidential election. Why? Because that's where the real action lies in this week's vote (sorry, Congress.) Second, a disclaimer. As much as I — and, probably, you — wonk out about targeted ads on social media, covert Russian influence operations and the inner-geekery of digital campaigning, the 2024 presidential election is still inherently analogue. Yes, [billions of dollars](https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2024/10/total-2024-election-spending-projected-to-exceed-previous-record/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), collectively, will be spent online to reach would-be voters. But even more money will be earmarked for grassroots get-out-the-vote efforts, TV spots in key swing states and old school leaflets. **But that hasn't stopped Donald Trump** and Kamala Harris from bombarding Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and Google searches with incredibly targeted messaging. And if the 2024 election came down to dollars spent, then Harris [would be home dry](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter005/). Ever since she took over the Democratic Party's nomination in the summer, the current US vice president has easily outspent her Republican Party opponent by a factor of at least 10 (on Meta) and by a factor of just over two (on Google.) --- **Daily political ad buys for the rival presidential campaigns on Meta's platforms from Aug 2 to Oct 29, the latest figures available.** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/11/US_meta_spenders_08_02_24_10_30_24.jpg) Source: WhoTargetsMe **Daily political ad buys for the rival presidential campaigns on Google's platforms from July 29 to Oct 25, the latest figures available.** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/11/US_meta_spenders_07_29_24_10_26_24-1.jpg) Source: WhoTargetsMe --- **Not surprisingly, this spending has fallen into two buckets.** Both Harris and Trump have thrown a chunk of their social media war chest at nationwide fundraising — particularly around hot-button topics like abortion and gun rights. But as we enter the final days of the campaign, the majority of cash is now flowing into swing states. **What's noticeable is that, based on the latest full-week figures** available ending on Oct 30, the Trump campaign is now massively outspending the Harris campaign across Michigan. But in almost all other swing states — with Pennsylvania as the stand-out — the Democratic candidate is way ahead in overall ad buys. Thank you for reading the free version of Digital Politics. Free subscribers receive the first newsletter each month. I'm offering a 10 percent discount off subscriptions this week. If you want to take advantage of that offer, click [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/us-election-special). **Typically, campaigns save their cash reserves for the final days** of an election to woo the small pocket of undecided voters. Given how close the polls are in all of these states, it's unclear whether either side believes they are breaking through with voters. Is Trump's sole focus on Michigan, for instance, a sign of his confidence elsewhere or his smaller cash reserves compared to Harris? We don't know. **Annoyingly, we'll only have the final numbers** for how much was spent in these critical US states after Nov 5. --- **Social media ad buys across Facebook's platforms between Oct 23 and Oct 30, the latest figures available. The darker the red/blue, the more money spent in those parts of the states.** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/11/Untitled-2-copy.jpeg) Source: WhoTargetsMe --- **Within these states, it's not surprising** the presidential candidates are going after different types of voters. But when you dig into the data, at least from Meta's platforms, it's stark how contrasting the Harris and Trump constituencies are. **What's below are the most used keywords used** to target people on Facebook and Instagram, from Oct 2 to Oct 31, the latest figures available, for either side of the election. If you're a fan of Aaron Rodgers (and you live in Michigan), then it's very likely you are being peppered repeatedly with Trump paid-for messages. **Such targeting stats can often be misleading.** You just have to look at the somewhat negligible overall keyword targeting from Harris (at least by volume.) But it's a clear indicator that both presidential hopefuls are doubling down on their key supporters, with days left before the election. --- ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/11/donald-trump.jpeg) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/11/kamala-harris.jpeg) Source: WhoTargetsMe --- **And yet, it's not all about existing voters.** [WhoTargetsMe](https://whotargets.me/en/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), the nonprofit organization behind these visualizations, also looked at which keywords the Harris and Trump campaign were fighting over when buying their rival Meta-based ads. **Again, these figures should be taken with a pinch of salt.** But what is evident — based on the same time period between Oct 2 to Oct 31 — is that Latin voters are where both sides believe they can still find potential supporters. **Honestly, I feel bad for those voters,** in swing states, who must be seeing so many of these competing ads as they scroll on their smartphones. --- **The most contested keywords on Meta's platforms, between both candidates, between Oct 2 and Oct 31.** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/11/Meta-contested-targeting--Oct-2---Oct-31--1.jpg) Source: WhoTargetsMe --- **THERE'S A LOT MORE TO DIVE INTO WHEN IT COMES** to the campaigns' use of political ads. And, don't worry, we'll come back to their increased use of TikTok further down. But one theme that has surprised me this cycle is how aggressive — and open — the US federal government has been when outing covert foreign interference campaigns. **Back in 2016, despite rampant allegations of potential** Russian interference, it took three years to produce the [Mueller report](https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl?ref=digitalpolitics.co). This time around, federal officials are mirroring a playbook that began ahead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022\. Two years ago, Washington was very public about Moscow's disinformation campaigns, and used a tactic called "pre-bunking" to get ahead of these lies before they took root. **In recent weeks, the US national security apparatus** has similarly "pre-bunked" alleged foreign attempts to undermine the upcoming election. That includes [linking Russian influence actors](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-russian-election-influence-efforts?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves) to false claims about illegal immigrants voting in Georgia; [warning against Iranian cyberattacks](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/cisa-and-fbi-warn-iranian-backed-cyber-activity-undermine-us-democratic-institutions?ref=digitalpolitics.co) aimed at undermining US democratic institutions; and [raising public awareness](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/fbi-and-cisa-release-joint-psa-just-so-you-know-false-claims-hacked-voter-information-likely?ref=digitalpolitics.co) about coordinated disinformation campaigns, linked to foreign governments, to sow doubt about the Nov 5 outcome. This is what paid Digital Politics subscribers read this month: 1) The digital fallout from Oct 7; Europe's future digital challenge 2) The fallacy of foreign interference; Why Big Tech are utilities 3) Why Moldova is on the frontline of 'hybrid warfare' 4) The AI battle between regulators; Profiles of Europe's new digital bosses 5) Tech policy implications of US election; Interview with European Commissioner Věra Jourová **So far, so good. But what these efforts fail to do** is highlight any form of domestic efforts to cast doubt on this year's election cycle. **I get that. No one wants the** **Federal Bureau of Investigation** or the **Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency** to be seen as meddling in national politics. But what these US government efforts have done is to over-egg the threat from foreign actors so that, in many people's minds, Russia, China and Iran are the main drivers of dissent and discord surrounding the election. **Let's be clear: these foreign governments** [are marginal](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter010/) in how election-related falsehoods spread. **That's not to underplay their attempts.** Yes, all three countries are eagerly doing what they can to undermine this week's election. That's particularly true in specific constituencies like the Latino community, where an influx of recent voter-suppression efforts via WhatsApp have the hallmarks of being a state-sponsored operation. **Yet when one of the presidential candidates** [repeatedly discusses](https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/113402418656741972?ref=digitalpolitics.co) unsubstantiated claims of voter fraud — and many of his surrogates do the same — I just don't see how Russia, China and Iran get a look in. **The world of social media, in 2024, is all about reach.** That overwhelmingly comes from the size of someone's online audience and how effective they can spread their message. That's where foreign governments have repeatedly fallen down, mostly recently in the Russian-linked ["Doppelganger" campaign](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-disrupts-covert-russian-government-sponsored-foreign-malign-influence?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that the US Department of Justice made public in early September. **Yes, this covert operation included the masquerading** of Russian narratives via faked websites attributable to the likes of the Washington Post and Fox News. But, in reality, such disinformation was viewed by very few actual people. **In contrast, mainstream politicians now repeatedly** spread falsehoods about the electoral process, and it's not just Trump. Once-fringe, but now popular, media outlets and podcasts also continue to promote such false narratives to millions of people across the country. Faced with those domestic voices, the foreign threat — despite the pre-bunking from US authorities — is a sideshow. --- **IT'S NOT JUST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT** that finds itself caught between a rock and a hard place. So too do social media giants whose internal trust and safety teams have been decimated over the last 18 months. The most noticeable example is **X**, or the artist once known as Twitter. But **YouTube**, **Facebook** and **Instagram** (**TikTok**, given its links to China, is in a different bucket) have all taken a step back from election integrity work. **Before I get irate emails from those of you** working at the platforms, I'm not saying these companies aren't doing something to protect this year's global election cycle that has spanned Pakistan and Bangladesh, to the European Union and France and, now, the United States. All still have terms of service that police hate speech, nefarious political ads and other election-related trickery. **It's just that, given the domestic political climate** in the US, these efforts aren't as strong as they should be. In part, that's down to the ongoing work of House Republican Jim Jordan's [select subcommittee on the weaponization of the federal government](https://judiciary.house.gov/subcommittees/committee-judiciary-118th-congress/select-subcommittee-weaponization-federal?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that has repeatedly called out social media companies for allegedly working with the federal government and outside researchers to censor rightwing voices. So far, no evidence to substantiate those claims has been made public. Thanks for reading Digital Politics. If you've been forwarded this newsletter (and like what you've read), please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter007/#/portal/). For those already subscribed, reach out on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com **There's a whole newsletter to dedicate to the** so-called '[Censorship Industrial Complex](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digital-bridge/the-horsemen-of-the-censorship-industrial-complex/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)' and the chilling effect on platforms' oversight of elections. And we'll get to some of that, in terms of what we still don't know about the digital side of this week's election, further down. But one thing is clear: the platforms have decided they'd prefer [not to be in the business of politics](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/24/technology/mark-zuckerberg-trump-politics.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and have pared back work on enforcing their terms of service related to the Nov 5 election. **To use a sporting analogy, some within the US** political class decided to "play the referee," by accusing the social media platforms of censoring political speech. And when confronted with those (unsubstantiated) allegations, most companies have [cried uncle](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/say%5Funcle?ref=digitalpolitics.co#English). **That's not to say they aren't taking down belatedly** misleading content — all while [outing foreign interference](https://about.fb.com/news/tag/coordinated-inauthentic-behavior/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) campaigns when they find them. But the 2024 cycle is notable, at least in the US, for how little the social media giants are actively policing their platforms, which play such a fundamental role in people's everyday experiences of the Harris and Trump respective campaigns. --- ## **Infrastructure: AI, TikTok, Musk and Transparency** **THIS WAS SUPPOSED TO BE THE ELECTION** where artificial intelligence dominated. A year ago, experts warned deepfake videos of the candidates, sophisticated large language models dissecting voters' intentions and a mass flood of AI-generated disinformation would skew the Nov 5 election like never before. **Thankfully, that has not happened.** Yes, there are incidents where Trump and Harris have been "deepfaked." Others, like the AI-generated image of Taylor Swift [allegedly supporting Trump](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c5y87l6rx5wo?ref=digitalpolitics.co), also garnered attention. **But, due to a combination of companies'** [**response**](https://www.aielectionsaccord.com/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), people's wariness of believing AI images/videos, and inertia within traditional political campaigns to use newfangled techniques, the US election has not been the "AI apocalypse" that many had first feared. **What's telling is that — compared to all other countries'** elections this year — AI companies have pulled out all the stops to protect the Nov 5 election. **Here's an example: it proved extremely difficult** for me to provide ChatGPT a prompt, related to the US election, to create the banner image for this newsletter. Repeatedly, the AI service refused to mock up a synthetic image, even around basic suggestions like "a US voter heading to the polls looking at social media." **That certainly wasn't the case when I tried** similar prompts, earlier this year, around elections in Pakistan, Brazil or the European Union. It's an anecdotal example of what I've heard repeatedly: that ahead of the US election, tech companies — at least when it comes to AI — want to be seen as the 'good guys.' **It makes sense US tech firms would prioritize** an election they were more knowledgeable of. But it also raises the question — especially when these firms are expanding globally — about their two-tiered protection for elections when the Nov 5 vote has garnered so much more support oversight to similar votes overseas. --- **IF AI DID NOT DOMINATE THIS YEAR'S ELECTION CYCLE** in the US, then it's fair to say that TikTok — more than any other social network — has had a break-out politically. That's ironic given that, by early 2025, **ByteDance**, its China-linked parent company, [will either have to sell](https://www.theverge.com/23651507/tiktok-ban-us-news?ref=digitalpolitics.co) TikTok's US operations or face a nationwide ban. (The company is challenging the sale/ban in court) **As someone who isn't Gen Z, I'm not going to** explain the lure of TikTok. But despite both [Harris](https://www.tiktok.com/@kamalaharris?lang=en&ref=digitalpolitics.co) (6.9 million) and [Trump](https://www.tiktok.com/@realdonaldtrump?lang=en&ref=digitalpolitics.co) (12.8 million) racking up sizable followings, neither politician has dominated the conversation about the election like previous generations of candidates have done on other social networks like Facebook or YouTube. **That's not because Trump and Harris** haven't "gone viral" on TikTok. As you can see from the figures below, taken from the last 60 days, both the presidential and vice-presidential candidates have been spoken about, repeatedly, by millions of social media users. --- **Overall number of posts and views on TikTok, related to Harris, Trump, JD Vance and Tim Walz, over the last 60 days, the latest figures available.** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/11/Zelf-1.jpg) Source: Zelf --- **It's just that, on TikTok, trends — and not politicians —** dominate the conversation. **For younger social media users,** the ability to talk independently about political issues has been a key differentiator compared to how, in previous eras, campaigns were able to bombard messages at would-be supporters. **It's no longer about, say, Harris and her surrogates** flooding the zone with specific messages to own the news cycle. Instead, she and Trump have had to tilt their approach on TikTok to what voters are already talking about. **For me, that's a significant shift** — and one that will likely stick around (as long as TikTok is still available in the US in 2025 and beyond.) **Below, for instance, are the top trending political topics** on TikTok for Nov 4, the latest figures available. Some — like women's rights and immigration — are likely themes that either candidate would like to see going viral. But others — (un)fit to serve and Israel/Palestine — are user-led trends that both Trump and Harris have no control over, but still are being shared/viewed by millions of TikTokers. --- **Trending topics related to the US election, ranked by total engagement, over the last 60 days.** ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/11/Zelf-2.jpg) Source: Zelf --- **FROM ONE SOCIAL NETWORK TO ANOTHER:** Elon Musk's X. **When the billionaire took over the formerly-named Twitter**, I thought the platform's days were numbered. Advertisers were fleeing. Tweaks to X's algorithms promoted hateful content. Users left in droves to the likes of Bluesky — a fringe social network that has never really caught on. **But as Musk threw his support behind Trump's campaign**, X has regained notoriety. Not that users have come back to the Blue Bird. Those days are gone. But the SpaceX founder has seemingly used his social network to promote Republican viewpoints — or, at least, right-leaning political conversations now dominate the platform like never before. **Let's be clear, there is no evidence, publicly,** that Musk has tilted his social network's algorithm to favor Trump and his allies. But based on the Washington Post's [analysis](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/10/29/elon-musk-x-republican-democrat-twitter-election/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) of 150,000 posts on X, between July, 2023 and Oct 23, 2024, from the most active 50 Democratic and Republican accounts, Conservative politicians and operatives gained more followers — and garnered more attention — on the network compared to their more liberal opponents. **For me, that is not a slam dunk.** But it's as close as we're going to get to understanding how Musk, now the sole owner of still one of the most popular social media platforms in the US, has the potential — however unproven — to nudge the online conversation in ways that fit his political worldview. **Will it have an affect on the overall outcome?** That, annoyingly, is impossible to gauge because voters' intentions are unlikely to be swayed by a singular post on X or a politically-skewed trending topic they see while scrolling. **But if newspaper owners are questioned** about their role in politics — based on the dwindling power that media organizations have on people's political views — it's a legitimate question to ask if any social media owner (Musk or others) should equally have such singular control over how people consume information on these networks. --- **PHEW. THAT'S A LOT.** The last point I want to make about the Nov 5 election is more basic. Do we actually know what's going online? **That may sound odd — hasn't this whole newsletter** been a snapshot of the digital election? **But with less than a day to go before election day** (and the high likelihood of either side contesting the outcome in the days/months ahead), we are currently in a worst position now compared to anytime previously in the social media age to understand who's doing what, where and to whom online when it comes the US election. **There are many reasons for this.** A lack of social media analytics tools, especially after Meta [closed](https://transparency.meta.com/en-gb/researchtools/other-datasets/crowdtangle/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) CrowdTangle, the gold standard for outsider oversight, at least on Facebook and Instagram, in the summer. Political campaigns, too, have been more wily in circumventing transparency. That includes the use of paid social media influencers to peddle messaging even while some of these individuals have not disclosed their ties to politicians. **One quirk for the US that doesn't exist** outside of the country is also the politicization of such transparency efforts. In the wake of claims of a "Censorship Industrial Complex," many outside researchers have either stopped tracking what happens within the domestic online realm or repositioned themselves to focus exclusively on foreign influence campaigns. That is a fundamental loss. **While I remain very skeptical about the influence** of foreign governments in voters' choice, there's a national security aspect to this, too. **The current lack of visibility on social media's impact on politics** means Russia, China and Iran can force their ways into the domestic conversation — even if they are mostly unsuccessful. **But because we can't track such covert campaigns**, there's an over-indexation of these foreign threats. That means, for most people, Moscow is behind all the bad stuff that they see online when, in reality, the Kremlin represents one of the smaller political actors jostling for individuals' attention ahead of Nov 5. --- ## What I'm reading **— A series of investigations across the US** has intensified scrutiny on how so-called 'data brokers' use people's personal information for commercial gain, [argues](https://iapp.org/news/a/a-view-from-dc-the-growing-reckoning-over-location-data?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves) Cobon Zweifel-Keegan for the International Association of Privacy Professionals. **— US politicians across the political spectrum** continue to rely on TikTok to reach would-be supporters despite the alleged national security risks, according to a [report](https://www.gmfus.org/news/tiktok-tactics-2024-us-candidates-dance-around-security-risks?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared&wpisrc=nl%5Ftechnology202) from the German Marshall Fund of the United States. **— The European Commission opened an investigation** into the Chinese e-commerce giant Temu under the bloc's Digital Services Act. More [here](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F24%5F5622?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The United Kingdom imposed sanctions on a number** of Russian nationals and organizations that are accused of spreading disinformation, primarily targeted at Ukraine. More [here](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-putins-interference-actors?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Freader). **— Sophisticated AI models can significantly** "pre-bunk" election-related myths, based on a study of more than 4,000 US registered voters. Read the study [here](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2410.19202?ref=digitalpolitics.co). ### Don’t expect much on tech from US election URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter013/ Last updated: 2024-10-28T12:00:47.000Z **HELLO FROM A EUROSTAR HEADING TO BRUSSELS.** This is Digital Politics, and I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). I'm on my way to Brussels to speak about foreign versus domestic disinformation. If you're in town, check it out[ here](https://efcsn.com/conference-2024/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Also, the prize for best Halloween effort goes to [this house](https://x.com/netcapgirl/status/1847293920079933853?s=48&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— We're a week away from the US election.** The outcome is uncertain. But one thing is clear: tech policy isn't going to change much, whoever wins. **— I spoke to Věra Jourová, outgoing European Commission** vice president for values and transparency, on the impact of disinformation and foreign interference on elections. **— How do the powers of new online safety regulators** worldwide compare? I've got a chart for that. **Let's get started:** _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The AI battle no one is talking about URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter012/ Last updated: 2024-10-21T11:00:48.000Z **IT'S MONDAY, LET'S GET DOWN TO BUSINESS.** This is Digital Politics, and I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). You currently find me vacationing on the English southern coast — in October. It's many things. But it is not [this](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mV9q%5FKdtQfc&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Some form of greater oversight for** artificial intelligence is inevitable. That has started a fight between regulators over who should wield the enforcement pen. **— Parliamentary hearings for Europe's new digital bosses** will be held early next month. Here's everything you need to know about these politicians. **— Internet freedoms worldwide fell for a 14th consecutive year,** according to research from Freedom House, a nonprofit organization. **Let's get started:** _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Why you should pay attention to Moldova URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter011/ Last updated: 2024-10-18T11:00:23.000Z **THIS IS THE SECOND BONUS EDITION** of Digital Politics in as many weeks. I'm [**Mark Scott**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**,** and want to turn my attention to this small Eastern European country. **Moldova holds both a presidential election** and separate referendum on whether to join the European Union on Oct 20\. A second round of the presidential race will likely be held on Nov 3\. **I visited Chișinău, Moldova's capital**, earlier in the year. Nominally, it was to report on how AI-powered disinformation [was wreaking havoc](https://www.politico.eu/article/moldova-fights-free-from-russia-ai-power-disinformation-machine-maia-sandu/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). But I left the country with a clear view that this weekend's election/referendum represents the epicenter of so-called 'hybrid warfare' between Russia and the West. **By that, I mean the Kremlin is using** digital interference, cyberattacks, paid-for pro-Russian local politicians and covert offline tricks to undermine Moldova's tilt to the West. **Yes, I know that image goes against** [**Oct 14's newsletter**](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter010/)about why we need to calm down about state-backed foreign interference. **But when I was in Chișinău, I sat down with** [**Ana Revenco**](https://x.com/revencoana?ref=digitalpolitics.co), head of the country’s Center for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation, and [**Alexandru Corețchi**](https://2024.egovconference.ee/speakers/alexandru-coretchi/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), director of Moldova’s Information Technology and Cyber Security Service. **What was clear from our conversations was how much** is riding on the outcome in Moldova's election/referendum in how we all tackle state-backed hybrid threats. **Let's get started:** _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### The fallacy of foreign interference URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter010/ Last updated: 2024-10-14T11:00:02.000Z **IT'S MONDAY. SO THAT MEANS ANOTHER DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and will be giving my two cents about US digital policymaking in the wake of November's election tomorrow at 2pm UK / 3pm CET / 9am ET. Watch along [here](https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN%5F8NP-kHu2QUmcZbhg4c1qfw?ref=digitalpolitics.co#/registration). **— By focusing on the threat from Russia**, **China and Iran,** we're fundamentally misreading the threats promoted across social media. **— The US government wants to break up Google**. It's time to call a spade a spade: these platforms should be treated like public utilities, and regulated as such. **— Kamala Harris is massively outspending Donald Trump** on political ads in key swing states. Don't believe me? I've got the stats (and a map) to prove it. **Let's get started:** --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Q&A: Content moderation under Europe's Digital Services Act URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter009free/ Last updated: 2024-10-11T16:48:40.000Z **WELCOME TO A BONUS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and as I experiment with this newsletter, that includes interviews with people I think you should know about. **This first installment** (hopefully of many, if you want to chat, email me on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com) is with [**Thomas Hughes**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/thomashughes1111/?originalSubdomain=uk&ref=digitalpolitics.co) who was, until this week, director of Meta's [**Oversight Board**](https://www.oversightboard.com/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or the independent group with quasi-judicial powers over what content is allowed on Facebook and Instagram. **The British human rights expert just left** to establish the [**Appeals Centre Europe**](https://www.appealscentre.eu/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). It's a group, funded initially via the Oversight Board's Trust, that will act to resolve disputes for those within the European Union who believe platforms have incorrectly acted against their content within the bloc's **Digital Services Act.** **Ahead of the Appeal Centre's creation this week**, I talked to Hughes about what his new Ireland-based entity expects to achieve; its ties to the now-separate Oversight Board; and why he thinks Europe's new social media rules can empower people's rights online. **Let's get started:** --- **EVER SINCE META'S OVERSIGHT BOARD** was announced more than four years ago, the body of legal and human rights experts has been a lightning rod. Some view it as a necessary step to better content moderation decisions on Facebook and Instagram, respectively. Others criticize it as a mere public relations exercise for Meta at a time when the company's role in what posts stay up remains opaque and, often, wrong. At the center of those decisions, Hughes — the former head of [**Article 19**](https://www.article19.org/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), a human rights organization — ran the Oversight Board's day-to-day operations. **Now, after five years of doing that** (he started before the Oversight Board was officially announced), his next project attempts to build on that somewhat complicated legacy. "What the project is really focused on is trying to make constructive use of the legislation that's coming into force under the Digital Services Act," he told me via Zoom. **OK, before we get into whether this is a good idea**, let's lay out the basics. Under [**Article 21**](https://www.eu-digital-services-act.com/Digital%5FServices%5FAct%5FArticle%5F21.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co) of the DSA, the rules provide for so-called out-of-court dispute settlements, or non-binding arbitration between platforms and users over whether content moderation decisions are correct. These are separate to direct appeals to platforms to reinstate posts and legal efforts, via courts, to have such material reinstated. It's the type of uber-complicated, quasi-regulatory structure that Europe excels (fails?) at. **The Appeals Centre is one of the only groups** taking on this role. At its outset, Hughes and his 20 Dublin-based colleagues will take content moderation requests linked to Facebook, TikTok and YouTube. They'll also focus on challenges in English, German, French, Italian and Dutch, though anyone across the 27-country bloc will be able to submit appeals. Over time, they want to add more platforms and languages. **"We think we will already be able to cover** Portuguese and Polish, as well as Arabic and Russian," Hughes added. His team is trialing AI-powered translation tools to expand its offering, though that is a work in progress. "It is a resource question," he admitted. "It's also a question of testing (the translation tools) in a live environment." Thanks for reading Digital Politics. Not a paying subscriber? This is what you missed from Monday's [installment](https://digital-politics.ghost.io/ghost/?ref=digitalpolitics.co#/site): 1) The digital legacy of Oct 7; 2) The dual digital challenge for the incoming European Commission; 3) Why Taiwan and South Korea dominate the microchip industry. Sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter007/#/portal/). **If you're looking to make a request** — and this only applies to people within the EU — you'll have to pony up 5 euros to cover some of the costs. The three platforms that have signed up with the Appeals Centre will equally be charged 95 euros, per complaint. That's how Hughes' organization expects to cover its costs. The Oversight Board Trust provided $15 million to fund the group's initial work. FWIW, the Oversight Board [has received](https://www.oversightboard.com/news/1111826643064185-securing-ongoing-funding-for-the-oversight-board/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) at least $150 million from Meta, leading to (somewhat overblown) questions about the group's independence. **"That has been part of the discussion** that we've had with the Commission," Hughes said when I asked him about the links to Meta's cash, in reference to Ireland's [**Media Commission**](https://www.cnam.ie/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). That's the local regulator which had to approve the Appeals Centre's content moderation mandate. "The reality of independence is very strongly embedded in the model that we've adopted," he added. "The perception (of reliance on Meta's cash), I hope, is transitory because we will be working across platforms." **Now, I can already hear the 'come on, now!' from** many of you reading this. If the Appeals Centre's upfront costs are covered by Meta — even via a blind trust over which the tech giant has no control — then how can it be viewed as truly independent? In truth, it's a similar question the Oversight Board has grappled with since its inception, too. **But here's the thing. Starting a pan-European content** moderation operation, in multiple languages and with quasi-judicial powers, is not something you can do for free. Someone has to front those costs. And in a world where few, if any, European funders exist for this type of work, Hughes legitimately had limited options to turn to for his initial investment. **For me, the Oversight Board has shown its** funding ties to Meta has not stopped it from taking whacks at the platform. The question for that organization has never been about its finances. Instead, its limitations lie with the Oversight Board's inability to make mass content moderation decisions across Meta's platforms. **Its binding decisions (and, now,** [**there are many of them**](https://www.oversightboard.com/news/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**)** relate to individual pieces of content. Mere drops in a digital ocean, if you will. The group's wide-ranging recommendations on how Meta should change its content moderation practices remain non-binding. Even though, at times, the company has implemented them. **A similar problem awaits Hughes and the Appeals Centre.** In practice, providing an impartial "judge" who can decide whether Facebook, YouTube and TikTok should have removed someone's post or video makes sense. "In the digital age, individual empowerment over speech has really been lacking," he told me. "This is a sea change moment. It will adjust the balance of control between the individual, companies and governments. It will allow people to define both what they post, but also what they see online." **I'm not so sure. What the British human rights expert** underestimates is people's apathy toward much of this. Yes, the Oversight Board has received, globally, tens of thousands of (free) submissions from people who believe Meta made wrong content moderation decisions. But I'm not convinced enough Europeans will be willing to cough up 5 euros, per complaint, and then go through the hoops required to challenge TikTok, YouTube and Facebook via the Appeals Centre. **Call me cynical, but I would venture that most of us** — if/when confronted with a message from any of these companies that our posts have been removed — would shrug our shoulders and just give up. A minority may go through the internal procedures already available within YouTube, TikTok and Facebook to get posts reinstated. Few will actively seek out something like the Appeals Centre, especially in languages currently not covered by the group, to take it one step further. **It goes to the wider difficulties Europe is having** with its new social media oversight. Much of this work is technocratic, not pragmatic. The Digital Services Act focuses on wonky risk assessments. It includes lengthy audits to show how platforms are combating online abuse. It includes complex options like out-of-court settlement bodies like the Appeals Centre, which rely on a level of user interest that, so far, has been lacking. **Still, that hasn't stopped Hughes from doubling down** on these efforts. "It could be enormously beneficial across all sorts of different segments of society," he told me in reference to parts of Europe's new social media rulebook coming into force. "But, if it's done badly, it could be enormously detrimental," he added. "A failed initial regulatory environment could then lead to something that is very draconian, very censorial, and very controlled by national governments." *This newsletter has been updated to reflect the Oversight Board Trust provided $15 million in start-up funding for the Appeals Centre Europe.* ## Sign up for Digital Politics Enjoyed what you've read? Join others now receiving weekly updates on how the worlds of technology and politics are colliding like never before Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. ### The digital legacy of October 7 URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter008/ Last updated: 2024-10-10T11:57:18.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm Mark Scott, and as a child of the 1990's, my musical tastes skew markedly to alternative rock. So [this](https://www.instagram.com/reel/C%5FzGSnVPD2C/?igsh=MWE3eWtuOTdvYjc5cg%3D%3D&ref=digitalpolitics.co) definitely made me chuckle. **Let's get started.** **— Today marks the one-year anniversary of** the Hamas-Israel conflict. The escalating war shows the new reality of so-called 'hybrid warfare.' **— I'm in Brussels this week to deliver a speech** about Europe's next five years on digital. Here's a sneak peak: it's about execution and convincing others to follow. **— Despite Western governments spending billions** on semiconductor subsidies, global giants like Taiwan and South Korea still dominate. --- _This post is for paying subscribers only._ ### Australia's digital rulemaking URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter007/ Last updated: 2024-09-30T11:00:48.000Z **G'DAY. THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and when it comes to playing the long game, it turns out that Spain (and, most notably, the Spanish Armada) [is in a class of its own](https://x.com/DrFrancisYoung/status/1839236075446788482?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Bien hecho, compadres. **Let's get started:** **— We're going deep on Australia's approach** to digital policymaking this week, particularly when it comes to online platforms, gender-based digital violence and the obligations that social media giants must uphold for their users. **— That includes two interviews. One is with** [**Michelle Rowland**](https://x.com/mrowlandmp?lang=en&ref=digitalpolitics.co), Australia's minister for communications. The other is with [**Julie Inman Grant**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/julie-inman-grant-0637035/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), head of the country's eSafety Commissioner, a local regulator. **— Also, despite almost no evidence of AI used at scale** during the upcoming elections in the United States, Americans are still freaking out about the emerging technology. --- ## Punching above its weight **AUSTRALIA OFFERS A PRIME EXAMPLE OF HOW** a relatively small country can punch above its weight on digital rulemaking. That's not to knock the 26 million proud Australians (some of whom are readers to this newsletter.) It's just that the global digital policymaking discussion often centers on the European Union, United States and China. Almost everyone else — including reams of countries in the so-called Global Majority — gets left out. **But Australia and its current center-left prime minister** Anthony Albanese are making a name for themselves. The country had already pushed through a [deal](https://www.accc.gov.au/by-industry/digital-platforms-and-services/news-media-bargaining-code/news-media-bargaining-code?ref=digitalpolitics.co), under the previous government, that allowed local publishers to be paid when their content appeared on social media. That model, similar to what [already existed](https://www.politico.eu/article/australia-copyright-google-facebook-reruns-europe-battle/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in Europe, [has now been copied in Canada](https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/online-news.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — equally to the annoyance of Big Tech. **But it's Albanese's plans,** [**announced on Sept. 10**](https://www.pm.gov.au/media/albanese-government-set-introduce-minimum-age-social-media-access?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**,** to set a mandatory age limit for accessing social media that caught my attention. Sure, technically, people are supposed to be at least 13-years-old before signing up to Instagram and TikTok (does anyone even use Facebook anymore?) But we all know that's a pretty low fence to climb, despite companies' [recent efforts](https://about.instagram.com/community/parents?ref=digitalpolitics.co#:~:text=Defaulting%20to%20Private%20Accounts,or%20responds%20to%20their%20content.) to keep those pesky kids off social media. **You have to see these latest plans in a wider context.** By the end of October, a review is expected to be submitted on the country's [**Online Safety Act**](https://www.esafety.gov.au/newsroom/whats-on/online-safety-act?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or rules dating back from 2021 that tackle online harms like terrorist content and child sexual abuse material. The Act also mandates specific [industry codes of conduct](https://www.esafety.gov.au/industry/codes?ref=digitalpolitics.co) that are now being copied in both the EU and United Kingdom's separate legislation. In short, for a pretty small market, Australia has had an oversized impact. It offers a glimpse, for other smaller countries, about what happens when you combine online safety rules with a regulator willing to push those laws as far as possible. **When I** [**met**](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digital-bridge/washingtons-zombie-digital-rulemaking/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) **Michelle Rowland, the country's politician** in charge of the country's online safety regime, in Australia's embassy in Brussels earlier this year, the former telecommunications lawyer was in full saleswoman mode. "In a short space of time, the breadth and the scale of new and emerging harms is quite startling," she told me, surrounded by a massive folder of briefing notes and sat across an exceedingly large boardroom table. "Whilst these massive organizations, with turnovers bigger than the GDP of some nation states, have considerable market power, we have a regulatory regime that recognizes market power, and where it is being inappropriately exercised." **Rowland was finishing up a whistle-stop tour of both London** and Brussels — two capitals whose separate efforts, the [**Digital Services Act**](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act-package?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [**Online Safety Act**](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-act-explainer/online-safety-act-explainer?ref=digitalpolitics.co), both borrow and differ from what Australia is trying to do. "We don't have the EU's member states. There's only one minister for communications in Australia, at the federal level," she said when I asked how Australia's social media rules could be viewed versus their international counterparts. "The UK has taken a long period of time to get (its rules) through. We've had ours for some time now." Her basic gist: Australia is more centralized than what Europe is doing, and is further ahead than the UK on implementation. **The Australian politician was adamant that all regimes** shared a similar ethos. "I do see the EU as being, again, a balancing of the need to address those harms, but also, the principles that our democracies hold, including freedom of speech and political expression are very important," she added. All lawmakers now fear the accusations of creating a so-called "Ministry of Truth" where dissenting voices are censored online. Personally, those accusations are more a political trick to tilt the social media scales in favor of more hyper-partisan users. **Rowland would not be drawn on what the review** of Australia's rules would lead to. And, to be clear, our conversation happened before Albanese announced his new age-focused social media proposals this month. But potential heftier penalties for companies that fail to meet their legal obligations are an option. "Firstly on fines, it's one of the issues that we're examining in the OSA review." she said bluntly. "We will complete this review in this term of government. This term notionally concludes around May next year, so we do have time frames for that (aka: new legislation.)" **The core question is this: does she believe** social media companies are doing enough, under the current Australian rules, to keep people safe online? "More needs to be done by platforms to keep Australians safe," Rowland answered when I put that to her. "These platforms know their consumers. They know their users better than anyone. Our philosophy, in this area, is that online safety needs to be a collective responsibility between governments, regulators, civil society and the industry." Thanks for reading Digital Politics. As a reminder, the first month of this newsletter will be free. If you like what you read, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter006/#/portal/) — I'm offering a discounted subscription until Sept. 30\. Happy reading! --- ## Chart of the Week With just over a month to go before the US elections, a sizable minority of Americans polled believe artificial intelligence will be used for "bad," while almost two-thirds of those individuals remain concerned AI will be weaponized to create and share false information. As of Sept. 30, little if any evidence exists that AI-generated political content in the US has had a meaningful impact on voters' decisions. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/09/Untitled-2-2.jpg) Source: Pew Research Center [https://shorturl.at/PE8lf](https://shorturl.at/PE8lf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## The Aussie regulator on the front line **JULIE INMAN GRANT IS CLASSIC POACHER-TURNED-GAMEKEEPER.** The American worked for both Microsoft and Twitter (before the Elon Musk era) before jumping ship, in 2017, to head a new Australian agency called the [**eSafety Commissioner**](https://www.esafety.gov.au/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). In recent months, the Boston University graduate picked a fight with Musk over how X handled online falsehoods linked to a deadly knife attack in Sydney. [Her agency lost](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/jun/05/x-elon-musk-vs-australia-esafety-commissioner-wakeley-church-stabbing-footage?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Inman Grant previously had fined the social media company over $400,000 for failing to explain how it was handling child sexual abuse material. X has appealed. **But let's not dwell on X. When I spoke to Inman Grant**, it was soon after deepfake pornographic images of Taylor Swift [starting doing the rounds online](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/jan/31/inside-the-taylor-swift-deepfake-scandal-its-men-telling-a-powerful-woman-to-get-back-in-her-box?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in early 2024\. My view on this is clear: [deepfake porn is political violence](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digital-bridge/deepfake-porn-is-political-violence/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). But I had called the head of Australia's eSafety Commissioner because she has championed the need for a serious approach to gender-based online violence for years. Her agency also deals with some of the nastiest online content out there. That includes so-called 'sextortion,' particularly targeted at teenage boys; horrific online child sex abuse, sometimes beamed live via mainstream video streaming services; and direct attacks on people across the country via online tools and social media that has led to real-life harm. **"It's sexualized, it's violent, it's rape threats,"** she told me when I asked her what types of issues, particularly those directed a women online, had come across her desk. "It's about killing your children. It's about your appearance and your weight and your supposed virtue. Gender double standards that still hold currency in our society." **One thing the eSafety Commissioner doesn't yet have** is serious fining capabilities to hold companies to account. Yes, Inman Grant's agency has investigatory and legal powers to force social media companies, internet services providers and others peddling blatant harm to be more open about how they handle such awful material. But to maximize the regulator's reach, the American former tech executive has not been shy in naming-and-shaming companies directly connected to enabling this digital abuse. **It's a potential lesson for others.** Yes, Australia's online safety regime has been around for longer everyone else's rules. But when confronted with an immediate 'no' from companies when they are asked to be more transparent about their practices, it's sometimes helpful to speak loudly about where you can affect change — all while holding out for potentially greater enforcement powers when the review of the Online Safety Act is finally published. My takeaway: companies care a lot about the court of public opinion. **"I don't think just responding to harms after they happen** is going to be sufficient, particularly given how powerful these tools are, and how quickly they have proliferated," Inman Grant said, in reference to how AI-generated awfulness has started to percolate to the surface. "We're gonna have to look much more *ex ante*, andhave the companies prove to us that they're building in safety protections that are efficacious and effective throughout the model." **That should ring alarm bells with** social media and AI companies, alike. So-called *ex ante* rulemaking is the cause célèbre among digital enforcers. It allows agencies to step in before harm actually happens and demand firms show how they are protecting their users. The goal: to stop bad practices before they happen, and not enforce after the damage is done. Just a reminder: I'm offering discounted subscriptions to Digital Politics until Sept 30\. If you like what you read, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter005/#/portal/). If you want to chat, I'm on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com. **"We're never going to arrest or regulate** our way out of this," she added. "But we do need to send a message that governments aren't going to accept this, and I think where we'll probably end up going with our Online Safety Act review is looking at more *ex ante* and being able to test the digital guardrails that these companies are putting in place." **Often, digital policy can get lost in translation**. The focus on reducing harms and promoting online safety can get away from the fact that real people can be hurt, in the real world, with what happens online. During our conversation, Inman Grant recalled multiple instances when people had turned to her agency for urgent help. The cases involved former partners weaponizing intimate images online; teenagers being duped into handing over increasing amounts of graphic images of themselves; individuals, based out of Australia, creating reams of deepfake pornography about those inside the country, without their consent. **"What we're seeing in terms of their ability to respond** to systemic issues, like repeat hacking of accounts and the sexual extortion, suggests to us that they really aren't picking up the signals," the American said when I asked how companies were responding to such cases. **Inman Grant has not been immune.** Someone also created deepfake pornographic images of her in an attempt to silence her voice online. "It's creepy that the guy was that fixated that he would spend time creating a deepfake, trawling the internet for as many images of me as possible," she added. --- ## Sign up for Digital Politics Enjoyed what you just read? I'm offering discounted subscriptions until Sept 30\. Sign up below. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. ## They said what now? *"By focusing only on the most expensive and large-scale models, SB 1047 establishes a regulatory framework that could give the public a false sense of security about controlling this fast-moving technology,"* California's Governor, **Gavin Newsom**, [wrote](https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/SB-1047-Veto-Message.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) after he vetoed local legislation, known as [SB 1047](https://digitaldemocracy.calmatters.org/bills/ca%5F202320240sb1047?ref=digitalpolitics.co), that would have placed a sweeping safety safeguards on advanced AI systems. *"Smaller, specialized models may emerge as equally or even more dangerous than the models targeted by SB 1047 — at the potential expense of curtailing the very innovation that fuels advancement in favor of the public good."* --- ## What I'm reading **— Meta's Oversight Board gives an overview** of how AI can be used to make content moderation more equitable and accurate. More [here](https://www.oversightboard.com/news/content-moderation-in-a-new-era-for-ai-and-automation/?ref=everythinginmoderation.co&utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— The US State Department and several American tech companies** announced more than $100 million in collective funding to help Global Majority countries take advantage of AI. More [here](https://www.state.gov/united-states-and-eight-companies-launch-the-partnership-for-global-inclusivity-on-ai/?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). **— The United Nations and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development** said they would work together on AI governance issues. More [here](https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/press-releases/2024/09/oecd-and-un-announce-next-steps-in-collaboration-on-artificial-intelligence.html?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— Ireland's data protection regulator** fined Meta just over $100 million for privacy violations related to how the company failed to store and protect users' passwords. More [here](https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/news-media/press-releases/DPC-announces-91-million-fine-of-Meta?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The Institute for Strategic Dialogue analyzed** how major platforms had prepared to combat harm and other problems ahead of the upcoming US election. More [here](https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/US-Election-Platform-Preparedness.pdf?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). **— The European Commission said** more than a hundred companies had signed voluntary pledges, known as the AI Pact, ahead of the bloc's mandatory AI Act coming into full force in 2026\. More [here](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP%5F24%5F4864?ref=digitalpolitics.co). ### We're the UN, and we're here to help URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter006/ Last updated: 2024-09-23T19:26:01.000Z **HELLO FROM THE EUROSTAR** departure loungein Brussels. I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and if you're looking for a realistic representation of what Google is actually like, I give you [this](https://www.instagram.com/reel/C8RHy6UtFo7/?utm%5Fsou&ref=digitalpolitics.co). Love it. **Let's get started.** **— Global leaders gather this week in New York** for the United Nations General Assembly. Little by little, the UN is consolidating its control over digital governance. **— The global battle for AI dominance comes down** to two categories: the United States and, way behind, everyone else. **— The European Commission has incoming** new leadership. That means a shift in policy focus for Brussels to combine tech with security and defense. --- ## **Be wary of those seeking global rules for the internet** **THE UNITED NATIONS OFTEN FEELS LIKE** that well-meaning friend who says all the right things, but fails to deliver on his/her promises. That's the feeling I can't shake as the great-and-the-good of the political and policy work gather in New York this week for the **UN General Assembly**, or almost universally known as UNGA. Gradually, different parts of the UN have been nudging their way into discussions on digital policy and internet governance. Groups like the Geneva-based [**International Telecommunication Union**](https://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx?ref=digitalpolitics.co) have been doing this for decades. Others, like **UNESCO** and its [recent recommendations](https://www.unesco.org/en/internet-trust/guidelines?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on governing digital platforms, are new to the party. **But there are two UN-related policy areas that will** get a lot of play this week that you should pay attention to. Both, when viewed together, represent an overt effort by the international body (mostly via the UN's [**Office of the Secretary General's Envoy on Technology**](https://www.un.org/techenvoy/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) to take the lead on the next generation of global digital policymaking. That, on first glance, isn't a bad thing. Currently, Western countries dominate those discussions. China does what it can to make itself known, often in obscured areas like international standards bodies. Almost all of the so-called Global Majority are given little, if any, say on topics like artificial intelligence policymaking and data governance. That is an inequality that serves no one's ends. **Yet I'm skipping steps. First, the announcements.** The UN published its [final report](https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/governing%5Fai%5Ffor%5Fhumanity%5Ffinal%5Freport%5Fen.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on AI global governance, overseen by the secretary general's tech envoy's office. The basic gist (see chart below, red arrow emphasis are mine): The UN should oversee the overlapping regional/national efforts at corralling this emerging technology. Other recommendations include: 1) creating an international scientific panel on AI akin to what exists for climate change; 2) developing globally-recognized AI standards; 3) supporting Global Majority countries via AI capacity training. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/09/Untitled-3.jpg) Source: United Nations 'Governing AI for Humanity' report **The second announcement,** expected at the UN's '[Summit of the Future](https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future?ref=digitalpolitics.co#:~:text=The%20Summit%20of%20the%20Future%20%2822%2D23%20Sep.%29,cooperation%3B%20Youth%20and%20future%20generations%3B)' event on Sept 22-23, is the long-awaited **Global Digital Compact.** Again, this effort looks good, from the outside. The aim is to better align the global push on digital to promote a 'trustworthy' internet; give people a greater say on how their data is used; and support Global Majority countries to benefit from the rapid expansion of technology. The final communiqué is [here](https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sotf-pact%5Ffor%5Fthe%5Ffuture%5Fadopted.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) (from page 40.) For a deep dive on how we got here, take a look [here](https://dig.watch/processes/global-digital-compact?ref=digitalpolitics.co). The top line: the UN wants to create shared international principles for the digital world. **Who doesn't want that, amirite?** Yet with all UN-sponsored efforts, the devil is in the detail. By opening up digital policy discussions to the widest global audience possible, the body has provided authoritarian regimes — especially China, its surveillance-heavy tech rules and its state-led approach to digital governance — an opportunity to promote their aspirations worldwide. That, as outlined in how the UN operates, is their right. **But what we have progressively seen is that Beijing** is more adept at wooing other capitals to its digital authoritarian cause than Washington, Brussels and other democratic capitals. The UN's increased efforts to take over digital policy leadership implicitly empowers such regimes to undermine the decentralized, interoperable and democratic-enabling principles that have made the internet the success that it is today. **A couple of examples. In the build-up to the** Global Digital Compact, China teamed up with the so-called G77 group of Global Majority countries to offer a [joint position](https://www.un.org/techenvoy/sites/www.un.org.techenvoy/files/GDC-submission%5FG77-and-China.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) on everything from how to fund connectivity infrastructure (hint: let Chinese telecommunications equipment makers flourish) to the need to include all voices (including those from autocratic regimes) in data governance policy. **The recently-published** [**UN Cybercrime Convention**](https://www.unodc.org/documents/Cybercrime/AdHocCommittee/Reconvened%5Fconcluding%5Fsession/Documents/AC%5F291%5FL15%5FADVANCE%5FUNEDITED.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) **also** allowed China (and Russia) to push a vision where states can ask foreign governments for electronic evidence for criminal investigations — so long as that crime is punishable by at least four years in prison. Western governments, global civil society groups and digital companies have cried foul, yet have struggled to respond effectively. **In response, those backing the UN's power grab** argue the current system skews too much toward Western countries. That criticism is true. They also argue that a more representative global dialogue around digital governance would both be more inclusive and lead to better outcomes — in terms of incorporating unheard voices. Again, it's hard to disagree with that. **But where the UN missteps is the belief that** the UN — and the UN alone – is the right venue for these digital policy discussions. We already have countless venues where these issues are discussed, including even many UN-sponsored efforts with its numerous agencies at a regional or specific policy level. **It would be a mistake to centralize these discussions** into lengthy UN negotiations, especially as that would give the likes of China an opportunity to push its state-led approach to digital policy that does not respect democratic values, free speech and other fundamental values. That is not how the internet started — and it definitely should not be how the next iteration of the digital world is created. Thanks for reading Digital Politics. As a reminder, the first month of this newsletter will be free. If you like what you read, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter005/#/portal/) — I'm offering a discounted subscription between now and Sept 30\. Happy reading! --- ## Chart of the Week **EVERYONE WANTS TO LEAD ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.** But based on 122 different indicators (grouped either by 'implementation,' 'innovation,' or 'investment), there's only one global champion: the US. China ranks second, though its lack of domestic AI talent pool is a major drawback. Other countries from Singapore and South Korea to the United Kingdom and France are evenly split in the 'also ran' category. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/09/The-Global-AI-Index-2024--Tortoise-Media--1.jpg) Source: Tortoise's Global AI Index [https://www.tortoisemedia.com/intelligence/global-ai/](https://www.tortoisemedia.com/intelligence/global-ai/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## What just happened in Brussels? **THE COMMISSIONERS ARE DEAD.** Long live the Commissioners! Well, not quite. Even after **Ursula von der Leyen**, the incoming president of the European Commission, [announced](https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/towards-new-commission-2024-2029/commissioners-designate-2024-2029%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co) her new executive branch last week, the current political leaders like Denmark's **Margrethe Vestager** will still be in place until the end of November. One noticeable absence: **Thierry Breton**, the French-born internal markets commissioner, who quit abruptly last week via throwing shade on von der Leyen through a [post on X](https://x.com/ThierryBreton/status/1835565206639972734?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Quick explainer: new Commissioners must first face hearings at the European Parliament, slated for October, before officially taking office, almost certainly on or around Dec 1. **OK, it's time to get to know the new political leadership** for the European Union that will be tasked with digital rulemaking. <> **First on the agenda is Finland's** [**Henna Virkkunen**](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/124726/HENNA%5FVIRKKUNEN/home?ref=digitalpolitics.co), the expected Commission executive vice-president for tech sovereignty, security and democracy. Her brief includes oversight of so-called DG Connect, or the unit with enforcement powers over the bloc's content rules, known as the **Digital Services Act**. She also has been tasked with jumpstarting AI innovation within the EU; improving the bloc's digital infrastructure; and shepherding Europe's subsidies around semiconductors. For a full list (and it's a long list) of Virkkunen's duties, read [this](https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/3b537594-9264-4249-a912-5b102b7b49a3%5Fen?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20VIRKKUNEN.pdf&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **Next, France's Stéphane Séjourné, the presumptive** Commission executive vice-president for prosperity and industry strategy. Paris' former foreign minister (and an ally of Emmanuel Macron) is expected to create a "European Competitiveness Fund" that will invest in next-generation technologies to improve the EU's ability to compete globally. The Frenchmen also is tasked with breaking down internal barriers to promote greater consolidation among EU member countries' domestic markets and with leading on the bloc's need for so-called critical raw materials. Again, for the wonks among us, more [here](https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/6ef52679-19b9-4a8d-b7b2-cb99eb384eca%5Fen?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20S%C3%89JOURN%C3%89.pdf&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **Spain's Teresa Ribera gets the glitzy competition file.** Until recently, that was the only enforcement powers that Brussels had — and Ribera's predecessor, Vestager, used her regulatory powers to go after the likes of Alphabet, Meta and Apple. The climate change expert will continue implementing the bloc's new digital antitrust rules, known as the **Digital Markets Act**. But in a shift to Commission policy (more on that later), the Spaniard will also oversee a revamp of EU competition policy to help local firms become global players. It follows similar [recommendations](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter004/) outlined by former European Central Bank president Mario Draghi. For all the details, click [here](https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5b1aaee5-681f-470b-9fd5-aee14e106196%5Fen?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20RIBERA.pdf&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **Finally, we have Ireland's Michael McGrath who** is expected to become the Commission's executive vice-president for democracy, justice and the rule of law. He has been given control over so-called DG Justice, or the group of Commission officials primarily tasked with policy areas like data protection and consumer rights. For the disinformation aficionados, the Irishman will run point on foreign interference and von der Leyen's proposed 'European Democracy Shield,' or as-yet unclear plan to join up the bloc's efforts to thwart foreign actors from causing harm with EU member countries. Want to know more? [Here you go](https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/907fd6b6-0474-47d7-99da-47007ca30d02%5Fen?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20McGRATH.pdf&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **For those who want an even more geekier look** at how these politicians will oversee the next generation of digital files — everything from the **Digital Fairness Act** to the **European Data Union Strategy** — click [here](https://infogram.com/commissioners-key-proposals-and-directorates-for-digitalcommissioners-key-proposals-and-directorates-for-digital-strategy-1h0r6rz39kk1l4e?ref=digitalpolitics.co). And before the uber-wonks complain, no, I haven't forgotten about Bulgaria's **Ekaterina Zaharieva**, the proposed Commissioner for startups, research and innovation. I just didn't have the space to go into [her remit](https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/130e9159-8616-4c29-9f61-04592557cf4c%5Fen?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20ZAHARIEVA.pdf&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **There are three takeaways from the new Commission**. First: no one exactly knows how it will all work. Currently, Brussels' rumor mill is in overdrive over who will be picked as these Commissioners' aides, or 'cabinets' in eurocrat parlance. Until that happens — and that will still be weeks off — don't listen to anyone who tells you they know how this will play out. **Second: Virkkunen has a reputation for knowing the digital policy files** (she worked on the Digital Services Act as a member of the European Parliament.) She also comes from a country that has been more willing to embrace innovation, global markets and entrepreneurship than other parts of the bloc. Looking at you, France. By including 'tech sovereignty' in her job description, von der Leyen may be tilting the scales toward a more open version of that concept versus one championed by France and its allies that is all about picking legacy industrial giants to take on global rivals from the US and China. For more on that, my colleague [**Konstantinos Komaitis**](https://www.komaitis.org/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and I break down what's needed [here](https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-ursula-von-der-leyen-tech-brussels-digital/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **Third: the geopolitics of this Commission is clear,** especially on tech. If the last Commission's tenure was dominated by creating new digital rules, this one is about linking technology to security and defense. That includes a focus on industrial policy, including semiconductors and critical raw materials, to position Europe and its digital sector at the center of how von der Leyen views the appropriate response to the global economic battle — currently, mostly between China and the US. **To be clear: that strategy may not work.** Ongoing disputes about how to enforce Europe's digital rules and how best to promote European innovation onto the global stage abound. But the new line within the Berlaymont building is, above all, about one thing: Galvanizing tech and digital to reposition the EU on the global stage. Just a reminder that I'm offering discounted subscriptions to Digital Politics until Sept 30\. If you like what you read, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter005/#/portal/). If you want to chat, I'm on digitalpolitics@protonmail.com --- ## What I'm reading **— The White House announced voluntary commitments** from AI model developers and data providers aimed at reducing AI-generated image-based sexual abuse. More [here](https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2024/09/12/white-house-announces-new-private-sector-voluntary-commitments-to-combat-image-based-sexual-abuse/?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— Three children rights experts weigh in on why banning** smartphones from minors may not be the panacea that many hope it to be. [More via the London School of Economics](https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/does-the-evidence-support-a-school-ban-on-smartphones/?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— Stanford University's Internet Observatory** details a covert Russian influence operation, known as African Stream, that targeted people across Africa and the US. More [here](https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/african-stream?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fshared). **— Meta and a number of leading European tech firms** wrote an open letter to local policymakers about why the bloc should not be so aggressive in its effort to regulate AI. [Read it here](https://euneedsai.com/?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). **— Digital ministers from the G20 countries met in Brazil**. Here's the [readout](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g20-ministerial-declaration-maceio-13-september-2024/g20-ministerial-declaration-13-september-2024?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Freader) of what they agreed to. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Enjoyed what you just read? I'm offering discounted subscriptions between now and Sept 30. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. ### The lopsided (digital) US election URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter005/ Last updated: 2024-09-23T08:26:44.000Z **WELCOME TO A BONUS EDITION OF DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and sometimes, I still miss my life as a journalist — especially when [this type of story](https://x.com/icod/status/1836141009459118501?ref=digitalpolitics.co) is just born to be written. **Let's get started:** **— With just under seven weeks to go before** November's election in the United States, something strange is afoot in how both the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates are spending on digital ads. **— I wanted to unpick what is actually happening** — and why we may be seeing a significant shift in the importance of paid-for messages on Meta's platforms and those owned by Google. **— All the data below comes from WhoTargetsMe**, a nonprofit organization that has the best independent data tools for analzying Meta and Google political ads. Check them out [here](https://trends.whotargets.me/countries/US/explorations/ad-spending?report%5Fid=e9563e0e-9f5e-4834-99f3-6bf08503abfc&ref=digitalpolitics.co), and sign up to WhoTargetsMe's newsletter [here](https://fulldisclosure.whotargets.me/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). --- ## Harris is crushing Trump on digital ads. But does it matter? **KAMALA HARRIS AND DONALD TRUMP** are in non-stop campaigning mode ahead of Nov. 5\. Ever since the US vice-president took over the Democratic Party nomination from **Joe Biden**, she [has out fundraised](https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2024/09/12/trump-vs-harris-fundraising-race-harris-reportedly-raises-47-million-in-24-hours-after-debate/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) her Republican Party rival in July, alone, $204.5 million to $47.5 million, respectively. Between Jan. 1, 2023 and July 31, 2024, the most recent data available from the US Federal Election Commission, the Biden-then-Harris ticket has pocketed $516.8 million compared to Trump's $268.5 million cash pile. **Harris has been quick to take advantage.** Yes, not all campaigning is done via social media. But if we look over the last three-months across Meta and Google, the Democratic candidate has outspent her opponent by a factor of 12, on Facebook and Instagram combined, and by a factor of two, on Google's services. **In short, if November's election came down to pure** political ad-buys, then Harris would be walking the 2024 campaign. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/09/Three-months-totals-.jpg) Source: WhoTargetsMe; Meta --- ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/09/Three-month-totals--Google--1.jpg) Source: WhoTargetsMe; Google Thanks for reading Digital Politics. As a reminder, the first month of this newsletter will be free. If you like what you read, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter004/#/portal/) — I'm offering a discounted subscription between now and Sept 30\. Happy reading! --- **Even when WhoTargetsMe extended its analysis** to include Republican and Democratic Party-affiliated groups, left-leaning efforts still far outmatched those on the right of politics. The nonprofit manually defined where individual Meta and Google ad buyers sat on the political spectrum, so take the below figures with a (slight) pinch of salt. **But, on average, Democratic Party-linked** and progressive groups are miles ahead in flooding social media with paid-for messages versus their Republican-affiliated counterparts. **It's not even close.** --- ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/09/Three-month-totals--overall-groups--Meta--1.jpg) ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/09/Three-monht-totals--overall-groups--Google-.jpg) Source: WhoTargetsMe; Google; Meta --- **When we drill down on the top 10 ad buyers** — this time, over the last 30 days, to take into account last week's debate and a final push ahead of Nov. 5 — the trend continues. **Part of this is down to Democrats just having more money** to spend than Republicans. But when you look at how the Trump and Harris campaigns are spending their cash, their different strategies are stark. **Based on my analysis of Meta's separate library of political ads**, [Trump](https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active%5Fstatus=active&ad%5Ftype=political%5Fand%5Fissue%5Fads&country=ALL&media%5Ftype=all&search%5Ftype=page&start%5Fdate[min]=2024-08-16&start%5Fdate[max]=2024-09-15&view%5Fall%5Fpage%5Fid=153080620724) is primarily targeting national fundraising efforts, with little direct targeting of crucial swing states. His ads solely focused on Pennsylvania, for instance, represent just 0.1 percent of the total for the last seven days (through Sept 14, the latest data available.) **Significantly more money was allocated to** drumming up crowds for [his rallies](https://www.donaldjtrump.com/events?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in Uniondale, New York and Wilmington, North Carolina. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/09/Top-10--Meta-ads--one-month-.jpg) Source: WhoTargetsMe; Meta **Harris' campaign** [**has taken**](https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active%5Fstatus=active&ad%5Ftype=political%5Fand%5Fissue%5Fads&country=ALL&media%5Ftype=all&search%5Ftype=page&start%5Fdate[min]=2024-08-16&start%5Fdate[max]=2024-09-15&view%5Fall%5Fpage%5Fid=24413227922) **a more regional approach.** Yes, they are still earmarking about 50 percent of their Meta ad buys for nationwide fundraising and get-out-the-vote efforts. But between 4-6 percent of her paid-for political messaging is dedicated, individually, to key swing states like Michigan and Wisconsin. --- **The picture for political ads bought on Google** is a little more nuanced. Again, Harris and her affiliates are outpacing Trump and his allies. But it's a significantly closer battle than on Meta's platforms. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/09/Top-10--Google-ads--one-month--1.jpg) Source: WhoTargetsMe; Google --- **The geographical breakdown on where the campaigns** are targeting their Google ads also shows a primary — and not unsurprising — focus on swing states. Yet Harris is also using these digital messages to fundraise in well-populated safe blue states like California and New York, respectively. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/09/Google-ad-buys--1.jpg) Geographical breakdown for ads bought by Trump National Committee. Source: Google ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/09/Harris-ad-buys-Google-1.jpg) Geographical breakdown for ads bought by Harris Victory Fund. Source: Google --- **Conventional wisdom dictates, based on the above figures,** that Harris should be home dry. Whoever spends more on (digital) ads typically has a political advantage, though Trump's 2016 campaign showed that a better understanding of how to target swing voters, with less money, can equally prove successfully. **The thing is, the polls are still neck-and-neck.** Take a look [here](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/us/elections/polls-president.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [here](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/2024/national/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://www.270towin.com/2024-presidential-election-polls/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **There are many reasons for this** — and I'm not an expert in the everyday twist and turns of domestic US politics to unpick that. But Harris' overwhelming lead in digital ad buys has not translated, yet, into a significant dominance in the offline presidential race. That may still shift, either way, as the campaigns increase their spending in the final weeks of the campaign. **But it's an example of how the online campaigning world** is not what it once was. **Now, viral politically-minded (and non-paid) TikTok videos,** online endorsements from social media influencers and other forms of digital advertising (via the likes of streaming services) are muddying the water after years when political operatives turned almost exclusively to Meta and Google to get out their messages. **That does not diminish the need for politicians** to spend, and spend big, with these Big Tech giants. They still dominate the world of digital political advertising. But the 2024 US presidential election cycle highlights the disconnect between spending big on these online paid-for messages and potential success at the polls. **Something is shifting in people's digital habits.** My bet: we're all becoming less willing to stop and watch social media ads than we were four years ago. Whatever the answer, it's a trend that will likely continue well after November's US election. ## Sign up for Digital Politics Enjoyed what you just read? I'm offering discounted subscriptions between now and Sept 30. Subscribe Email sent! Check your inbox to complete your signup. No spam. Unsubscribe anytime. ### To regulate or to compete? URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter004/ Last updated: 2024-09-17T08:57:31.000Z **IT'S MONDAY AND THIS IS DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and as I enter the third week of my new job, I bring you [actual footage](https://www.instagram.com/reel/C%5Ff5iGdJIwg/?utm%5Fsource=ig%5Fweb%5Fcopy%5Flink) of me now that the work has kicked off for real. **Let's get started:** **— Europe is caught between doubling down** on regulation and embracing its inner-American to compete in the next global tech race. **— Yes, it's true. Gen Z'ers do get their news** from TikTok. But older generations aren't that far behind either. **— Google's latest antitrust lawsuit in the United States** comes down to two things: the past/future of advertising and publishers' lobbying power. --- ## **Send in the Man from Rome** **MARIO DRAGHI IS THE QUINTESSENTIAL** European technocrat. The 77-year-old, multilingual Italian served as his country's prime minister, the governor of the Bank of Italy and president of the European Central Bank. But he also worked at Goldman Sachs — the epitome of American capitalism. So it's no surprise, then, that Draghi's long-awaited report on improving the European Union's competitive edge ([chapter one](https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961%5Fen?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%20%5F%20A%20competitiveness%20strategy%20for%20Europe.pdf&utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves), [chapter two](https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/ec1409c1-d4b4-4882-8bdd-3519f86bbb92%5Fen?filename=The%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness%5F%20In-depth%20analysis%20and%20recommendations%5F0.pdf&ref=digitalpolitics.co)) wouldn't be out of place if authored by a Wall Street analyst. Yes, it was framed in eurocratic language of solidarity, equality and human rights. But its message was clear: Europe is failing to keep pace with global rivals like the US and China — and time is running out. **For the digital wonks among us, part of Draghi's pitch** for reform was squarely aimed at areas like artificial intelligence, telecommunications and quantum computing. "With the world on the cusp of an AI revolution, Europe cannot afford to remain stuck in the 'middle technologies and industries' of the previous century," the Italian quipped. "We must unlock our innovative potential." **To that, I couldn't agree more. Draghi took aim at the multitude of** digital rules and regulations — 100 tech-focused laws and over 270 regulators involved in digital enforcement, per his tally — and cried: 'enough is enough.' If Europe wants to stand alongside China and the US on tech, he argued, then the 27-country bloc needs to tap into pan-EU pots of capital; reinvigorate innovation, in part through state-funded research and development; and put a lid of the ongoing need to regulate that has set Brussels apart from Washington. **The Italian used the EU's privacy rules, known as the** [General Data Protection Regulation](https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), as an example of where things have gone wrong. Yes, protection of people's fundamental rights is non-negotiable. But the regulatory burden — let alone the [ongoing infighting](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter001/) between national data protection authorities over which agency gets to enforce — has fallen more heavily on small businesses. That [has allowed bigger firms](https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/25/how-silicon-valley-gamed-the-worlds-toughest-privacy-rules-1466148?ref=digitalpolitics.co), with greater in-house regulatory expertise and legal resources, to gain an advantage over smaller rivals — often placing European companies at a serious disadvantage. **For Draghi, this isn't just about the past.** He questioned how the same regulate-first approach to artificial intelligence (via the bloc's [Artificial Intelligence Act](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20230601STO93804/eu-ai-act-first-regulation-on-artificial-intelligence?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or AI Act); online content (via the [Digital Services Act](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or DSA); and digital competition (via the [Digital Markets Act](https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/index%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or DMA) would allow European firms to compete against international rivals that don't have similar domestic rules putting checks on their growth. Caveat: most global firms need the EU as a market, so almost all comply with the bloc's regulation. "Implementation must avoid producing administrative and compliance burdens and legal uncertainties as the GDPR (did)," Draghi warned about Europe's next generation of digital rulemaking. **Couple of points: Not everyone in Brussels** (and EU national capitals) agrees with Draghi's assessment. And it's still very much unclear if his pitch of paring back digital regulation will be anything more than a (very long) report on improving the bloc's competitive edge. The former Italian prime minister is not close to the current government in Rome — one that has been more eager to use state funds for growth and on whom **Ursula von der Leyen**, the upcoming European Commission president, [needs to keep happy](https://www.politico.eu/article/giorgia-meloni-ursula-von-der-leyen-italian-prime-minister-european-commission-law-report-politics/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) for inter-EU political reasons. Others also view Europe's litany of (not only) digital rules and see it as a differentiator for local firms — as well as a way to keep locals safe from harm. **But Draghi's key question —** does Brussels want to regulate or compete? — is one that will define the next five years of the next Commission's tenure. Officials are already struggling to enforce existing digital rules, all while European companies continue to lose out to international rivals on everything from AI to cloud services to quantum computing. Is that because Europe has too many rules? Possibly. But it's also because the bloc isn't (and I can't believe I have to say this) an actual country like the US and China is. The EU doesn't have a single market, really. Its financial markets are disjointed and inefficient. That's not regulation's fault. That's just how things work when you're corralling 27 countries to agree on a way forward. **Many outside of the EU, especially in the US**, eye the cavalcade of digital rules that have been passed (see above) with envy. 'If only we could do something similar,' they claim, 'then we would be onto something.' Another caveat: many also view the regulatory burden created by the DSA, DMA and AI Act and say: '*no grazie*.' It's ironic that just when Europe still believes (somewhat too proudly) it's the de facto Western leader on digital regulation that one of its most prominent economic minds believes it's time to throw out many of those rules in the name of global competitiveness. **That is one thing that EU officials still struggle to realize.** It's great you've created an ongoing conveyor belt of digital rulemaking. But if you want others to follow — and provide real social benefit to Europeans, themselves — then those laws also need to prove effective. How we define that 'effectiveness' is often in the eye of the beholder. But if Brussels fails to deliver results with its new generation of digital rules, two things will likely happen. 1) The bloc's long-term economic prospects will suffer; and 2) Other countries will start looking elsewhere for leadership. **One to watch:** The European Commission may unveil its new structure — and officials to run the different parts of the EU's executive branch — on Sept. 17\. It's still unclear how much detail we'll get due to a last-minute political tussle in Slovenia (don't ask.) Names to watch: [**Henna Virkkunen**](https://www.eppgroup.eu/who-we-are/our-members/henna-virkkunen?ref=digitalpolitics.co), a Finnish politician, may take over the digital files. **Thierry Breton**, the current French digital chief, [bowed out of a second term](https://x.com/ThierryBreton/status/1835565206639972734?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in Brussels after von der Leyen asked Paris to nominate someone else. Thanks for reading Digital Politics. As a reminder, the first month of this newsletter will be free. If you like what you read, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter003/#/portal/) — I'm offering a discounted subscription between now and Sept 30\. Happy reading! --- ## Chart of the Week Americans of different generations were asked how often they used TikTok, the China-linked social network, to learn about news and information related to political and social issues. **One to watch:** The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit will weigh arguments on Sept. 16 from both TikTok and the US government over the legality of federal legislation that will either see the social media giant sold or banned by Jan. 19, 2025\. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/09/Untitled-2-1.jpg) Source: [https://issuu.com/webershandwick/docs/twsc-pulse-on-tiktok](https://issuu.com/webershandwick/docs/twsc-pulse-on-tiktok?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## What's Really Driving the Google Advertising Antitrust Battle **I GET IT. IT'S HARD TO GET EXCITED ABOUT** the murky world of digital advertising. But, like it or not, this multi-billion dollar industry powers much of the internet. And the beginning, last week, of the [lawsuit](https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1566706/dl?ref=digitalpolitics.co) brought by the US Department of Justice and several US states against Google's alleged abuse of its dominant position in online ads is a prime example of enforcers trying to wrangle the complexities of a Big Tech giant's (incredibly lucrative) business model. **"One industry behemoth, Google, has corrupted legitimate** competition in the ad tech industry by engaging in a systematic campaign to seize control of the wide swath of high-tech tools used by publishers, advertisers, and brokers, to facilitate digital advertising," the Department of Justice wrote in its submission. Google, not surprisingly, disagrees. For the search giant, its practices didn't skew the market, and it faces tough competition from the likes of Disney and TikTok. "We are going to show the court we are one big company among many others," **Karen Dunn**, Google's lawyer (who also helped to prepare **Kamala Harris** ahead of last week's debate with **Donald Trump**) told the court. **If you want to get lost in the every turn of last week's trial,** here are the best blow-by-blow accounts: [The Verge](https://www.theverge.com/24237832/google-monopoly-trial-ad-tech-antitrust-us-search?ref=digitalpolitics.co); [Digiday](https://digiday.com/marketing/decoding-the-jargon-behind-googles-antitrust-ad-tech-trial-a-glossary-for-the-confused/?ref=digitalpolitics.co); and [The Conversation](https://theconversation.com/google-is-facing-another-crucial-court-case-in-the-us-and-it-could-have-major-consequences-for-online-advertising-238227?ref=digitalpolitics.co). ICYMI, Washington also isn't the only enforcer to target Google's dominant advertising business whose annual revenue (at least for the part under scrutiny in the US case) generated more than $31 billion in 2023\. The European Commission [filed separate charges](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F23%5F3207?ref=digitalpolitics.co) against the tech giant about its alleged abusive position in the ad tech market last year. The United Kingdom's competition authority [also dropped](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-objects-to-googles-ad-tech-practices-in-bid-to-help-uk-advertisers-and-publishers?ref=digitalpolitics.co) its own charges, also related to Google's advertising business, last week. In both jurisdictions, the company denies wrongdoing. **At first glance, the details of the case don't look good for Google.** US authorities have a long-listed of former Google executives — and an even longer list of officials from competitors — outlining how the tech giant used its dominant position, on both sides of the buying/selling side of the online advertising industry, to nudge customers toward its own services. Internal emails, too, show that some Google executives were eager to use every weapon available to beat rivals. “I really believe that if we can execute on this stuff, we’ll be able to crush the other networks," wrote **David Rosenblatt**, then the chief executive of DoubleClick, which had recently been bought by Google for $3.1 billion. **Yet for Google, this is old news.** And, to a degree, it's right. The US lawsuit focuses primarily on old-school so-called display and banner ads, or the paid-for messages that you see when scrolling through media outlet's websites. In an era when almost no one reads newspapers and everything has shifted to social media, the idea of litigating who owns those types of ads feels very much yesterday's news. In social media advertising — let alone other forms of advertising like on streaming services — Google does have tougher competition from the likes of Meta and Amazon. How can the search giant be abusing its dominant position in this new era of advertising, goes the theory? If it was an unfair monopoly, wouldn't it have snuffed out that competition, too? **It's a good theory. But one that doesn't take away from the fact** that traditional digital advertising is still worth tens of billions of dollars each year. And if Google — or any other company, for that matter — abused its dominance to tilt the scales unfairly toward its services over rivals, then such historic illegality should face the full force of the law. If Google's argument is that the industry has moved on, and whatever may have happened is water under the bridge, then that's not how countries' competition laws actually work. (I say, as a non-lawyer.) **Part of this is Google's efforts to focus on legal areas —** like its growing competition in social media advertising — where it feels it is on more solid legal ground. It also takes away from the inevitable murkiness of the ad tech world where concepts like 'ad exchanges,' 'demand-side platforms,' and 'open auction transactions' make even the wonkiest of digital policy geeks turn away in boredom. **But the main question that Google needs to contend with** is how it ensured it wasn't taking too much of the revenue from digital advertising — at a time when it pretty much owned both sides of the buy/sell relationship. That allowed the search giant to pocket roughly 30 percent of every dollar that flowed to publishers' websites. Is that good value? Why couldn't smaller rivals find a way to break into that market, even when offering to take a smaller percentage? Did Google lock in customers with labyrinthine technology that made it next to impossible to leave? These are the crucial points as the judge weighs up the merits of the Department of Justice's case **What the lawsuit also showed — and this is coming from an ex-journalist —** is how powerful the role of publishers (many of which are likely witnesses against Google) has been. That goes for both this current US case and the years of anti-Google lobbying that has pushed almost all Western antitrust enforcers to take a hard look at the tech giant's advertising business. Many of these media outlets, in both the US, Europe and elsewhere, saw drastic reductions of advertising revenue when Google used technology to entice companies to shift their marketing dollars. There was an assumption, by many publishers, that this was unfair. In reality, it was inevitable because a sharper rival offered advertisers a better way to reach would-be customers. **Many of these outlets, too, also had their own digital advertising** offerings that just weren't as good as those offered by Google. In response, many have turned to lobbying against the tech giant, often directly at national leaders, to get countries to act. It's not something that gets much, if any, coverage in the media — mostly because it requires publishers to willingly delve into some of their own lobbying tactics. FWIW, I [wrote this in 2015](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/29/technology/european-publishers-play-lobbying-role-against-google.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and it remains one of the only efforts (that I can find) to call media companies out for what they are doing. **That doesn't mean publishers don't have a point** (see the entire section above.) But it's worth remembering, as you read about the US antitrust case in media outlets that often have skin in the game — but, rarely, acknowledge it. **One to watch:** The European Commission [won a surprise last-minute victory](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech%5F24%5F4624?ref=digitalpolitics.co) against Apple in a long-running state-aid case that focused on tax breaks the iPhone maker received in Ireland. Did I get something wrong? Do you have upcoming research or news that I should know about? You can email me at digitalpolitics (at) protonmail (dot) com. As always, you can sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter003/#/portal/). ## What I'm Reading **— Domestic institutions, and relations between** national governments and private industry in the EU, US and China are central to understanding how these three powers will shape the future 'global tech war,' [argue](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract%5Fid=4954744&ref=digitalpolitics.co) Anu Bradford, Eileen Li and Matthew X Waxman for the Harvard National Security Journal. **— Meta will soon restart using public content** posted on Facebook and Instagram in the UK to train its AI systems after pausing those efforts when local privacy enforcers questioned the legality of such data collection. More [here](https://about.fb.com/news/2024/09/building-ai-technology-for-the-uk-in-a-responsible-and-transparent-way/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— The recent efforts by US law enforcement to combat** covert Russian disinformation campaigns that targeted local voters highlights the limited powers American agencies have in combating the ongoing threat, [claims](https://www.techpolicy.press/russian-indictments-highlight-us-limitations-in-fighting-disinformation/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) Dean Jackson in Tech Policy Press. **— If you want a one-stop guide to all of Europe's** digital rules, Bruegel has updated their (very complicated) chart. Be warned: [it's a doozy](https://www.bruegel.org/system/files/2024-06/Bruegel%5Ffactsheet%5F2024%5F0.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **— Shout-out to my colleagues, who put together** an [exhaustive analysis](https://dfrlab.org/2024/09/04/mythical-beasts-and-where-to-find-them-report/?ref=digitalpolitics.co#executive-summary) on the global web of spyware companies that have relationships with companies, investors and individuals spread across multiple jurisdictions. ### The AI election global boomerang URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter003/ Last updated: 2024-09-09T11:00:42.000Z **WELCOME BACK TO DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm [Mark Scott](https://www.linkedin.com/in/markscott82/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and I am an unashamed coffee snob. So, as we shift from summer to the fall, I've already heard the four words that I dread this time of year: [pumpkin spice latte season](https://www.starbucks.com/menu/product/418/hot?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **Some logistics from me.** I'm going to be in Brussels Sept. 19-20, then again on Oct. 8-9\. Followed by Washington (most likely the second half of November), and Berlin on Nov. 20-21\. If you're around and want to meet, ping me [here](mailto:digitalpolitics@protonmail.com) or [here](mailto:mscott@atlanticcouncil.org). **Let's get started.** --- ## Global Majority, AI and Elections **A JAILED POLITICIAN RUNS TO BECOME HIS** country's next leader via AI-generated election rallies and speeches. A deceased lawmaker urges voters to support his son in another country's election through videos created with artificial intelligence tools. An alleged war criminal rebrands himself as a cuddly cartoon — powered by images created with AI services — on his way to successfully winning his country's presidency. These are all clear examples of how artificial intelligence played a significant role in recent elections in [Pakistan](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/11/world/asia/imran-khan-artificial-intelligence-pakistan.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co), [India](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2024/2/12/how-ai-is-used-to-resurrect-dead-indian-politicians-as-elections-loom?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [Indonesia](https://www.reuters.com/technology/generative-ai-faces-major-test-indonesia-holds-largest-election-since-boom-2024-02-08/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), respectively. **At a time when the** [**over-hyped threat**](https://www.politico.eu/politico-editorial-series-bots-and-ballots-artificial-intelligence-reshape-election-2024/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) of AI undermining this year's megacycle of elections worldwide is (hopefully) subsiding, it's time to drill down on how this emerging technology is affecting political campaigns globally. For me, one thing is clear: the real innovation when it comes to AI and politics is happening in the so-called Global Majority countries — and not in places like France, the United Kingdom and, in November, the United States. **Sure, we have seen sporadic — and** [**well-publicized**](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digital-bridge/finally-someone-used-gen-ai-in-a-western-election/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — efforts to use ChatGPT and its rivals to woo voters in these developed countries. We've even seen efforts to skew elections via so-called deepfake videos and audio clips, most starkly in [Slovakia's parliamentary elections](https://fakty.afp.com/doc.afp.com.33WY9LF?ref=digitalpolitics.co) late last year. But let's be honest. Many of these efforts have been quickly debunked. Political campaigners also tell me that even the more wonky AI use cases (involving analyses of voter databases via bespoke large language models) are still about two years away from being any good. In short: so far, AI has not been a factor. **Yet that hasn't stopped election after election** from Southeast Asia to South America from showing clear signs that AI tools can play a significant — mostly public — role in political campaigning. First, a disclaimer: I'm not an expert in the domestic political situation of any of these countries. But from discussions with scores of digital rights campaigners, election officials and some politicians, what has become clear is that many campaigns in Global Majority countries have basically skipped one, if not two, generations of political technology to become a true hotbed for AI innovation. **To use a bad metaphor — it's similar** to how these countries equally jumped over desktop computing to go from so-called '[dumb phones](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dumbphone?ref=digitalpolitics.co#:~:text=plural%20dumbphones,browser%29%20typically%20found%20on%20smartphones)' to high-speed internet-enabled smartphones, all within a few years. It's a breakneck transition that has left many heads swirling. Next up: expect many of these AI tactics to boomerang back into the West. **"I think there is a lot of concern because it's uncharted terrain,"** [Janet Love](https://www.elections.org.za/pw/About-Us/Who-We-Are/Commissioners/Vice-Chairperson?ref=digitalpolitics.co), vice-chairperson of South Africa's Election Commission told me when I asked her about her agency's approach to quelling AI-powered online disinformation. Thankfully, that country's recent election, in May, didn't see much of that nastiness (although there was a fair share of [online falsehoods and gender-focused abuse](https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Online-Gendered-Abuse-and-Disinformation-During-the-2024-South-African-Elections.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co).) Still, Love, the official, knows we're just at the start of this trend, not at the end of it. "All of us are feeling a huge need for greater capacity and expertise," she added. **The cost of AI tools certainly played a factor.** If you can subscribe to many of these services for less than $30 a month, then it's a no-brainer to use them if you're in need of reams of politically-motivated images, videos and audio to blast at would-be supporters online. And while many of the Big Tech firms behind these tools [have made public statements](https://www.aielectionsaccord.com/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) about stopping harmful uses of their technology, (voluntary) oversight of those pledges is patchy, at best. **Without seeking to diminish the importance of** Global Majority countries, these markets are often too small and too obscure to get the necessary attention required to stop AI harm from happening. It's one thing for **Kamala Harris**' campaign to use AI tools to woo voters — something that would garner global attention. It's something else when it's, say, Moldova, which holds a presidential election and referendum on joining the European Union in late October. **For** [**Nighat Dad**](https://www.linkedin.com/in/nighat-dad-3a937173/?originalSubdomain=pk&ref=digitalpolitics.co)**, executive director of Digital Rights Foundation**, a nonprofit organization in Pakistan, the main takeaway from how AI was used in that country's election in February was that it made clear how successful the technology could be in winning over supporters. "It had a huge impact," she told me. "It influenced people's minds." Now, she added, all political parties rely on artificial intelligence to create both public-facing messages and covert efforts to harm opponents. She has even seen it shift toward gender-based violence, with local female actors having their images used to create realistic deepfake pornography. **"An after-effect of generative AI in our elections** is that a lot of women in the public eye have become victims of deepfakes," said Dad. Still, in Pakistan, few are willing to talk about such dangers. "No one is talking about how (AI) will affects humans," she added. "They only want to focus on the opportunities." Thanks for reading Digital Politics. As a reminder, the first month of this newsletter will be free. If you like what you read, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter001/#/portal/) — I'm offering a discounted subscription between now and Sept 30\. Happy reading! --- ## Chart of the Week People worldwide were asked whether social media represented a positive or negative force for democracy in their countries. Those in Global Majority countries, on average, had a more optimistic view of social media, while those aged at least 40-years-old, globally, held a more pessimistic outlook on the technology. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/09/Digital-Politics-3.jpg) Source: Pew Research Center [https://shorturl.at/K3C44](https://shorturl.at/SzdtP?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## How to Really Combat Disinformation **IT'S NOT EVERY DAY THAT LAWS ABOUT** money laundering and trademark infringement are used to take down a widespread Russian influence operation. But, when US attorney General **Merrick Garland** took to the stage last week, that's [exactly what happened](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-disrupts-covert-russian-government-sponsored-foreign-malign-influence?ref=digitalpolitics.co). In one fell swoop, the US government seized 32 websites that had pretended to be the likes of Washington Post and Fox News to peddle Moscow's disinformation and propaganda to unknowing Americans. **In conjunction, the US Treasury Department also** [**sanctioned**](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2559?ref=digitalpolitics.co) senior Russia officials – including **Margarita Simonyan**, the head of state-backed media outlet RT — for their role in the deception. It's not the first time Washington has taken such steps. But the designation is aimed at making it more difficult for those individuals to participate in the global world order (it's arguable if these efforts have teeth.) **This marks the latest chapter in the so-called 'Doppelganger'** campaign that [dates back to at least 2022](https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-influence-ukraine-fake-news/?ref=digitalpolitics.co). It involves Russian-linked groups using such fake versions of mainstream news outlets to dupe online users from the UK and Germany to France and, now, the US. In this [latest episode](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-rt-employees-indicted-covertly-funding-and-directing-us-company-published-thousands?ref=digitalpolitics.co), two Russian citizens were also indicted for funneling $10 million into a Tennessee-based company that created scores of pro-Russia social media content — without disclosing Moscow's involvement. Since November, 2023, this clandestine campaign posted almost 2,000 videos that received roughly 16 million views on YouTube, according to the US government. The company also peddled Kremlin propaganda on TikTok, X and Instagram, respectively. For a deeper dive, my colleagues [have you covered](https://dfrlab.org/2024/09/06/how-doppelganger-and-other-russia-linked-operations-target-us-elections/?utm%5Fsource=pocket%5Fsaves). **There's a lot to unpack here. But Washington's sting** is not the only game in town. Earlier this year, the EU [also took action](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F24%5F2373?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to quell this Russia influence operation. But instead of using decades-old trademark legislation, the 27-country bloc turned to its new social media rules, known as the [**Digital Services Act**](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act-package?ref=digitalpolitics.co). It also didn't go directly after those peddling such covert campaigns, including scores of fake websites that pretended to be top-tier European media outlets like Der Spiegel and Le Monde. In Europe, the investigation's target was Meta, which may have infringed the Continent's digital rules by allowing Russian operatives to use its platforms to spread disinformation and deceptive advertising. **It feels odd that when confronted with a known influence operation**, Europe went after the amplifier (Meta) and not the creator (Russia.) But the one-two punch between Washington and Brussels offers a stark example of how both sides of the Atlantic approach the influence threat. **In the US, law enforcement shut down websites,** sanctioned individuals and indicted culprits. It was a one-off hit against what is likely a larger operation, with officials using the powers on hand to whack one mole (out of many.) In Europe, the focus was more systemic, forgoing dawn raids on Russian spooks to pinpoint how the Kremlin's propaganda reached social media users. Meta contends (rightly) these efforts barely resonated with everyday people. But for EU enforcers, the question is about the tech giant's role in how such disinformation was spread, not about why these fake websites were able to spring up in the first place. **There are a lot of reasons why Europe took this approach.** For one, not every EU country views Russia as a threat, so coordinating between national law enforcement agencies can be tricky. Brussels [already directly sanctioned](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/eu-imposes-sanctions-on-state-owned-outlets-rtrussia-today-and-sputnik-s-broadcasting-in-the-eu/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) Kremlin-backed media outlets like **RT** and **Sputnik**. But the bloc doesn't have the collective (investigatory) resources available to the US Department of Justice and Treasury Department to hit Moscow's agents where it hurts. EU law enforcement agencies arguably don't have the same global reach as their American counterparts. **I try to be balanced between how Washington and Brussels** approach such issues. But it's hard not to view US authorities' recent actions and believe that, in the short-term, their all-guns-blazing approach — based on decades-old legislation — is a better tactic to fight Russian online interference than what European officials are trying to do. **In days, Kremlin-backed fake websites were shut down;** people were indicted; and leading Russian officials were put on sanction lists. In Europe, despite the months-long investigation into Meta, 'Doppelganger' sites are still active, and their messages are still spread on social media (mostly on X, formerly Twitter.) No one has yet to be criminally indicted. **For me, the differing takes on Doppelganger** illustrate how Brussels and Washington could work together on combating these influence operations. US authorities have the power to take immediate action on the underlying threat, while EU officials can take a more long-term systemic approach to quelling how such disinformation is spread online. **That would involve hard-nosed American law** enforcement agencies working with as-yet untested European social media enforcers — both coming from different legal traditions. But, such a joined-up strategy could be more effective than working alone. --- I'm still playing around with the format of this newsletter, so please bear with me. If you want to sign up, click [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter002/#/portal/). I'm also thinking about setting up a WhatsApp community group if that would be useful to you. You can email me at digitalpolitics (at) protonmail (dot) com. ### The year ahead: what I'm watching (part two) URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter002/ Last updated: 2024-09-03T11:00:38.000Z **DIGITAL POLITICS IS LIKE A CITY BUS**. You wait around for ages, and then two come along at once. I'm Mark Scott, and this is a bonus (inaugural) edition of the newsletter. You can find part one [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter001/). **I am nothing but fair and impartial** in my analysis. And that also goes for the memes that I include at the top of each newsletter. On Monday, I grumbled about overly-expensive Oasis tickets. So it only seemed fair to [give you some Blur](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WDswiT87oo8&ref=digitalpolitics.co) on Tuesday. **Ok, enough with the 1990's British music references.** Here's what is on my radar for the rest of 2024. **Let's get started.** --- ## Competition **PERSONAL DISCLAIMER:** [**I AM NOT A FAN OF BREXIT**](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/why-im-choosing-to-become-an-irish-citizen.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**.** But one thing the UK's departure from the European Union has done is to give London a chance to tread a different regulatory path, including on tech. **That's why the country's** [Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act](https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3453?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or DMCC, is an interesting test case for what can happen when you blend European-style digital regulation with an Anglo-Saxon pinch of pragmatism. **The legislation, passed in the final days of the last** British government in May, gives the country's competition regulator new powers to quell potential digital anticompetitive behavior before it harms consumers. But unlike what Brussels is doing (more on that below), London gives its enforcers greater leeway to police Big Tech giants. **That means the UK's Competition and Markets Authority** will soon publish specific antitrust rules for companies with so-called '[**Strategic Market Status**](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/digital-markets-competition-and-consumers-bill-supporting-documentation/a-new-pro-competition-regime-for-digital-markets-policy-summary-briefing?ref=digitalpolitics.co).' The goal is to set clear definitions for what is, and is not, acceptable for firms, as they expand into new markets or gobble up smaller rivals. **In essence, British officials will be allowed to decide what** constitutes potential anticompetitive behavior for, say, Google in markedly different ways than they will do so for Amazon. Such a bespoke approach would be illegal if attempted in the US. But this one-size-fits-no-one regulation is clearly different from how the EU approaches its comprehensive digital enforcement via the [**Digital Markets Act**](https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/index%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**.** **That neatly takes us, again, across the English channel** where Brussels has [swiftly opened investigations](https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-opens-non-compliance-investigations-against-alphabet-apple-and-meta-under-digital-markets-2024-03-25%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co) into the likes of Meta, Alphabet and Apple over how they are complying with its new digital antitrust rulebook.Each company has gone about handling the probes in interesting ways, with Meta and Alphabet more willing to play ball ([despite significant pain points](https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-sends-preliminary-findings-meta-over-its-pay-or-consent-model-breach-digital-markets-act-2024-07-01%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) compared to Apple. **Yet just like the bloc's new social media laws,** much still needs to be figured out beyond deciding which firms are so-called '[gatekeepers](https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/gatekeepers%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co).' Here's an example. Technically, the Digital Markets Act is supposed to allow for interoperability, or giving users the ability to send posts between, say, Apple's iMessage and Meta's WhatsApp. That has created massive security and privacy challenges that will not easily be overcome. **Another problem is the politics of enforcement.** Traditionally, the European Commission's competition unit, known as [**DG Comp**](https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/index%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co), has been viewed as the first among equals, jealously guarding its enforcement mandate. Yet under the new digital antitrust rules, the bloc's tech-focused unit, known as [**DG Connect**](https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/departments-and-executive-agencies/communications-networks-content-and-technology%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co), also has a say in how companies are policed. Publicly, officials say everyone is playing nice. But, behind the scenes, tensions are flaring up over which unit has the final say. **In the coming months, expect more high-profile investigations and,** potentially, new charges, though the initial probes aren't expected to be completed until the first quarter of next year. If I was a betting man, though, I would put good money on a final foray by outgoing European competition chief, [**Margrethe Vestager**](https://x.com/vestager?ref=digitalpolitics.co), before she hangs up her enforcement hat in late October. **What could that look like?** A potentially blockbuster fine (most likely against Apple) before the end of Vestager's decade-long tenure. **In the US, the series of Big Tech federal and** state lawsuits will continue at pace, including what remedies Google will be forced to swallow after a federal judge recently [ruled](https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/f6ab5c368725101c/43d7c2a0-full.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) the search giant had abused its dominant position. **Still, where my attention has shifted** to is the [eagerness of US authorities](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/07/ftc-doj-international-enforcers-issue-joint-statement-ai-competition-issues?ref=digitalpolitics.co) (and their [international counterparts](https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/alphabet-inc-google-llc-slash-anthropic-merger-inquiry?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) to find a way into the policy discussions around artificial intelligence. **Even before OpenAI released its ChatGPT service** to the world in late 2022, AI was already dominated by a small stable of Big Tech firms that held significant global market share in compute power, cloud storage and other basic infrastructure required to run the most advanced models. Add into that mix a series of high-profile so-called '[acqui-hires](https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2024/03/19/mustafa-suleyman-deepmind-and-inflection-co-founder-joins-microsoft-to-lead-copilot/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)' and [strategic investments](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/microsoft-and-mistral-ai-announce-new-partnership-to-accelerate-ai-innovation-and-introduce-mistral-large-first-on-azure/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and this emerging technology increasingly looks like a closed shop. **Still, I don't think it's going to be as easy** as competition enforcers think to get antitrust charges to stick against Big Tech firms on AI. **For one, companies like Microsoft have shrewdly** structured recent deals to avoid any form of exclusivity — a major red flag for competition authorities. For another, the current bottleneck in the likes of AI-focused semiconductors (<> [Nvidia](https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/28/investing/nvidia-earnings-stocks/index.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co) <>) will likely work itself out as buyers seek alternatives, including those built internally. Thanks for reading Digital Politics. As a reminder, the first month of this newsletter will be free. If you like what you read, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/#/portal/) — I'm offering a discounted subscription between now and Sept 30\. Happy reading! --- ## Chart of the Week 2.0 The academics mapped which countries were home to public GPU, or graphics processing units, cloud computing — a central component in creating AI systems. They then divided the world into 'Compute North' that developed AI models; 'Compute South' that aided local deployment of such models; and 'Compute Desert' that had no access to such infrastructure. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/08/Compute-Desert.jpg) Source: Lehdonvirta, Wú, Hawkins [https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/8yp7z](https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/8yp7z?ref=digitalpolitics.co) --- ## Geopolitics **IT'S BECOME A CLICHE TO SUGGEST** the online world is in open conflict with the offline world. But you just have to look at what [has happened to **Pavel Durov**](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckg2kz9kn93o?ref=digitalpolitics.co), Telegram's chief executive, in France and what Brazil [has done to X](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/aug/31/x-offline-brazil-elon-musk?ref=digitalpolitics.co), formerly Twitter, to get a good idea of where things are going. **After decades of a *laissez-faire* approach to the internet**, governments have finally woken up to the need for greater control. That, as a principle, isn't a bad idea. But where some see the need to impose democratic accountability on technology, others eye an opportunity to spread a more authoritarian worldview. **Into that quagmire, enter: the United Nations.** The recent UN [**Convention against Cybercrime**](https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/v24/055/06/pdf/v2405506.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co), which allowed China and Russia to promote efforts to silence dissenting voices online, is a clear example of where the international body potentially has done more harm than good. **No one denies that digital policymaking** should be more inclusive, especially to the needs of those in Global Majority countries. But by allowing all countries (some democracies, some not) an equal say about global internet governance, the UN is shifting into shaky political ground. **Case in point: the UN's** [**AI Advisory Board**](https://www.un.org/en/ai-advisory-body/about?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or group of well-meaning international experts, is being positioned as the first among equals when it comes to coordinating the international governance response to the emerging technology. For me, that would be a mistake as it allows more authoritarian regimes to potentially embed anti-democratic values into what is still a nascent policy area. **No one knows who's going to win the White House** in November. But one thing is for sure: the **EU-US Trade and Tech Council**, in its current format, is no more. (Alas, [no more trips](https://www.politico.eu/article/china-eu-us-trade-technology-council-summit/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to Luleå, Sweden.) That biannual meeting between European and US officials helped to rekindle the transatlantic tech and trade relationship after it had soured during Donald Trump's administration. But the question then becomes: what next? **Officials in both Washington and Brussels want to find ways** to work with each other, but — again — a lot will depend on who wins the US election. Given how both Republicans and Democrats view China, though, we'll at least see more (muted) coordination on potential export bans and other trade-related tech issues after **Ursula von der Leyen**, the returning European Commission president, [made her China hawk](https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-vows-to-stop-china-from-invading-taiwan/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) credentials crystal clear. **How US officials, from any political party, respond** to Europe's ongoing digital enforcement (most notably on content moderation, competition and artificial intelligence) will also shape the transatlantic relationship. **There's a misconception, domestically, that** American policymakers are out to get Big Tech. But, if you talk to non-US officials, you'll soon realize that parts of the federal government — when dealing with international counterparts — are very much wedded to promoting US business abroad. There's nothing wrong with that. It's just a reality. **On a more positive note,** the AI policymaking world will turn to France early next year when the country's president, **Emmanuel Macron,** hosts the so-called "[AI Action Summit](https://www.elysee.fr/en/ai-action-summit?ref=digitalpolitics.co)." It's the successor to AI Safety summits, held in the [UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/ai-safety-summit-2023?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [South Korea](https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/ai-seoul-summit-2024?ref=digitalpolitics.co), respectively, though the French are keen to use the global gathering to showcase a Gallic (business-friendly) twist on artificial intelligence. **With the 2024** [**global year of elections**](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digital-bridge/welcome-to-the-digital-election-thunderdome/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) **now three-quarters** over, policymakers must now figure out how much, if anything, did digital tricks and online interference affect voter outcomes. Let's leave aside the [over-hyped threat from AI](https://www.politico.eu/politico-editorial-series-bots-and-ballots-artificial-intelligence-reshape-election-2024/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to focus on global digital disinformation campaigns from China, Russia and Iran. **These authoritarian regimes continue to target** audiences, worldwide, though each prioritizes different aims. For Russia, it's all about Ukraine. For China, it's all about promoting the Chinese Communist Party. For Iran, it's all about attacking Israel and the US. The countries also approach audiences in developed countries significantly different than those from the Global Majority. **Yet for Western policymakers seeking insight** from this year of elections, one thing is clear: [the problem is domestic, not foreign](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/markscott82%5Fthe-russians-are-coming-the-russians-are-activity-7227603806195200000-ZoBH?utm%5Fsource=share&utm%5Fmedium=member%5Fdesktop). Authoritarian governments have minimal impact on actual voters compared to local (political) influencers, mostly because they lack the authenticity required to break through the sea of noise that is social media. **But that's not how many officials and politicians** [**see it**](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digital-bridge/the-russians-are-coming-the-russians-are-coming/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), and it has skewed the policy response to over-index on foreign threats instead of domestic harm. Again, this isn't about censoring online speech. But it's about recognizing the democratic threat from digital actors is overwhelming from within, not outside, a country's borders. --- Thank you for all the messages from this week's inaugural edition(s) of Digital Politics. I appreciate the feedback, especially about word length. Duly noted. If you want to sign up, click [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/#/portal/). You can also email me at digitalpolitics (at) protonmail (dot) com. ### The year ahead: what I'm watching (part one) URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/newsletter001/ Last updated: 2024-09-02T11:00:55.000Z **WELCOME TO DIGITAL POLITICS.** I'm Mark Scott, and this is how I spent my Saturday. I got up, had breakfast, and spent more than four hours waiting to buy Oasis tickets. And then, after all that, Ticketmaster's algorithm raised the prices through the roof. In honor of that, I [give you this](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bx1Bh8ZvH84&ref=digitalpolitics.co). **As I** [**start my new job**](https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7235292700529377280/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) **this week,** I've been thinking a lot about what's ahead for the rest of 2024 when it comes to digital policymaking. My mind works by theme, not country/region, so I've broken down what I'll be watching over the next four months. **Couple of caveats. This is an ever-changing list,** and one that skews more toward the developed world than so-called Global Majority countries. It's also not complete. If you think I've missed something, let me know at digitalpolitics (at) protonmail (dot) com. **Let's get started.** --- ## Social Media **THE EUROPEAN UNION'S POLITICAL MACHINERY** is starting to whir back into gear after the summer break, and the bloc's content regulators are in for a busy period. The European Commission already [has](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP%5F24%5F926?ref=digitalpolitics.co) [enough](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip%5F24%5F2664?ref=digitalpolitics.co) [investigations](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP%5F24%5F1485?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [charges](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-sends-preliminary-findings-x-breach-digital-services-act?ref=digitalpolitics.co#:~:text=12%20July%202024-,Commission%20sends%20preliminary%20findings%20to%20X%20for%20breach%20of%20the,and%20data%20access%20for%20researchers.) linked to its [**Digital Services Act**](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act-package?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to keep the boffins working overtime until December. Add to that: [ongoing political efforts](https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-elon-musk-donald-trump-interview-thierry-breton-letter-social-media/?ref=digitalpolitics.co), by some, to push Europe's social media rules in specific directions ahead of **Ursula von der Leyen**, the incoming Commission president, doling out top assignments during her next 5-year tenure in the Berlaymont building. **Yet these glitzy public shows of strength** are not where the true action will take place. Much of the detail required for Europe's new rules (known, in the lingo, as [**Delegated Acts**](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/delegated-acts.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co#:~:text=Delegated%20acts%20are%20non%2Dlegislative,essential%20elements%20of%20the%20legislation.)) has yet to be published, and several of these acts are expected in the coming months. National EU regulators (again, in the parlance, referred to as [**Digital Services Coordinators**](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-dscs?ref=digitalpolitics.co)) also must hire scores of experts; devise how to work with each other on cross-border cases; and unpick the regulatory reality from what Brussels created with its untested Digital Services Act. **In short, there's a lot of detail still to be hammered out** at a time when von der Leyen wants to show Europe has its act together on digital. Add in ongoing foreign interference campaigns and potentially new charges against certain Big Tech firms (my bet: Meta), and Brussels' efforts to police social media will soon look like an effort to build the plane in mid-flight. **Jumping across the English channel,** and the United Kingdom equally has work to do on its own rules, know as the [**Online Safety Act**](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-act-explainer/online-safety-act-explainer?ref=digitalpolitics.co). London went a slightly different route than Brussels with its social media rules. But it is expected to publish so-called '[codes of practice](https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/illegal-and-harmful-content/codes-of-practice/?ref=digitalpolitics.co),' or specific guidance for how to comply with the new provisions, by the end of the year. **What's complicating this effort, though,** is a recent spate of [racist violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024%5FUnited%5FKingdom%5Friots?ref=digitalpolitics.co) — often spurred on via social media posts — that has renewed local politicians' desire to revamp the Online Safety Act, even before it has truly got underway. Let's be clear: social media did not instigate this summer's riots in Britain. But the country's regulator, Office of Communications, or Ofcom, is under mounting pressure to act. **Two countries worth tracking are Canada and Australia.** Ottawa may finally move ahead with its (long-troubled) [**Online Harms Act**](https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/online-harms.html?ref=digitalpolitics.co), while Canberra is currently reviewing that country's [**Online Safety Act**](https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/online-safety-act-2021-review-issues-paper-26-april-2024.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co). Nothing is certain. But any legislative movement, from these countries, would add to the pressure, within democratic countries, for greater checks on social media. **And that takes us, finally, to the United States.** For those who have followed my career, I [remain massively skeptical](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digital-bridge/washingtons-zombie-digital-rulemaking/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) Washington will do anything on digital policymaking, no matter who wins the White House in November. **Within the Beltway, social media and content** **moderation** have become culture war issues — something that has [left the US vulnerable](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/digital-bridge/the-us-is-walking-in-blind-into-november/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) to both foreign and domestic threats ahead of the upcoming nationwide vote. Don't expect Congress to act. Federal agencies like the [**Federal Election Commission**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal%5FElection%5FCommission?ref=digitalpolitics.co)have also dragged their feet to enforce existing rules on, say, online influencers who take money from political candidates to promote campaigns online. **As with almost all digital issues in the US**, my interest lies where actual laws are made: the courts (and, to a lesser degree, US state legislatures.) **Last week, for instance, a federal appeals court** [released an opinion](https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/22-3061/22-3061-2024-08-27.pdf?ts=1724792413&ref=digitalpolitics.co) that claimed TikTok could be legally liable for harmful content posted on its network because of how the company's [complex algorithm](https://www.politico.eu/article/anatomy-scroll-inside-tiktok-ai-powered-algorithm-israel-palestine-war/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) served up such material to users. That would potentially undermine a 30-year-old law, known colloquially as [**Section 230**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Section%5F230?ref=digitalpolitics.co), that gave these networks immunity from what others posted on their sites. **If the appeals court's view holds up** (and that's a big 'if'), then it may open the floodgates to lawsuits from social media users against Big Tech firms over accusations companies aided in inflicting harm on these individuals. Thanks for reading Digital Politics. As a reminder, the first month of this newsletter will be free. If you like what you read, please sign up [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/#/portal/) — I'm offering a discounted subscription between now and Sept 30\. Happy reading! --- ## Privacy **WE'RE STAYING IN WASHINGTON WHERE** all eyes (at least in the data protection world) are focused on whether the [**Kids Online Safety Act**](https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/1409/text?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or KOSA, will become law before the end of 2024\. That bill and another piece of legislation, known as [**Children and Teens' Online Privacy Protection Act**](https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/1418/text?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or COPPA 2.0, made it through the US Senate over the summer. **If you want to go deeper,** here are good overviews ([KOSA](https://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/kids%5Fonline%5Fsafety%5Fact%5F-%5Fone%5Fpager.pdf?ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [COPPA 2.0](https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2024/7/senate-overwhelmingly-passes-children-s-online-privacy-legislation?ref=digitalpolitics.co#:~:text=in%20the%20Senate.-,The%20Children%20and%20Teens'%20Online%20Privacy%20Protection%20Act%20%28COPPA%202.0,years%20old%20without%20their%20consent.)). The basic gist is that companies would be banned from targeting advertising at children and would not be able to collect minors' data without consent. Social media companies would also have a so-called 'duty of care' to under-18 year-olds using their services. An example: designing algorithms to avoid harmful content like material promoting eating disorders being shown to kids. It mirrors, to a degree, [similar requirements](https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/childrens-information/childrens-code-guidance-and-resources/age-appropriate-design-a-code-of-practice-for-online-services/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) already mandatory in the UK. **Time is running out on both privacy-centric bills**, especially as the US House of Representatives has not picked up the mantle on either proposals. It's very unlikely that either the Democrats or Republicans will win both the House and Senate in November, so any path forward is expected to include a mad-dash effort, possibly in the so-called [lame-duck session](https://rollcall.com/2023/11/17/tentative-senate-calendar-for-2024-available/?ref=digitalpolitics.co) after November's election. **My best guess: we won't see either bills become law** this year and Washington will again prove it remains second tier on any form of digital policymaking. **On the other side of the Atlantic, two battles are** underway within Europe when it comes to privacy, though they are linked. **For years, many have grumbled the bloc's** General Data Protection Regulation, or GDPR, has punched below its weight. They look at how the rules are enforced — in a system that gives Ireland and Luxembourg massive clout over Big Tech firms, mostly because these countries are where the companies are headquartered — and say Dublin and Luxembourg are just not doing enough. **I would possibly refer them to the multi-billion dollars** of [collective](https://www.edpb.europa.eu/news/news/2023/12-billion-euro-fine-facebook-result-edpb-binding-decision%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co) [fines](https://www.simmons-simmons.com/en/publications/ckrus16301do70a28ptvwqy5t/amazon-faces-record-gdpr-fine?ref=digitalpolitics.co) doled out by these two jurisdictions in recent years as a counterpoint. But it is true Europe's privacy revamp, now six years old, has not been the Big Tech slayer that many had hoped for. **Expect that battle (between those who want tougher** enforcement and those who prefer the status quo) to again surface when the new European Commission takes over in mid-November. A recent Commission [report](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14054-Report-on-the-General-Data-Protection-Regulation%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co) flagged issues with how GDPR had been enforced, and many privacy campaigners — let alone disgruntled national regulators — would like to overhaul the current enforcement system. **Their goal: to centralize cases into the likes** of Meta, TikTok and Amazon, so that Brussels, not Dublin or Luxembourg, run the show. Yet Commission officials acknowledge there is little appetite to enter yearslong negotiations to redo Europe's privacy laws, meaning this fight will be more bark than bite. **And that takes us to the second front:** the [European Data Protection Board](https://www.edpb.europa.eu/edpb%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co). This pan-EU group of national regulators has played host to bitter battles (if that's possible?) between domestic enforcers scrapping over who has the final say in enforcing the bloc's rules. That has been led by a number of campaigning agencies (looking at you, German data protection authorities) that don't think Ireland and Luxembourg are doing enough. **In Europe's labyrinthine privacy enforcement structure**, these two national capitals, technically, have final say over fines and remedies. But there's a (super complex) appeals process baked into the European Data Protection Board that gives that body's [secretariat](https://www.edpb.europa.eu/about-edpb/who-we-are/edpb-secretariat%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co) a lot of power to settle such disputes. In case after case, these officials have sided with a more aggressive approach to enforcing Europe's [privacy standards](https://www.edpb.europa.eu/news/news/2022/edpb-adopts-art-65-dispute-resolution-binding-decisions-regarding-facebook-instagram%5Fen?ref=digitalpolitics.co). **That doesn't mean it will be smooth saying.** Meta, for instance, is now suing the European Data Protection Board ([here](https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=273161&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3230858&ref=digitalpolitics.co) and [here](https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=273175&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3236984&ref=digitalpolitics.co)) over claims this pan-EU group overstepped its powers. It's unclear how successful the company will be. But the question remains: who gets the final say on enforcing arguably the Western world's most important data protection regime? --- ## Chart of the Week Freedom House, a nonprofit organization, ranked how countries approached digital issues related to domestic elections. The darker the red, the worse the ranking. ![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/df/80/df8046d2-bf27-4315-9b97-ced0ef736260/content/images/2024/09/Freedom-House.jpg) --- ## Artificial Intelligence **AND SO WE COME TO AI.** It's not the most important policy topic linked to this (overhyped) technology. But both the US and European Commission (on behalf of the EU) will sign the Council of Europe's [**Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence**](https://rm.coe.int/1680afae3c?ref=digitalpolitics.co) in Vilnius on Sept. 5\. **Many in civil society grumble the proposals** have been gelded (example: massive carve outs for national security and defense) to the point of making them useless. But the framework does represent the first legally-binding international treaty aimed at corralling harms associated with AI. It certainly will not be the last attempt. **In Europe, officials and companies are still scrambling** to figure out how the bloc's Artificial Intelligence Act is going to work. Add into the mix: a somewhat connected '[**AI Pact**](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-pact?ref=digitalpolitics.co),' or set of voluntary commitments that Brussels wants firms to sign up to before much of the AI Act actually comes into force over the next two years. **Companies have been asked to sign up by mid-September** ahead of a flashy ceremony planned for the end of the month. The non-binding pledges include: 1) put processes in place to ward against harm; 2) ensure humans oversee technology that will fall under the AI Act; and 3) include markers that let users know when they are shown AI-generated content. **The Commission's** [**AI Office**](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-office?ref=digitalpolitics.co)**,** or short-term effort to get ahead of the thorny AI enforcement questions, still needs to hire experts and find ways to work better with its international counterparts. European countries, too, need to figure out which (over-stretched) local regulators will be tasked with part of the AI Act's oversight. **In the US, much will depend on who wins the White House**, given how differently **Donald Trump** and **Kamala Harris** [have defined](https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2024/8/ai-after-the-election-potential-differences-between-a-harris-administration-and-a-second-trump-administration-for-artificial-intelligence-regulation?ref=digitalpolitics.co) their approaches on AI. [Legislative efforts](https://www.dlapiper.com/en/insights/publications/ai-outlook/2024/major-ai-legislation-advances-in-senate-key-points?ref=digitalpolitics.co) by some in the US Senate also must be taken with a pinch of salt, given Washington's meager digital legislative track record. **For me, the $64 million question instead relates** to the future ofthe so-called [**US AI Safety Institute**](https://www.nist.gov/aisi?ref=digitalpolitics.co), or agency within the US Department of Commerce [tasked with](https://www.csis.org/events/us-vision-ai-safety-conversation-elizabeth-kelly-director-us-ai-safety-institute?ref=digitalpolitics.co) promoting public safety and scientific rigor on questions about AI safety. The body was first announced at the UK's [AI Safety Summit](https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/ai-safety-summit-2023?ref=digitalpolitics.co) last year, and follows in the footsteps of a [British entity](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ai-safety-institute?ref=digitalpolitics.co), with the same name, whose remit equally involves overseeing the latest AI models. **But whereas the Brits gave their body** an initial budget of $130 (albeit one that will likely be slashed, due to that country's economic woes), its American counterpart is still struggling for money. Over the summer, the US Congress [earmarked $10 million](https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/newsroom/news-releases/technology-modernization-fund-announces-investments-in-nuclear-safety-and-ai-governance-07192024?ref=digitalpolitics.co) for the AI Safety Institute — a tiny fraction given how much is being spent on AI research, privately, across the US. **Despite the lack of funding, the agency's workload** is not slowing down. Last month, it [signed agreements](https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/us-ai-safety-institute-signs-agreements-regarding-ai-safety-research?ref=digitalpolitics.co) with both Anthropic and OpenAI to run tests on both companies' future AI models, before release, in the name of public safety. To do that properly, it's going to take well-paid and knowledgeable personnel to get under the hood of arguably some of the most complex large language models out there. **For those who believe AI represents an existential risk** to humanity (caveat: my take is that [this view is still overblown](https://www.politico.eu/article/ai-control-kamala-harris-nick-clegg-meta-big-tech-social-media/?ref=digitalpolitics.co)), then a cash-strapped institute that could soon be culled under a Trump 2.0 administration is just not a very good look. **How well the agency handles its first outings** with OpenAI and Anthropic, respectively, will be key indicators if such so-called co-regulatory oversight of complex AI systems — in the name of public safety — is a model fit for purpose. Stay tuned for the second half of my 2024 watchlist that will drop into your mailboxes on Sept 3\. My goal is to keep Digital Politics to a maximum of 2,000 word, hence the double newsletter this week to cover all topics. If you want to sign up, click [here](https://www.digitalpolitics.co/#/portal/). You can also email me at digitalpolitics (at) protonmail (dot) com. ### Welcome to Digital Politics URL: https://www.digitalpolitics.co/coming-soon/ Last updated: 2024-08-23T13:40:41.000Z Hi, welcome. Thanks for signing up (if you haven't done that already, you can do that [here](#/portal/).) I'll be publishing every Monday, and will focus on what I know best: how the worlds of politics and technology are colliding like never before. Expect a mixture of posts about social media, digital competition, online privacy and — what else — artificial intelligence. There'll probably be some geopolitics and a heavy dose of snark, too. As I embark on the next stage of my career as a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab's Democracy + Tech Initiative, focused on digital governance, my goal here will be to reflect on how policymakers, politicians, tech executives and civil society groups are grappling with many of the questions that will define society in the years to come. If that sounds like your cup of tea, let's get started. Stay tuned for Sept 2.